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ABSTRACT
“A NECESSARY SIN”: AN ETHNOGRAPHIC STUDY OF SEX SELECTION IN
WESTERN INDIA
Utpal Niranjan Sandesara
Adriana Petryna
Philippe Bourgois
This dissertation analyzes sex-selective abortion in western India as a lived process with
profound cultural, ethical, and demographic implications. Over the past three decades,
selective elimination of female fetuses has emerged as a disturbing form of family
planning across parts of Europe and Asia. In India, the practice remains widespread
despite extensive efforts to combat it, with drastically skewed girl-to-boy ratios resulting
in many locales. Drawing on eighteen months of ethnographic fieldwork with families
and clinicians practicing sex selection, as well as with government officials and activists
attempting to regulate it, this dissertation examines how prenatal sex determination marks
fetuses with gender and incorporates them into local systems of kinship, biomedicine, and
governance. Elucidating a kinship logic that renders daughters threatening and sons
indispensable, I follow prospective parents and clinicians as they imagine divergent
futures for children-to-be, navigate a clandestine black market, and employ specific
biomedical techniques to produce and act on gendered fetuses. In the process of sex
selection, fetuses become subject to complex ethical deliberations, familial struggles over
reproductive decision-making, herbal and religious modalities of son production, and a
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host of public interventions aimed at saving daughters-to-be. I argue that the diverse
actions around prenatal sex determination presuppose, shape, and intervene on a
“gendered fetal subject”—an imagined or potential person whose liminal status (between
human and non-human, between alive and un-alive) makes it a point of connection
among households, clinics, and governance institutions. Tracing the production,
transformation, and elimination of gendered fetal subjects reveals how kinship extends
prenatally, as well as how fetuses become incorporated into social life. Furthermore, as
suggested by prospective parents’ fraught reflections on the notion of a “necessary sin”
(profoundly unethical but nonetheless unavoidable), understanding gendered fetal
subjects provides an entry point for untangling the moral complexities of sex selection as
a liminal form of violence—a gendered violation at the very threshold of human social
existence.

viii

TABLE OF CONTENTS
ACKNOWLEDGMENT ........................................................................................................ III
ABSTRACT ................................................................................................................................ VI
TABLE OF CONTENTS...................................................................................................... VIII
LIST OF TABLES .................................................................................................................... XI
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS ............................................................................................... XII
A NOTE ON TRANSLATION, TRANSLITERATION, AND NAMING ............... XIII
INTRODUCTION...................................................................................................................... 1
Prologue: Asha-Ben and Jiten-bhai ........................................................................................................ 1
Situating the Problem ............................................................................................................................. 9
Studies of Sex Selection ......................................................................................................................... 12
Place and Person ................................................................................................................................... 25
Constructing the Field .......................................................................................................................... 35
The Gendered Fetal Subject ................................................................................................................. 39

CHAPTER 1: THE MARKET FOR SEX SELECTION ............................................... 56
“A Secret Thing” .................................................................................................................................. 56
The Rise of Sex Selection: From the 1980s to 2001 .............................................................................. 59
The Rise of Sex Selection Governance: From Antecedents to 2005 ..................................................... 66
An Evolving Market: 2005 to 2012 ....................................................................................................... 78
Chetna Clinic ........................................................................................................................................ 83
Requests, Deflections, Refusals, Referrals ............................................................................................ 95
Everyday Knowledge and the Sex Selection Landscape .................................................................... 102

ix
Vectors of Blame ................................................................................................................................. 107

CHAPTER 2: THE MORAL ECONOMY OF GENDER-KINSHIP ...................... 114
“A Necessary Sin” ............................................................................................................................... 114
Descent, Marriage, and Alienation ..................................................................................................... 120
A Modern Reproductive Regime ........................................................................................................ 128
Ambivalence, Uncertainty, and the Imposition of Gender ................................................................. 154

CHAPTER 3: THE CLINICAL PRACTICE OF SEX SELECTION ..................... 160
Seeing Inside the Black Box ................................................................................................................ 160
Learning to See Fetal Sex ................................................................................................................... 163
“1,000%”: Error and Uncertainty ..................................................................................................... 174
Sex-Selective Abortion and Risk......................................................................................................... 181
Late-Term Sex Tracking and Selective Perinatal Care...................................................................... 191
The Cutting Edge of Biomedical Sex Determination ......................................................................... 197

CHAPTER 4: FAMILY DECISION-MAKING AND WOMEN’S AGENCY....... 203
Situating Reproductive Decisions ....................................................................................................... 203
Contentious Decisions, Collective Decisions ....................................................................................... 209
Coercion: Preeti-ben ........................................................................................................................... 212
Pressure, Prohibition, and Coping: Pushpa-ben ................................................................................ 219
Shifting In-Laws, Shifting Agency ...................................................................................................... 223
Consensus, Divergence, and Women’s Reasons ................................................................................. 226
Constrained Agency, Impossible Choices: Kavita-ben, Again ........................................................... 235

CHAPTER 5: THE LOCAL ECOLOGY OF SON PRODUCTION ....................... 238
Struggling with Sonlessness ................................................................................................................ 238
Biomedical Techniques: Reproductive Exhaustion ............................................................................ 244

x
Herbal Techniques: Proactive Son Production .................................................................................. 251
Religious Techniques: Fate, Divine Will, and Bargains with God ..................................................... 260
Coda: “A Necessary Sin,” Again ........................................................................................................ 275

CHAPTER 6: ANTI-SEX SELECTION DISCOURSE............................................... 286
The Backward Family ........................................................................................................................ 288
The Imbalanced Population................................................................................................................ 296
The Threatened Daughter .................................................................................................................. 301

CONCLUSION ...................................................................................................................... 322
BIBLIOGRAPHY ................................................................................................................. 325

xi

LIST OF TABLES
Table 1 – Child Sex Ratio (0-6) of Indian States and Territories ..................................................... 51
Table 2 – Child Sex Ratio Comparison: Northern/Kadva versus Central/Leua ............................... 53
Table 3 – Caste Composition of Baroda State Northern Division, 1931......................................... 54
Table 4 – Sex Ratio of Births in Three Mahesana-Area Villages (Early-2000s Survey) ................ 159

xii

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS
Figure 1 – Vectors of Blame Around Sex Selection ...................................................................... 113
Figure 2 - Child Sex Ratio and Total Fertility Rate, 1981-2011 .................................................... 158
Figure 3 – Ultrasound Images of Fetal Genitalia, 12 Weeks ........................................................ 202
Figure 4 – “Can You Imagine a World Without Girls?” ................................................................ 313
Figure 5 – “Those Killing Girls in the Womb—Wake Up!” ........................................................... 314
Figure 6 – “A girl is an inalienable, necessary part of society” .................................................... 315
Figure 7 – “Isn’t innocent laughter on your doorstep dear to you?” .......................................... 316
Figure 8 – “These eyes full of feelings and the innocent face”.................................................... 317
Figure 9 – “A few dreams, a few hopes” ..................................................................................... 319
Figure 10 – Silhouette and Skeleton ............................................................................................ 320
Figure 11 – “What Is My Flaw?”................................................................................................... 321

xiii

A Note on Translation, Transliteration, and Naming
Throughout the text, most quotes are my own translations from Gujarati. While
striving for English comprehensibility, I have attempted to preserve some of Gujarati
speech’s distinctive flavor (e.g., the use of juxtaposition to imply “and” or “or”: “motherfather,” “five-six,” “boy-girl”). Conversations with doctors, government officials, and
other professionals sometimes involved a mix of Gujarati and English, with switches
between the two languages frequently occurring even within a single sentence; in such
instances, I have not attempted to mark linguistic specificity. Rare instances of Hindi
conversation are identified in the text.
Gujarati, Hindi, and Sanskrit words have been italicized wherever they appear in
the text. In the interest of balancing readability and disambiguation, I have avoided
diacritical marks save for the macron distinguishing “long” and “short” versions of ‘a’
(i.e., ‘ā’ versus ‘a’).
In naming persons, I have followed the same conventions of reference and
address I followed during fieldwork, suffixing kinship terms as a sign of respect:
generally -ben [sister] or –bhāi [brother, hereafter “–bhai”], and occasionally –māsi
[mother’s sister, hereafter “–masi”] or –kākā [father’s brother, hereafter “–kaka”], for
older figures with whom I bore relationships of closeness, affection, or deference. The
word sāheb [boss, hereafter “saheb”] was used ubiquitously to refer to or address doctors,
and I have preserved it in translation. For readability’s sake, I have used the construction
“Dr. [Name]” when referring to doctors in the text, even though this was rarely used in
everyday conversation (the more common constructions being “[Name]-saheb,”
“[Name]-bhai,” or “[Name] Doctor”). I have used pseudonyms for all persons and clinics,
except when referring to the deceased or to widely known facts about public figures.
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Introduction
Prologue: Asha-Ben and Jiten-bhai
We stood waiting under the full moon’s cool light. It was late. The highway was
deserted save for the occasionally passing truck and its attendant dust cloud.
Shivering under her sweater, Uma-masi looked pensive. When I asked her
thoughts, she smiled: “Just thinking it’ll be good if it’s a boy! That’s it—we want a good
report.”
Eventually, a car pulled up. A man and a woman sat up front, and another man
behind them. Uma-masi and I crammed into the back seat. She provided just enough
information to set the driver in the right direction.
Then, she asked, “How many girls do you have?”
“One girl, four years old,” the man next to us replied.
“Caesarean, or normal?”
“Normal, normal.” After a pause, the man continued, sounding concerned, “Why?
Does it make a difference?”
“No, it’s just—with a Caesarean, then...” Uma-masi’s voice trailed off, and she
stared out the window.
We stopped at a petrol pump. Under the bright lights, I could see the group better.
The woman—Asha-ben—had a slight build, with a narrow face, an aquiline nose, and
wire-rimmed glasses. She was wearing a salvaar-kameez, a tan cardigan, and a red
headscarf. The man from the back seat—her husband, Jiten-bhai—was tall, with a boyish
face, the faintest mustache, and a parted mop-top. He was wearing a rumpled blue blazer
over a T-shirt and baggy corduroy trousers. The driver was Asha-ben’s cousin.
Setting out again, the cousin drove slowly. He passed with caution and slowed to
a crawl at speed bumps. Jiten-bhai murmured approval: “Yes, keep it slow, eh?... Be
careful... We have to take care of this.”
I learned that the family belonged to a local Prajapati (traditional potter) subcaste. Jiten-bhai was a government engineer with an out-of-town posting. He and Ashaben had returned to Mahesana, where their parents lived, just for this trip. They had found
Uma-masi through the cousin’s neighbor, a surgical assistant in one of the city’s many
clinics.
For most of the trip, the cousin and Uma-masi discussed their mutual
acquaintance’s futile pursuit of a son—thwarted by “damn luck,” as his wife had now
undergone two sex-selective abortions at great cost. Toward the end, the cousin mused, “I
pray to God for him. But the universe doesn’t let anyone off. If you have karma from
prior births, you won’t get a result no matter what you do.” He added somberly, “And all
this—getting rid of pregnancies—isn’t that a sin, too?” Uma-masi grunted in
agreement—“Of course.”
As we approached the destination, Uma-masi’s phone rang. Picking up, she
murmured our location—“railway crossing”—and abruptly hung up.
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“Saheb must be restless!” Asha-ben ventured. “Since he’s sitting, waiting for this
work. Would any other doctor be at his clinic like this, in the middle of the night?
Wouldn’t everyone ask why? There’s a lot of risk in this work.”
Uma-masi nodded gravely. “There’s been a lot of checking lately.”
“Who earns without taking risk?” the cousin asked with a smile.
Uma-masi instructed the cousin to park in an alley near the clinic. “In the
daytime,” she explained, “it’d be a problem. Who’s checking now? Nothing to worry
about!”
The couple, Uma-masi, and I entered the clinic. Throwing open the consultory
door, Uma-masi marched in. We proceeded to the curtained-off examining area. Umamasi directed Asha-ben onto the table, draped her lower body with a piece of cloth, and
instructed her to expose her abdomen. Jiten-bhai stood directly across from the
ultrasound machine. I sat by his side, on a short cabinet in the corner.
The doctor entered. With perfunctory greetings, he settled onto a stool in the
center. Gripping the sonography machine’s transducer, he slung the cord around his neck
and began scanning Asha-ben’s belly.
A grayscale image oscillated on the screen before us. At the center, a whitebounded space—the uterus—and around it, a background that pulsated rhythmically with
Asha-ben’s heartbeats and breathing. The doctor pressed buttons to zoom in on the
fetus’s thighs and then altered the transducer’s position and angle to adjust the view.
Jiten-bhai and Uma-masi gazed raptly at the screen. Asha-ben stared up at the ceiling,
periodically closing her eyes and sighing.
After some minutes, the doctor shifted the image away from the fetal pelvis. He
measured the skull to estimate the gestational age: fourteen weeks. Returning to the
genital region and freezing the image, he reholstered the probe.
Asha-ben and Jiten-bhai looked at the doctor expectantly. Sighing, “He Rām,” he
mumbled the result under his breath, so that only Uma-masi and I caught it: “Looks
female.” The couple turned toward Uma-masi. She shook her head. Covering her belly,
Asha-ben swung her legs off the table and into to a sitting position. Uma-masi continued
to frown and shake her head.
Turning to Jiten-bhai, the doctor declared, “It’s a girl.”
“Really, Saheb?” the husband asked weakly. Asha-ben stared down at the ground.
Her jaw clenched.
The doctor continued speaking to Jiten-bhai. “Yes, definitely. No doubt. It’s a
girl.” He pointed to the screen and began tracing. “Look. This is the child. This is the
leg—thigh, knee, foot.” Indicating a black area, he said, “This is the space between the
thighs. Nothing’s visible there. If it were male, you’d see the scrotum here.” He pointed
to the thigh. “The scrotum would be this color. But it would be”—now back to the
black—“here. And you’d see a penis. You can see there’s nothing here. Just black—
blank space.”
Jiten-bhai stared at the screen. “Yes, space...” he repeated, almost as if testing the
idea out. Then, he scowled. “Certain?”
“Yes, yes. It’s empty, so definitely female. 110%.”
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Gesturing toward the outside, Uma-masi commanded, “Let’s go! Talk it over
outside. Decide what you want to do.”
Jiten-bhai shuffled out to the back corridor, and Asha-ben followed. Her cousin
joined them from the waiting room. All three took verbal turns affirming abortion as the
inevitable next step: “What else is left to think about?... No, it’s pretty much decided...
What else is there?... Since we don’t want to keep it, what else?”
Asha-ben crossed her arms, folding her torso into itself. Jiten-bhai’s head hung,
his eyes fixed on a floor tile.
Uma-masi emerged. They discussed abortion logistics. The cousin called the
mutual acquaintance in Mahesana. Taking the phone, Uma-masi loudly reiterated the
prices for scanning and selective abortion. After hanging up, she said with a scowl, “I
made it clear to him! 15,000 if it’s a boy, 20,000 if it’s a girl.” The cousin objected, but
she insisted.
Eventually, Jiten-bhai sighed and produced a stack of thousand-rupee notes.
Taking them, Uma-masi returned to the consultory. Outside, the family debated abortion
timing.
A moment later, Uma-masi summoned everyone in. Standing before the doctor’s
desk, she declared that they could return in the early morning—before eight o’clock—or
in the evening, after six. Asha-ben asked how long the abortion would take, and Umamasi reassured her—no more than two hours. Jiten-bhai nodded and bowed to the doctor.
We exited.
Walking to the car, Uma-masi emphasized the need to come at the prescribed
times: “Otherwise, there could be checking happening. And the officials who do all
this—their office is nearby. Got it?”
Then, in a hushed tone, she added, “The child is pretty big! It’s well-developed—
more like four months.”
Appearing worried, both Asha-ben and Jiten-bhai asked, “Really?”
Adopting a pedagogic tone, Uma-masi said, “The child’s heartbeats and
everything have started up. It’s pretty big!” After a pause, she smiled and said, “Keep it!”
But we had reached the car, and the suggestion disappeared into the night air as everyone
scattered to get into the vehicle.
As we rolled away, the cousin received a phone call. “Yes,” he shouted. “We’re
coming back now.” He stated our location.
Uma-masi hissed at him, elongating each word: “Don’t publicize it to everyone!”
We all flew upward as the car went over a bump at high speed. “Watch it!” Ashaben admonished sharply.
Raising one hand in a gesture of indifference, her cousin mumbled, “Well, now...”
His voice trailed off. For the remainder of the trip, he continued driving jerkily.
Jiten-bhai’s phone rang—his mother. “Yes, yes...” we heard him say wearily.
“Yes, that’s it... No, no. That... What else can we do? That’s it, right?”
After he hung up, Uma-masi shook her head and said, “I’m disappointed! I was
thinking, ‘God’ll definitely give them a boy.’” She offered advice for the next day: “Be
careful. Don’t say he’s an engineer, or where you live. I said he’s a teacher, with low pay.
Don’t say anything, or Saheb‘ll take more!”
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“But it’s already too much!” the cousin protested. “Weren’t you going to get the
price reduced?”
“I got this done cheaply for you!” Uma-masi bellowed. “People aren’t doing it for
less than 50,000!”
The cousin raised his voice in response: “People do it for 10,000!”
“Where? You inquire, find a place, and then tell me, ‘Masi, you got us too high a
price!’ You won’t find it.”
The cousin’s voice softened a bit. “This time, we paid up. We’ll have to go with
you again, right? Get us an adjustment then. Right now, it is what it is.” He continued in a
more contemplative tone, “This time, we have to do wrong anyway. I mean, in the end,
it’s a sin, right? Usually I don’t get involved in this work. I’ll only do wrong if it’s for my
relatives. Just this, and then one time my wife’s sister needed it—two years ago, she was
pregnant, and very worried. She said, ‘Find it for me, won’t you?’ I said no, but
eventually I found it in Mahesana, and we got it done. He charged 5,000.”
“Where’d you have it done?”
“Well, I don’t want to name names—“
“Dr. Navin?”
“No, not there. He does it, too. But this was with Dr. Harnish.”
“Oh, yes. Dr. Harnish used to look. He used to do abortions, too. But then he
stopped everything.”
“Right. This was two years ago. He said 5,000, and we paid 4,000.”
“Right. But he doesn’t do it anymore. Now our patients go to Dr. Navin, and he
doesn’t take less than 50,000. But his work is sloppy—a small machine, and he gets it
wrong. You can’t trust a man like that.”
Here, Uma-masi pivoted. “Did you have any form filled?” she asked.
Jiten-bhai replied, “They take signatures when they do sonography, right? But—“
“With all your information—mobile number, address, all that?!”
“They always take that, no?
Uma-masi scowled. “Well, you’ll have an inquiry after nine months!”
“Really?
“Yes, now they come for that. So say you had a miscarriage at home, at three
months. Did you hear what happened recently? A doctor got caught in a raid. An
Ahmedabad doctor was looking and sending patients to Gandhinagar for cancelling the
pregnancy. There’s intense checking going on right now!” Uma-masi seemed to be
implying that if there were string operations in nearby Gandhinagar and Ahmedabad—
Gujarat’s state capital and largest city, respectively—the heightened policing might soon
spread north to the smaller but infamous Mahesana District.
After a long silence, the cousin ventured a tentative inquiry: “Masi—Saheb’s
decision is sure, right? I’m just wondering if we should get it checked anywhere else—“
“1,000% sure! This doctor’s never wrong. Especially since I was there—I can tell,
too.”
We passed the remaining journey quietly, save for Asha-ben and Jiten-bhai asking
if I would return with them the next day—“for company.” I said I would, albeit strictly as
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a companion and researcher; I could not clinically or commercially facilitate, as Umamasi might. They readily agreed.
Upon reaching Mahesana, the cousin drove to Uma-masi’s neighborhood. When
we reached her house, she got out. Motioning for Jiten-bhai to lower the window, she
extended a hand: “You still have to give me mine!”
Jiten-bhai muttered an objection. Uma-masi persisted, now somewhat maternally:
“No, no, that’s not the way! After I got your work done?”
Jiten-bhai grudgingly pulled out a note. Squinting at it, Uma-masi asked
incredulously, “What is this?!”
“We already gave Saheb so much!” the cousin yelled. “Why don’t you get it from
him tomorrow?” I caught a glimpse of the money: 100 rupees.
Shaking her head vigorously, Uma-masi countered, “No, no, he won’t give! You
have to give me mine separately.”
In a tone both conciliatory and dismissive, the cousin retorted, “Well, we’ll have
to come to you again in the future, right?”
“No, no, that’s no good. After I wasted my entire night for you? Come on—give
me 500.”
Jiten-bhai frowned. “I don’t have 500.”
Uma-masi frowned back. “That won’t do.”
“But if I don’t have it, what do you want me to do?”
Uma-masi threatened to collect the money from their mutual acquaintance. The
cousin reiterated that they would need her services in the inevitable next pregnancy.
Shaking her head, Uma-masi turned brusquely and walked home.
After dropping Asha-ben at her parent’s house, the men drove me to my
apartment. As we rode, Jiten-bhai growled: “Honestly, Modi’s wrong in doing all this. It
should all be cleared away. People who really need it—people who already have one
daughter—should have the freedom to get it looked at. People are going to have it done
anyway.”
His cousin-in-law suggested, “The government should fix a place, decide a price,
and then give permission. All this secret activity wouldn’t be necessary anymore—that
much less headache. And especially for the poor class. Right now, those people can’t get
it done, and they don’t have education, so they pop out five-six girls hoping a boy. If this
were legal, it would protect the country’s ābādi [population, prosperity] too.”
“Ābādi is well and good,” Jiten-bhai said. “But what’s the sad state of the woman
who has to do five-six deliveries? We educated people understand. We say, ‘It’s a girl?
Okay, no problem.’” As if responding to the retort forming in my mind, he hastened to
add, “Whether or not we keep it, that’s a secondary issue! But the village public—no
education, no literacy—they have this mentality: ‘No, we have to have a boy.’ What
effect does that have on a woman? With this many deliveries, the body gets worn out,
weak, ruined.”
When we reached the apartment, Jiten-bhai took my number and said he would
call in the morning.
I typed fieldnotes late into the night. I felt overwhelmed, unsure of how to
understand my first observed “negative result,” as Uma-masi called it. Her off-hand
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suggestion—“Keep it!”—had gone unheeded. The mumbled “He Rām” and “female,”
the crestfallen faces, the blank stares and scowls, the grim decision, the reckless driving,
the inevitability of the abortion, the shared sense of a pregnancy wasted—through all
these, I understood, in a new way, the power of seeing gender prenatally.
*
Jiten-bhai called shortly after 6:30 AM. After picking me up fifteen minutes later,
he sped off toward the clinic.
Orienting myself in the car, I noticed a middle-aged woman in the back with
Asha-ben—her mother-in-law. She introduced herself, explaining that she worked for a
prominent obstetrician in Mahesana. We made some small talk.
During a lull in conversation, Asha-ben asked if the U.S. had a ban on “looking.”
I explained that, to the contrary, it was often a routine part of prenatal care. Jiten-bhai
reiterated his view that the government ought to grant couples with daughters the
“permission to look.” He shook his head: “It’ll never stop completely. The tool’s there, so
it’s a way for doctors to make money. And people want a boy.”
His mother interjected, “You know that neighbor—the one who came over to dry
bean pods at our place? She had seven girls and got an abortion with the eighth!” Turning
to her daughter-in-law, she said, “Twenty years ago, they did it by ‘raw delivery’—the
whole child came out!” I asked if her employer had provided sex selection services.
Waving her hand dismissively, she snorted, “It was happening everywhere! Everyone
was doing it. There were three-four a day at our clinic. Everyone’d be lined up! Back
then, the whole child came out.”
Asha-ben looked sharply out the window. She seemed uncomfortable. Her
mother-in-law reassured her, “This is nothing. This’ll be done in three hours. No need to
worry. Back then, they put in medication, the pain started, and it happened slowly.” She
narrated the experiences of several acquaintances who had undergone sex-selective
abortion by the old technique.
When we reached the clinic, a nurse pointed to a private room on a side corridor.
The tile was dingy, the furnishing sparse—a stool, a cot, and a settee, with a window onto
the street. Outside, crows cawed and sparrows sang. A faint light filtered through the
diaphanous curtains.
The family sat down to wait, and I with them. They wondered aloud about where
the doctor was. “We left Hetvi at home alone,” Asha-ben explained. “And she doesn’t do
well without me. Since she has her cartoons, it’s not a problem. But it’s just them two—
my father-in-law and Hetvi.” She sighed. When a nurse entered, the mother-in-law
confirmed the doctor would allow her, as a clinically experienced person, to accompany
Asha-ben for the abortion.
Once the nurse departed, the older woman reassuringly observed, “The work’ll be
done in two hours! Not like the old era.” Again, she rattled off numerous examples of
“raw deliveries” among friends. Some cases were particularly gruesome, featuring
perforated wombs or fetuses stuck inside due to clinician negligence.
Eventually, the mother-in-law shifted topics seemingly incongruously, detailing
how her employer had paid for Jiten-bhai’s education from elementary school through
college. In concluding the long narrative, she turned toward me and said, “Even then,
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when I talked to the doctor—‘We need this work done for us’—it was a clear no! Not
even a name!”
The nurse entered and summoned the two women. To my surprise, Asha-ben
asked me to accompany them: “I’ll feel more comfort.” Afterward, she would explain
that she had wanted another clinically trained person monitoring the doctor. Despite my
disclaimer, I had not been able to fully set aside my biomedical identity.
After the abortion, sweepers shifted Asha-ben, still unconscious from sedation,
back to the same room. Her mother-in-law and I followed behind. Once the sweepers left,
Jiten-bhai turned to his mother and asked, “So does an entire soul come out—a whole
girl? Does a whole child come out?” She furrowed her eyebrows: “No, no, you have to
take out pieces.”
Jiten-bhai sat alongside the cot. His mother and I lounged uneasily on the settee.
From the window behind us, the tinny sound of a tea stall stereo playing Mohammed Rafi
floated in: “Chaudhvin kā chānd ho, yā āftāb ho…” After a few minutes, the mother-inlaw quietly stepped out. Sidling closer to the cot, Jiten-bhai picked up his wife’s hand.
Afterlooking at the pair—she unconscious, limp, breathing slowly; he slouched over,
holding her hand, glancing between her face and the ground—I stepped out as well.
Routine outpatient visits were in full flow, and I watched people come and go on the
patio.
After fifteen minutes, we re-entered to find Asha-ben slowly waking. Her head
writhed side-to-side, and she flapped her hands, communicating a message we could not
grasp. Suddenly, her eyes shot open. A frown spread over her face. She gasped, and after
a moment, we could make out the words: “Hetvi... Hetvi...” An urgency tinged the
repetition of her daughter’s name. Jiten-bhai quickly reassured his wife that Hetvi was
alright; she was eating noodles and playing calmly, according to his father’s report.
Hearing this, the animation again left Asha-ben’s body, and she slumped back to stillness.
When she stirred again after some minutes, she mumbled, “It hurts... It hurts...”
Her mother-in-law’s retort was flat: “Of course. Since they circled around in there, it’s
going to hurt.”
Her eyes still closed, Asha-ben continued, “Was it a whole girl? Did a whole girl
come out? Or was it pieces?”
Jiten-bhai shook his head and said, “Why do you want to know all that? We can
discuss it after going home.” He caressed his wife’s head.
Asha-ben was just sitting up when a fortysomething man entered the room
unannounced. Before we could say anything, he handed Jiten-bhai a pill packet and said,
“If there’s too much pain, give her these.”
Finally receiving unhurried medical attention, Asha-ben grasped further: “So can
I drink water?”
“Very little, or you’ll feel nauseous. How many girls do you have? One? Well,
now, before getting pregnant again, take Ayurvedic treatment.” The newcomer pulled
several brightly colored business cards from his shirt pocket. Handing them to the couple,
he explained, “When you want to get pregnant, come see me. I’m a doctor. You’ll get a
result—1,000%! See, the women have no role in this, because the boy-girl thing depends
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on XY-XX, and X and Y come from the man. So you have to start treatment for the man
three months beforehand. 1,000%, you’ll get a result.” The couple nodded.
As they spoke further, Jiten-bhai handed me one of the cards. I turned it over and
took in the information: “Dr. Rajen,” an Ayurvedic fertility specialist, based in a
neighboring district. My attention snapped back as I heard the doctor mention abortion:
“... but there’s so much headache in all this. Instead, better to get treatment for a boy from
the beginning.”
His phone rang, and he answered: “Arrived?... Okay, ask for ‘Chetna Clinic’...
Call when you’re here.”
After hanging up, Dr. Rajen continued his previous instructions: “And then, if you
want to get it checked, we do that too. If you want it done in a different city, we can do
that, too. But I have 1,000% success! I can give you thousands of names.” Saying this, he
left to find his clients.
Shortly thereafter, Asha-ben felt ready to leave. Swinging her legs off the cot, she
willed herself up. Jiten-bhai and I supported her like human crutches, and she tottered
forward. We exited to the patio. Jiten-bhai brought around the car. Asha-ben lay down in
the back, her head on her mother-in-law’s lap.
Some kilometers out, we hit a nail. As Jiten-bhai and I jacked up the car at a
nearby petrol pump, I asked quietly, “So were you decided—with a girl, you weren’t
going to keep it?”
Removing the wheel nuts, he furrowed his brow momentarily. Then, with a sigh:
“Yes, yes. We had decided. No question.” After changing the tire, we rode back to
Mahesana in silence.
*
Some aspects of the encounter with Asha-ben and Jiten-bhai were atypical in my
fieldwork with north Gujarat families—her relative taciturnity, for instance, or the
opacity of the reasoning (Chapter 2) and familial decision-making (Chapter 4) around
selective reproduction. But in other ways, the couple’s story exemplifies important
findings from my research: the prominence of intermediaries, bargaining, partial
knowledges, and policing in the black market for sex selection (Chapter 1); the
sonographic search for genitalia, the related uncertainties, and the ensuing clinical
reactions (Chapter 3); the complementation of biomedical treatment with non-biomedical
techniques for enhancing son production, and the ethical dilemmas of sin (Chapter 5);
and just-out-of-sight regulation from the state and other governance bodies (Chapter 6).
These were hallmarks of sex selection as process, problem, and human experience.
This dissertation attempts to explain a form of gendered violence by situating
instances of that violence within ethnography and then situating that ethnography within
broader social structures.1 I illustrate how gendered fetuses tie together families,
reproductive medicine, and governance institutions in various ways—some perhaps
obvious, some unexpected, all deeply troubling. What follows is an effort to understand
stories like Asha-ben and Jiten-bhai’s in their poignancy, complexity, and social
embeddedness.
1

cf. Farmer 2003: 41.
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Situating the Problem
The Public Secret
Over the past three decades, a troubling new form of family planning has emerged
in India: the selective abortion of female fetuses. The practice has seismically shifted
populations by preventing the births of millions of girls. This trend parallels
developments in much of Eurasia, from the Balkan Peninsula to China. In all these
places, and among significant sections of their worldwide diasporas, sex selection has
become commonplace.
In India, as elsewhere, the magnitude of the problem is most commonly
represented through sex ratio (SR). A staple figure of demography, the SR measures the
number of female persons per 1,000 male persons in a particular population.2 Two
variations figure prominently in discourse on sex selection. One is the SR at birth (SRB).
The other is the child SR (CSR), or the SR within a specified young age bracket; in
Indian census statistics, for example, the CSR represents children aged 0-6.
Demographers and other scientists generally agree that human biology favors the
generation of slightly more boys than girls, leading to SRBs between 935 and 971 in the
absence of outside intervention.3 Perinatally and postnatally, a “female survival
advantage” may countervail the skewing at birth, with girls better equipped to survive
tribulations in late gestation, infancy, and early childhood—all other factors being equal.4
Historically, female infanticide, neglect, physical abuse, and other forms of
gendered violence have erased or even reversed the early-life female survival advantage
in India. But sex selection has inaugurated an unprecedented skewing of SRBs and CSRs
by making it possible to eliminate girls prenatally—to prevent them from coming into
full social existence. Between 1981 and 2011 the countrywide CSR fell from 962 to 914.
In nearly a third of the country’s states and territories—including Gujarat, where Ashaben and Jiten-bhai’s story unfolded—the 2011 figure was below 900 (Table 1). Fortynine districts and seventy cities exhibited CSRs below 850.5
The falling CSR and the “disappearing daughter” have become the twin
representational pillars of one of twenty-first-century India’s chief public crises.6 In his
2

The international demographic convention is to present sex ratio as the number of males per 100 females.
Throughout this dissertation, I follow the Indian convention of females per 1,000 males for two reasons.
First, it remains true to the representations circulating in my field site. Second, I also believe it facilitates an
easier intuitive grasp of the number of “missing” women.
3
Chahnazarian 1988; Waldron 1998: 53-63. For a detailed analysis of claims regarding “natural” SRBs, see
Brian and Jaisson 2007.
4
Hill and Upchurch 1995; Waldron 1983: 323-324, 1998: 64-108. For analyses based on neonatal mortality
data from India during the 1990s and 2000s, see C. Kumar et al. 2013: 125; Million Death Study
Collaborators 2010: 1855.
5
The entities with CSRs below 850 represent 8.3% of the country’s 593 districts and 15% of the 468 cities
or urban agglomerations with populations greater than 100,000. Unlike most census statistics in the
dissertation, which are drawn from the Census of India’s final enumeration data, these figures are based on
the provisional population totals.
6
In characterizing sex selection as a “crisis,” I mean to highlight the ways in which public construction of
crises constrains the very terms available for thinking about them (Roitman 2013) while creating a form of
“scandalous publicity” centered on affective mergers of state, citizen, society, and problem (Cohen 1999).
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January 2015 speech announcing the launch of a national Beti Bachāo, Beti Padhāo
[“Save the Daughter, Educate the Daughter”] campaign, Prime Minister Narendra Modi
called sex selection a sign of “mental illness” and a harbinger of “terrible crisis.”7
Invoking historical practices of female infanticide, he declared, “From our mindset, we
belong to the eighteenth century. We are not fit to be called people from the twenty-first
century. In the eighteenth century, the girl child was allowed to see the mother's face and
then [killed]. We are worse, as we kill our girls in the womb and don't let them be born...
Like a beggar, this PM is begging you for the life of girls.”8
While the countrywide campaign is recent, discourse on sex selection has
pervaded Indian society for some time. Countless television segments, newspaper
articles, and academic studies have focused on the problem. Various state governments
and NGOs have implemented campaigns to “save the daughter,” mobilizing diverse
techniques from cash incentives to street theater and visual art. A national law has
expressly prohibited prenatal sex detection for over two decades.
Nonetheless, selective abortion of female fetuses continues ubiquitously, a
“public secret” whose enactment lies just outside official visibility.9 The practice
comprises two stages: sex determination (SD) and selective abortion. A biomedical test—
usually an ultrasound scan in the fourth gestational month—materializes the sex of the
fetus, establishing it as a son- or daughter-to-be. Male fetuses are subsequently nurtured
to birth, while female fetuses are aborted.
Despite the hyper-proliferation of talk about sex selection, there remains a need
for further description and analysis of the actions that families, clinicians, and governance
institutions take with respect to the gendered fetus. This dissertation is a response to that
need. In the following pages, I attempt to render visible the everyday, “on-the-ground”
complexities of sex selection as a lived process.
Difference, Power, and “Family Values”
Upon hearing about my research, many American listeners have jumped to a
common refrain: But why can’t they just see that boys and girls are the same? That they
can do the same things? I have frequently found myself pointing out the distinct but
nonetheless pervasive ways in which gender inequality persists in the West. But I have
also found myself returning to the contrasts Mahesana-area repeatedly drew between
Gujarati and American kinship.
While granting that sex selection was not a problem in the U.S., many families
situated the divergence as a function of fundamental differences in “family values,”
“rules,” “social structure,” “social system,” or “culture”—differences that did not leave
American families unindicted. Why, people asked, was “European” or “white” kinship so
unreliable, with widespread divorce and a lack of normative closeness between siblings?
How could Americans bear to live in a society that normalized the tragic separation of
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sons from parents?10 Why did we “throw” our elderly into “old age homes,” rather than
loving them, caring for them, and serving them till their deaths (at any cost)? How could
anyone countenance kinship norms that prioritized a thin individual independence over
thickness, extensiveness, and mutuality? In short, while acknowledging that Americans
must see sex selection as deeply problematic, pregnant women and their relatives could
readily point to what they saw as deeply problematic aspects of American kinship.11
It is a truism that every society’s kinship system prioritizes some desiderata over
others, rendering certain possibilities commonsensical and others highly unlikely, certain
roles coveted and others tragic. Social order, personhood, and their reproduction rest on
norms and practices that both potentiate and constrain, often building in forms of
alienation and even violence.12 Normative Gujarati and American kinship can each be
caricatured as possessing certain predominant values (e.g., predictability versus freedom)
and certain threatened figures (e.g., aborted female fetuses versus abandoned elders,
gender inequality versus domestic stability). By no accident, the very forms of sociality
that give rise to each order’s characteristic problems also render the other’s
simultaneously more visible and less comprehensible.
I do not wish to overdraw the parallel between the social problems posed by each
society’s kinship structure—much less to normalize sex selection. But by invoking the
comparison, I am arguing for coupling specificity and nuance with a broad approach that
recognizes how all gender and kinship arrangements obviate some problems while
raising others.
The rhetoric of “saving women” can prove dangerous, particularly when
combined with a “consistent resort to the cultural” as an explanation for gender
inequality.13 For instance, while feminist discourse grants U.S. domestic violence victims
social, political, and human specificity, it often portrays Indian counterparts as suffering a
“death by culture.”14 A glance at colonial representations of sati, dowry, and female
infanticide reveals how Orientalizing constructions like the “contentious tradition,” the
“cultural crime,” and the “savage family” have historically obscured the inner workings
of gendered violence while enacting new forms of sociopolitical oppression.15 So, too,
the neo-colonial discourses of hegemonic Western feminism have often subjected “the
10

Although I observed numerous cases of sons establishing separate households in Gujarat, the practice
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third world woman” to “Western eyes,” with lamentable consequences.16 You and I must
both resist facile fantasies of “saving” Indian women from Indian patriarchy.17
As a Gujarati-American man writing on sex selection, I seek to balance careful
attention to difference with robust moral outrage, so that the combination may rectify
tendencies toward insipidness and decontextualization, respectively.18 This dissertation
examines how patriarchy lodges in and reproduces itself through one practice, in all its
historically and culturally constituted specificity. At the same time, as I discuss below,
the narrow story presented here does tell us something broader about gender, power, and
visibility.

Studies of Sex Selection
India’s skewed SRs have garnered extensive scholarly attention. In a masterful
review, Mary John has observed that the quest to understand sex selection has spanned an
“obsession with numbers” (from demography) and an insistence on local, qualitative
insights (from “micro-studies” and ethnographies).19 Here, I sequentially discuss
demographic, historical, and fieldwork-based research on skewed SRs, drawing out the
conceptual tools and empirical findings that comprise scholarly understandings of sexselective reproduction in India. (Comparative material from elsewhere in Asia appears in
the notes.)

16

C. T. Mohanty 1986. See also Liddle and Rai 1998.
Spivak 1988: 297.
18
cf. Walley 1997.
19
John 2014. In addition to John’s review, several pieces provide helpful handles on the vast literature
around skewed SRs. Hesketh and Zhu (2006) and Dyson (2012) have tackled the question of “abnormal” or
“skewed” sex ratios generally, covering postnatal discrimination and sex disparity at various ages alongside
prenatal sex selection. Guilmoto and Tovey (2015) have specifically addressed “masculinization of births,”
shepherding a vast array of evidence on SRB skewing in Asia and Eastern Europe. The essays in Attané
and Guilmoto’s Watering the Neighbour’s Garden (2007) reflect the breadth and depth of quantitative and
qualitative work on “female demographic deficit” across different Asian contexts. Though older, Croll
(2000) and Miller (2001) remain valuable as anthropological reviews of 1990s literature on skewed CSRs
and childhood gender discrimination. While smaller Indian syntheses exist, there remains a need for the
sort of extended treatment Attané has given the “demographic masculinization” of China (2013).
I would add to John’s comment on the “obsession with numbers” that demography’s disciplinary
emphasis on the notion of demographic transition has also played a decisive role in framing research and
praxis on sex selection. (The literature on demographic transition theory itself is vast, and I cannot do it
justice here; see Caldwell et al. [2005] for one synthetic account. Johnson-Hanks [2008] provides an
overview of demographic transition theory for anthropologists, while Szreter [1993] and Greenhalgh [1996]
offer historical analyses of the theory’s centrality to the rise and functioning of demography as a research
and policy enterprise.) The core presumption commonly embedded in demographic transition theory—that
historically specific processes of development prompt populations to pass from pre-modern conditions of
high fertility and mortality through a transitory population boom due to falling mortality and ongoing high
fertility to a fully modern state of low mortality, low fertility, and low population growth—creates a
triumphalist narrative that squares poorly with the proliferation of high-technology sex selection.
Dichotomies emanating from unilinear demographic transition narratives—between “tradition” and
“modernity,” between the “bad” demographic behavior of the poor or rural and the “good” behavior of their
affluent or urban counterparts—have plagued research and policy-making around the population
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“Missing Women”: Quantifying Gender Inequality
The prominence of skewed SRs in Indian discourses around gender inequality
traces to three seminal publications of the 1970s. During that decade, a pair of
demographic monographs tackled the longstanding pattern of overall male-female
imbalance in India’s population, ultimately concluding that it had to originate in “excess
female mortality” (EFM), particularly during early-childhood and childbearing years.20
Contemporaneously, the Committee on the Status of Women in India devoted the first
substantive pages of its monumental report to “the decline in the sex ratio ever since
1901,” deeming it “a disturbing phenomenon in the context of the status of women” and
exploring its relation to unequal mortality rates and life expectancies.21 Together, these
three publications firmly established India’s skewed SRs as a problem for further
investigation.
By the 1990s, quantification of EFM increasingly took the form of counting
“missing women.”22 Studies in this vein suggested differential mortality had produced a
shortfall of 60 to 100 million women worldwide, with a third in India alone. A 2002
reanalysis argued that while EFM rates and proportions of missing women had both
fallen, declining SRBs due to sex-selective abortion were partly offsetting the
improvements.23
By that point, specific estimates of prenatal sex selection were emerging.
Analyses of data from the 1990s suggested radical skewing of SRBs and CSRs,
particularly in northwestern states like Punjab, Haryana, and Gujarat.24 One investigation
concluded India’s proportion of “missing girls” aged 0-6 had risen from 1.9% in 1981 to
20
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Originally proposed by Amartya Sen (1990, 1992), the “missing women” measure was soon taken up by
several other scholars (Coale 1991; Klasen 1994).
23
Klasen and Wink 2002.
24
Arnold et al. 2002: 764-766; Bhat 2002b: 5254-5258; Bhat and Zavier 2007: 133-140; Das Gupta and
Bhat 1997: 310-311; Retherford and Roy 2003; Sudha and Rajan 1999: 596-604, 612; Sudha and Rajan
2003. For similar examinations in China, see Banister 2004; Hull 1990; Johansson and Nygren 1991; Zeng
et al. 1993. For South Korea, see Kim 1995; Park and Cho 1995. For a comparative analysis of CSRs and
“missing women” across India, China, and South Korea, see Das Gupta et al. 2009. Skewing of SRB in
Vietnam did not take off until the mid-2000s (Belanger et al. 2003), but it has since progressed rapidly
(Guilmoto 2012b; Guilmoto et al. 2009; ISDS 2007). There is also clear evidence of skewed SRBs in the
Caucasus (Duthé et al. 2012; Mesle et al. 2007; UNFPA 2013, 2014), Albania (UNFPA 2012), Hong Kong
(Wong et al. 2010) and Nepal (Frost et al. 2013).
By contrast, studies in Bangladesh’s Matlab district have demonstrated that despite a history of
EFM and discriminatory treatment in health and nutrition (L. Chen et al. 1981; D'Souza and Chen 1980),
sex selection has not taken hold, even with couples pursuing pregnancy largely to have a son (Bairagi
2001); EFM and fertility rates have fallen without any concomitant rise in SRB (Alam et al. 2007; Kabeer
et al. 2013). Given Japan’s patrilineal kinship system, agrarian-industrial economic history, and low
fertility rates, its relatively balanced SRs also present a contrast to India and the rest of East Asia. Historical
demography reveals “weak son preference” with no evidence of EFM from the 1600s through the early
twentieth century (Kikuzawa 1999; Kureishi and Wakabayashi 2011), and Caldwell and Caldwell (2005)
have discussed reasons why infanticide in Tokugawa Japan, though a common method of family planning,
did not acquire a sex bias.
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3.8% in 2001.25 Estimates of countrywide sex-selective abortions around the turn of the
millennium ranged from 100,000 to 500,000 annually.26 Two studies hazarded
approximations of cumulative prenatal sex selection since 1980, yielding figures of
several hundred thousand annually and several million in aggregate. 27 Meanwhile,
numerous analyses of large reproductive health datasets attempted to infer the
relationship between prenatal ultrasound and selective abortion.28 In short, measuring sex
selection became a major pursuit.29
Causality and Patterning: Kinship, Economy, Value
Scholarship on skewed SRs and sex selection has aspired to more than just
quantification of magnitudes and trends. Much research has tackled questions of why,
how, and in what pattern. The kernels of present-day social scientific thinking on such
questions may be found in two studies—an anthropologist’s library analysis and a
demographer’s field investigation—from the 1980s, when selective abortion had yet to

25

L. Visaria 2007a: 64-66. For an earlier estimate of the “missing women” added to various state-level
populations during the 1980s, see Das Gupta and Bhat 1997: 311.
26
The 100,000 figure is from Arnold et al. (2002)., and the 500,000 figure from Jha et al. (2006). Other
estimates for annual sex-selective abortion during the same period include 370,000 (Bhaskar and Gupta
2007) and 480,000 (Bhalotra and Cochrane 2010). For a similar attempt to quantify the extent of selective
abortion in South Korea, see Kim 2002. For China, the quantification of sex-selective abortion has acquired
a specific urgency in light of ambiguity in the relative contributions of prenatal sex selection, female
infanticide and child death, and under-reporting of female births; for some contributions suggesting the
importance of sex-selective abortion, see Banister 2004; Johansson and Nygren 1991; Wu et al. 2006; Zeng
et al. 1993; Zhu et al. 2009.
27
Jha et al. 2011; P. M. Kulkarni 2007.
28
Arnold et al. 2002; Arnold and Parasuraman 2009; Bhalotra and Cochrane 2010; Bhat and Zavier 2007;
Retherford and Roy 2003; Rosenblum and Akbulut-Yuksel 2012. Y. Chen et al. (2013) analyzed the
relationship between ultrasound diffusion and prenatal sex selection in China.
29
Although they are tangential to my analysis, it also bears mentioning two scholarly debates regarding sex
selection that played out during the late 1990s and early 2000s. First, there was the continuing question of
whether factors other than EFM and sex selection might account for “missing women.” The most farfetched and widely publicized hypothesis in this vein may have been Oster’s proposal (2005) that much of
the “missing women” problem in Asia could be explained by a SRB of 1.50 among carriers of hepatitis B, a
notion that was resoundingly refuted (Das Gupta 2005). Agnihotri directed much of his work at closing
“escape hatches” such as differential migration, under-enumeration, or variation in SRB (2000, 2003). Even
those demographers who expressed skepticism regarding the veracity of pre-1951 overall SRs as indexes of
gender discrimination ultimately agreed that the post-1980 CSR figures could only be understood as
consequences of sex selection (Bhat 2002a, 2002b; Bhat and Zavier 2007).
The second debate concerned whether prenatal sex selection might, to some extent, act as a
substitute for postnatal EFM, enhancing the survival chances of the girls that were born. Goodkind
championed this possibility (1999, 2003) additionally venturing into normative territory by arguing that
such substitutive effects might problematize the ethics of condemning sex-selective abortion. Drawing on a
variety of quantitative data, Sudha and Rajan demonstrated that the “substitutive effect” did not prevail in
India; instead, regions with high SRBs also tended to exhibit high EFM, creating a situation of “double
jeopardy” (1999, 2003; see also Agnihotri 2001). More recent data suggest that while the practice of sexselective abortion may help reduce EFM, the number of girls surviving due to a reduced mortality gap is
more than offset by the number of girls eliminated prenatally (Rosenblum 2013). Li et al. (2007) find signs
of an additive effect in the Chinese data as well.
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capture the scholarly imagination and EFM remained the predominant mechanism of
CSR skewing.
Barbara Miller’s 1981 book The Endangered Sex evaluated regional EFM
differences through a literature review-based synthesis.30 Building on an economist’s
earlier hypothesis, Miller argued that northwestern India’s predominant agrarian
production mode—low-labor-intensity wheat cultivation—led to women’s productive
exclusion and social seclusion, along with intense “son preference” and “daughter
discrimination”; by contrast, the southeast’s rice-paddy agriculture required more labor,
resulting in women’s economic inclusion, moderate son preference, and daughter
appreciation.31 Miller distinguished between the “emic” reasons given for son
preference—dowry, marriage costs, threats to honor, old age care, ritual needs—and the
“etic” factor underlying gender discrimination—devaluation of women’s work. Presaging
the advent of prenatal sex selection, Miller warned, “A form of birth control which
regulates the sex of offspring... would find a wide audience of acceptors in rural India...
There is the strong possibility that such a method would have the undesirable result of an
even more drastic imbalancing of the sex ratio.”32
Miller’s work anticipated subsequent attention to the “demographic divide”
separating northwestern and southwestern India.33 Her focus on agrarian systems
foreshadowed subsequent work on associations between SR skewing and production and
prosperity. And the emic motivations she cataloged would remain, virtually unchanged,
the same ones recapitulated in superficial twenty-first century analyses of selective
abortion. Curiously, though an anthropologist, Miller did not mention differences in
systems apart from the narrow issue of marriage costs and gifts.34 Her thesis was
straightforward: social value and survival prospects rested on gendered allocation of
work.
Appearing as amniocentesis and sex-selective abortion first became visible in
public culture, The Endangered Sex sparked a famous scholarly debate in the journal
30

Miller 1997.
The agrarian production hypothesis appeared in conjectural form in Bardhan 1974: 1303-1304.
(Interestingly, in noting that states with high female death rates also tended to exhibit drastic EFM,
Bardhan singled out Uttar Pradesh, Punjab, Rajasthan, and Gujarat.) Miller cautioned that property-holding
mattered, with non-propertied families in different regions behaving more similarly to each other than to
their propertied neighbors.
32
Miller 1997: 35-36.
33
The seminal work for bringing the northwest-southeast dichotomy into demographic debate was Dyson
and Moore 1983. Citing Miller as a precedent, Dyson and Moore argued for geographical division of India
into two broad demographic regimes, with the northwest characterized by skewed SRs, high fertility, and
high infant and child mortality, and the southeast by the inverse. They posited that the regional bifurcation
rested on sociocultural variation in kinship patterns, which led to differing levels of female autonomy and,
more distally, different demographic behavior. (More specifically, they characterized north Indian kinship
as favoring exogamy, agnatic cooperation, women’s non-inheritance, inferiority of wife-givers to wifetakers, dowry payments, and a preoccupation with seclusion and honor; they then contrasted south Indian
kinship as favoring endogamy, affinal cooperation, women’s property rights, affinal equality, bridewealth
or weak dowry, and less rigid control of female sexuality.)
34
As just one glaring example, matriliny—a major sociocultural feature distinguishing some parts of the
south—did not receive mention except in a footnote on dowry in Kerala (Miller 1997: 148fn149).
31
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Economic and Political Weekly. Responding to a book review reiterating Miller’s fears
about prenatal sex selection,35 economist Dharma Kumar asked, “Why conclude that all
of North India will go in for mass female foeticide in the twenty-first century?”36
Labeling “absurd” the assumption that “a desire for at least one son... will lead to the
‘demise of the female,’” she argued “supply of and demand for women” would
eventually lead to a reproductive equilibrium.37 Her essay, which concluded with
provocative questions—“Is not female foeticide better than female infanticide, or even
than severe ill-treatment of little girls? What are the alternative policies of improving the
treatment of women?”38—prompted responses that congealed around several core
questions: Was sex selection an “economic” (i.e., self-correcting) or “cultural” (i.e., nonself-correcting) problem? Was the separation of “cultural” and “economic” itself
misguided? Was prenatal sex selection preferable to infanticide? Or was the comparison
inapt, given the low likelihood of people resorting to the latter as uniformly or easily?
Given sex selection’s apparent acceptability and compatibility with family-building
desires, how rapidly would it spread if made more accessible? And how might one
imagine alternative social arrangements—ones in which female fetuses might not be
aborted?39 The contention ignited by Miller’s book foreshadowed contemporary
discourses around sex selection in the resort to “supply-and-demand” arguments,40 the
salience of the infanticide comparison, the disputation of culture-versus-economy
framings, and the acknowledgement of prenatal sex selection’s rapid proliferation.
The family-building strategies discussed in the Economic and Political Weekly
debate appeared empirically in the second representative investigation from the 1980s,
Monica Das Gupta’s 1987 analysis of child mortality in eleven Punjabi villages.41 Das
Gupta found EFM concentrated in particular reproductive scenarios: sex differentials in
mortality rose with birth order and especially for girls with a living sister. The study also
correlated fertility decline, education and prosperty with lower child mortality but greater
EFM, suggesting a greater selectivity. Das Gupta speculated about possible explanations
for gender discrimination, ultimately tracing EFM to the locally dominant Jat caste’s
“culture” and other castes’ emulation of it. In this view, women’s displacement to
conjugal households after marriage, along with the economic and political organization
resulting from this kinship pattern, rendered girls of limited value to their parents.
Echoing the notion of a demographic divide, Das Gupta contrasted Punjab with south
India, which exhibited lower EFM amid kinship structures that did not uproot daughters
as radically from natal families.
35

Bardhan 1982: 1450.
D. Kumar 1983b: 62.
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D. Kumar 1983b: 63.
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D. Kumar 1983b: 64.
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For the contributions to this debate, see Dube 1983a, 1983b; R. Jeffery and Jeffery 1983; D. Kumar
1983a; Vishwanath 1983. For a follow-up essay by the authors of one of the contributions, see R. Jeffery et
al. 1984.
40
For a recent review of “supply-and-demand arguments”, see P. Jeffery 2014. I ethnographically analyze
such arguments in everyday talk around Mahesana elsewhere (Sandesara ms).
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Das Gupta 1987. The villages had been included in the Khanna Study, made (in)famous in anthropology
by Mamdani (1973).
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Das Gupta’s investigation established that falling fertility, rising education, and
high prosperity—hallmarks of “modernization” or “development”—could coexist with
and even exacerbate EFM. The study situated EFM as a family planning mechanism:
older sisters diminished the survival prospects for additional girls. The pattern was more
extreme among the affluent, who could better modulate their children’s well-being
through selective investments. Moreover, by highlighting Jat “culture,” Das Gupta
championed kinship as an explanatory factor to rival Miller’s agrarian economy.42
Subsequent quantitative research on SR, EFM, and sex-selective abortion has
largely echoed Das Gupta’s findings. As I discuss in Chapter 2, various studies have
associated EFM and prenatal sex selection with falling fertility, higher-order births to
parents with daughters, and higher levels of prosperity.43 Put differently, couples like
Asha-ben and Jiten-bhai—urban, educated, and affluent, with one or more daughters—
were disproportionately likely to pursue sex selection.
Over the past fifteen years, a plethora of demographic analyses have further
examined the patterns and consequences of sex selection. Several have attempted to
42

Much subsequent research would treat kinship and economics as competing, rather than complementary
(see, for instance, the debate addressed in Banerjee and Jain 2001), despite Kishor’s forceful argument for
considering the two together (1993). Examining local-level patterning of EFM in relation to spatial
exogamy and female labor force participation, Kishor found greater exogamy was associated with higher
EFM (the result anticipated by Das Gupta) but that the effect was weakened by interaction with higher rates
of women’s work (a result with echoes of Miller). She also found an independent effect of rice cultivation
in reducing EFM.
43
For the association between falling fertility and intensification of sex selection, see A. Basu 1992, 1999;
Das Gupta and Bhat 1997; Sudha and Rajan 1999, 2003. Similar patterns have been identified, at different
time-points, in South Korea (Park and Cho 1995) and Vietnam (Guilmoto 2012b; Guilmoto et al. 2009). In
China, the drastic fertility decline associated with implementation of the One-Child Policy in the early
1980s greatly exacerbated SR skewing (e.g., Eklund 2011b; Greenhalgh 2001; Greenhalgh and Li 1995; Li
et al. 2007; Zeng et al. 1993: 29-33). Guilmoto has recently formalized this effect with the notion of a “sex
ratio transition” due to “fertility squeeze” (2009).
For the association of higher birth order (and existing daughters) with discriminatory behavior,
EFM, and prenatal sex selection, see Arnold et al. 1996; Arnold et al. 2002; Arokiasamy 2004; Jha et al.
2011; Jha et al. 2006; V. Mishra et al. 2004; Muhuri and Preston 1991; R. Pande 2003; Retherford and Roy
2003. A careful analysis of data for Tamil Nadu by Srinivasan (2015) found “daughter deficit”—due to
both prenatal sex selection and female infanticide—rising with birth order. See also Diamond-Smith et al.
(2008), who found female infanticide concentrated in higher-order births and among families with
daughters. Similar effects have been demonstrated for prenatal sex selection in China (Banister 2004; Li et
al. 2007: 27-29; Poston et al. 1997), South Korea (Kim 2002; Park and Cho 1995), Vietnam (Guilmoto et
al. 2009), and the Caucasus countries (Duthé et al. 2012; Mesle et al. 2007).
For the association of EFM and sex-selective abortion with markers of affluence (urban residence,
maternal education, wealth expenditure, landholding, high standard of living, and upper-caste status), see
Agnihotri 2000, 2003; Arokiasamy and Goli 2012; Guilmoto 2008: 100-109; Jha et al. 2011; Jha et al.
2006; Murthi et al. 1995; Retherford and Roy 2003; Siddhanta et al. 2003. In contrast to the Indian data,
Chinese data reveal greater sex selection in rural areas (Banister 2004; Guilmoto and Attané 2007). While
the Chinese material suggests an inverted-U (Kuznets-type) curve for the relationship between SRB and
socioeconomic status, the Indian material lends support to the notion of a monotonic decrease in SRB with
rising affluence (Guilmoto and Ren 2011). Although this conclusion at the countrywide level may mask
more complex regional patterns, the analysis in Siddhanta et al. (2003) suggests a similar pattern of
monotonic decrease for many states, including Gujarat.
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measure how the PCPNDT Act or government incentive programs have impacted SRs.44
Many others have modeled future marriage patterns, with one recent paper projecting the
proportion of involuntary bachelorhood among Indian men aged 50 to reach as high as
10% by 2065.45 A detailed field survey in North India has associated perceived shortage
of brides with various changes in gender and kinship practices, including reduced dowry,
shifting inheritance patterns, greater flexibility in post-marital residence, reduced
restrictions on women, and lower stated son preference.46 Research has demonstrated sex
skewing in births to Indian-born women in England and Wales, Canada, and the United
States.47 And building on calls for “disaggregated analysis” and attention to inter-regional
“convergence,” numerous recent works have focused on the spatial patterning of skewed
SRs, challenging the northwest-southeast dichotomy by demonstrating differences within
the two regions and commonalities across them.48 In short, quantitative analyses have
helpfully delineated diachronic trends and synchronic patterns in SR skewing due to sex
selection, as well as some of its consequences.
While drawing on demography’s insights, I wish to avoid the discipline’s notion
of “son preference.” Deriving from the survey practice of
soliciting “fertility
preferences” from reproducing subjects, the construct—usually measured as some
variation on the proportion of “sons desired” to “daughters desired”—pervades debates
around skewed SRs. But it suffers from two fundamental problems. First, in collapsing
multifaceted desires and unknown futures into straightforward figures, it masks
ambivalence, uncertainty, and social desirability bias; use of son preference as outcome
or explanatory variable gloss over the uncomfortable fact that solicited preferences and
future behavior (or inner desires) may interrelate in nuanced and contradictory ways.
More importantly, “son preference” misses precisely those qualitative complexities that
provide purchase for understanding selective reproduction. Scholars have noted how it
may be more appropriate to speak of “son necessity,” “son compulsion,” or
“indispensable sons”; conversely, many have called for more explicitly examining
“daughter discrimination,” “daughter aversion,” “daughter disfavor,” “daughter
dispreference,” or “dispensable daughters.”49 Adoption of “son preference” as an
44

For attempts to measure the impact of the PCPNDT Act on SRs, see Nandi 2015; Nandi and Deolalikar
2013. For evaluation of incentive schemes’ impacts on SRs, see Anukriti 2014; C. Mazumdar 2012; Sinha
and Yoong 2009.
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Guilmoto 2012b. Kashyap et al. (2015) estimate that while bachelorhood will rise, the proportion of
women never married will rise even more due to rising women’s education and non-marriage of highly
educated women. See also Guilmoto 2010, 2012a; Kashyap et al. 2015. For similar estimates of the
Chinese “marriage market,” see Guilmoto 2010, 2012a; Jiang et al. 2007; Poston and Glover 2005;
Tuljapurkar et al. 1995.
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M. Larsen and Kaur 2013.
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A U.K. study (Dubuc and Coleman 2007) found skewing in overall SRB. A Canadian study (Almond et
al. 2013; Ray et al. 2012) showed skewing among firstborns as well as higher-order births. A U.S. study
(Abrevaya 2009) demonstrated skewing in higher-order births only.
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Agnihotri 2003; Guilmoto 2008; Srinivasan and Bedi 2008, 2009b. For the importance of disaggregated
analysis, see Agnihotri 2000. For importance of attention to convergence, see A. Basu 1999.
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anthropological term is dangerous, for it may truncate the very richness that must be
examined. In this dissertation, then, I use a combination of the above terms to discuss the
familial affects driving sex selection.
Contentious Legacies: Histories of Female Infanticide
Whereas demographers have generated extensive insights on the “female deficits”
due to selective abortion, historical scholarship permits situation of the biomedical
practice within a longer legacy. During the colonial era, female infanticide became a
focus of administrative preoccupation in parts of northwestern India. 50 Drawing on
historical records, researchers have analyzed killing of newborn girls and the
denunciatory discourses through which it became visible, problematic, and interventionworthy.
The earliest work compiled details of SRs and interventions for areas where
female infanticide prevailed, including present day Gujarat.51 Much subsequent research
has focused on colonial Punjab, analyzing how British administrators generated
moralizing, civilizing, and ultimately interventionist discourses about infanticide while
indirectly encouraging it through land and revenue policies.52
At the same time, in writings spanning four decades, L.S. Vishwanath has
grappled with female infanticide among the Leua Kanbis, a dominant peasant sub-caste
of central Gujarat.53 Seeking to understand “the relationship between female infanticide,
hypergamy, polygyny, lineage system, and other social institutions,” Vishwanath has
treated infanticide “not as an isolated social phenomenon... but... in the framework of the
social system.”54 His analysis foregrounds the decisive role of caste-internal prestige
hierarchies centered on land, wealth, and reputation, along with marriage practices that
articulated and sustained the hierarchies. Leua Kanbis exhibited a de facto status and
marriage ranking that permitted familial mobility; households aspired to ultimately join
the Patidars—the wealthy, prestigious families whose designation would eventually
Khanna 1997. For “daughter dispreference,” see T. Patel 2007c: 135-136; Sangari 2012: 39, 43. For
“dispensable daughters,” see R. Kaur 2008.
50
Again, the regional demographic divide appears. British observers reported female infanticide among the
Todas of South India (Marshall 1873; Rivers 1906), but it did not become an intervention-worthy problem
as it did in the territories of present-day Gujarat, Rajasthan, Punjab, Haryana, and Uttar Pradesh.
51
Panigrahi 1972.
52
Malhotra 2002; P. Oldenburg 1992; S. Sen 2002.
53
Vishwanath 1973, 1983, 1998, 2000, 2004, 2007. The Leua Kanbis are the same sub-caste described in
Pocock’s Kanbi and Patidar (1972); Vishwanath’s analysis of aspiration and hypergamy poses a historical
counterpoint to Pocock’s seemingly timeless descriptions.
The Leua Kanbis are a second-order division according to the typology presented in Shah (1982).
Throughout this dissertation, I use the term “sub-caste” to refer to both second-order divisions (groups
historically observing commensality but not intermarriage with other members of the same first-order
division) and third-order divisions (local endogamous units). Context should generally suffice to clarify the
operative order.
54
Vishwanath 1973: 404. While occasionally comparing the Kanbis with the other prominent “infanticidal
caste” of Gujarat, the Rajputs of Kutch and Kathiawar, Vishwanath emphasized that different marriage and
property systems rendered the dynamics of the two cases considerably different. Bhatnagar et al. (2005)
have analyzed female infanticide and its “suppression” among the Kutch and Kathiawar Rajputs, adopting a
historical-discursive approach that parallels much of the Punjab work.
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become, by assimilation, the entire caste’s moniker. But upward maneuvering came at a
high price: lavish marriage expenditures and dowries to secure hypergamous alliances. In
Vishwanath’s analysis, Leua Kanbis resorted to female infanticide to manage household
social and economic prospects—especially among families of high rank, given the
impossibility of an honorable (hypergamous) marriage, but also among middle- and lowclass families unable to bear ruinous costs.55 As a result, Leua Kanbis exhibited markedly
skewed overall SRs and CSRs, with some of the latter dipping close to 500.56
Vishwanath meticulously documented British administrators’ “discovery” of
female infanticide through censuses, administrative investigations, and Kanbi reformist
activism. Colonial authorities promoted anti-infanticide compacts and formation of small
endogamous circles (gols) to combat hypergamy, but ongoing status striving consistently
undercut such efforts. Because female infanticide still made sense as a kinship practice in
political-economic context, it continued behind closed doors. In a pattern with striking
contemporary echoes, individual cases defied detection, and the practice remained visible
primarily in aggregate statistics. Eventually, administrators applied the Female
Infanticide Act of 1870 to Kanbis, subjecting them to heightened surveillance and hefty
penalties for infanticide and hypergamy.57
Contemporary field researchers have found a significant prevalence of female
infanticide in the southern state of Tamil Nadu—again, concentrated among higher-birthorder daughters.58 Several have drawn explicit connections between infanticide and
“development,” as exemplified by the political economic changes of the green revolution
55

In treating female infanticide as a property management strategy situated within a longer politicaleconomic history, Vishwanath has argued that Muslim rulers’ dissipation of Rajput power and subsequent
Maratha and British land and revenue policies had both engendered and constrained Kanbi agrarian
prosperity (2000: 93-94; 2004: 2317en2312; 2007: 276-277). This more longue durée approach stands in
contrast to other analyses that have primarily or exclusively emphasized the British contribution to the
political economy of female infanticide (e.g., A. Clark 1983; V. Oldenburg 2002).
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According to Vishwanath’s description, “shortage” of girls compelled poor families to practice
brideprice, exchange marriage, and even inter-caste marriage with Koli women. At the same time,
marriageable women remained in surplus at high ranks, and polygyny, dowry, and infanticide persisted.
Vishwanath thus illustrated a phenomenon that would remain woefully under-acknowledged in twentyfirst-century discourses on selective abortion’s relation to marital “supply and demand”: “female deficit”
can reinforce a stratified “marriage market”, with lower-class men pushed into bachelorhood or socially
non-normative unions due to selective reproduction in upper and upwardly mobile classes.
57
Clark’s essay on “female life chances” among the Leua Kanbis (1983) echoed Vishwanath’s analysis and
additionally framed female infanticide as a strategy for advancement of not only individual households, but
the entire sub-caste. According to Clark, selective elimination of girls contributed to the Kanbis’
ascendancy as a locally dominant caste by reducing land fragmentation, consolidating agrarian power, and
facilitating subordination of more rapidly growing castes like the Kolis. EFM (largely through infanticide)
was thus a reproductive strategy that enhanced not only the position of households within a sub-caste, but
also that of the sub-caste relative to other groups. This analysis anticipated Clark’s later argument that
broad class and gender relations could decisively influence more “proximate” determinants of EFM in
India (1987). Kaur has echoed Clark in her call to situate “daughter dispensability” vis-a-vis political
economy, noting historical evidence of female infanticide, involuntary bachelorhood, and polyandry
occurring together in nineteenth-century Punjab as pieces of a comprehensive strategy of gendered property
management (2008).
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Chunkath and Athreya 1997; George et al. 1992.
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and market liberalization.59 But the latest research in Tamil Nadu has shown a shift to
prenatal sex selection as the major contributor to skewed SRs.60 Even in regions of more
recent female infanticide, sex-selective abortion has become predominant.
As in Prime Minister Modi’s speech announcing the national Beti Bachao
campaign, present-day governance discourses often invoke nineteenth-century female
infanticide to condemn sex-selective abortion. In Gujarat, such invocations most often
refer to “making girls dudh-piti [milk-drinking],” or killing them by drowning in a tub of
milk; this technique was practiced among the Rajputs of Western Gujarat, while Leua
Kanbis more frequently employed strangulation, starvation, or opium administration. I
found that the historical image of the drowned newborn carried considerable affective
force for north Gujaratis. But as I discuss in Chapter 6, its facile deployment within antisex selection representations also elided the historical and cultural specificities separating
nineteenth-century infanticide and twenty-first century selective abortion, often leading to
substitution of “dowry,” generalized “discrimination,” or a monolithic “tradition” for the
pressures that actually drove families to sex selection.
The Work of “Culture”: Qualitative Scholarship on Sex Selection
What unique contribution can contemporary qualitative research—particularly the
subset characterized by an anthropological theoretical lens and an empirical commitment
to ethnographic fieldwork—add to the above-enumerated demographic and historical
insights?61
John has lamented how even field studies on sex selection tend to fall into wellworn analytic ruts:
Unfortunately, many... give generic and repetitive explanations for the
prevalence of son preference and daughter dispreference. There is a
tendency to simply repeat the usual list for son preference in patrilineal
and patrilocal societies—as security in old age, for carrying on the family
name, for lighting the funeral pyre and so on, compared to an equally
generic view of daughters as a burden...
In much of the literature,... terms are used generically and loosely,
with little explanatory value. Thus, “tradition”, “culture”, “mindsets”, “son
preference”, and more generally “gender discrimination and bias”,
continue to be the most frequently cited. Interestingly, were we to
compare the contemporary situation with the colonial period,... one may
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The specification of theoretical and ethnographic commitment distinguishes the scholarship I am
highlighting from the extensive armchair debates regarding philosophical and bioethical implications of sex
selection (e.g., Dickens et al. 2005; O. Jones 1992; Kusum 1993; Milliez 2007; Moazam 2004; Weiss 1995;
Wertz and Fletcher 1989, 1998; Zilberberg 2007). Much of this work, uninformed by ethnographic
perspective, has replicated ethnocentric discourses of radical alterity, static “culture,” and Western
individual autonomy versus non-Western social constraint. For an example of bioethical debate informed
by field experience, see the essays in Oomman and Ganatra 2002.
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well get a feeling of déjà vu—what, apart from the new technologies, has
really changed?62
Here, I review qualitative scholarship that avoids these traps, concluding with a statement
of what my study adds to it.
Journalists have produced some rich analyses of sex selection. Most notably,
Mara Hvistendahl has used multi-sited research to link the rise of sex selection in Asia
with transnational processes of population control and technological development.63 The
Indian mass media have also generated innumerable written and audiovisual articles
regarding selective abortion, though many of these simply rehearse stock narratives of
gender bias and essentialized “tradition.”64
Numerous ethnographic essays have documented aspects of the sex selection
process.65 Two mixed-methods studies from the turn of the millennium, remarkable for
the degree of researcher-respondent rapport, remain among the best sources for mapping
abstract SR patterns onto lived experiences of household decision-making and clinical
sex selection.66 Contributions to the 2007 volume Sex-Selective Abortion in India
analyzed multiple dimensions of the practice, such as the “mindset” behind eliminating
female fetuses and abetment from government health workers.67 Other ethnographic
research has connected the pursuit of biomedical sex selection in south India with falling
fertility, rising dowry, and agrarian change.68 And recent work among women in urban
Rajasthan and the Punjabi-American diaspora has illuminated sex selection as a
pragmatic response to both familial pressure and internalized gender inequality.69
Of note, in the early 2000s, Leela Visaria conducted a mixed-methods study of
fertility behavior, skewed SR, and selective abortion in three villages near Mahesana.70
She found SRB skewing in higher-order births, and an amplification of this skewing with
higher caste, education, and landholding status. Women in focus groups cited smallfamily norms, high cost-of-living, a daughter’s alienation at marriage, the burden of
lifelong gifting, and potential abuse by a daughter’s in-laws as reasons for pursuing
selective abortion. Visaria documented widespread awareness of and access to sex
selection services, along with a pattern of husbands and in-laws wielding decisionmaking power regarding such services. Here, too, selective reproduction emerged as a
pragmatic response to familial pressure and personal desires for a son. Chapters 1, 2, 3,
and 4 of this dissertation pick up the threads left by Visaria’s research, offering in-depth
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explorations of the sex selection market, kinship motivations for the practice, the
technicalities of clinical sexing, and diversity of familial decision-making patterns.
The past decade has also seen publication of four fieldwork-based books
exploring the underpinnings and practices of sex selection. Navtej Purewal’s Son
Preference analyzes the titular construct (and knowledge production around it) in Punjabi
culture, tracing the discursive formation through colonial and postcolonial configurations
of statistics, gender ideologies, governance norms, and reproductive choices.71 Sunil
Khanna’s Fetal/Fatal Knowledge leverages long-term ethnography in peri-urban Delhi to
tie use of sex selection technologies to local histories of gender, economic change, and
family planning.72 Mattias Larsen’s Vulnerable Daughters in India pairs focus group data
from eight Himachal Pradesh villages with a fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis of
kinship norms and socioeconomic change to address the apparent paradox of SRs falling
alongside rising appreciation for daughters; he ultimately concludes that rapid
socioeconomic transformation, rising uncertainty in intergenerational expectations, and
fertility decline have combined to reinforce valorization of boys, with “son necessity”
leading to skewed SRs when co-occurring with either changing familial authority
structures or a conjunction of dowry and minimal women’s empowerment.73
The most wide-ranging and ethnographically deep study is the 2008 report
Planning Families, Planning Gender.74 Drawing on fieldwork in fifteen villages of
Punjab, Haryana, Himachal Pradesh, Rajasthan, and Madhya Pradesh, the authors have
analyzed quantitative statistics alongside qualitative data on gender roles, family
reproductive strategies, and sex selection practices to illuminate the “underlying
dynamics of persisting adverse child sex ratios in North India.”75 Consistently
foregrounding the micro/qualitative as a vital complement to the macro/demographic, the
report provides a practice-theory analysis of persistence and change in gender-kinship
institutions and documents biomedical and non-biomedical strategies of sex selection.
The authors have argued that in their fieldsites, “family planning” means planning for
sons and avoiding daughters; that women’s agency in sex selection must be understood
vis-a-vis household structures and broader social norms that devalue women; and that
explaining skewed SRs demands examination of complex arrays of social factors and
transformations rather than single, static causes.
Finally, a burgeoning qualitative literature addresses consequences of sex
selection in India, especially marriage transformations and governance responses.76
Numerous scholars have engaged ethnographically with large-scale trans-regional
marriage flows emerging in response to severely skewed SRs, particularly in Punjab and
Haryana.77 Extensive research—much in the form of reports—provides legal, policy, and
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sociological analysis of anti-sex selection efforts.78 Several scholars have appraised
programs aimed at curbing female infanticide in Tamil Nadu, noting some positive
impact on SRs but also critiquing overly restrictive eligibility requirements, misguided
conceptualizations of the problem, and tacit endorsements of gender disparity.79
Particularly helpful is Rajeshwari Sunder Rajan’s nuanced analysis of how such
programs run up against “the futility of treating [infanticide] as a crime,” rearticulate
stereotypical narratives about backwardness and dowry, and ultimately render unwanted
girls “children of the state.”80 Beyond India, Susan Greenhalgh’s work examines how the
Chinese state has generated and responded to “missing girls” through rural reform and
the one-child policy, opposition to and accommodation of son preference, and recent
framings of “excess masculinity” and “surplus men.”81 I return to this material—
particularly Sunder Rajan and Greenhalgh’s contributions—in discussing efforts to “save
the daughter” in Chapter 6.
In concluding her comprehensive review, John describes “three broad orientations
that need to be probed”: “culture” (echoes of Das Gupta), “political economy” (echoes of
Miller), and “violence” (the unique contribution of feminist praxis around violence
against women).82 She also calls for further efforts to investigate five “domains... that are
caught up in one way or another in aiding sex selection or possibly in combating the
practice”: families, clinics, governance institutions, women’s education, and women’s
labor.83 As I explain below in introducing the gendered fetal subject and the moral
economy of gender-kinship as conceptual tools, I aim to bring culture, economy, and
violence into the same frame through a careful examination of bodies, kinship, and value.
The foundation for such an analysis lies in deep ethnographic engagement with three of
John’s domains: families pursuing sex selection services, clinics providing them, and
institutions attempting to combat them. I bring to the analysis of these domains
corresponding bodies of anthropological literature on gender and kinship, biomedicine,
and governance and the state. Using empirical material from the three domains and
theoretical insights from the three literatures, I analyze the process of sex selection as
lived, understood, and contested on the ground. The study’s contribution rests largely on
deep ethnographic embeddedness within a single site: the north Gujarat district of
Mahesana.
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Place and Person
“Why Gujarat?”
At a family wedding some months before I commenced full-time research, an
acquaintance—a prominent U.S. fundraiser for the Bharatiya Janata Party—asked my
plan. He interrupted my response several times to suggest I study a community in Punjab
or Haryana: “That’s where this problem’s really bad... They’re much worse than
Gujarat... They have so much dowry, and they really do this more.” As I continued, he
grew more agitated, until he finally blurted out, “This’ll just make Gujarat look bad! With
all the work that Narendra Modi’s put into making Gujarat a good example, why do you
want to dig up something bad? Why don’t you focus on where it’s actually a problem?”
The prime minister, he reminded me, hailed from Vadnagar, a town in Mahesana District;
how could the problem possibly be so bad within Modi’s homeland?
During fieldwork, I repeatedly heard the same motifs from government officials,
community leaders, doctors, and families. Even while actively pursuing SD scans and
aborting female fetuses, many couples told me, “You know, this problem isn’t that bad
here.” They suggested I shift my study from Gujarat (2011 CSR: 890) to Punjab (846) or
Haryana (834), where exorbitant dowry meant that “no one lets their daughters live.” Or
perhaps some village in Uttar Pradesh (902) or Bihar (935)—“backward states, where no
one understands the value of a girl.” They persistently constructed a “geography of
blame”84 in which sex selection always existed, at least in its worst form, somewhere
else.
Given such admonitions, a focus on Gujarat stakes out a stance on fundamental
matters of power, naming, and erasure. While doubtless a problem elsewhere, sex
selection also plagues Gujarat. In 2011, Mahesana District’s CSR was 842. The CSR for
the district’s urban areas was 793. Mahesana city had the most skewed CSR for any
urban agglomeration in the entire country (760), and several local towns exhibited
comparable figures. In an era when the “Gujarat model” has become a rallying slogan for
a region, a powerful political current, and a national development trajectory, it remains
imperative not to gloss over ongoing social problems in the state.
For me, the political is also deeply personal. In contending that “sex selection is a
problem that we Gujaratis must face,” as I often did during fieldwork, I claimed
membership in an imagined community of language, culture, and power. As a Gujarati
diaspora child, born and raised in the U.S., I approached this project as a “return home,”
obsessively working through and problematizing my own “hyphenated identity.”85 The
research might be seen as “halfie anthropology,” attuned to multiple constituencies,
invested in reception across multiple audiences, and aware of the dubiousness of the
native/non-native distinctions that have historically framed the anthropological
enterprise.86
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But, of course, things don’t break so neatly into halves.87 What did it mean to
approach the fieldwork as a Gujarati? An American? A Patidar-by-descent? A child of
inter-caste marriage? An elite-educated anthropologist? A doctor-in-training? A man? A
feminist? Throughout my foray into Gujarati sex selection, I found myself pulling apart
the “threads of a culturally tangled identity.”88
A Personal Path
I grew up in an upper-middle class, mixed- but firmly upper-caste GujaratiAmerican household. There, while navigating American childhood, I simultaneously
learned Gujarati language and culture. I also developed there an inchoate feminist
consciousness.89
During my upbringing, I came to understand Gujarati gender and kinship norms,
albeit as they became transformed through the dislocation of diaspora: Why did some
acquaintances consider us strange for housing my mother’s parents from time to time, as
we did my father’s parents all the time? Why so much conflict between my mother and
her in-laws, and virtually none between my father and his in-laws? How had the world
changed since an elderly relative’s response to the birth of my mother—a second
daughter—with the phrase “a stone is born”?
Finally, home was where I first became aware of sex selection. I frequently
overhead as my mother and my father’s mother talked in hushed tones about how in-laws
had forced a distant relative, Preeti-ben, to undergo sex-selective abortion. (I describe
Preeti-ben’s experience in Chapter 4.)
In India for another research project as a teenager, I met with an old friend of my
grandfather. Sitting across from me on a patio chair, the old man took my forearm in a
vise-like grip and intoned, “You know what the biggest problem facing our society today
is? We Patels don’t even allow our daughters to be born! Get it checked, and get it out if
it’s a girl! That’s it.”
His words echoed during the rest of my three-month trip. I began noticing
references to sex selection everywhere—in newspaper charts depicting falling SRs, in
images of strangulated fetuses on the backs of state buses, in everyday conversation with
friends and family. I soon realized I had woken up tardily: the state and mass media were
already constructing the phenomenon as a public crisis, and a fast-growing academic
87
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literature was analyzing it. Upon beginning dual training in medicine and anthropology, I
resolved to undertake an ethnography of sex selection in Gujarat.
Histories of Person, Histories of Place
Born into an affluent Leua Patidar family, my paternal grandmother spent her
formative years in Mahesana.90 When she was still young, her father, an official for the
native Baroda State, moved the family from their nearby native village to the
headquarters for the state’s largest division.
My great-grandfather’s administrative career came at the tail end of over a
century of British indirect rule in north Gujarat. During the nineteenth century, when
colonial officials and social reformers had preoccupied themselves with infanticide
among central Gujarat’s Leua Kanbis, such concern had been virtually absent in the
north, despite a large Kanbi population.91 In sharp contrast to both British and native
central Gujarat, Baroda’s northern division showed relatively balanced SRs (Table 2).
The difference originated largely in the distinct kinship practices of Kadva
Kanbis, who were (my grandmother’s community notwithstanding) the numerically
preponderant Kanbi sub-caste in north Gujarat.92 According to contemporary accounts,
the few Kadvas in British central Gujarat were quickly exempted from the Female
Infanticide Prevention Act after investigation revealed no infanticide among them.93 But
none of the accounts commented on the significance of this finding; nor has such
comment emerged in later analyses of female infanticide or Gujarati society.94 The
Kadva-Leua discrepancy matters because it illuminates the sociocultural contingency of
sex selection.
The key to resolving the north-central (Kadva-Leua) divergence was already
present in the aforementioned colonial accounts. Ethnological descriptions of the Kadvas
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almost always focused on two characteristics: first, a strong group identity constantly
reiterated through ongoing connections to a shared mythic origin-place (Unjha) and
patron goddess (Umiya Mata); and second, the practice of “bound marriages” [bāndhyā
or bandhukā vivāh].95 In a pattern confirmed by contemporary vernacular sources,96
weddings occurred approximately once a decade.97 All girls over forty days old were
married in mass ceremonies at their home villages. According to one account, even
unborn children could be married (contingent on their emerging one male, one female) by
pregnant women walking around the sacred fire together.98
While caution is warranted regarding the colonial portrayals’ precise details, a
sufficient evidence base exists to confidently make six observations regarding Kadva
Kanbi society and kinship. First, daughters almost inevitably married before puberty,
though cohabitation would not commence till later. Second, since marriages took place
simultaneously (and often en masse), there existed limited scope for status-seeking
through lavish wedding expenditure. Third, dowries were modest and often came from
groups much larger than individual households. Fourth, Kadva society’s centralized,
relatively egalitarian structure contrasted sharply with Leuas’ decentralized hierarchies.
Fifth, a certain prevalence of direct exchange marriages—more acceptable among
Kadvas than Leuas—may have further negated tendencies toward hypergamy. Finally,
these sociological factors articulated with an agrarian political economy in which the land
could less effectively support dense populations or heavy agro-capital accumulation,
decreasing the prospects for hypergamy, lavish dowry, and ruinous aspiration relative to
central Gujarat. In combination, these factors made daughters, despite their out-marriage,
less of a burden on Kadva families. The behavioral effects of this condition seem
apparent from Table 2.
By the time bound marriages ceased in 1930 amid intense pressure from social
reformers and the state to repudiate child marriage,99 Kadva Kanbis (now Patidars) had
achieved considerable prominence and status in the north. Following the practice of
splitting castes into good and bad, hardworking and lazy, British and native
administrators had long treated Kanbis as “the best husbandmen” in the region. Such
95
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favor, conjoined with solid landholdings, land consolidation, revenue reforms, and
famine and credit crises from the early nineteenth century onward, had allowed Kanbis to
control increasingly large portions of agrarian capital.100 They had become the region’s
dominant caste.
Besides the ever-present fixation on Brahmins and Vaniyas, colonial documents
also noted the importance of Chaudharys (Anjana Kanbis), a more cattle-focused peasant
sub-caste; pastoralist groups like the Rabaris; the warrior Rajputs; several “Untouchable”
groups; and numerous artisanal castes such as potters (the forebears of Prajapatis like
Asha-ben and Jiten-bhai). Only the Kolis (increasingly known as “Thakardas” and
eventually “Thakors”) could numerically rival the Kadvas; but whereas the latter saw
their fortunes rise with agrarian, industrial, and commercial development, Kolis often
found themselves in immiseration, forced to farm small plots or rent out their labor.101
Table 3 shows the proportions of different castes in Baroda’s northern division in 1931—
the last year with full caste enumeration. By that point, the various castes were forming
or stabilizing marriage arrangements, often in the form of local endogamous gols [circles]
of nominal equals.102 At the time of my fieldwork, the numerically predominant groups in
the Mahesana area remained those most prominent in Table 3, and marriage gols largely
resembled the ones established in the early twentieth century.
By the time my grandmother married in 1941, Mahesana had grown immensely.
When it first became a subdivision headquarters in the 1870s, it was still but a village
(population: 7,825). But it held promise because of its location on the newly constructed
railway between Delhi and Ahmedabad. Baroda’s rulers had subsequently built three
branch lines from the town to different parts of north Gujarat, and it had become the
divisional headquarters in 1906.103 It thereby acquired a political, commercial, and social
import that would continue into the twenty-first century. It remained relatively small
(14,762 souls in the 1931 Census), typifying a regional pattern of modest urbanism that
caused administrative officials to remark, “Most of the places designated as towns in the
Census Reports are merely overgrown villages, and are called towns because they happen
to have a population of 5,000 or more or are the headquarters of [subdivisions].”104 A
century later, I still heard such comments, frequently delivered with warmth and glee,
from denizens of Mahesana—many themselves recent rural-urban migrants.
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Post-independence modification left the Mahesana District the 2010s with a
territory of 4,401 square kilometers—2.2% of Gujarat’s land area.105 It was a place of
“tubewell capitalism”-driven prosperity, with Kadva Patels and certain other groups
having parlayed numerical strength, land, and agricultural prosperity into capital
accumulation, educational attainment, commercial and industrial investment, and
political dominance.106 The region boasted a large commercial class and an extensive
diaspora, both abroad and within the metropolises of western India.107 By the 2011
Census, Mahesana comprised nine subdistricts, each headquartered at a town of the same
name. The district contained 597 inhabited villages, and an overall population of 2
million—one-quarter urban, with one-tenth in Mahesana city alone. Rural, urban, and
overall literacy rates were among the highest in Gujarat. And against 129,169 boys aged
0-6, there existed 108,763 girls.
Even though my family had long ago lost most connections to the region, even
superficial references frequently gave others a basis for projecting an identity onto me:
“Oh, so you’re from around here... By caste?... No, no, just say you’re Patel—mix-bix
doesn’t matter! You are whatever your father is... KP or LP?... Ah, Leua? So not one of
us Umiya-wallahs... Still, our people will always welcome you, since you’re Patel...
What’s your wife? Do Chinese people have castes?... America, eh? New Jersey, or
Chicago?... I have cousins in Georgia and Australia...” Try as I might to contextualize my
responses, my identity consistently came unmoored in conversation, allowing for a
dizzying, sometimes maddening, and frequently productive oscillation among different
states of belonging and alterity.108
But before reaching that point, I faced the challenge of accessing a field I had
never visited. To begin, then, I finagled an observation opportunity at an obstetric clinic
in Gandhinagar.
Glimpses from the Outside
The Gandhinagar clinic drew patients from a north Gujarat territory culturally
similar to Mahesana. For six weeks in 2012, I observed a senior doctor and his junior
partner in their daily routines.
I re-learned obstetric biomedicine in its local form—patterns of doctor-client
interaction, vernacular terminologies, embodied practices, and norms of pregnancy
management and termination. I also caught glimpses of themes that later appeared in
105
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Asha-ben’s story: profound expressions of hope and despair; repertoires of request,
refusal, and referral around SD and second-trimester abortion; partial but powerful
knowledge about sex selection networks; and the ever-present specter of state
surveillance.
Early on, I observed the senior doctor parry multiple families’ SD requests. Many
probed coyly: could he suggest someone who would “check,” since he didn’t have a
machine himself? People cited similar reasons for seeking SD: desiring a son for old age
care and lineage perpetuation, and avoiding another daughter who would inevitably
depart after marriage and (in some castes) take with her a substantial dowry.
While refusing all SD requests initially, the senior doctor sometimes relented with
persistent families, slyly promising to “name a doctor near Mahesana” when “the time is
right—at three months.” If unwilling, he blamed the state: “It’s on the government! The
government’s made the law, so what can be done?”
One day, with his boss out, the junior doctor refused to perform a secondtrimester abortion. Later, during a tea break, he explained, “This is risky business. You
can’t do it after three months. What if they had SD done elsewhere and then came here?”
Taking a long sip of cha, he ventured, “People with two girls should have
permission to get SD. That’d help control population. Otherwise, they’ll birth five-six
children to get a boy! But then enforcement should be made tighter for others—those
who don’t need it.” Another sip. “Anyway, that patient will find someone to do it. And I
know who, too. Get it? Everyone knows you can find it at so-and-so place. From here,
they’ll probably go directly there.”
Some days later, I circled back to the conversation. The junior doctor explained:
It’s happening on a large scale in a town near Mahesana—a doctor named
Ganpat-bhai. He does everything openly. Everyone knows he’s doing it,
but he never has problems. He must be in cahoots with the government
people there. And why would the public oppose him? They’re getting it
done with him! He must be feeding bribes. But he can do it openly.
Honestly, people are doing it openly in many places. There are
agents, too. They bring people for SD. The agent knows the patient, to the
doctor can trust there’s no problem. And these agents take a lot of money!
If the SD costs 5,000, the agent’ll take another 5,000 from the patient.
After taking a sip, the doctor surprised me: “I know because a friend—a medical school
classmate—does it now. He has this kind of system.” When I asked if he could put us in
touch, he just laughed.
Eventually, I expressed a desire to conduct fieldwork in Mahesana. Both doctors
warned of access difficulties: “The people doing it, they won’t let you find out... Patients
can go anonymously, but it’s not that way for you, right? Patients pay, so the doctor’ll do
it for them. They won’t tell you.” Nonetheless, they eventually agreed to support what
they laughingly began calling “the secret mission.”
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After placing some phone calls, the senior doctor instructed me to meet with his
old friend, a Mahesana internist. It remaining unclear what would follow. I boarded a bus,
beginning the journey that eventually connected me to Uma-masi and her clients.
Nandini Clinic
Following a chain of referrals, I found myself walking into Nandini Clinic.
Several weeks had passed without rain, and the air felt oppressively humid. Entering, I
encountered a spatial configuration that I soon recognized as typical for Mahesana
obstetric clinics: a waiting room full of benches; through a door, a consultory containing
the doctor’s desk, family seating, and a curtained-off examining area; elsewhere, several
fan-cooled general wards and air-conditioned private rooms for patients of differing
financial capacities; down the corridor, an operative theater and delivery room; and
adjoining, an associated medical store. Nurses moved briskly among the waiting room,
the consultory, and various patient rooms. A pharmacist, a surgical assistant, a clerk, and
several sweepers tended to different parts of the apparatus. Inside the consultory, the
doctor and his assistant rapidly cycled through patients. Outside, women and relatives sat
on the benches and fanned themselves, waiting to be seen for gynecologic, contraceptive,
infertility, and pregnancy care.
I eventually learned that Nandini represented, in microcosm, a regime of
commercialized biomedical reproduction that had arisen during the previous three
decades.109 Over and over, pregnant women and their older relatives used nearly the same
words to describe the transformation: Back in that era, none of this medicine! Deliveries
happened at home, with a midwife—maybe the government hospital, if you lived in the
city. No one took any pills, and women went back to work—in the fields, milking the
cattle—right away. But now, with this sedentary life and education and junk food, bodies
aren’t the same. Everyone’s delicate. A pregnancy only goes smoothly if you spend
thousands on treatment.
Between 2001 and 2010, clinic deliveries in Gujarat increased from just 40.7% of
births to 89.3%,110 but the biomedicalization of pregnancy and childbirth was both older
and more complete in Mahesana. In a comprehensive early-2000s survey, Mahesana
District had Gujarat’s highest rates of clinical births (74.6%, against a state average of
52.5%) and births attended by biomedical personnel (80.7%, against 62.1%).111 In a late2000s follow-up, Mahesana continued to display the highest rates of “institutional”
(84.3% against a 56.4% average) and “safe” (87.1%, against 61.6%) deliveries.112 Data
from the past few years suggest that 91% of pregnant women in Mahesana received at
least three prenatal check-ups—again, the highest level in the state.113
Proceeding in lockstep with India’s economic liberalization, the biomedicalization
of local reproduction assumed a distinctively commercial character. This was generally
true for Gujarat, where one-third of public referral facilities lacked an obstetrician despite
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2,000 practicing privately, and private-sector deliveries rose from 17% to 60.3% during
the millennium’s first decade (against just a marginal increase in public-sector deliveries,
from 24% to 29%).114 But it was especially true for Mahesana, which boasted Gujarat’s
highest rate of women receiving prenatal care in the private sector.115
Mahesana’s first private obstetrician established his practice in 1981. After a half
dozen others joined him during the 1980s, private clinics mushroomed in the 1990s and
2000s—again, in parallel with broader economic liberalization. By 2010, Mahesana
District had over eighty private obstetric practitioners, with nearly sixty concentrated in
the towns of Mahesana, Visnagar, Kadi, and Unjha. Roughly three-quarters were Patels
or Brahmins, and the former alone comprised a simple majority. Well under one-quarter
were women.116 Most had completed medical training at one of two premier institutions
in Ahmedabad. They were generally just one or two generations removed from
agriculture, their fathers having been either farmers or new entrants to the commercialprofessional middle class—merchants, teachers, and so on; for most, becoming a doctor
had meant considerable upward mobility.
Within this local obstetric landscape, Nandini quickly became my base. The
obstetrician, Dr. Dilip, was known for being welcoming and “jolly,” with a puckish sense
of humor. Sitting with him and his assistant in the consultory, I quickly learned the
contours of commercial pregnancy care in Mahesana. Privacy was scant, with incoming
and outgoing families often seated together even during exchanges about intimate
matters. The average patient encounter lasted five minutes: entrance, complaint, basic
questions, a quick exam, perhaps some more questions, and any necessary instructions or
troubleshooting.
Dr. Dilip’s interactions with clients reflected cross-cutting hierarchies of medical
authority, social esteem, and commercial service: families performed deference,
invariably referring to the doctor as “Saheb,” but “the boss” remained ever-attentive to
making his customers—particularly those from higher social strata—feel valued.
Encounters often veered in a decidedly disempowering direction with respect to gender
and autonomy. The key discussion and decision-making channel frequently ran between
Dr. Dilip and husbands or mothers-in-law, marginalizing patients themselves. The
conjugal “therapy management group”117 could dictate when and how a woman should
become pregnant (fertility treatment), whether a pregnancy should be ended (abortion),
how a birth should take place (Caesarean), and so on. Relatives often talked over patients,
verbally negating the latter’s control over their own bodies: “She doesn’t know
anything!... Why don’t you ask me what’s to be done?” Such exchanges were far from
the only pattern. Many women asserted themselves, even over family members’
114
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objections. And sometimes, relatives spoke as mere spokespersons, relieving patients
from talking about uncomfortable matters. But the underlying patriarchal current
remained, especially since Dr. Dilip frequently spoke in terms that reinforced the genderkinship norms of Gujarati Hindu society.
Time at Nandini also underscored sonography’s centrality in local reproductive
medicine. Despite acknowledging medical orthodoxy regarding the gratuitousness of
more than three scans per pregnancy, Dr. Dilip and other local obstetricians typically
performed sonography at every monthly visit and intervening “problem visits,” so that
many women underwent ten or more scans. Client expectations reinforced the extensive
ultrasound use, with families expressing dismay if the doctor did not “look.”118
Moreover, the machine and its operation were status symbols. Doctor and clients alike
discussed the costs of different devices, the importance of a “big TV,” and the merits of
“high-definition” and “3D-4D” imaging modalities. Ultrasound had become seamlessly
incorporated into the everyday language of visuality: the sonography service was
“looking,” and obtaining it was “getting it looked at.”119
Formation as a biomedical trainee profoundly influenced the observations and
interviews resulting from my time at Nandini. My clinical orientation facilitated
discussion of individual cases’ medical details, as well as the practices, norms, and
implicit knowledge embedded in biomedical obstetric care. It caused Dr. Dilip to oscillate
between avuncular and collegial modes of relating to me—sometimes quizzing me on
microbiological trivia, sometimes asking me to look up American guidelines regarding a
certain drug’s pregnancy safety, sometimes involving me in backstage deliberations on
how to proceed in particularly thorny cases. Moreover, other local doctors routinely
remarked that our shared medical background made them feel at ease in speaking about
sex selection.
My deepest connection to sex selection came from the very first person I
encountered at Nandini. Upon reaching the waiting room that first day, I learned that Dr.
Dilip and most of the staff were occupied by a complicated Caesarean section. The news
came from a woman who, grinning, identified herself as a staff nurse—Uma-masi. Over
the next hour, as we waited for Dr. Dilip, she asked me countless questions about myself,
and I did the same.
I eventually grew to know Uma-masi as I know few among even my closest
friends. She was extremely gregarious, with a riotous sense of humor. It was impossible
to walk even a hundred feet alongside her in the streets of Mahesana without stopping
multiple times for her to greet acquaintances, crack jokes, and follow up on promises
given and received. She could speak harshly, chiding patients and friends, but she was
also quick to forgive, or to wave tension away and carry on. Like many local privatesector nurses, she possessed little formal education but thrived clinically on the basis of
intense curiosity, extensive experience, and excellent patient rapport.
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Over the months and years after our initial encounter, Uma-masi welcomed me
into her life and family. I ate countless meals at her home. Her daughters-in-law
embraced me as a brother, telling me wistfully about their home villages and poking fun
at their mother-in-law whenever she stepped out of earshot. Uma-masi’s sons took me out
to eat and initiated me into Mahesana-area youth masculinity. Her husband showed me
family albums and didactically told me about the social issues facing north Gujarat. The
family and I would stay up late at night watching television, lounging on the patio swing,
and gossiping. In short, Uma-masi and her family enveloped me in their domestic life.
Largely due to them, Mahesana became like home.
Uma-masi also played a decisive research role. Through her, I moved from
hearsay and sidelong observations to direct contact with Chetna Clinic, its doctor, and
couples like Asha-ben and Jiten-bhai. Only with her revelation of her work as a sex
selection facilitator, connecting families and doctors, did my field become fully
constituted.

Constructing the Field
Methods
I initially imagined my Mahesana “field” as spanning three interrelated domains:
clinics, households, and governance institutions. I then approached fieldwork and
analysis with the aim of exploring, interrogating, and deconstructing the boundaries
separating the three.
Assistance from Dr. Dilip and Uma-masi allowed me to access a relatively
understudied part of the sex selection apparatus: obstetricians, commercial facilitators,
and biomedical technology.120 The heart of the clinical fieldwork lay in observation of
172 SD visits and twenty-nine selective abortions at Chetna Clinic, where Uma-masi took
clients. Time at Nandini permitted me to observe routine obstetric care, which was
pervaded by awareness and talk of sex selection. Countless informal conversations with
Dr. Dilip, Uma-masi, other Nandini and Chetna personnel, and eleven facilitators
illuminated otherwise shadowy practices. Finally, through Dr. Dilip’s patronage, I
arranged semi-structured qualitative interviews with thirty-three local obstetricians and
radiologists;121 the interviews covered the shifting sex selection market, the technical and
social dynamics of SD and selective abortion, and perceptions of government regulation.
In working with doctors, I was largely “studying up,” engaging research
participants who outranked me in expertise, wealth, and local prestige and power.122 My
biomedical positionality proved helpful, as it allowed me to bridge clinical and
120
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ethnographic registers. I could speak to doctors as colleague, underling, and researcher.
At the same time, my identity also necessitated greater vigilance—not only for commonsense elisions that demanded greater scrutiny (“You understand this is the only way...”),
but also for my own careless capitulation to biomedical assumptions. I had to constantly
make strange otherwise familiar practices and subject fellow clinicians to the same
hermeneutic suspicions as others.
The clinical setting provided the chief entry-point to the household domain.
Patronage from doctors played a pivotal role in facilitating recruitment of pregnant
women and their families, though I met some through referrals by neighbors, friends,
relatives, or other research participants. I conducted formal qualitative interviews with
members of forty families, but the bulk of my understanding did not come from these
encounters, which quickly veered into predictable rehearsal of socially desirable
responses. Instead, the most important fieldwork with families centered on hundreds of
informal conversations that transpired while cutting vegetables, lulling children to sleep,
cleaning up “accidents,” picking cotton, attending weddings and baby showers, admiring
family albums, sipping chā, watching pirated movies, celebrating religious festivals,
flying kites, or dining together. As per the demographic makeup of the sex selection
clientele I observed, the vast majority of families with whom I engaged were Gujarati
Hindu; I note in the text wherever I am speaking specifically of a Jain, Muslim, or nonGujarati family.
I commenced fieldwork expecting to encounter immense difficulties in studying
clinics and households and relatively easy access to the state government; precisely the
inverse prevailed. Ultimately, perhaps it was for the best. Although I missed out on
certain statistics, policy processes, and administrative insights, the diversion away from
high-level perspectives forced careful attunement to the local representations and
practices through which governance became palpable. I spoke with countless local
bureaucrats, government doctors, community health workers, other public health staff,
and activists. I frequented not only the tea stall near the local health department office,
but also several primary health centres, health subcentres, and subdistrict-level health
offices. Friendly local officials allowed me to accompany them for clinical inspection
visits and village “awareness” seminars. Furthermore, I entered a “polymorphous
engagement”123 with governance discourses and practices through various mediatized
artifacts: policy documents, case law, legal forms, inspection checklists, posters,
pamphlets, books, billboards, and radio and television advertisements extolling the virtue
of daughters.
Field experiences also led me to broaden my lens. Conversations with gol leaders
yielded rich insights on community-level steps to combat sex selection. Similarly, short
films, booklets, social media messages, and taped speeches from various nongovernmental sources revealed how the “save the daughter” ideal entered wider
circulation, generated new public audiences, and captured imaginations.
Numerous fieldwork events obviously bridged multiple domains: medico-legal
workshops at obstetric conferences, for instance, or government seminars attended by
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village women. More significantly, overlaps among the three artificially bounded
domains—clinics, households, governance institutions—emerged from engagement with
everyday practices supposedly native to one, such as clinical recordkeeping,
neighborhood discussion of state policy, or obstetric responses to patient demands.
Indeed, the clinical and household components became a continuum of observed practice
and in-depth conversations without any clear dividing line, with governance ever-present
as a layered-on-top (and sometimes infiltrating) presence. This dissertation is an
argument not only for taking a “jeweler’s-eye view”124 of each domain, but also for
understanding how all three thoroughly blended together to constitute the phenomenon of
sex selection.
Ethics
My fieldwork and subsequent writing have posed ethical dilemmas in three broad
categories. First, the matter of gendered positionality. Feminist ethnography must always
contend with the inherent potential for “inequality, exploitation, and even betrayal,” since
everything is “ultimately data, grist for the ethnographic mill, a mill that has truly
grinding power”; the field situation places the participant-observer in a “ghoulish and
structurally conflictual relationship to tragedy” that exposes the “conflicts of interest and
emotion between the ethnographer as authentic, related person (i.e., participant), and as
exploiting researcher (i.e., observer).”125 These issues proved especially acute for me as a
man working largely with women, and on gender.126
I approached fieldwork aware of the need to treat my own masculine identity as
part of a system of power, rather than merely a form of difference.127 Gender was not
merely a barrier of “access” to be “overcome” or “minimized,” but a central aspect of the
fieldwork condition that required constant, reflexive attention.128 I had to carefully
interrogate and handle my gender identity as it intersected with caste, age, geographic
provenance, technical expertise, clinical situation, and other crosscutting factors.
Recruiting, engaging, and representing women and those around them called for hyperawareness of gendered power.
My biomedical positioning and the patronage of trusted clinicians complicated
matters. Both factors facilitated recruitment of families,129 but I had to remain vigilant for
and act against the additional layer of gendered power they introduced: Did a particular
patient see conversing with me as linked to her ongoing care, or as a means to involve
another biomedical (pseudo)expert in it? Was she agreeing to speak only out of a sense of
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obligation to the doctor—itself born from a relationship shot through with inequalities of
gender, class, and authority?
Throughout the fieldwork, I strove to mitigate the ill effects of such dilemmas of
recruitment and relation. Early on, I decided to approach families through the
intermediation of a nurse or other female staff member, rather than the doctor’s direct
recommendation—a strategy that widened the scope for polite refusal. I observed clinical
interactions only when I could obtain permission directly from the patient herself.
Sometimes, gender dynamics necessitated that I speak only with men or older women in
a family. In other cases, I could speak freely with pregnant women, and their husbands
and in-laws appeared uninterested. Between these two extremes, a wide range of
situations prevailed, with each household requiring an individualized approach.
In writing, I have attempted to avoid or mitigate objectifying representations of
women. I do not harbor illusions regarding the feasibility of entirely avoiding
objectification, given my triple constitution as a masculine, biomedical, and ethnographic
subject. But I hope this dissertations denaturalizes and assails gender inequalities in
greater measure than it reinforces them.
There is also the matter of confidentiality and betrayal. Manifesting in
abandonment, erasure, and exposure, betrayal is an unfortunately pervasive aspect of
ethnographic fieldwork and representation.130 In my work, betrayal might intersect with
issues of gendered power, manifesting in an unsettling of family dynamics through
unwelcome attention or unwise disclosure. But the potential for indiscreet betrayals
stretched beyond the household, into my navigation of collegial relationships, clinicianpatient relationships, and state-citizen relationships. As I discuss in Chapter 1, I found
myself obligated to traverse a web of discretion and deceit during fieldwork. After
gathering and objectifying information, I took extensive data protection measures.131 And
in the text, I have modified or omitted many details regarding persons, places, and
events.. Such changes do not warp the overall picture, but they bracket details that might
further illuminate it.
Finally, this project has engendered dilemmas regarding witnessing violence. I
have frequently castigated myself, asking what could justify my quasi-voyeuristic
observation of a form of gendered violence. Of course, I was never a passive observer,
nor “neutral”: I consistently engaged in intense, lengthy conversations with people about
the meanings of their practices. My contribution to such dialogues evolved as I learned
more about sex selection, its underpinnings, and its context.
But I also restrained myself from intervening proximally in the face of
sometimes-wrenching events. Such distancing was not a result of “suspending the
ethical,” but rather of determining that immediate action would presume an
understanding of the very phenomenon, the very violence, the very complexity to be
grasped—that the key moral intervention lay not in presuming and acting on “the
130
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primacy of the ethical,” but rather in producing “excellent, reflexive, and critical”
ethnography that could illuminate the sociocultural conditioning of violence and
ethicality itself.132 Assuming the position of ethnographic witness, I took it as imperative
to engage with “perpetrators” as part of a critical anthropology committed to parlaying
explanations of power into praxis.133
But how to responsibly represent witnessed violence? How to “give an account of
these shocking events without giving in to a desire to shock”—to avoid a “pornography
of violence”134 in which “places, images and events flash by in rapid succession, an
unintelligible pastiche of terror whose effect is to unsettle rather than enlighten”?135
In writing this dissertation, I have aimed to find a balance between “[fattening
violence up] into prurience” and “flattening it down into theory.”136 In avoiding
prurience, I have sought to steer clear of “lurid recountings that serve little other purpose
than to show... that I was there”137—particularly when ghastly images and sensationalistic
narratives already circulate widely in the “scandalous publicity”138 that conjures sex
selection as one of modern India’s chief crises. More specifically, given that vivid antisex selection messages often become transformed into anti-abortion messages,139 I have
restricted description of selective abortion itself to the minimum necessary for analysis. I
have also attempted to keep my writing accessible to a wide readership, mindful of the
adage that a feminist ethnography of violent social formations faces two tasks: first, to
deconstruct relations of domination and violence; and second, to begin constructing
visions for more equal ways of being.140

The Gendered Fetal Subject
This dissertation’s central argument is that actions around ultrasound sex
determination both presumed and produced a gendered fetal subject—an imagined or
potential person whose positioning at the limit of sociality made it the center of a whole
assemblage of familial, medical, and regulatory activity. Prenatal SD practices
incorporated the unborn into kinship systems. In doing so, they gave rise to a host of
other practices that presupposed, shaped, and intervened on the gendered fetus.
Sonographic gendering mobilized imaginings, visions, hopes, fears, evaluations, and
deliberations, ultimately potentiating rejection or acceptance of specific fetal relatives.
In positing a gendered fetal subject, I am not ascribing the unborn a subjectivity.
Rather, I am emphasizing its subjection to power. French philosopher Michel Foucault’s
work illustrates how knowledge production simultaneously produces subjects, subject
positions, and social phenomena.141 Anthropologists have widely used Foucauldian
132

Valentine 2003; cf. Scheper-Hughes 1995.
Clarke 2010.
134
Daniel 1996: 3, 4.
135
Pedelty 2013: 25.
136
Daniel 1996: 4; see also Scheper-Hughes and Bourgois 2004: 25-26.
137
Farmer 2003: 26.
138
Cohen 1999.
139
Nidadavolu and Bracken 2006.
140
C. Cohn 1987: 717-718.
141
Foucault 1990, 1995, 2003.
133

40

theory to explore subjectification—the production of subjective consciousness—within
systems of power. But assujetissement, the bivalent term that predominated in Foucault’s
early work carries another meaning in addition to “subjectification”—“subjection.”142
With connotations of fixing tightly, assujettissement (unlike the later subjectivation)
foregrounds how power relations subjugate material bodies, tying them into broader
social formations. In practices and discourses around sex selection, the fetus became
subject to the power of kinship, biomedicine, and top-down regulation.
Prenatal classification according to binary sex—indeed, the very possibility of
such classification—situated the fetal subject as a “boundary object”143 on the borders
among families, clinics, and governance institutions. Activity around prenatal gender in
these domains sometimes converged and sometimes diverged, creating the resonances,
tensions, and complexities that characterized sex selection. Brought into the force field of
gender and kinship—henceforth, gender-kinship144—liminal beings became subject to
further intervention and imagination.
Materializing the Fetal Body
In highlighting the constitution and circulation of a gendered fetal subject, I am
building on overlapping lines of inquiry in philosophy and reproductive anthropology.
The first contains considerable theorizing around the gendering of fetal matter, with a
seminal instance appearing in Judith Butler’s Bodies that Matter. Extending Louis
Althusser’s notion of “interpellation,” which posits persons as “always already” subjected
to ideologies through everyday processes, Butler has said of birth:
Consider the medical interpellation which (the recent emergence of the
sonogram notwithstanding) shifts an infant from an “it” to a “she” or a
“he,” and in that naming, the girl is “girled,” brought into the domain of
language and kinship through the interpellation of gender. But that
“girling” of the girl does not end there; on the contrary, that founding
interpellation is reiterated by various authorities and throughout various
intervals of time to reinforce or contest this naturalized effect.145
This observation highlights how authoritative biomedical pronouncement subjects bodies
to a gender system that both pre-exists them and becomes instantiated through their
description. In Butler’s view, bodily materialization is a process that “stabilizes over time
to produce the effect of boundary, fixity, and surface”;146 as per her earlier work, such
corporeal borders constitute the limits of the socially hegemonic and are hence always
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vulnerable and dangerous.147 Following this approach, SD sonography actually
interpellated fetuses into local gender-kinship hegemony before birth, positioning them at
the threshold of sociality.
Several philosophers have explicitly addressed Butler’s bracketed sonogram. In
analyzing the collective ideological “hallucination” of “fetus, fetal sex, fetal gender”
through ultrasound, Lesley Larkin has written:
The [fetus] is... compulsively sexed and gendered; the visual
representations that precede—and substitute for—its physical entry into
society are constructed as ‘girls’ and ‘boys.’... Sex itself is constructed and
naturalized through both authoritative medico-technological discourse
and—ironically—the subordination of medical diagnosis of sex to
social/familial constructions of gender... Authentic sex is first and most
successfully constructed not on a ‘real’ body but on the technological
image of a body... The ultrasound image... not only appears to make
visible the fetus (‘baby’) and its genitals (‘sex’), but, in the third layer of
‘revelation,’ it makes gender visible on the images of fetal genitals.148
Larkin’s description of sonography’s alchemy—image to body, body to genitals, genitals
to sex, sex to gender—provides a useful handle for analyzing the clinical practice of SD.
In fact, she has observed that the very language of “sex determination”—the prevalent
idiom in Gujarati clinical and governmental talk—laminates together three actions: “’find
out,’ ‘control,’ ‘decide.’”149 Action around gendered fetal subjects in Mahesana certainly
involved all three.
While philosophy offers helpful theoretical insights, contextualizing lived
experiences of sex selection requires a turn to ethnography. Since the 1970s, scholars
working at the intersection of feminist and medical anthropology have produced an
extensive literature on reproduction as it relates to gender, embodiment, biomedicine, and
power.150 The literature’s vast empirical and theoretical insights are a testament to the
value of “[dragging] reproduction to the center of social theory.”151 Revitalizing and
nuancing a longstanding anthropological interest, the sub-field highlights the importance
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of analyzing the relationships between production of persons and production of the social
order—of understanding how procreation and cultural formations situate and extend one
another.152 Furthermore, as Janelle Taylor argues, “what feminist ethnographers have
shown, through their research into women’s reproductive lives and experiences, is what
anthropologists have long sought to demonstrate: that to study ordinary people in their
everyday lives is, indeed, to address the big ideas.”153 In my case, sex-selective
reproduction provides insight on how persons and relations are produced by and produce
gendered social systems, even before birth.
Considerable feminist research has examined prenatal practices and processes to
elucidate how reproductive technologies subject fetuses, embryos, gametes, and other
nascent bodies to novel imaginings and strivings. This work describes how biotechnically
mediated fetal images circulate among clinics, families, markets, governments, and
broader public spheres, making fetal subjects visible as ontological artifacts,
epistemological challenges, and socio-political possibilities.154 It also shows how
reproductive technologies and kinship reconfigure each other, generating new forms of
sociality.155 Scholarship specifically focused on prenatal diagnosis illustrates how it
mediates recognition of children-to-be as particular types of future persons, facilitating
their rejection (through abortion) or acceptance.156 For instance, Barbara Katz Rothman
has poignantly demonstrated how prenatal testing renders even wanted pregnancies
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“tentative,” while Rayna Rapp has evocatively described how women navigate the
prospect of “chosen loss” that emanates from amniocentesis.157
Within prenatal diagnostics, ultrasound is the modality par excellence for
“imaging and imagining the fetus”158—for materializing its body and personhood.
Clinical ethnographers have demonstrated how sonography becomes a technology of
“appraisal, acquaintance, and care,” with its visual immediacy granting it a privileged
role in prenatal knowledge production.159 The “cyborg fetus” of ultrasound imagery is
always a culturally specific achievement, created through real-time coordination of talk,
touch, and vision.160 “Seeing the baby” raises pleasures and dilemmas, activating intimate
and collective meanings while forging relations among kin.161 It is within these broader
patterns that we must situate how Mahesana-area SD interlaced recognition of fetal
subjects with powerful affects of hope, fear, disappointment, and satisfaction.
Three ethnographic books have analyzed sonography in practice. Lisa Mitchell’s
ethnography of Canadian obstetric ultrasound demonstrates how sonographic sight leads
clinicians and families to personify the fetus and emplace it within kinship: “The fetus
emerges as a social being, a social actor with a distinctive identity—‘the baby’—
enmeshed in a social network of kin.”162 Janelle Taylor has traced public circulation of
fetal sonograms, analyzing how the ultrasound fetus becomes a personified, commodified
fetish to which various cultural meanings attach; echoing Rothman and Rapp, she
emphasizes how scanning paradoxically makes the fetus more connected but more
contingent.163 Most recently, Tine Gammeltoft’s account of disability-selective abortion
in Vietnam has highlighted how sonographic images become the subjunctive and anxietyridden medium for parents to meet their children-to-be. 164 Gammeltoft describes how
abnormal scans generate an “existential aporia” in which parents must reject the bonds of
either kinship or citizenship, prompting a turn to medical advice, scientific and
cosmological meaning-making, everyday disability experiences, and collective
deliberation to transform decisions around selective abortion into something bearable.
She argues for the need to “emphasize the roles played by the inchoate, the invisible, the
not fully articulated in human lives,” given that “perhaps more than any other social
figure, the fetus embodies the possible, the tentative, that which is not yet fully there; it
exists and yet it does not, it affects others without being tangible or visible to the eye.”165
Gammeltoft’s ethnography exemplifies an emerging literature on selective
reproductive technologies, which fulfill a role previously belonging to infanticide alone
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by enabling “deliberate selection of new family members.”166 In their recent review,
Gammeltoft and Ayo Wahlberg analyze selective reproduction vis-a-vis family-building
practices, medical commercialization, and political control, ultimately emphasizing how
it generates novel dilemmas as well as novel possibilities.
This dissertation extends feminist analyses of reproductive biomedicine by
considering how technologies of sex selection materialized and acted on fetal bodies,
subjecting them to gender-kinship norms, personification, and intervention. It considers
how tentative pregnancies, chosen losses, fetishized fetuses, and inchoate persons
appeared and disappeared in the reproduction of patriarchy.
Visibility, Potentiality, and the Moral Economy of Gender-Kinship
The story that emerged around the gendered fetal subject during my fieldwork
was one of seeing and being seen, appearance and concealment, exposure and
disappearance. In this, the visual nature of sonography was neither totally necessary nor
totally incidental. Many of the same dynamics might have prevailed with SD by
amniocentesis (as in the 1980s) or blood test (as in the possibly near future). And yet the
pervasiveness of a visual knowledge paradigm—of “looking” and “getting it looked at, of
manifesting and hiding—did influence constructions of the gendered fetal subject, as I
discuss in Chapter 3.
In sex selection, as in other social phenomena, visibility was “not simply an
image,” but “a real social process” at the confluence of perception and power; it
simultaneously mediated and confounded production of knowledge, control, and
recognition.167 The ethnography itself also involved “learning to see”—tracking persons
and things across contexts, scrutinizing concealment and revelation, and analyzing how
visible objects mediated relations.168 Understanding the social life of the gendered fetal
subject requires asking, “How is visibility possible? For whom, by whom, to whom and
of whom? What remains invisible, to whom and why?”169
“Seeing,” as Valerie Hartouni has stated, “is... a set of densely structured and
structuring interpretive practices... that engages us in (re)producing the world we seem to
apprehend only passively.”170 Visuality encompasses “not just the social construction of
vision,” but also “the visual construction of the social.”171 For instance, scholars have
shown how biomedical imaging practices shape clinical problem solving, concepts of
personhood and body, and broader health politics.172 More generally, medical
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anthropologists have illustrated how seeing and being seen reconfigure embodied social
relations across a wide range of conditions, from pregnancy in rural India to inpatient
hospital treatment in Papua New Guinea.173 Building on these perspectives, the story
contained in these pages is fundamentally about the visibility of the gendered fetal
subject and its surrounding practices.
Vision matters largely because it is a medium of social recognition: seeing an
object is a crucial moment in recognizing it—particularly so for persons.174 Far from
being a natural fact, personhood is always a cultural production, requiring social
recognition to bring it into being.175 Indeed, personhood “is a process conferred,
attenuated, contested, and withheld by the collective”—particularly at the beginnings of
life.176 In discussing “the moral and social complexity that everywhere surrounds the
beginnings of personhood,” Wendy James has observed, “’Recognition’ implies a
pragmatic acceptance, conferring on the embryo, foetus, or infant at the least a
provisional ‘personhood’ and an extension of basic physical care. This is not universal or
automatic. Not all early human life is socially ‘recognized’ in this sense and partly as a
consequence of the nature of such recognition not all survives.”177
Lynn Morgan’s extensive comparative work rearticulates, empirically
substantiates, and extends James’s argument by highlighting the culturally variable status
of the unborn.178 Morgan’s scholarship shows that pre-birth body, personhood, and moral
status—indeed, even (social) birth itself—depend on culturally specific collective action.
It emphasizes how the unborn are always liminal or threshold beings, embodying both
possibility and its incomplete actualization. Morgan’s insights exemplify an extensive
literature attesting how fetal ontologies, personhoods, and imaginaries—hence,
recognitions as well—vary greatly with social and historical positioning.179 Across
different situations, recognition of the unborn may vary not only in degree, but also in
type.180 And since “the question of recognizing a child clearly anticipates its potential
social place,” recognition may not prove unambiguously positive.181 For female fetuses in
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north Gujarat, social visibility could spell elimination, with rejection occurring both
despite and because of recognition.182
People sought to visualize fetal subjects in order to recognize their gendered
potentialities. Writing on potentiality in biomedicine, Karen-Sue Taussig and colleagues
have recently observed that “to imagine or talk about potential is to imagine or talk about
that which does not (yet and may never) exist.”183 Their exposition identifies three
different meanings for potential: “a hidden force determined to manifest itself—
something that with or without intervention has its future built into it”; plasticity; and “a
latent possibility imagined as open to choice, a quality perceived as available to human
modification and direction.”184 Reflecting Morgan’s influence, the account then uses the
embryo to illustrate how one object may embody all three meanings, and “how easily one
meaning slides into another, so that a claim about potential as a hidden force... becomes
subject to a (necessary) action or even choice.”185
Building on this perspective, I propose that gendering made visible the unborn’s
potential in the first and third senses—as human matter inevitably destined to develop
into a particular type of relative, and as a still-unactualized person subject to reproductive
choice. Ephemerally materialized in multiple, often-contradictory forms, fetal potentiality
prompted searching, recognition, and reaction. It became interpellated—within medicine
as malleability, within kinship as relationality, and within governance as citizenship.
Once visible, the gendered child-to-be became subject to evaluation—to
differential attribution of worth according to sociocultural logics. Anthropological studies
have typically focused on two different senses of “value”: worth as generated for and
through material exchange relations, and fundamental principles that order ways of being
and doing in the world.186 In analyzing the relationship between Gujarati “family values”
and the social values attached to different bodies, I am straddling these two senses.
Spurring materially and ethically productive actions, the gendered fetal subject
epitomized connections between the worth of potential persons and shared conceptions of
the good life.187
Gendered fetus’s became situated vis-a-vis value(s) through the functioning of a
moral economy of gender-kinship. I adopt here Lorraine Daston’s definition of “moral
economy” as a “web of affect-saturated values that stand and function in well-defined
relationship to one another”—an emotion- and value-laden system (moral) that follows
explicable (though not always predictable) regularities (economy).188 In Daston’s view,
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moral economies extend beyond individual psychology or ideologically veiled material
interests. Instead, they represent balanced systems of emotional forces with equilibria,
constraints, malleability, internal logics, and close ties to human activity. Moreover, they
defy separation of instrumental and affect-laden actions.
Scholars have employed the moral economy concept to analyze practices from
drug-related violence in the U.S. inner city to corruption in postcolonial governments.189
Several have discussed moral economies of kinship or gender, with the most detailed
account elucidating the intertwining of kin relations and property systems in community
reproduction.190 By invoking a moral economy of gender-kinship, I am highlighting that
sex selection was not reducible to a straightforward process of households, communities,
“gender bias,” “discrimination,” or “patriarchy” eliminating potential girls before they
could come into existence. Rather, gendered fetal subjects acquired differential value
amid complex systems of material and affective relations. Shared expectations and
regularities regarding management of bodies, personhood, and household economy
heavily conditioned the rejection of daughters-to-be.
How, then, did different processes interpellate the gendered fetal subject within a
moral economy of gender-kinship? In part, visibility to the family facilitated the fetus’s
situation within gender-kinship logics. The potential child became conscripted into a
system that converted bodily difference into hierarchies of domination and
subordination.191 The unborn became always-already subject to hegemonic norms of
marriage and descent, inheritance and gifting, care and expenditure, and connection and
separation. With sonographic materialization, prospective parents could read different
future trajectories of reproductive labor, alienation, and retention from different fetal
bodies. Daughters-to-be frequently settled “at the point of kinship’s (never quite
nonnormative dissolution,”192 where severed bonds left behind only the negative residue
of relations.
Family-building overlapped with clinical action: just as a gendered fetal subject
required interpellation within a gender-kinship system, a gendered fetal subject presumed
interpellation through biomedical technology and expertise. Much like the “unborn
patient” of in utero surgery or the barely “viable” second-trimester fetus, the gendered
child-to-be existed by virtue of and remained subject to clinical intervention.193 It
materialized through the activity of an apparatus extending from ultrasound machine,
a “legitimising notion” that gives rise to regularities of value and activity (1995: 3fn1). Like my analysis,
hers, which examines “the moral economy of science,” does not conform to the view that “moral economy”
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14).
189
de Sardan 1999; Karandinos et al. 2014.
190
Brandstädter 2003: 437. Of note, Brandstädter states that the focus on social reproduction within
capitalist economies requires a divergence from Thompson and Scott, who hold the moral economy to
stand in opposition to capitalist logics. For other uses with gender or kinship, see, e.g., Fassin et al. 2008:
234; Huberman 2011; Paxson 2006. In most such instances, the notion of moral economy provides an
important framing device but is not unpacked per se.
191
Rubin 2011.
192
Pinto 2014: 256.
193
Casper 1998; Christoffersen-Deb 2012.

48

sonographer, and pregnant woman toward clinical setting, family, and society.194 In
visualizing and interpreting genitals, the sonographer initiated the alchemic conversion
that facilitated recognition (and acceptance or rejection) of a potential son or daughter.
Commercialized biomedicine entered the moral economy as a site for capital
accumulation through inscription of cultural logics on maternal and fetal bodies. The
gendered fetal subject became tied to dynamics of profit and patronage that encompassed
exploitation, entrepreneurship, mutual assistance, and pity.
Finally, the PCPNDT Act and anti-sex selection campaigns interpellated the
potential child as a subject of reproductive governance, or “the mechanisms through
which different historical configurations of actors... use legislative controls, economic
inducements, moral injunctions, direct coercion, and ethical incitements to produce,
monitor and control reproductive behaviours and practices.”195 Selective reproduction
became the target of normalizing biopolitical interventions that linked corporeal control
and population management.196 Biomedically inflected governance discourses constituted
female fetuses as “threshold subjects”—“fetal citizens... worthy of state protection”
through legal-bureaucratic intervention on the social space of the womb.197 Despite
considerable resource expenditure, interventions organized around “seeing like a state”
missed the black market and the shared moral-economic understanding that subtended
it.198 At the same time, governance remained intimately intertwined with the moral
economy through histories of economic liberalization, obstetric commercialization, and
ultrasound import; through measures promoting population control and gender-unequal
economic development; and through the PCPNDT Act, which generated rent-seeking
opportunities and a “politics of duplicity” by driving sex selection underground.199
Ultimately, the gendered fetal subject and the moral economy of gender-kinship
mutually shaped each another. In SD, families and clinicians visualized the fetus amid the
interpellating forces of gender-kinship, thereby materializing those forces prenatally.
Practices of selective abortion and selective nurturance then differentially addressed
gendered fetal potentiality, leading to a selective reproduction that favorably positioned
families within the moral economy while simultaneously modifying its material (bodily)
base.
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The Matter of Violence
Countless activists and academics have advocated for understanding sex selection
as a prenatal form of gendered violence.200 The process certainly enacts a violent logic
embedded in the moral economy of gender-kinship, which attaches lower value to female
bodies. Like the neonatal deaths studied by Nancy Scheper-Hughes in Brazil, sex
selection is a form of structural violence in which institutions of state, medicine,
community, and family operate together to transform undervaluation of particular bodies
intro social disappearance.201 But locating the act of sex-selective reproduction on a
continuum of violence that stretches from structural to intimate reiterates the need to
theorize its proximate administration.202 How should we ethnographically understand the
recognition and rejection of daughters-to-be as a violent social process, particularly when
anti-sex selection discourse always risks slippage into general anti-abortion discourse?203
A focus on the gendered fetal subject as liminal person can help untie the knot.
As discussed above, the unborn exist at a threshold of human social life.
Materializing or surfacing the fetal body always entails marking out a boundary that does
not stand outside sociality, but rather defines it. The fetus’s potentiality and liminality—
not quite a person (but not quite not), not quite alive (but not quite not)—matter, for they
pose a limit against which sociocultural forces press.
Veena Das’s work poignantly illustrates how the limits of human life are a
privileged site for the operation of violence, which both unmakes and makes sociality:
“In the process of being articulated and sometimes practiced, violence seems to define the
edges at which experimentation with a form of life as a human form of life occurs.”204
Elsewhere, Das has specified:
The dangers that human beings pose to each other... relate to not only
disputations over forms but also disputations over what constitutes life.
The blurring between what is human and what is not human shades into
the blurring over what is life and what is not life... Sometimes [denial]
announces itself in... the fear of natality, and the thought that violence may
be linked not only to handing out death but also in the refusal to allow
another to be born.205
By oscillating along (and thereby problematizing or collapsing) the linear axis “personnonperson,” the gendered fetal subject of Mahesana inhabited an in-betweenness that
made possible a particular form of selective reproduction while simultaneously rendering
that form comprehensible as gendered violence. In SD and selective abortion, families
recognized the female fetal subject as embodying a particular kind of potential
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personhood and then eliminated it on the basis of its moral status as a non-actualized
person.206
The argument for sex selection as a form of gendered violence is relatively easy to
accept from a purely structural or systemic perspective, with no concrete families,
clinicians, or fetuses in the picture. Ethnography opens up the possibility of theorizing the
materiality of violence at the limit of human personhood, but it also makes any
theorization about violence more complicated. Confronting the gendered fetal subject and
the machinations entails elaborating and nuancing our understandings of the interplay
between sex selection and the moral economy it embodies. Rather than simply locating
the former within the latter, we must draw connections, mark separations, and theorize
how the prevention of existence for certain imagined persons relates to a society-wide
diminishment of female presence. The up-close perspective on sex-selective reproduction
allows for analysis of it as a violent experiment at the limit of social life—the limit of
violence itself.
Overview of the Dissertation
Each of the dissertation’s six chapters elucidates a different part of the assemblage
of actions surrounding the gendered fetal subject. Chapter 1 describes the history and
functioning of the market for gendering and selectively eliminating fetuses, focusing on
the roles of technologies, biomedical experts, and other personnel. It also describes the
rise of a governance regime that has attempted to catch ongoing acts of sex selection and
render them publicly visible. Chapter 2 delineates the moral economy of gender-kinship
that gave meaning to clinical gendering, emphasizing the futures that families envisioned
for potential children. Chapter 3 describes the concrete clinical practices that materialized
and intervened on the gendered fetal subject, spanning sonographic SD and its
uncertainties, selective abortion and its risks, and selective nurturance. Chapter 4
examines household power dynamics and women’s agency around gendering and
eliminating potential children, with a focus on seeing beyond stock narratives of family
decision-making. Chapter 5 considers non-biomedical techniques that operated alongside
conventional sex selection to shape gendered fetal subjects. It also closes the portion of
the dissertation focused on clinical and familial action by considering practitioners’ and
families’ perspectives on the ethicality of selective reproduction. Chapter 6 shifts the
spotlight to construction of the gendered fetal subject within institutions and discourses of
governance, analyzing public attempts to render visible, valorize, and thereby save
threatened daughters. In the conclusion, I reflect on what the gendered fetal subject of
north Gujarat contributes to our understandings of sex selection and prenatal personhood
more generally.
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Table 1 – Child Sex Ratio (0-6) of Indian States and Territories
2011 Child Sex
Ratio
INDIA
919
Western India
Gujarat
890
Maharashtra
894
Daman and Diu
904
Dadra and Nagar Haveli
926
Goa
942
North India
Haryana
834
Punjab
846
Jammu and Kashmir
862
Delhi
871
Chandigarh
880
Rajasthan
888
Uttarakhand
890
Uttar Pradesh
902
Himachal Pradesh
909
Madhya Pradesh
918
Chhattisgarh
969
East India
Bihar
935
Orissa
941
Jharkhand
948
West Bengal
956
Andaman and Nicobar
968
Islands
South India
Lakshadweep
911
Andhra Pradesh
939
Tamil Nadu
943
Karnataka
948
Kerala
964
Puducherry
967
Northeast India
Manipur
930
Nagaland
943
Sikkim
957
Tripura
957
Assam
962
Mizoram
970
Meghalaya
970
Arunachal Pradesh
972

2001 Child Sex
Ratio
927
883
913
926
979
938
819
798
941
868
845
909
908
916
896
932
975
942
953
965
960
957

959
961
942
946
960
967
957
964
963
966
965
964
973
964
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Source: Census of India
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Table 2 – Child Sex Ratio Comparison: Northern/Kadva versus Central/Leua

NORTH

CENTRAL
1872 Child Sex Ratio (0-6)

Kadi Subdivision: 941
Vijapur Subdivision: 928
Kheralu Subdivision: 954
Visnagar Subdivision: 941
Vadnagar Subdivision: 961

Petlad Subdistrict: 834
Khera District: 897

1881 Child Sex Ratio (0-9)
Kadi Subdivision: 958
Vijapur Subdivision: 976
Mahesana Subdivision: 976
Visnagar Subdivision: 961
Kheralu Subdivision: 988
Vadnagar Subdivision: 917

Petlad Subdistrict: 866

1891 Child Sex Ratio (0-9)
Kadi Division: 995

Baroda Division: 950
1901 Child Sex Ratio (0-10)

Kadi Division: 970

Petlad Subdistrict: 777
1911 Child Sex Ratio (0-9)

Kadi Division: 934

Baroda Division: 888
1921 Child Sex Ratio (0-12)

Kadva Kanbis: 978
Source: Census of India

Leua Kanbis: 863
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Table 3 – Caste Composition of Baroda State Northern Division, 1931

Source: Lobo 1995: 190-191
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Note: 1911 Census of India found roughly 30,000 Anjana Kanbis (Chaudharys) out of 216,000 total in the
northern division, suggesting an error in this table. The Chaudhary population was likely an order of
magnitude larger—about 3% of the population.

Chapter 1: The Market for Sex Selection
“A Secret Thing”
It was Wednesday morning. I reclined against the richly upholstered sofa in Umamasi’s sitting room. She sat cross-legged across from me, taking string beans from a
splayed newspaper sheet and cutting them into a steel bowl at her feet. We chatted about
how many routine antenatal patients would come to Nandini Clinic that afternoon for
“big sonographies”—detailed fetal anatomy scans performed twice or thrice per
pregnancy. Rocking side-to-side, Uma-masi exclaimed, “There will be so many
patients!”
Then, shaking her head, she smiled mischievously and whispered, “All of them,
infatuated with boys!” I was startled: for the first time in our countless conversations,
Uma-masi was mentioning the pursuit of sons. I asked whether patients requested Dr.
Dilip to “take a look at that.” Still smiling, she nodded emphatically: “Huh-uh! Of
course. But Dilip-saheb doesn’t say anything. For that, you have to go elsewhere.”
Picking up the bowl of cut vegetables and moving into the kitchen, she shouted over her
shoulder, “I’ll explain later!”
Since the previous monsoon, in 2012, Uma-masi had welcomed me to
Mahesana’s Nandini Clinic. But never in my many hours of clinical observation or my
many evenings with her family had anyone even mentioned the ubiquitous but
clandestine practices through which clinicians and families visualized and reacted to fetal
sex.
A short time later, Uma-masi and I took a rickshaw to Nandini. During a lull in
the morning’s patient flow, when we were alone in the consultory, she whispered
conspiratorially, “Don’t tell Dilip-Saheb—I’m telling you this because you’re like my
son!—but to earn money I take patients elsewhere. I’m telling you this because you’re
like my son. My monthly earning ends up being 20,000.” I was flabbergasted. 20,000
rupees—more than twice her regular salary as a nurse.
The next evening, Uma-masi and I sat on her patio swing, swatting away
mosquitos and slowly drifting through the stagnant, humid monsoon air. I moved our
conversation back toward sex determination (SD), and she said, “Well, it’s gotten so that
doctors do it inside-inside,1 secretly. They do it, but they don’t let it be known outside.
And people pay twenty-five!” Widening my eyes, I asked if the cost was as high as
twenty-five hundred rupees.
Her response was swift and incredulous: “Are you serious?! Twenty-five
thousand!” I was astounded. 25,000 rupees could purchase about $1,500 of goods, but
lower salary levels for the Gujarati middle class meant that the figure was even larger
1
In Gujarati speech, reduplication like “inside-inside” is common, generally carrying an intensifying effect.
I frequently reproduce it in my translations to convey something of the texture of the original Gujarati
conversation.
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than the comparison might suggest. 25,000 rupees was most of a senior government
schoolteacher’s monthly salary. 2 For a household dependent on manual labor, it could
easily represent the bulk of a year’s disposable income.
Before I could ask any more, Uma-masi peremptorily waved me into the house:
“Come! Time for you to eat. We can talk later.” My curiosity remained in suspension.
*
Two days later, during a solitary moment in the consultory, I nervously asked
Uma-masi whether we could chat at length about the “boy-girl test,” since it was the chief
focus of my research. Given the topic’s sensitivity, I had not previously pressed it. But
now, after her admission, I felt emboldened to raise new questions.
Cocking her head to the side, Uma-masi replied, “Of course! But not at the
clinic—we should have that talk at home.” Then, she smiled and added:
And if you’d been there last night—oh, you’d have been able to see! I told
the other saheb—a wonderful saheb!— there’s a boy from the U.S. who’s
here to do a study, and he wants to talk, so will you talk? Well, he said,
‘Definitely, I will. Just bring him, Sundays or evenings. If he’s going to
keep it secret, no problem. But you bring him yourself, and you take him
away.’
I went to that clinic yesterday, and you would’ve gotten to see in
person if you were there! It was a patient for what we were talking
about—looking. Dilip-saheb refused, since we don’t do it. But then I
explained to them, my way, and took them to that saheb—a wonderful
saheb! Watch, you’ll get to see everything yourself. But everything secret,
eh?
Now I was certain: I was already inside a sex selection referral network. The kindly,
maternal nurse who had warmly welcomed me to Mahesana was a facilitator for the very
services I had come to study. I was beginning a new, embedded engagement—
enlightening, fraught, often wrenching—with the practices that permitted families and
clinicians to recognize and react to a gendered fetal subject.
*
Two days later, after dinner, Uma-masi and I sat on opposite ends of her sofa,
each with an arm up against the wall. It was already 11 PM. I timidly brought up the
potential interview. In response, Uma-masi laughed, “Go ahead and ask! I’ll answer the
best I know.”
We talked continuously for the next two hours, her detailed explanations of the
local sex selection market tumbling forth in matter-of-fact descriptions, grand boasts, and
clever quips. At some points, she lowered her voice and intimated that even her husband
and sons did not know the information she was about to reveal. At others, she shouted
2

At the time of my fieldwork, the exchange rate hovered around sixty-to-one, and the purchasing power
parity exchange rate just above fifteen-to-one. Thus, in terms of consumables, 25,000 rupees could
purchase about $1,500 worth of goods. Put differently, 1,000 rupees exchanged to just under twenty U.S.
dollars, and represented more like seventy dollars in terms of purchasing power.
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proudly as her daughter-in-law sat next to us and listened, nodding along and smiling. In
repeated asides, she told me she trusted me “because you are like my son”—“because
Uma-masi always knows how to take the measure of people, and I know you’re not going
to do anything bad with this information!”
We began by discussing the “wonderful saheb.” Uma-masi intimated that “the
place for getting it looked at” was “a private clinic, just like Nandini,” located in a nearby
subdistrict headquarters. The obstetrician’s sex selection practice was “a secret thing.” He
only “looked” and provided abortions on Sundays and in the evenings; at those times, it
was “safe” in the small town, since “there can’t be any government checking when the
officials are off.”
The prior week, Uma-masi had taken two Patel families who had contacted her
“via-via”—in a roundabout fashion, after obtaining her mobile number from previous
clients. Rendezvousing in Mahesana, they had set off for the small town together. “Once
we take them,” she added, “we can’t ever leave them alone there! We have to stay
together. If they get it kenchhal, we have to stay.” Perplexed by the unfamiliar word, I
asked for clarification. She elaborated, “If they don’t want to keep it. Then I have to stay
till the termination is finished. That’s what you call“—and now, a clearer articulation,
accompanied by a slashing gesture—“cancel.” As I would learn, the English word was
her favored term for the erasure of pregnancy that followed recognition of female fetuses.
Lowering her voice, Uma-masi intimated, “That saheb only takes 10,000—very
little! People are taking 25,000 rupees, but he takes less!” After a pause, she chuckled,
“And I earn 25,000 every month!” Looking around shiftily—presumably for her
husband—she held up three fingers. “Saheb gives me this many out of 10,000!”
Astonished, I opened my mouth to say the number, but she hushed me. Still whispering,
she explained that her earnings were “enough for all the household costs”: milk,
vegetables, grains, spices, and sundry groceries; new clothing, jewelry, and shoes;
cleaning supplies and toiletries; blankets, bedding, and small furniture; rags and mats;
spending money for both sons; and “fashion” items for herself. While hiding the details
of her earnings from family members, Uma-masi used her income to wield considerable
domestic power and secure upward mobility in consumption and status for the entire
household.3
Uma-masi and I continued talking until 1 AM. She drew me further into the world
of sex selection than I could have imagined just days earlier, describing the slow rise,
spectacular fall, surreptitious renaissance, and definitive end of the practice at Nandini;
her own cultivation of a referral network for SD tests and sex-selective abortions; and the
idiosyncrasies of various doctors who continued to furtively provide the illegal services.
Toward the end, she promised, “I’ll talk to Saheb about bringing you. We’re not
looking to do him wrong, right? It’s not like we’re going to publicize—‘Such-and-such
doctor is doing it in this place!’—or tell people. We can’t betray! Whatever house we eat
bread and rice from, we can’t treat badly.”
*
3

A biographical analysis of Uma-masi’s work and earning as gendered economic tactics situated in
patriarchal household, community, and economic structures is the focus of a separate essay, currently in
preparation.
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That first extended conversation was the definitive inflection point in my
initiation into seeing the market for SD and selective abortion. Over the next two years, I
would piece together the history and contours of the Mahesana-area sex selection market,
gradually developing a picture of how it connected technologies, expert operators, clients,
facilitators, government officials, and gendered fetal subjects in complex relations of
sight and concealment, control and evasion. While Chapter 2 explores the gender-kinship
meanings projected onto the fetal image, and Chapter 3 the actual clinical processes of
recognizing and reacting to gendered fetuses, here I describe the local network in which
clinicians, facilitators, and families attempted to visualize and act on fetal sex even as
governance institutions attempted to visualize and act on the crime of SD.
What was (or was not) made visible and knowledge in the Mahesana-area black
market? Certainly fetal sex, but also technologies, practices, expertise, and enterprises for
identifying it; the public crisis of sex selection, as understood through sex ratios (SRs)
and embodied in the threatened female fetal subject; the “perfect” crime of sonographic
SD, which defied detection; government power and impotence, as seen in enforcement
actions both spectacular and mundane; and, targets of blame for the problem of selective
reproduction.
In the first half of what follows, I trace the historical evolution of the Mahesana
sex selection market. I examine the rise of technology, expertise, and social demand in
the 1980s and 1990s; the rise of state prohibition and policing after 1994; and the
market’s gradual underground retreat after 2005. The goal is to trace “a history of the
present”4 for sex selection in a specific locale—a historical narrative with “an
unequivocal and unabashed contemporary orientation.”5 In the chapter’s second half, I
focus on the market’s contemporary workings. I begin with Chetna Clinic, my primary
window for seeing how providers handled clients, evaded surveillance, distributed
profits, and managed information around SD and selective abortion. After analyzing
other obstetricians’ wariness regarding participation in sex selection, I fill out the local
landscape by examining what circulating knowledge and rumors revealed about market
participants. In concluding, I confront how different actors assigned blame for sex
selection’s persistence and pervasiveness.

The Rise of Sex Selection: From the 1980s to 2001
Biomedical techniques of selective reproduction first became visible to Uma-masi
during the 1990s. She would later recount:
I accompanied one of my in-laws when she went to get it looked at
twenty-five years ago! We went to the hospital. They took the woman
inside, and they looked by sonography. (That boy is now married, with his
own boy!) Back then, I didn’t understand anything. How could I imagine
this was a thing you could see? I didn’t know what we had gone to do.
Then, when they had a boy, I got suspicious—‘They’ve done something.’
4
5

Foucault 1995: 31.
Dreyfus and Rabinow 1982: 119.
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By the time of Uma-masi’s trip, the market for SD in North Gujarat had already evolved
considerably, transitioning through several modalities for seeing sex.
In the 1980s, the region’s few private obstetricians began “looking at” fetal sex
through amniocentesis, a markedly invasive procedure.6 During the fourth gestational
month, the doctor would pierce a patient’s abdomen, uterine wall, and amniotic sac with
a long needle to extract amniotic fluid. He would send the sample to a pathologist’s
laboratory for analysis of free-floating fetal cells. A few days later, he would relay the
pathologist’s written report of sex chromosomes: XX or XY. Amniocentesis was a taxing
method of SD, requiring invasive sampling, laboratory coordination, and a waiting period
between testing and receipt of results.7
Early on, doctors sent samples to laboratories in Ahmedabad (seventy-five
kilometers away) or even distant Mumbai, since local pathologists did not possess the
requisite expertise in chromosomal analysis. But one senior practitioner cynically
recalled, “Once demand here increased, the pathologists got smart. They learned quickly.
Most of this chromosomal analysis—98%—was bound to be for SD!” For their roles in
rendering fetal sex visible and actionable, obstetricians and pathologists each collected
between 500 and 1,000 rupees—substantial sums in those days.8
After amniocentesis, unwanted daughters-to-be had to be eliminated by initiating
premature labor—what patients and practitioners called “kāchi [raw, premature, unripe]
delivery.”9 For many women, kāchi delivery proved a harrowing ordeal, with ever6

Cowan (1994: 36-40, 2008) has anazlyzed social influences—and in particular, women’s roles—in
amniocentesis’s development (through the 1970s) and diffusion (from the late 1970s onward) as a global
technology. Of note here, Cowan has observed that pioneering work in both amniotic sampling and
microscopic visualization of fetal chromosomes was motivated largely by a desire for a prenatal SD
mechanism—interestingly enough, to identify potentially disabled male fetuses in women with family
histories of X-linked diseases like hemophilia (1994: 36-39). Cowan has also noted that amniocentesis
could not have moved from development to widespread diffusion in the U.S., Canada, and the U.K. without
legalization of the only “therapy”—abortion—for “positive diagnosis” (1994: 40). Also see Rapp (1999:
23-29).
7
See Rothman (1986: 86-96) and Rapp (1999: 113-118) for detailed descriptions of women’s experiences
with the test procedure in the U.S. Rapp has discussed women’s anxiety-ridden experiences of waiting for
amniocentesis results in the context of disability testing in the U.S (1999: 103-118). She has proposed the
notion of “liminal dread” to describe the multi-layered existential concerns relating to “fear of causing a
miscarriage, fear of learning bad news, and, perhaps, fear of having unbalanced the forces of nature which
are presumed to be protecting a pregnancy” (Rapp 1999: 105). Rothman has proposed the notion of
“suspended animation,” noting how amniocentesis, whose results might not come back until after the start
of fetal movement, fundamentally changed the meaning of such movement and the associated experience of
attachment in pregnancy (1986: 100-115).
8
A 1986 survey of forty-two amniocentesis practitioners in the metropolis of Mumbai (S. Kulkarni 1986)
found that the fee for amniocentesis ranged from seventy to 600 rupees, with most doctors charging
between 200 and 400. According to the survey, a vast majority of amniocentesis procedures were
performed for the sole purpose of SD. Most practitioners also performed selective-abortions with a
“female” result.
9
Doctors used one of two primary methods to initiate kāchi delivery: injecting a saline solution into the
amniotic cavity per abdomen, or instilling ethacridine lactate—an abortifacient—between the amniotic
membrane and the uterine wall via a catheter threaded through the cervix. Both caused cessation of the
fetus’s vital processes and precipitated eventual expulsion. For a concise description of these methods in
historical perspective, see Bygdeman and Gemzell-Danielsson (2008: 196-197, 198-199).
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increasing labor pains stretching out for up to three days.10 In some cases (like those
narrated in gory detail by Asha-ben’s mother-in-law), fetuses remained un-expelled.
Furthermore, as performed in Mahesana during the 1980s, kāchi delivery entailed
considerable risk; every older obstetrician could recall instances of severe
complications.11 A woman undergoing abortion after amniocentesis faced significant
bodily suffering: hours to days of grim labor, and non-trivial chances of severe bleeding,
life-threatening infections, or other fatal complications. The quest for a son could result
in a woman’s incapacitation or even death.
By the early 1990s, the local advent and proliferation of ultrasound technology
enabled SD by chorionic villus biopsy (CVB). Loosely paralleling amniocentesis, CVB
entailed sending a sample from the developing placenta for chromosomal analysis. The
procedure could be performed earlier—within the first trimester—but sonographic
guidance was required to maneuver the needle around the delicate early-pregnancy womb
and conceptus.
Though CVB was, like amniocentesis, a multi-step process, it quickly gained in
popularity because of its first-trimester timeframe.12 Early detection allowed families to
more quickly move beyond a “tentative pregnancy.”13 Furthermore, CVB’s first-trimester
timing allowed doctors to perform abortion through manual surgical procedures, which
were generally quicker, easier, and safer. Avoidance of the painful, protracted, and oftendangerous kāchi delivery proved highly appealing to women.
During a brief period in the late 1980s and early 1990s, when ultrasound
technology had arrived but not yet advanced beyond the rudimentary, CVB became the
primary method of SD. As Dr. Dilip said when recalling his residency training, “those
who were not aware got amniocentesis done at four months, and those were smart got
CVB at two months.”
The 1991 Census results showed the combined impact of amniocentesis and CVB
on 0-6 child sex ratio (CSR) in Mahesana District. Among towns, Mahesana (868),
Visnagar (861), Kadi (867), Vijapur (872), and Unjha (875) all exhibited CSRs below
900. The rural areas of some subdistricts also came in below 900. Rural and urban CSRs
were nearly equally skewed in the subdistricts of Visnagar (869 against 861), Vijapur
(886 against 882), and Mahesana (892 against 868), but overall there remained a
10

Rothman (1986: 189-216) and Rapp (1999: 238-248) offer moving descriptions of second-trimester
abortion after “positive” amniocentesis results, including medical procedures, bodily and emotional pain,
and aftermaths.
11
The most common complications were amniotic fluid embolism, hypernatremia, disseminated
intravascular coagulation, or uterine rupture. Amniotic fluid embolism is a condition in which amniotic
fluid enters the maternal bloodstream, triggering a severe reaction. Hypernatremia is an abnormally high
level of sodium in the bloodstream. Disseminated intravascular coagulation is a serious condition in which
clotting-related proteins in the blood become over-reactive, leading to clots in small vessels throughout the
body, as well as the potential for paradoxical bleeding.
12
According to S. Kulkarni (1986), several Mumbai doctors had already started practicing CVB in the mid1980s, with charges ranging from 1,000 to 1,5000 rupees. Cowan (1994: 36, 40-44) has characterized CVB
as still in late development or early diffusion by the early 1990s; this characterization may be more apt for
diagnosis of genetic disease in the West than for SD in Gujarat. Also see Rapp (1999: 29-30).
13
Cf. Rothman 1986: 7, 96-115.
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considerable rural-urban divide; in Kadi Subdistrict, for instance, the rural figure (921)
was more than fifty points higher than the urban. Urban living—associated with
education, affluence, lower fertility, and medical consumerism—correlated with a higher
likelihood of undergoing SD.
Despite its first-trimester timeframe, CVB eventually waned in popularity due to
its logistical complexity, technical difficulty, and medical risks. Like amniocentesis, CVB
entailed laboratory coordination and delayed results. Intermingling of maternal and fetal
tissue could produce “contamination” and inaccurate results. And because the procedure
disturbed the fragile early-pregnancy conceptus, it frequently led to miscarriage, fetal
injury, and other complications. For these reasons, CVB soon yielded to the very
technology that had enabled its rise: ultrasound.
Sonography machines operated on the principle of echolocation.14 Electrical
current induced vibration in piezoelectric crystals, leading to propagation of inaudible
sound waves into the maternal abdomen. On encountering materials with different
densities, the waves bounced back differently. The reflections induced new vibrations in
the crystals, resulting in electrical signals. The machine’s processor then converted the
signals into pixels for display.15
Ultrasound offered several key advantages over CVB and amniocentesis. First, it
posed no known physical danger to the pregnant woman or fetus. Second, it freed
obstetricians and patients from laboratory coordination and waiting; the sonographic
screen instantaneously displayed results. Third, although its second-trimester timeframe
necessitated a return to kāchi delivery, ultrasound SD could still take place earlier then
the next-safest alternative, amniocentesis.
By the mid-1990s, obstetricians moved to visualizing sex by what a senior
obstetrician of Unjha called the “reproducible image, where you look, I look, and we see
the same thing.” It was the beginning of “looking” and “getting it looked at,” in a literal
sense. Doctors’ own words reveal the shifting sensorial modalities for clinical enactment
of fetal gender: first, “blind” SD by amniocentesis; then, the hybridity of CVB, with
sonographic sight providing “guidance” for sampling but the truth of sex remaining in
microscopic visualization; and finally, “direct” seeing, with ultrasound allowing
practitioners to simultaneously locate the site of sex (now genitalia rather than
chromosomes) and interpret what was there.16

14
L. Mitchell (2001: 22-49) has provided an extensive historical-cum-technical analysis oriented toward
making sense of contemporary ultrasound imaging. For further historical perspective, see Yoxen (1987),
who has discussed experiments in ultrasound by a wide range of actors through the end of the 1950s, and
McNay and Fleming (1999), whose four-decade history picks up where Yoxen’s leaves off. Nicolson and
Fleming (2013) have zoomed in on a specific element of this broad story—the pioneering work of Glasgow
obstetrician Ian Donald.
15
For more elaborate ethnographically oriented discussions of ultrasound technology’s technical aspects,
see Barad (1998: 87-89), and Taylor (2008: 3-5).
16
Cf. Mol 2002.
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Diffusion of ultrasound technology proceeded rapidly, as doctors felt “we had to
purchase, because everyone else was purchasing.”17 Early on, devices came primarily
from Japan’s Shimadzu, U.S.-based ATL, and the Indian Wipro-General Electric
partnership. Countrywide, imports and domestic production grew exponentially from the
early 1990s onward, with countrywide annual sales exceeding 4,000 units and 3 billion
rupees ($65 million) by 2006.18 North Gujarat obstetricians could purchase basic
machines for a few hundred thousand rupees (several thousand dollars)—a month or two
of net clinical income. In Mahesana city, sonography became an essential part of private
practice around 1990. In smaller towns, most obstetricians acquired machines within a
brief span in the mid-1990s. After these points, ultrasound became a sine qua non of
practice in each locale: new entrants like Dr. Dilip had to “settle in with sonography on
hand from day one.”
Most obstetricians had received minimal training in ultrasound. Through the late
1980s, even Ahmedabad’s academic hospitals contained but a few of the newfangled
devices, and “the sahebs” jealously guarded them. Some proprietors of new devices
undertook observational apprenticeships with more experienced colleagues. Many
attended professional association trainings seminars in Ahmedabad; one obstetrician
recalled that instructors “showed SD, because there was no law, there was no
government—this was going on routinely, so they showed the perineum and explained,
‘This is how you look for clitoris-penis.’”
The same doctor remembered, “Because this was becoming the gynec’s breadand-butter, because of patient demand, you had to learn it. So everyone learned—
everyone started knowing from experience.” Echoing this statement, most obstetricians
recalled developing expertise primarily through trial-and-error: “By looking, we became
experts: this is penile shadow, this is scrotal shadow.” “Slowly-slowly, in doing it, we
learned: how the perineum looks, how a male child looks. And then we got a perfect
grasp.” By self-tutelage, older doctors became experts in seeing sex. And by 2000, with
ultrasound’s proliferation, young practitioners were learning to discern genitalia while
still in training.
Within the mushroom market for sonographic SD, perceived expertise became a
key competitive factor. While some doctors maintained that “everyone knew equally
well, since everyone did it,” many insisted that certain colleagues displayed exceptional
visual gifts. Practitioners strove to cultivate positive reputations among prospective
clients. In one illustrative case, a clinician publicized his second daughter’s name
prenatally, lest people think he had misinterpreted his wife’s scan—after all, wouldn’t
any doctor with one girl use his own machine to identify and avoid a second?
Reputation was not merely a word-of-mouth phenomenon. Many clinicians
formally publicized expertise. Although advertising eventually ceased with enforcement
of the prohibition on sex selection, assorted artifacts—just barely hidden at the time of
my fieldwork—testified to the era of open SD. Old letterheads listed “Expert in Boy-Girl
17

Being the first to acquire the necessary equipment and expertise, radiologists emerged as the earliest
sonographic SD providers and, for a time, drew referrals from obstetricians. But the latter soon began
procuring machines and honing their own vision.
18
Mahal et al. 2006: 180; Wonacott 2007.
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Diagnosis” as a qualification. On one clinic’s main signboard, I found the first word in
“Sonography Diagnosis Center” handwritten over tape covering older text—“Boy-Girl.”
Several doctors distinguished themselves by advertising “Boy-Girl at Three Months,”
since most sonographers initially could not perform SD until four months.
The last point underscores a client preference for early detection. As in the shift
from amniocentesis to CVB, a shortening of the time from conception to sonographic SD
allowed families to make earlier decisions. It also protected both doctors and women
from the logistical difficulties and medical risks of late abortion. Throughout the 1990s,
advancing operator expertise coupled with the development of better machines to drop
the threshold for visualizing prenatal gender. As “high-resolution machines appeared, and
people’s eyes started seeing better,” in one doctor’s words, the limit gradually fell from
eighteen weeks to thirteen.19
With fetal sex visible earlier, doctors reverted from kāchi delivery to the
procedural abortions that had prevailed during CVB’s heyday. Given the advent of
supportive hormonal drugs, early-second-trimester surgical abortions were now even
easier and safer.20
Nonetheless, bodily risks remained. Numerous obstetricians admitted to having
perforated patients’ uteruses while performing hasty procedures. Moreover, as
government surveillance for sex selection rose in the 2000s, the pressure to minimize
inpatient time would lead to quicker, rougher, riskier terminations.
Despite the dangers of selective abortions, most practitioners recalled sex
selection in the 1990s and early 2000s as “nothing special”—“just part of routine
practice.” Obstetricians openly disclosed SD results and recorded them on charts—
“likely XX,” “likely XY.” Patients regularly sought second opinions. And as many
clinicians emphasized, “there was freedom to do SD”—since “there was no regulation, no
law, nothing,” “everything was going on openly.” With prohibitions functionally
nonexistent before 2005, sex selection services flourished openly.
Pricing reflected sex selection’s banality: doctors typically charged the same fees
for SD and selective abortion as for routine sonography and abortion.21 Despite
19

For comparison, a study at a London university hospital in the late 1990s, using an SD method essentially
similar to the one employed by Mahesana obstetricians, and on a high-quality (for the era) machine found it
possible to accurately assign fetal sex in 79% of cases at thirteen weeks, and 90% at fourteen; excluding
cases in which sexing was not even attempted, the accuracy at these gestational ages was 92% and 98%,
respectively (Whitlow et al. 1999). I found a wide range of opinions on timing and accuracy in the 1990s,
with some obstetricians claiming that errors must have been lower than the roughly one-in-ten rate in the
contemporaneous West—“because we had the expertise!”—and others maintaining that the error rate may
have been higher, albeit easily rectified by follow-up scans.
20
See Lohr (2008) for a general discussion of second-trimester surgical abortion. The transition to quicker,
easier abortion was aided by the arrival of prostaglandin agents in the Mahesana pharmaceutical market
during the 1990s. Administered some time before the operation, these hormonal drugs promoted cervical
softening and opening, making removal of the fetus more straightforward. See Lohr (2008: 154-155) and
Bygdeman and Gemzell-Danielsson (2008: 199-200) for concise discussions of these agents.
21
In a contrast from the early 1990s, Khanna recalled seeing a doctor and client in peri-urban Delhi settle
on prices of 1,500 rupees for ultrasound SD and 1,000 rupees for selective abortion, the former almost
certainly being higher than the price of a routine scan (2009: 2-3). George and Dahiya reported that the cost
of ultrasound SD in rural Haryana rose to about 900 rupees by the late 1990s—double what it had been half
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generating limited direct profits, selective reproductive services bolstered obstetric
business by keeping clients pleased and attracting patients who might otherwise forego
private pregnancy care. Performing sex selection also allowed doctors to fulfill social
obligations to relatives, friends, and acquaintances.
Amid the liberalization of India’s economy, the 1990s brought a burgeoning of
social demand for private obstetric care generally, and sex selection specifically.
Biomedical family planning increased, and fertility fell—a trend I discuss in Chapter 2.
Simultaneously, public awareness of ultrasound technology spread in parallel with the
devices themselves; an early-2000s study in rural Mahesana District noted:
All women... knew exactly where to go for sex-determination tests, how
much they cost, and so on. They were aware that such tests are... done... in
private facilities, the majority of which also provide abortion services. The
women could also describe the sex-determination procedure quite
accurately and in great detail. 22
At the intersection of family planning and medicalized pregnancy, families increasingly
knew how to plan gender and kinship through selective elimination of female fetuses.
The 2001 Census data revealed the fruit of late-1990s sex selection: markedly
skewed 0-6 CSRs. The overall number for Mahesana District was 801. A rural-divide
persisted, but not because rural CSR was anywhere near normal. The district exhibited a
rural CSR of 813, and the figure stood below 900 in every subdistrict; some district’s
rural CSRs had declined precipitously, as seen in Kheralu (-66), Vijapur (-74), Visnagar
(-85), Kadi (-91), and Mahesana (-96) Subdistricts. But the divide persisted because
urban CSRs had fallen as much, or even more. Towns’ CSRs typically sat fifty points
below those of their surrounding rural areas, and not a single one was above 830. The
overall urban CSR was 751: only three girls for every four boys. The city of Mahesana
had a CSR of 728, and even that was outstripped by Unjha (717) and Visnagar (713). At
the turn of the millenium, expanding technology, expertise, and social awareness had
spurred a drastic rise in selective reproduction.
It was in this period that Dr. Dilip and Uma-masi’s careers took shape.
*
On the day Nandini Clinic opened in the mid-1990s, Uma-masi was Dr. Dilip’s
very first patient. She soon began referring women from her extensive social network,
sometimes receiving a small commission for her service. Eventually, she started spending
half-days assisting at the clinic, “without taking any money—just for fun, because I had
such an interest in learning!” Eventually, in the early 2000s, Dr. Dilip and Uma-masi
agreed on a full-time job with regular salary.
Dr. Dilip had purchased an ultrasound machine when establishing Nandini, and
SD and selective abortion quickly became large components of his practice. He charged
a decade earlier and again, likely much higher than the cost of a routine scan (1998: 2194). The discrepant
pattern in Mahesana seems unlikely to be due to recall bias or social desirability bias on the part of
practitioners, since families also uniformly recalled nil or minimal premiums for SD and selective abortion.
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minimal fees for the services. Both he and Uma-masi recalled, “It was nothing then... Just
part of practice... There was no law... We did it for people for free.”
While Dr. Dilip understandably displayed modesty on the topic, others informed
me that he had attained prominence as a sex selection expert. Once, my casual mention of
the doctor’s name to a neighbor prompted her to smile and nod enthusiastically: “He is
such a smart doctor! I was just short of three months with Mihir”—her son, born in
2003—“and he told me right then: ‘It looks good—you’ll have a boy.’ Imagine! Before
three months were even complete, he could look and tell me.”
By the time of Mihir’s birth, Dr. Dilip could discern fetal genitalia at twelve or
thirteen weeks. Moreover, he had developed the skills to perform rapid procedural
terminations, even at sixteen weeks, such that his post-abortion patients departed in mere
hours. Reminiscing about the bygone era, Uma-masi widened her eyes and laughed, “Our
saheb was quite the expert! Some days, there were ten—and never a day without one!”
But government regulations would soon transform both Dr. Dilip and Uma-masi’s
participation in the market for recognizing and reacting to fetal sex.

The Rise of Sex Selection Governance: From Antecedents to 2005
Two Pillars
As a sex selection market arose in the Mahesana area, various things became
visible: ultrasound technology, practitioners and their expertise, fetal sex, and the
possibility of prenatal gender-kinship planning. With the rise of sex selection governance
at local, state, and national levels, very different things came into view: a populationwide threat to female births, a newly defined crime, and spectacles of government
policing.
One pillar of the governance apparatus surrounding sex selection pre-dated
biomedical SD in India. The Medical Termination of Pregnancy (MTP) Act of 1971
legalized abortion in case of “risk to the life of the pregnant woman or of grave injury to
her physical or mental health,” “substantial risk” of a “seriously handicapped” child, or
pregnancy in a “lunatic”; clarifications resulted in broad interpretation of the “mental
health” provision to include pregnancy due to rape and “contraceptive failure”—the latter
eventually becoming the main grounds for terminating unwanted pregnancies.
The law was explicitly framed around “health,” “humanitarian,” and “eugenic”
rationales. Indeed, the government-appointed Abortion Study Committee’s 1966 report
had recommended legalization of abortion for health and safety reasons, citing the high
prevalence of dangerous procedures.23 Half a century later, Mahesana obstetricians would
generally foreground the same reasons in describing the MTP Act’s importance.
But a shadow rationale haunted the law. Parliamentary debate around the bill,
while showing that “there is no serious anti-abortion opinion in India,” also revealed a
heavy resort to overpopulation as a justification for permitting abortion.24 The MTP Act
23
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passed amid a domestic and global political climate in which reducing population growth
at almost any cost had become a political imperative, partly as a result of pressure from
Western governments, scientists, and population lobbyists.25 Thus, with health and
population control, respectively, as the chief stated and unstated purposes abortion
became legal “quite independently of the women’s movement.”26
The “right to abortion” emanating from the MTP Act has always teetered on
precarious legal grounds. Legally, an unwanted pregnancy is insufficient to justify
abortion: it must become medically reinscribed as contraceptive failure.27 In practice,
Mahesana obstetricians categorized most abortions under this indication, and often did
not even bother completing the mandatory forms that would make the procedures visible
to the state. Consequently, women could generally count on termination of unwanted
pregnancies. But this access was heavily dependent on doctors’ will, due to both formal
legal provisions28 and “off-the-books” practices that relegated abortions to the purview of
medical discretion.
Even in the 1970s, the emergent “right” to abortion—and its ever-present shadow,
population control—quickly became tied up with sex selection. The population control
movement contributed heavily to the development and diffusion of prenatal diagnostic
technologies in India, with the premise that sex selection methods would encourage
people to utilize abortion.29 The first academic report of amniocentesis in India, from
1975, noted:
In India cultural and economic factors make the parents desire a son, and
in many instances the couple keeps on reproducing just to have a son.
Prenatal determination of sex would put an end to this unnecessary
fecundity. There is of course the tendency to abort the fetus if it is female.
This may not be acceptable to persons in the West but in our patients this
plan of action was followed in seven of eight patients who had the test
carried out primarily for the determination of sex of the fetus. The parents
elected for abortion without any undue anxiety.30
Within two years, researchers at a major hospital in western India were finding that
families had aborted 430 of 450 prenatally determined female fetuses during a one-year
span.31 SD and selective abortion were taking off.
Consequently, abortion finally became “an issue for Indian feminists” in the
1980s, but “for quite a different reason” than pregnant women’s bodily autonomy.32 By
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the time Barbara Miller’s speculations regarding prenatal sex selection set off an
intellectual firestorm in 1983, the practice had already become highly visible in some
segments of public culture. Private clinics openly advertised SD while portraying
daughters as a “liability” to the family and a “threat to the nation.”33 Stories of sexselective abortion circulated in media reports, political debates, and everyday gossip.
In response, the Indian women’s movement mobilized to condemn and combat
the practice.34 Several organizations mounted public activism campaigns. Activistacademics generated further evidence around amniocentesis and selective abortion in
metropolitan cities.35 The central government eventually issued a circular banning SD in
state facilities; in response, private provision of the service proliferated, and commercial
sex selection became a major business. It was during this period, too, that activists
conceived and disseminated certain messages that, circulated in other contexts, would
become resignified as anti-abortion—most notably, the shock-oriented labeling of sex
selection as “female foeticide.”
In 1988, after constant pressure from Mumbai activists, the Maharashtra
government passed an anti-sex selection law—albeit one whose provisions diverged
considerably from feminists’ recommendations. Lobbying by the Gujarati women’s
movement subsequently led to passage of what many contemporaries called an
“improved” version of the law in Gujarat.36 Most Mahesana-area doctors remained
unaware of the legislation.
Then, in 1994, the central government passed what would become the second
pillar of sex selection governance: the Pre-Natal Diagnostic Techniques (PNDT) Act. The
law was framed around establishing and regulating a clean separation between “use of
pre-natal diagnostic techniques” for “detecting genetic or metabolic disorders or
chromosomal abnormalities or certain congenital malformations or sex linked
disorders”—the “eugenic” purposes earlier endorsed by the MTP Act—and the “misuse
of such techniques” for “pre-natal sex determination leading to female foeticide.”37
The PNDT Act mandated registration and regulation of clinics providing prenatal
diagnostics. It prohibited prenatal testing save for detection of certain “abnormalities” in
certain clinical situations. Performing SD, advertising it, bringing it about, and disclosing
fetal sex all became forbidden. The law additionally required creation of national and
state bodies to facilitate enforcement. Penalties for violation included suspension or
revocation of medical licensure, imprisonment up to five years, and fines up to 50,000
rupees. While persons seeking SD could also face penalties, the law specified a
presumption, “unless the contrary is proved,” that “the pregnant woman has been
compelled by her husband or the relative to undergo pre-natal diagnostic technique.”
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Two years after the law’s passage, Parliament framed rules and regulations for it.
The supplemental legislation specified clinical recordkeeping protocols: doctors would
have to maintain a register of all women tested and fill a “Form F” for every such patient.
In addition to information about the clinic, a complete Form F would include the patient’s
identifying details, her pregnancy and family history, the specific indication for testing,
the procedures performed and their results, and the clinician’s signature. Ostensibly a
record of bona fide reasons behind prenatal testing, the form would become a crucial tool
for constructing “misuse.”
With its focus on diagnostic technologies, the PNDT Act represented an attempt
to thread a needle—leaving abortion in general untouched while curtailing sex-selective
abortion. It was an approach fraught with tension.38 In fact, early in the process leading to
the law’s formulation, some officials had actively advocated revising the MTP Act
instead.39 Years later, amid widespread recognition of the PNDT Act’s ineffectuality in
the early 2000s, the central government would again consider modifying abortion law—
perhaps even by restricting abortion to the first trimester.40 In both cases, the PNDT Act
ultimately emerged as the site of legislative intervention. But the tension remained.
The choice to regulate prenatal testing definitively shaped the challenges of
PNDT (and later PCPNDT) implementation. In a pattern with striking echoes of
nineteenth-century female infanticide, sonographic SD was, by its nature, easy to conceal
from the regulatory gaze: it was quick, requiring but a few minutes; opaque, enjoying
seclusion within a private clinic and a private doctor-patient relationship; and ephemeral,
leaving behind no telltale traces.41 The official morality encoded in law did not
harmonize with the gender-kinship and profit motives of families and doctors, and the
interests of both consumers and providers aligned in favor of keeping the crime secret.
Moreover, the injured party, whether conceptualized as the female fetus, womankind, or
even all of society, could not act to prevent or expose the injury.42 It was little wonder
that numerous north Gujarat doctors referred to ultrasound SD as “the perfect crime.” The
central problematic of enforcement would always remain how to make visible the
forbidden act of seeing.
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Rising Publicity: Accountable Implementation and Saving the Daughter
Sex selection in North Gujarat continued to flourish in the late 1990s. Though
enacted, the PNDT Act carried no juridical force. As Dr. Dilip straightforwardly
observed, “SD was not a crime.” Most obstetricians “practiced openly,” for the
government was “not keen to act on this law”—“the act was there, but there were no
active steps to implement.”
The eventual impetus for implementation emerged from judicialization of the
potential daughter’s “right to live.”43 In 2000, a coalition of activists filed public interest
litigation in the Supreme Court against the central government and states.44 Drawing
attention to flaws in the PNDT Act’s language and its virtually non-existent
implementation, the litigation requested the court to compel governmental bodies to
constitute necessary administrative entities, enforce existing provisions, and initiate
amendments to account for various loopholes.
The suit was still pending when provisional results from the 2001 Census
underscored its urgency. The 0-6 CSR for all of India had fallen from 945 in 1991 to 927.
Several states exhibited figures well below 900. Gujarat’s was 878—fifty points lower
than a decade earlier—and Mahesana was one of a few districts with CSRs below 800. In
addition to galvanizing campaigning around sex selection, the Census results drew the
attention of international organizations such as the United Nations Population Fund
(UNFPA), which would thereafter become involved in India’s “missing girls” problem.45
The status of women, the civilizing mission, and the nation-state’s need for international
legitimacy were converging to compel action.46
On May 4, 2001, the Supreme Court issued the first of six judgments47 on the
public interest litigation. The ruling began:
The practice of female infanticide still prevails despite the fact that the
gentle touch of a daughter and her voice has a soothing effect on the
parents... The traditional system of female infanticide whereby the female
baby was done away with after birth... continues in a different form by
taking advantage of advanced medical techniques. Unfortunately,
developed medical science is misused to get rid of a girl child before birth.
Knowing full well that it is immoral and unethical as well as it may
amount to an offence, foetus of a girl child is aborted...
It is apparent that to a large extent, the PNDT Act is not
implemented by the Central Government or by the State Governments.
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The court ordered formation of regulatory entities at the national, state, district, and
subdistrict levels; consideration of possible amendments to cover new diagnostic
technologies; execution of “awareness campaigns against the practice of prenatal
determination”; and ongoing submission of compliance reports by the concerned
governments. In addition to issuing supplemental instructions, further rulings that year
chastised nine sates, including Gujarat, for not taking timely action.
Within two years, amendments transformed the PNDT Act into the PreConception and Pre-Natal Diagnostic Techniques (PCPNDT) Act prevailing today. The
law’s titular purpose switched from “Regulation and Prevention of Misuse” to
“Prohibition of Sex Selection,” with sex selection defined as “any procedure, technique,
test or administration or prescription or provision of anything for the purpose of ensuring
or increasing the probability than an embryo will be of a particular sex.” The
amendments explicitly forbade pre-conception and pre-implantation sex selection. A new
Form F incorporated signed declarations from the pregnant woman and the clinician at
the bottom: “I do not want to know the sex of my fetus... I have neither detected nor
disclosed the sex of her foetus to any body in any manner.”
In conjunction with the Supreme Court orders, the changes to the law initiated the
increased government activity that eventually drove sex selection underground. By the
mid-2000s, states were undertaking the most obvious and publicly recognizable parts of
PCPNDT implementation: appointing members to the requisite bodies, registering
prenatal diagnostic centers, and promoting “awareness.” Between 2001 and March 2005,
Gujarat registered 2,315 clinics—the fourth highest total in the country.48 In Mahesana
District, Freshly trained officers took the mandated bureaucratic steps, forming a District
Advisory Committee, mandating ultrasound machine registration, and requiring
sonographers to fill out Form F and maintain a ledger of scans performed. Local officials
also held “awareness” events and distributed literature to make doctors aware of legal
provisions, abysmal SRs, and the intention to scale up enforcement.
The rise of PCPNDT implementation coincided with initiation of vigorous state
and local campaigns for reducing sex selection demand.49 Here, non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) played a key role. In 2004, the Ahmedabad-based Centre for
Health, Education, Training, and Nutrition Awareness (CHETNA) held a series of
workshops for “sensitization” of community activists, corporate leaders, and politicians.
In collaboration with UNFPA and the Population Foundation of India, CHETNA also
launched a “Missing Girl” campaign—later renamed “Valuing the Girl Child”—focused
on community surveys, information delivery, and community workshops in villages of
Mahesana and one neighboring district. In one representative “communication campaign”
from 2005 to 2006, the organization relied on “House-to-house contacts, neighbourhood
meetings, street plays,... rallies, road shows, essay competitions, open dialogues, CD
shows, social audit, fairs, Yuva Mela, and public meetings,” as well as “exhibitions... on
strategic pathways of pilgrims during popular religious events, malls and other public
48
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places.”50 State government officials, meanwhile, were meeting with local professional
organizations and addressing community gatherings, urging citizens to eschew sex
selection. Discourse on the practice was rapidly proliferating.
Given Mahesana’s abysmal SRs, activists from the area quickly became involved
in state- and national-level movements to combat sex selection.51 Inspired by one of
CHETNA’s workshops, Unjha’s Member of Parliament collaborated with local
community members to organize a gathering of several thousand women on January 5,
2005. The event was officially publicized under the heading of “Social Awareness and
Elimination of Stribhrunhatyā”—the last word being a rapidly spreading neologism
directly translated from “female foeticide.” Invitations for the event featured a
“respectfully addressed letter to the cruel mother-father” from the “aborted daughter-fetus
growing in the womb,” penned “upon reaching heaven”; it asked about the mother’s
health after abortion, voiced the “former daughter’s” shattered hopes for playing with and
bringing joy to relatives, and closed with the lines:
Think about it—you’re wishing for my brother’s birth in my place, but
I’m asking you: where will you marry him? Because just like with me, all
parents today see their happiness and convenience in killing their
daughters before birth. Is that appropriate? I hope that no one gets a
mother and father like you.
Posters for the event featured images of a fist crushing a fetus and prominently displayed
local CSRs: 742 for the whole subdistrict, 717 for the town.
Attendees at the Unjha event listened to a series of speeches from “important
guests,” watched a “lamp-lighting as a sign of commitment,” and followed as they—and
the five doctors in attendance—were led in oaths to foreswear sex-selective abortion.
They received booklets—again, adorned with a fist crushing a fetus—that informed them
of Unjha’s abysmally low CSR, the reasons “why daughters are unwelcome,” “our role in
stopping stribhrunhatyā,” the possible consequences of falling SRs, and the need to “save
our daughters” and “not mess with nature’s work.” The material reminded potential
mothers that “the giving of a virgin [in marriage] is a great gift” and offered up several
alarming statistics. A separate booklet offered an “Eyewitness Report of the Murder of a
Child in the Womb,” based on the American anti-abortion film The Silent Scream.
The Unjha event and its associated paraphernalia relied on a discursive coupling
that would remain prominent in anti-sex selection appeals more than a decade later:
emotional appeals from individual threatened daughters-to-be alongside sobering (or
fear-mongering) presentation of aggregate SRs and their future implications. They also
presaged another pervasive feature about latter-day campaigns to “save the daughter”:
“mixed messages”52 around abortion and stribhrunhatyā. Numerous scholars have
analyzed how The Silent Scream disembodies the fetus and establishes a separate
personhood for it, predicating an affective appeal to the pregnant woman, community, or
50

Vakharia 2009: 32.
See, for instance, Joseph and CYDA (2007: 187-188, 195).
52
Nidadavolu and Bracken 2006. See also Ganatra (2008).
51

73

body politic to halt abortion altogether;53 its use in Mahesana District—already noted as
problematic by a contemporary evaluation54—underscores the blurring, in practice, of
well-intentioned activism and anti-abortion rhetoric. And the Unjha usage was far from
an isolated incident. Around the same time, a college-based anti-sex selection campaign
in Mahesana condemned bhrunhatyā [foeticide] and employed posters depicting fetuses
being killed, often by mothers.55 Official Gujarat government posters relied on affective
appeals to mothers, displaying “clearly anti-abortionist” messages that stressed the
“utilitarian value” of future women as reproducers.56 I return to these discursive features
of anti-sex selection efforts in Chapter 8.
Fourteen months after the Unjha event, in March 2006, Chief Minister Narendrabhai Modi took International Women’s Day as the occasion for launching a campaign to
“save daughters” in Gujarat—Beti Bachāvo. (The program’s title would soon include
“Beti Vadhāvo”—“celebrate daughters.”) Within a short time, politicians, religious
figures, and sub-caste leaders were invoking Narendra-bhai’s slogan at mass rallies and
sermons, motorcycle tours and marriages. In the early stages, governmental and nongovernmental Beti Bachāvo efforts, like those in most parts of the country, focused on
conveying SR figures; inspiring shock, fear, sadness, and affection around the potential
daughter and her elimination; and delivering and eliciting slogans, artwork, mass oaths,
and other publicly visible performances of anti-sex selection stances.
Many doctors and connectors would later suggest that Beti Bachāvo and related
NGO programming paradoxically encouraged sex selection by increasing the practice’s
visibility: “The government itself provided the publicity for this thing!” “People in the
village didn’t know you could tell if it’s a boy, but then it started coming on TV and
everything, so the public became aware.” Several doctors postulated a perverse reaction
to repression, arguing that “the more you restrict something, the more people want it,” so
that “as there was more advertisement—‘Beti Bachāvo, Beti Vadhāvo’—people were
attracted to SD more.”
At any rate, most doctors agreed that, despite the campaigns, demand for sex
selection only grew in the early 2000s. For the first half of the decade, a rigorous national
health survey found a sex ratio at birth (SRB) of 850 among women reporting prenatal
ultrasound, and just 554 in the subset with two daughters and no sons.57 At a time when
child mortality could account for roughly an 11-point (or 1.1%) CSR skew, the same
survey found a 0-6 CSR of 888 in Gujarat.58 With PNDT enforcement efforts not yet
restricting access to services, sex-selective abortion continued rampantly.
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For providers, state regulation presented only a minor bureaucratic “nuisance.”
Doctors began keeping the mandated records and raised the price of SD to 500 rupees,
but little else changed. Dr. Dilip recalled:
It was only after 2000 that this system started—if we do a sonography, we
have to fill Form F, all that. But even then, the doctor’s awareness came
slowly-slowly-slowly. Not until the government machine became more
active—until there were raids, like mine—did we realize that we would
have to work more cautiously.
The Spectacle of Enforcement: The “First Raids”
In many doctors’ recollections, September 20, 2005 was a watershed moment for
PCPNDT enforcement in Mahesana District. That day, a visiting team from New Delhi
sealed five local doctors’ ultrasound machines. These “first raids” shattered obstetricians’
feelings of impunity.
Theatrical, mass-mediatized portrayals of crime and policing, in which states
“devote considerable effort to staging illusory victories over the dark forces of violence
and disorder,” evince “a desire to condense dispersed power in order to make it visible,
tangible, and effective.”59 Spectacular shows of “law enforcement” become a “site for
staging efforts—the double entrendre is crucial here—to summon the active presence into
being, to render it perceptible to the public eye, to produce both rulers and subjects who
recognize its legitimacy.”60 Within such dramas, the violated female body may be
deployed to craft “a collective sense of moral purpose in the face of a daunting world in
which violence was thought to have become endemic, ubiquitous, even unpoliceable.”61
The “dramatic enactments of crime and punishment—both those disseminated by the
state and those consumed by various publics”—become attempts to perform social order,
representing and simultaneously creating it in situations where “technologies of
governance—including technologies of detection and enforcement—are... under dire
threat.”62
The early Mahesana raids, premised on detecting high-tech violation of female
citizens-to-be from the distinctly low-tech paper record, constituted just such a spectacle
of enforcement. They brought the PCPNDT Act into force through publicly disseminated
drama, thereby installing government prohibition as a visible aspect of the local sex
selection market.
According to Uma-masi, at the time of the raids, Dr. Dilip “was doing ten-twelve
curettings every day—looking and curetting, all over in five minutes.” Dr. Dilip himself
recalled, “At that time, we weren’t thinking such a raid could come, because the
government machinery was not doing all these things. We didn’t imagine this could
happen.” Retrospectively, most clinicians maintained that the raids came as a complete
surprise.
59

Jean Comaroff and John Comaroff 2006: 274, 276.
Jean Comaroff and John Comaroff 2006: 280.
61
Jean Comaroff and John Comaroff 2006: 289.
62
Jean Comaroff and John Comaroff 2006: 292.
60

75

In fact, Gujarat’s government had already sealed fifteen sonography machines for
recordkeeping deficiencies between 2003 and September 2005. Just one day before the
Mahesana raids, on September 19, officials sealed three doctors’ machines in neighboring
Gandhinagar District.63 And according to several Nandini staffers, Dr. Dilip also received
a private warning from a local Health bureaucrat who was a childhood friend: “‘A team
from Delhi is coming, so if there’s anything, be careful. Otherwise, you’re in for it.’”
The doctor did not heed the warning signs. He was in the midst of a sex-selective
abortion when a dozen government officers arrived. Travelling in “VIP cars” and
escorted by commandos, the team left bystanders in awe. Doctors began phoning one
another: “They’re checking all the gynecs’ clinics, one after another!” PCPNDT
enforcement had abruptly come into view as a spectacle.
At Nandini, the team “barged straight into the office, without even asking,” in
Uma-masi’s recollection. The friendly local officer told Uma-masi to summon Dr. Dilip.
When she went to convey the message—“This is trouble, come quick!”—she found the
doctor still finishing the selective abortion. She confided as much to the official, who
quietly told her to shift any patients “like that” elsewhere, “’or Saheb is dead!’” She later
laughed while recalling, “There were so many MTP patients in the clinic that day! So the
sweepers and I picked them up and carried them next door—onto the roof, across, and
down.” With state eyes finally positioned to directly witness serious legal violations, the
Nandini staff acted quickly to make the evidence—patients themselves—disappear.
When Dr. Dilip finally entered the consultory, the central team demanded his
PCPNDT records. He would later remember:
They said, ‘Give us your Form F, show us your records.’ And then they
looked for deficiencies. I tell you, Utpal, they looked for a reason!
Nowadays, every doctor knows more of the requirement than the CDHO
[Chief District Health Officer]. But back then?... Our system was very
unorganized. We filled the forms, but not up to the mark—just patient
name, address, reason for sonography. But not in detail. We were sending
this much with a letter saying, let us know if there is any deficiency.
Well, searching-searching-searching, they found deficiencies,
negligence in four-five forms—signature, address, so on. It was not like
we were caught doing SD. But the paperwork was not adequate. So on that
basis, they told me, ‘You are doing SD.’ On the basis of a form, how can
you tell that I am doing SD?! I asked, how can you get intention from
that? They said, ‘That’s not for us to see—the court will see!’
At the other four clinics, as at Nandini, the raids did not detect and expose sex selection
practices per se, but rather technical deficiencies in PCPNDT-mandated documents.
Bureaucratic errors became stand-ins for the invisible crime. At all five sites, government
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officials sequestered the ultrasound machine and applied a wax seal to the room,
officially forbidding sonography.
Once the equipment had been sealed, journalists arrived. Dr. Dilip recalled
bitterly:
The worst damn thing was that they brought in two journalists and a
photographer. The next day, it was the headline in the papers! And then
the headlines came every day. It was rubbish! It’s the worst memory of my
life: “Seal applied to five female-feticidal doctors’ machines.” “A central
team has sealed female fetus-killers’ machines...”
Initially, this was just to set an example—they had the target to
release after one week. The Supreme Court lawyer told me that the
procedures would take place, and then everything would be open again.
But then our government used this in a bad way; they decided they didn’t
want to let us go... And the wolves of our society, they kept it going to
make money.
Among the “wolves,” Dr. Dilip counted journalists eager to capitalize on the spectacle,
NGOs seeking publicity through condemnation of sex selection, and a state keen to make
PCPNDT governance visible. A wide range of interested actions seemed predicated on
exposure of the targeted doctors as criminals.
The “wolves” also included government officers seeking bribes. Dr. Dilip
recalled, “One of those officials gave an order by day and then did the opposite by
night—seven days after helping seal our machines, the rascal came back to me, because
he was hungry for money!” Several other targeted doctors independently corroborated the
allegation. Heightened PCPNDT enforcement meant new opportunities for individual
government officers to capitalize on criminal activity.
The five obstetricians ultimately refused to pay the local official, committing
themselves to a “chronic legal process.” The state government soon initiated cases
against them under the PCPNDT Act, and the ensuing judicial proceedings dragged on
for months. Dr. Dilip recounted:
At court, they made us sit outside, with petty thieves who had stolen twothree thousand! And the judge would say, you are like this, and you are
like that! We told him to prove it. But there was no proof. It was so bad! It
was horrible! And that damn judge—he held our hearings at 11 AM, even
though we could have clinic duty. The court gallery would be full, and if it
wasn’t, he called in others to fill it up. Then, he would shout, ‘Call in the
accused, the sinners, the female fetus killers!’
Various uninvolved obstetricians recalled the case as a seemingly arbitrary humiliation
for their colleagues—“as if they were deadly killers.” The process of making PCPNDT
violations and PCPNDT enforcement visible—premised on the notion of reading the
crime from paper records—had transitioned from a clinical and media spectacle to a
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judicial one.
Eventually, the court ruled against the government, citing procedural lapses in
equipment seizure and evidence collection, along with the rationale that “not having
adequately filled the form was not a major crime,” as Dr. Dilip recalled. The result fit
into a Gujarat- and country-wide trend: in early cases under PCPNDT, prosecution efforts
faltered due to evidentiary lapses, legal framing missteps, and judicial skepticism
regarding the ultimate import of mere recordkeeping errors.64
Personalistic factors also played a role in some acquittals. Dr. Dilip later revealed:
The government lawyer fighting the case against us, he used to take cha
with us. He eventually took money to make the case weaker! And in the
end, the judge turned out corrupt too! He sent his man to us to negotiate.
Oh, after that, he kept saying, these men are such gentlemen, and they
have met with such injustice, and this and that. Imagine!
Another colleague confirmed that of the several million rupees the five obstetricians
spent during the legal proceedings, “almost everything was black—not on paper, but to
speed up the decision.” While failing to produce any convictions, the 2005 raids allowed
lawyers and judges to extract PCPNDT-based profits from four of the five affluent
clinicians.
Ultimately, Dr. Dilip and the other targeted doctors found the financial burden of
legal fees and bribes compounded by loss of clinical revenue. With the sonography
machines sealed, most patients went elsewhere for care. Because newspapers had printed
zoomed-in photographs of doors with wax seals on them, many assumed that Nandini and
other affected clinics had been “locked up” entirely. And, as Dr. Dilip later put it, “There
was also bound to be a social shock, right? Because this was the first time?” Despite
widespread acceptance of sex selection in everyday life, the negative publicity associated
with the raids and subsequent legal proceedings stigmatized the five doctors.
The highly visible spectacle surrounding Dr. Dilip and his colleagues made state
prohibition a palpable force, and sex selection an actual crime. While admitting to
providing sex selection services, Dr. Dilip would lament, “This happened even though we
were innocent!” His seemingly contradictory statements make perfect sense in light of the
fact that “everyone was doing it” in the early 2000s. Though widely publicized, the
PCPNDT Act had lacked juridical force, and clinicians had practiced SD and selective
abortion openly. The law effectively acquired clout through the raids, making itself felt in
the scrutinization, shaming, and prosecution of a subset of offenders, none of whom had
previously hidden their activity.
Years later, local obstetricians were united in lamenting how the government had
“set out to make an example.” Almost everyone had been performing sex selection while
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keeping inadequate records; in retrospect, almost anyone could have been targeted and
caught.65 That the government had “victimized” the five doctors for “technical causes”
only reinforced the perception of the 2005 raids as an arbitrary show of power. The sense
of arbitrariness was well encapsulated by a statement, perhaps apocryphal, that several
observers claimed to have overheard from a central official responding to a local
bureaucrat: ““Why are you so concerned about the details? Our purpose is to shut down,
plain and simple!”
Though legal loopholes and corruption ultimately scuttled prosecution of the
doctors, the “first raids” and their accompanying media frenzy pierced the ongoing
banality of selective reproduction and pushed a previously conspicuous biomedical
market underground. The spectacle gave Mahesana-area obstetricians a sobering
demonstration of state power around selective reproduction: the government was finally
“becoming serious” about the PCPNDT Act. It was a key milestone in the evolution of a
local governance regime that eventually contributed to the end of sex selection at
Nandini, and the rise of Uma-masi’s career as a facilitator.

An Evolving Market: 2005 to 2012
A Black Market in Becoming
Following the 2005 raids, Mahesana-area obstetricians began leaving the sex
selection market. Reflecting a decade later, many attributed their cessation of SD and
selective abortion to desires to “abide by the law” or “behave ethically.” They described a
process of moral awakening in which increased “awareness” of “the law of the land” and
“the very bad sex ratio” reshaped views on sex selection. A number emphasized the
impact of realizing that individual sex selection events were aggregating to produce
population-level demographic disparity, “a social nuisance” that portended “social
destruction” and “social problems” such as rampant drug and alcohol use, rape,
involuntary bachelorhood, and upper-caste men “having no choice” but to wed women
from “tribal communities or other communities much lower than us, which disturbs our
moral sense.” Such recognitions, the doctors explained, spurred them toward following
the law and “helping keep balance.”
While moral concerns featured prominently in retrospective accounts, most
obstetricians also cited fear of “the crackdown.” One observed drily, “People stopped so
the law’s obstacles wouldn’t get in the way. No one stopped by choice. But everyone’s
afraid of the law... If you don’t stop, there’s a chance of being trapped at any time.” For
many, an abstract legal morality intertwined with a hard-nosed legal pragmatism. Amid
increases in state policing, even rising returns on sex selection became insufficient to
offset the risks of PCPNDT violation. Numerous doctors noted that, having “established
our practice,” “built our patient base,” and “gotten set with a proper income” while
performing SD and selective abortion through the early 2000s, they now felt comfortable
ceasing the practices without fear of financial collapse.
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Perhaps surprisingly, Dr. Dilip did not abandon sex selection after the Nandini
raid. Recalling the early-2006 unsealing of his sonography machine, he once said to me:
The loss was quite high during six months when the machine was sealed—
practice came down by 60%, so there was 80% loss in net income... Plus,
expenses—lawyer, so on. We were all discussing, and we said, ‘This
lawyer’s fee, and money for the judge—where are we going to get it from?
By doing this only, right?’ So to recover losses, and to regain practice, SD
was the only way.
Upon release of the equipment, SD at Nandini resumed.
Uma-masi recounted:
Dilip-saheb wasn’t afraid—there couldn’t be a raid at our place
immediately afterward, right? So he started up again, right away—he
earned his! He took 3,500 for a girl, and 5,000 for a boy. Our business ran
like crazy for a while. It was a daily income of 50,000! If we checked ten,
with five good results, I got 500 in tips—100 from each patient—and
some VIP patients happily gave 500 or 1,000!
Now, Saheb didn’t tell the patient or take the money. Saheb just
made a signal to me—one finger raised for ‘boy,’ one finger down for
‘negative.’ We didn’t let the patient realize—no words! He would tell
them, ‘Sit outside, and Ben will come, take the money, and tell you.’ Then
I would go outside for a bit—the next building over, or under the stairs
somewhere, but not at the clinic. I would explain to the patient—boy or
girl—and take the money.
With PCPNDT enforcement suddenly visible after the 2005 raids, the price of the black
market service had jumped an order of magnitude, from 500 rupees to 5,000.66 And the
perception of intensified government surveillance had created an opportunity for clinical
staff like Uma-masi to more integrally participate in and capitalize on the tests. Dr. Dilip
and Uma-masi’s method for indirectly conveying results exemplified the
communicational codes that arose in clinical practice and public imagination. Journalistic
articles abounded with speculative references to how doctors now communicated sex
insidiously by pointing to photographs of boys or girls, invoking gods or goddesses, or
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telling families to purchase penda or jalebi.67 Several Mahesana-area doctors recalled
being asked by government officials to remove pictures of babies from their consultories,
lest they be suspected of using the images to quietly disclose sex.
Although Dr. Dilip resumed SD provision, the raids had left him wary of
performing selective abortion. Uma-masi remembered:
Saheb looked, but he didn’t do the other part. For MTP, he always gave
patients to me and sent me personally to Harnish-bhai. Saheb looked here,
and the MTP happened there... Sometimes, I took four at a time! And I got
good money for it. If the patient gave Harnish-bhai 5,000, he gave me 500.
There were days when I made 4,000!
Dr. Dilip, Uma-masi, and Dr. Harnish disaggregated the two stages of sex selection
across different sites—a pattern that was becoming increasingly common with rising
surveillance.68 Given the invisibility of sonographic SD, and the plausibility of claiming
ignorance regarding an abortion patient’s previous SD, spatiotemporal disaggregation
dissipated some of the risk attached to sex selection services.
At some point, Uma-masi started diverting some SD patients from Nandini
toward Dr. Vinay, a newly established obstetrician who promised, “’Come to me, and
you will get what you deserve—1,000 rupees per patient!’” Instead of leaving Uma-masi
to collect tips from patients, as Dr. Dilip did, Dr. Vinay guaranteed a 20% commission.
Taking roughly fifty patients a month to Dr. Vinay and Dr. Harnish for sex selection
services, Uma-masi earned over 40,000 rupees—more than six times her regular salary.
Her work exemplified the rising importance and profitability of facilitation in a market
that was rapidly moving underground.
Large-Scale Enterprises: Dr. Rohit and Dr. Ganpat
As many providers left the market, a doctor fifty kilometers east of Mahesana
built up the largest sex selection enterprise the region had ever seen. Within a brief span,
Vijapur’s Dr. Rohit Patel69 generated tremendous wealth—tens of millions of rupees, by
many estimates—as families, aware that “the government is now getting strict about the
boy-girl test,” flocked to his high-profile practice.
Colleagues usually scowled when recalling the scale and methods of Dr. Rohit’s
practice. One remembered, “He used to do twenty or thirty patients daily! They would all
be sitting, lined up, at his clinic. And he gave everyone four-five visiting cards—‘You
can send anybody for SD.’” Obstetricians who had abandoned sex selection found their
patients consistently ending up in Vijapur, and Dr. Rohit began encouraging collegial
referrals.
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According to one colleage, Dr. Rohit also stitched patients’ cervixes closed
“without reason” after “male” results, charging up to 5,000 rupees for the additional
procedure and insisting on delivery in Vijapur. When families returned at full term, he
would “claim that there was such-and-such problem, and that they needed to do a
Caesarean or the boy would come out crazy, or with cerebral palsy.” Since “everyone
would want the child to survive and be healthy”—“the main purpose, after all, was to
have a boy!”—most families acquiesced. If they did not, he allegedly administered the
drug methylergonovine,70 precipitating contractions against a closed cervix, fetal distress,
and stillbirth—“the child would really die, and the patient would think, we should have
gotten the Caesarean!” Dr. Rohit thus capitalized on selective reproduction not only by
charging for scans and abortions, but also by extracting additional profit from
unnecessary cervical stitches, ransom of the much-desired son, and forced Caesareans.
Nonetheless, patients continued to frequent his clinic, for it was a conspicuously
accessible enterprise in an otherwise-clandestine market.
In 2010, after Dr. Rohit’s sex selection operation had flourished for several years,
senior leaders of the Mahesana Obstetric-Gynecologic Society (MOGS)—a professional
association encompassing dozens of doctors in Mahesana and Patan Districts—tipped off
local government officials. Frustrated by the recordkeeping emphasis and “harassment of
innocents” in PCPNDT implementation, MOGS members had decided in a full-body
meeting to “name the culprit, provided the authority is prepared to take action.” (Dr.
Rohit had not been present.) Most local obstetricians later recalled the tip as a noble
undertaking aimed at shifting state efforts away from bureaucratic technicalities and
toward “catching red-handed the people who are doing.” A few observers instead
ascribed the action to jealousy: numerous MOGS members, like Dr. Dilip, were still
offering small-scale sex-selection services, and most admitted envy regarding Dr. Rohit’s
earning. Either way, the professional association offered up the Vijapur doctor as a target
for the regulatory gaze.
By the evening of April 13, 2010, Dr. Rohit’s sonography machine had been
sealed. Several days earlier, the Mahesana Anti-Corruption Bureau, in concert with the
local PCPNDT Cell, had sent undercover officials to the clinic with a pregnant woman—
a “dummy patient,” in local parlance. In response to a request for SD, Dr. Rohit had
quoted a 5,000-rupee charge and told the group to return on the 13th; unbeknownst to
him, the conversation had been recorded. At the time of the scan, the group proffered
chemically marked notes, but whoever accepted them quickly realized something was
amiss and attempted to dispose of the money. After raiding the premises, government
officials charged the doctor with PCPNDT violations, evidence tampering, and
obstructing a public servant. Local newspapers heavily publicized the sting. Five years
after the 2005 raids, government action—now supported by local obstetricians—again
created a governance spectacle for public consumption.
The legal case against Dr. Rohit soon fractured. Within a month, the doctor had
brought suit against local officials in Gujarat’s High Court. Alleging evidentiary
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improprieties, his petition asked the court to “quash and set aside the illegal procedure
adopted and action taken by the respondent-authority,” initiate removal of the seal,
mandate compensation for lost income with 18% interest, and “direct the respondents not
to take any coercive steps against the petitioner.” By the end of May, district authorities
had released the sonography machine. On July 19th, the High Court disposed of Dr.
Rohit’s petition without ruling on its merits, noting that the government had essentially
admitted to giving up on the case. With that, state action against Mahesana District’s
most prominent sex selection practitioner ended.
Years later, speculation abounded regarding how Dr. Rohit had dodged
punishment. Many colleagues claimed that the raid “turned out a failure” because “he had
someone else take the money so nothing would happen to him, and the case was
dismissed.” Others alleged that the compounder had flushed the marked money down a
toilet upon growing suspicious, thereby obliterating the key evidence. Still others offered
speculations about bribery: “Rohit-bhai paid money in corruption—2 million!—and got
the case thrown out and his machine opened up.”
Shortly after the conclusion of legal proceedings, Dr. Rohit died of a heart attack.
Although he had allegedly suffered from cardiac problems for years, some colleagues
maintained that “tension” from the case had precipitated the attack. Others scoffed at this
theory, observing that Dr. Rohit was “not the kind to take tension over anything.” Given
the doctor’s young age, many ascribed cosmic significance to his sudden passing—
“nature’s punishment,” “a blow from the universe.” One colleague opined, “The
universe—God only—killed the scoundrel! It’s clear to me—the life of girls itself came
back and killed him! If you looked at him, he could have lived 100 years. I believe it was
the hand of the universe that took him.” Dr. Rohit’s death fit neatly into an emerging
discourse of sex selection as both legal and moral crime: divine justice had succeeded
where the law had failed.
After the Vijapur raid, Dr. Dilip stopped performing SD. Newspaper reports on
the raid mentioned sixteen local doctors receiving PCPNDT warning notices, and Dr.
Dilip later recalled being issued one around that time. In his and his staffers’ tellings, the
warning identified him as under suspicion of providing sex selection services, citing as
warrant the conspicuously skewed SR among infants born at Nandini. Uma-masi
recounted:
Saheb stopped around April 2010. He was getting a lot of pressure. Our
ratio was all boys... In the delivered issue, there were all boys. Just two or
three girls a month—nothing but boys! So the Collector and all of them
said, Dr. Dilip is looking... There was a notice: ‘You are looking for
people.’ Then Saheb promised he would never look again. And since then,
he doesn’t. Once he made his money, he stopped—‘Let other people do it;
I don’t want to.’
Reflecting the national construction of sex selection as a crisis of aggregate SRs, local
surveillance efforts were now utilizing clinic-specific SRs as proxies for the invisible
crime.
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Dr. Dilip’s withdrawal from the market was part of a broader wave of provider
attrition that also included Uma-masi’s referral partner Dr. Vinay. The gradual
transformation of sex selection from plentiful and visible to scarce and secretive, which
had begun with nominal PCPNDT implementation in the early 2000s and intensified with
the 2005 raids, reached a new stage after the Vijapur raid, Dr. Rohit’s death, and further
state gestures toward vigorous policing. Most obstetricians now refused to provide SD or
selective abortion on any substantial scale.
Following Dr. Dilip and Dr. Vinay’s abandonment of SD, Uma-masi quickly
found another collaborator: Dr. Ganpat, another small-town obstetrician who had quickly
replaced Dr. Rohit as the region’s most notorious practitioner. With him, she managed
referrals by phone, visiting the clinic once a week to receive her commissions—thirty
percent of the total collection. The doctor, meanwhile, charged 10,000 rupees per service,
or twice the pre-2010 figure. Given high patient volume—sometimes as many as twenty
selective abortions per day—Dr. Ganpat’s daily earnings supposedly reached 300,000.
Nurses at the clinic earned 50,000 per month, and even sweepers enjoyed salaries
approaching 20,000—several times what their counterparts at other clinics earned.
Colleagues, facilitators, and clients later emphasized the “boldness” of Dr.
Ganpat’s “very large-scale” operation—an “epicenter” of sex selection in North Gujarat,
“the destination for people from everywhere.” Some reported that the doctor routinely
served patients from every corner of Gujarat, as well as Rajasthan, Maharashtra, and
other states. Many recalled how brazenly he distributed visiting cards to facilitate referral,
sometimes pulling one out of a purse, wallet, or desk to show me. He supposedly showed
little concern for discretion, “inviting everyone in, even if they came without reference,”
with “no saying no, no screening”—“as long as patients had money, he would just put
them on the table straightaway.” Colleagues speculated about regular bribes to
government officials, with some declaring confidently that he “could not possibly do it
like this except with the support of the authority—with the blessings of the authority.”
Eventually, though, Dr. Ganpat’s enterprise, too, came to an end. Thenceforth, no
Mahesana-area obstetrician practiced sex selection as openly as him or Dr. Rohit. The
market had shifted further underground.

Chetna Clinic
Accessing Sex Selection
By early 2013, Uma-masi was actively seeking a collaborator to replace Dr.
Ganpat. Her search ended in a small town near Mahesana, with Chetna Clinic and Dr.
Ranjit. In first describing the doctor to me, she explained:
Five-six months ago, I went to see my cousin. Turns out, he farms this
saheb’s land. He told me, go meet with Saheb, and your work will be
done. So I went. Saheb asked where I was from, who I was, all that. I told
him how I was a nurse in Mahesana, what my father’s village was, who
my cousin was. Once he knew my cousin handled his fields—a connection
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through the village—he trusted me—that I wouldn’t get him in trouble
with anyone.
The thick sociality of kinship and patron-client relations helped forge the new referral
relationship: the “axiom of amity”71 ensured that Dr. Ranjit could rely on Uma-masi’s
discretion.
Recalling their first encounter, Uma-masi elaborated, “I told Saheb, ‘This is how
it is, and if you’re prepared to give me mine, I’ll give you good money—VIP patients, the
kind who’ll pay 12,000.’ He was taking just 3,000 for looking—an overly low bill! He
didn’t know you could do like this. So then I taught him. I’m the one who made him
smart!”
In fact, Dr. Ranjit himself credited Uma-masi with enlarging the scale of sex
selection at Chetna. “Before two years,” he once told me, “I was taking just 3,000. She
was the one who started giving 10,000. She was the one teaching: ‘This is demand,
people are ready, they are paying 45,000, so we have to become opportunistic.’”
Dr. Ranjit began offering me such frank intimations only after months of wary
aloofness. The process of establishing my ethnographic intention began shortly after my
initiatory conversation with Uma-masi, when she took me to Chetna on an SD visit. After
picking up the patient and her husband in Mahesana, Uma-masi’s son drove us along a
dark road, lined by fields and trees on both sides, until we reached Dr. Ranjit’s town.
The young man parked the car in a narrow street lined by squat buildings of old
and sometimes decaying construction. Dusk had settled over the town. The fragrant scent
of bidi smoke filled the air. I followed Uma-masi and her clients as they picked their way
past produce-laden wooden carts, dodging rickshaws and mopeds and running boys.
At the end of the dusty path stood Chetna Clinic. As at most local clinics, the
waiting room contained a chipped wooden reception desk, benches, and a prominent
bilingual sign: “Here prenatal SD (boy or girl before birth) is not done. It is a punishable
act.” A nurse showed us into the well furnished consultory. A nondescript man stood
behind the desk. Grinning widely, Uma-masi introduced us. I explained my project
briefly. As Dr. Ranjit stared at me, I bumbled verbally around the topic of sex selection.
He eventually squinted and cut me off, mumbling that government regulations were now
very tight.
My next visit to Chetna came months later, when I began full-fledged fieldwork.
While scanning, Dr. Ranjit sporadically asked me questions about my research plan,
confidentiality protocols, and work at Nandini. Following the sonography, Uma-masi
encouraged me to “interview Saheb, if you like.” Taken aback, laughably unprepared,
and worried about the doctor’s potential wariness, I thrust forward my advisors’ official
introduction letter and timidly asked if we could converse further “next time.”
My third time to Chetna with Uma-masi, I finally asked Dr. Ranjit if I could
speak with him or observe his activities in greater depth. “I can’t do that,” he said,
shaking his head. “SD is a very hot issue right now!” Uma-masi reassured him it would
“no problem”—the information was “for research only”—but Dr. Ranjit was adamant:
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“After taking it for research, he will submit it in writing to the university, no?” His quiet
voice grew louder as he continued:
Do you know there were multiple complaints recently to the CDHO, BHO
[Block Health Officer], local officials? ‘People are coming from out of
town, and then this doctor is looking in this way and taking 12,000.’ It’s
very tight! I can’t give an interview. Have Dilip-bhai arrange things with
doctors in Mahesana—there are so many! This is a small town. I can’t take
the risk.
Attempting to inspire confidence, I started explaining my confidentiality protocols, but
the doctor waved his hand dismissively: “People maintain Swiss bank accounts, and still
the lists of black money come out! I can’t take that kind of risk.” I asked if I might simply
continue to observe. Uma-masi jumped in to reiterate that there would be “no problem.”
Dr. Ranjit turned to her and said sternly, “Only if you bring him, huh? He must come
with you and leave with you.” As we departed, I was aware that only the doctor’s trust in
Uma-masi had prevented my complete banishment.
For several months, Uma-masi did not allow me to set foot inside Chetna. Even
when taking me along, she had me sit outside the clinic. At the same time, during phone
conversations with Dr. Ranjit, she frequently slipped in references to my coming over for
dinner or “just to chat.”
Perhaps due to the small insinuations of trustworthiness, Dr. Ranjit responded
favorably when we met again, fifteen months after our initial encounter. After shouting,
“Oh ho!” and reaching out to shake my hand, he asked questions about my ongoing
research and nodded with each reply. Uma-masi restated her hope that he would grant me
a meeting. He reiterated his “No,” but now with a wry smile. Two days later, on another
visit, he finally responded to Uma-masi’s persistent request in the affirmative: “Okay, but
he’ll have to do night duty here!” A “night halt,” he explained, would demonstrate both
my commitment and my trustworthiness: what ulterior motives were strong enough to
motivate sleeping over in one of the clinic’s bare rooms?
Shortly thereafter, I visited Chetna without Uma-masi for the first time, while
accompanying Asha-ben’s family for her abortion. A week later, my completion of the
overnight stay initiated a long series of observations. Over the subsequent months, Dr.
Ranjit sought repeated assurance that I would not “submit my name and location to the
university.” Upon receiving my pledge of confidentiality, he inevitably recalled our early
interactions: “There was no other problem. But we are worried about exposure. You
know this is a very sensitive issue.” The promise to never publicly identify Dr. Ranjit,
bolstered by Uma-masi’s authority and a long process of acquaintance, ultimately
allowed me to observe and analyze the inner workings of an ongoing sex selection
enterprise.
Situating Dr. Ranjit
There is no easy way to make sense of Dr. Ranjit. He was a deeply pious man,
with Hindu religious icons filling every corner of his consultory and home. His clinical
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days began in prayer, and pilgrimages and temple visits occupied much of his free time.
He seemed to constantly ruminate—even perseverate—on the sinfulness of sex-selective
abortion. Yet he quickly put a price on it when negotiating with patients: “Why would I
commit sin for so little?!” He exhibited a gentler manner than any local obstetrician I
knew, addressing routine patients with marked respect and sensitivity. Yet he could be
very short with sex selection patients, sometimes expressing outright indifference to their
anxiety and suffering. He professed what I perceived as genuine guilt and embarrassment
about his notoriety. But he continued to act on what I could only understand as avarice,
collecting hundreds of thousands of rupees (several thousand dollars) every Sunday for
scan after scan, abortion after abortion.
Like many local doctors, Dr. Ranjit came from a family of modest means. A
brilliant pupil, he had earned a merit scholarship to study medicine in Ahmedabad.
Obstetrics “was not a line of preference” for him—in fact, he “had no desire to do this.”
But when he had consulted an astrologer regarding specialty selection, the latter had
advised, “‘You go into this line—you will have success in this line.’”
Following residency, Dr. Ranjit had established Chetna Clinic. The building was
typical: a waiting room with adjoining patio; private and shared inpatient rooms; a
dispensary—really more a closet—containing a small medication stock; and a consultory
with the typical curtained-off area for examination and sonography.
For many years, Dr. Ranjit had focused on “bread-and-butter” practice: antenatal
care, labor and delivery, Caesarean section, medical and surgical treatment of general
gynecologic problems, and routine abortion. He had mostly avoided SD, instead referring
patients to colleagues like Dr. Rohit and Dr. Ganpat. Nonetheless, recalling his early days
in private practice, when many rural patients still gave birth at home, he admitted:
Back in those days, if it was male—after four months, it’s clear, right?— I
used to tell them for free! Then, the patient would happily come for
delivery. If it was female, I did not disclose. But if it was male, I told them
even if they didn’t ask! Because at that time, there weren’t so many
hospital deliveries—people delivered at home, or with midwives, or with
Ayurvedic doctors. So if I told them it was male, they would insist for
hospital delivery!
Long before beginning his large-scale sex selection practice, Dr. Ranjit had
opportunistically profited from free, unsolicited SD on his poorest patients.
By the time we met, Dr. Ranjit was a major figure in the North Gujarat sex
selection market. He drew patients from every caste and class. Upper-caste and affluent
families were disproportionately represented, and especially so with SD on a potential
second (versus third or fourth) child. Most clients came from Mahesana and the six
adjoining districts, but some traveled from hundreds of kilometers away. Outside visitors
frequently noted the irony of a major sex selection enterprise in Mahesana District—the
homeland of the state health minister, Chief Minister Anandi-ben Patel, and Prime
Minister Narendra-bhai Modi himself.
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Like most local sex selection providers, Dr. Ranjit preferred to take clients at
“awkward times” or “off hours”—evenings, Sundays, and holidays—due to the miniscule
likelihood of government inspection visits. On arriving in the Chetna waiting room,
clients encountered a hodgepodge of routine patients, sex selection facilitators, and sex
selection patients, the latter often tending to young daughters—never sons—who
crawled, ran, cried, shouted, and played on the floor. When registering with the reception
nurse, some families feigned a routine visit, waiting to reveal their purpose to the doctor;
others glanced around furtively before leaning over and whispering, “We’re here to get it
checked... We have to get it looked it... We’re here for a test.” The nurse wrote the
patient’s name (or the false name given) on a chit, which another nurse took inside.
Connectors, who usually phoned beforehand, just waved at the reception nurse and
herded clients toward an open bench. Once registered, families settled in to wait,
sometimes for hours.
Inside the consultory, unfacilitated clients again used vague language—“check,”
“test,” “looking”—to convey their aims. Dr. Ranjit responded by asking questions to
probe their trustworthiness and ascertain how they knew of him. After vetting clients, Dr.
Ranjit clarified pricing. He took pains to underscore the separate charge “if the result is
not good—if anything else is to be done”.
Dr. Ranjit then showed families into the examining area and performed SD. To
obtain a definitive result, he often had to repeat the scan, making the patient cycle
between consultory and waiting room. With “female” results, he asked clients “your
decision,” frequently precipitating discussion of options for selective abortion. He
permitted and even encouraged return visits for confirmation, scrawling out a chit that the
family could present to jog his memory: gestational age in weeks, obstetric history, town
of origin, ‘D’ for “direct” or ‘A’ for “agent,” payment quoted and collected, and a symbol
for the tentative result—‘^’ for female, ‘-‘ for male. It was usually around this time, after
the disclosure of the scan result, that Dr. Ranjit collected his payment.
Producing Profits
Dr. Ranjit generated massive profits from visualizing and acting on fetal sex—
easily 200,000 rupees on a single Sunday. Factoring in scattered sonographies and
abortions on regular workdays—most did not pass without at least one—he enjoyed a
monthly income of 2 million rupees, or three to four times what his colleagues earned
from routine practice.
Returns on sex selection fluctuated with the patient’s economic class. While Dr.
Ranjit usually collected between 8,000 and 15,000 rupees for a single test or abortion,72
initial quotes varied based on clients’ appearance and manner. With typical middle-class
patients, the doctor might ask for 12,000; if clothing, accessories, and speech suggested
affluence, perhaps 15,000; and from poor, beleaguered patients, sometimes “only” 7,000.
Doctor and staff used various tactics—extracting promises of discretion, segregating
simultaneous abortion patients to different rooms, instructing facilitators to collect
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different families’ payments separately—to prevent intercommunication and sustain
differential pricing.
Connectors collaborated with Dr. Ranjit to enact the sliding fee scale. In fact,
many coached him on how to charge specific people: in accordance with an ethic of
“help,” “good work,” or “service,” they down-negotiated prices for acquaintances and
poor patients while furtively whispering phrases like “They’re VIP!” or “You have to get
yours!” to encourage elevated pricing for others. Facilitators like Uma-masi praised Dr.
Ranjit for the fact that “he will take whatever I give him—if I say, you will only get this
much with this patient, but you still have to do it, he will do it.” Uma-masi often prearranged a result-stratified fee structure: 15,000 “if it’s positive,” 10,000 “if it’s
negative,” and 20,000 for a “package with cancel.” Stratified pricing acknowledged both
the misfortune of a “female” result and the superadded burden of paying for two different
services.73
Of course, initial price quotes were subject to extensive bargaining, with
discounts ultimately ranging from 1,500 to 3,000. Commencing after disclosure of the SD
result, negotiations could become testy, with doctors and clients both raising their voices:
“It can’t be so little, Bhai!... It can’t be so much, Saheb!... So am I to take whatever you
say?... What, am I to give whatever you say, Saheb?... Why not just ask for it for free?...
Are you even serious?!” More often, both parties bargained passive-aggressively, with
smiling appeals to the other’s “understanding.” Clients cited household misfortunes—
multiple daughters, a recent death, an ongoing illness, precarious income, failed
investments—to justify fee reduction. Clients receiving “male” results frequently paid in
full, with only perfunctory bargaining, while those with “female” results insisted on
paying less: “If it had been the real deal, it would be different.” “This is a third girl—try
to understand, Saheb.” “If it had been positive, we would happily have paid up.”
Occasionally, pity for “genuine cases”— poor patients with multiple daughters and a
“pathetic life”—led Dr. Ranjit to accept as little as 5,000 rupees for SD; in such cases, he
sometimes set up an interest-free installment system, permitting (and expecting) payment
over a year.
Dr. Ranjit was less willing to reduce fees for selective abortion. Outside the
“package deals” arranged by facilitators, he rarely granted more than a token discount.
The timing of negotiations capacitated Dr. Ranjit’s firmness: unlike with SD, where he
often disclosed results before demanding his fee, he usual fixed and collected payments
before providing abortion. Despite falling in more ambiguous legal terrain, every
abortion carried a small-but-nontrivial threat of catastrophic exposure, given the greater
potential (relative to SD) for bodily complications. Moreover, every selective abortion
entailed significant sin—a problem I explore in Chapters 5. Given these risks, pricing for
the second stage of sex selection was largely non-negotiable.
After the doctor, connectors profited most at Chetna, earning between 1,000 and
5,000 rupees per referral. Some collected Dr. Ranjit’s fees from clients and skimmed off
a portion before delivering the remainder. Others made clients pay the doctor directly,
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returning alone later to claim their commissions. As in Asha-ben’s case, facilitators also
profited through tips; Uma-masi, for instance, typically extracted 500, even when clients
felt despondent at the result.
Facilitators also capitalized when clients decided to obtain selective abortion
somewhere other than Chetna. As I discuss in Chapter 3, Dr. Ranjit often encouraged
patients to go elsewhere, especially in risky cases. Many connectors coordinated selective
abortion with obstetricians who provided the service despite avoiding SD. Uma-masi
typically channeled five or six patients per month to Mahesana’s Dr. Harnish, who
charged 5,000 to 10,000 rupees and gave a 20% commission. Linking Chetna with other
clinics in the underground market, connectors profited from coordination work that
pragmatically coupled the two stages of sex selection, thereby permitting their separation
in space and time.
From Dr. Ranjit and connectors, smaller profits diffused outward to others in the
Chetna sex selection network. With “good” results, connectors pressed clients to tip the
nurses several hundred rupees. Staff sweepers consistently collected a 300-rupee
“cleaning” fee after selective abortions, even though the work performed was
indistinguishable from the cleanup following routine abortions. In rare cases, when kāchi
delivery resulted in emergence of an intact fetus—too recognizable for disposal through
routine biomedical waste systems—the sweepers might charge 500 to bury the remains at
a remote location; though rarely discussed even by clinical stuff, this “dirty” labor by
lower-caste women played a key role in invisibilizing and thereby supporting biomedical
sex selection.74
Beyond the clinic, profits trickled to various peripheral actors. Connectors
sometimes passed between 500 and 3,000 rupees to upstream referrers. Often, they also
arranged for their own relatives or friends to transport clients to Chetna. While
maintaining that she sought “to save patients money, to not let them spend one
unnecessary paisa,” Uma-masi sometimes forced even families possessing a car to travel
in a vehicle of her appointment—her neighbor Gautam-bhai’s rickshaw or her son’s car.
The “gas money,” “driver cost,” and “vehicle rental” frequently totaled several thousand
rupees—an exorbitant amount for the distance covered.
The profiteering of various sex selection actors exacted a heavy toll on families.
Ishwar-bhai Chaudhary, whose wife Nayna-ben underwent SD and subsequent abortion
at Chetna, ran down the costs to me as he waited for a nurse to hand over post-abortion
medications: “12,000 for sonography, 9,000 to get it taken out, 1,000 for a day’s
rickshaw fare, 1,000 for car rental the second day, 350 for medications, and 300 to the
sweepers”—a total of nearly 25,000 rupees. Despite a recent family illness and some
failed investments, Ishwar-bhai’s household could absorb the cost, given his 30,000rupee government teaching salary, 10,000-rupee private tuition income, and extensive
social capital. But for families of manual laborers, farmers, and low-rung salaried
workers, total costs between 15,000 and 30,000 could consume over a year of disposable
income. Little surprise that countless clients mortgaged land, borrowed money at
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usurious interest, or sold family heirlooms and other liquid assets to pay Dr. Ranjit, Umamasi, and others. For many families, visualizing the gendered subject of kinship—and
eliminating her, if a potential daughter—proved ruinously expensive.
Knowing and Concealing
To whom was sex selection visible? Dr. Ranjit, his staff, and his ultrasound
machine functioned as central points in a network of knowledge, constellating scattered
referrers and clients. Colleagues referred patients to reinforce the obstetric patron-client
relationship and fulfill various social obligations, but sometimes also for direct profit.
Many clients came with clinical staffers, like Uma-masi, or with midwives, pharmacists,
and other community-based facilitators. Finally, a motley assortment of figures who had
crossed paths with Dr. Ranjit at some point—temple priests, train conductors,
pharmaceutical representatives, insurance agents, a nearby charity hospital’s trustees,
dentists, a village veterinarian’s wife, and myriad acquaintances of previous clients—
made referrals to Chetna.
Dr. Ranjit constantly evaluated whom to authorize as a sex selection referrer. As
with Uma-masi, formation of new connections entailed establishing trust and setting
business terms. In acknowledging and activating potential facilitators, Dr. Ranjit
entrusted and empowered them with knowledge of his practices, along with the privilege
of participating in them.
Collaboration between the doctor and connectors rested on discretion—the
“embodied practices that conceal and reveal potentially significant information and that
performatively establish a subject’s positionality within a specific community of
practice,” simultaneously encompassing both concealment and disclosure.75 It was not
through objectivized “secrets,” but through a process of discretion that people moved
between “inside” and “outside”—or rather, engaged in “forms of concealment and
revelation... that, in fact, defied such simple binary logic.”76 Discretion concealed key
information from public view while allowing controlled sharing of such information in
ways that confirmed belonging within a specified community and produced “intimate
relationality.”77 Discretion allowed for capitalization on market knowledge, with “the
value of secret knowledge [becoming] apparent and [gaining] social force in the moment
of its revelation, when it was no longer secret” for clients.78 By allowing and trusting
connectors to possess, conceal, and selectively reveal his practices, Dr. Ranjit established
a working intimacy with them, setting up a loose network of information and
information-bearers that was ostensibly insulated from public view.
Nevertheless, trust regarding discretion did not necessarily transfer to business
practices, and Dr. Ranjit frequently lamented connectors’ lack of commercial
transparency. Some used their middle position to extract more money by misleading both
doctor and client; for example, Uma-masi collected fees from clients, quietly pocketed
2,000, presented the rest to Dr. Ranjit as full payment, and took another 3,000 in
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commission. Others claimed the need for large commissions to satisfy upstream referrers
and then kept all the money, the second-degree connectors being either non-existent or
unremunerated. Dr. Rajen—the Ayurvedic fertility specialist who approached Asha-ben
after her abortion—was the most prolific facilitator at Chetna, bringing in half a dozen
patients per week, but Dr. Ranjit and his staff privately detested the man, calling him
“unreliable” and “not transparent.” They often recounted how Dr. Rajen had attempted to
“snatch” a longstanding patient from Dr. Ranjit’s own gol, accosting her outside the
clinic and insisting she would only receive SD if paying through him; the lie had come to
light only because the client had complained to Dr. Ranjit, prompting him to confront Dr.
Rajen and extract a confession. In general, the limited visibility of much of the SD
business to even the central service provider created countless possibilities for connectors
to profit through deception.
At the same time, facilitators’ profitable middle position was constantly
jeopardized by the leakiness of their specialized knowledge.79 The problem of “direct
patients”—people visiting Chetna without intermediation—brought connectors into
pitched conflict with Dr. Ranjit, for when such patients appeared trustworthy, he had little
incentive to turn them away. To avoid bypass, facilitators practiced numerous
information management tactics, such as hiding the clinic’s particulars until in transit or
claiming that the doctor would never accept unfacilitated clients. Nonetheless, once
families recognized Chetna as a sex selection site, the knowledge and trust that
undergirded facilitation routinely leaked.
The leakiness of market knowledge posed not only financial, but also legal
danger. Uma-masi used her phone to coordinate Chetna trips and to give prospective
clients standardized instructions: “Yes, to get it looked at?... It can be done after three
months and ten days... No, don’t have the form filled, don’t register it anywhere... Come
meet me. Your work will be done.” Toward the end of my fieldwork, however, she grew
concerned about wiretapping. She talked often about obtaining a separate line for
discussing SD, “so that our number doesn’t keep circulating—what if someone from
government gets it?” In fact, the circulation of her number, along with rumors of her
efficacy, was one of her chief business assets; she could hardly afford to end it. But her
anxiety underscored the danger of circulating information: what if one’s market
knowledge and participation became visible to the state?
Policing and Participating
The specter of government policing suffused clinical encounters at Chetna.
Whenever a PCPNDT sting occurred anywhere in Gujarat, Uma-masi painstakingly
recapitulated the televised coverage to Dr. Ranjit: had he heard about the Ayurvedic
practitioner caught taking a “fake patient” to a Surat sonographer, or the obstetrician,
broker, and rickshaw driver busted near the Ahmedabad bus depot? Dr. Ranjit and his
collaborators exhibited a shared paranoia about the specialized technologies used in
stings, such as chemical tracers and recording devices.80 Rasila-masi, a midwife from
Patan, always received, counted, and delivered patient payments in a handkerchief to
79
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avoid contact with “powdered notes” and retain scope for “raising many doubts” in case
“someone is recording on a mobile, or there’s a camera”: “Who knows what I’ve given in
the handkerchief?” While describing the handkerchief method, Rasila-masi requested
assurance that I was not recording our conversation. I heard the concern in identical form
from many connectors: “You never know! Patients are so clever. We could be sitting here
talking, I could be giving advice, and they could be recording me!” Dr. Ranjit expressed
recurrent fear that someone might photograph or record his work, frequently snapping
when patient relatives used mobile phones in the examining area. Although the state
detection apparatus was largely ineffective, providers remained hyper-vigilant, given the
possibility that officials might opportunistically pounce on circulating proof of sex
selection.
Despite pervasive concern about surveillance, Dr. Ranjit and his referrers
displayed remarkable laxity in vetting potential clients. While providers claimed to screen
families carefully, I almost never saw them refuse prospective clients, even though the
latter sometimes gave only the vaguest references: “Remember we came, that one time?...
My sister’s sister-in-law got it done here two years ago.... My uncle—the one with a
business in Gandhinagar—he came to you fifteen months ago... My niece is married to
that doctor in Mahesana.” Even when Dr. Ranjit obviously could not recognize families,
necessitating several minutes of follow-up questions, he did not turn them away. In
response to my queries about how he ensured that clients were “authentic” (his term), he
explained, “Usually, patients don’t have mala fide intention. They have a genuine
problem. From discussion, we can get a sense that a patient is genuine—‘We came
through this person, or this long ago.’ We can sort it out. You can see it on their face, in
their eyes.” Most facilitators used a similarly vague intuition to explain their confidence:
“I just know, from the way they talk... I can grasp someone’s personality right away!...
You can always tell, immediately.” When Uma-masi and other connectors refused
clients, it was not for perceived indiscreetness or potential government linkage, but for
stingy, indecisive, or otherwise annoying behavior. Although generally professing great
caution, sex selection providers rarely found cause for concern in any specific case.
In fact, with sex selection a ubiquitous part of everyday life, families often
discussed Dr. Ranjit’s services quite indiscreetly. On dozens of rickshaw or bus rides
back from Chetna, I heard clients speak loudly—even shout—into the phone: “No, no,
because there’s a clinic there... We had to have my wife looked at, for that... It’s called
Chetna. He said it was a girl, so we stayed to get an abortion.” Dr. Ranjit and facilitators
implored clients to avoid exposing Chetna, but the information leaked constantly. While
providers responded to public policing with secretive paranoia, clients sometimes treated
sex selection as a banal, openly discussable matter.
Providers also clashed internally over discretion, in ways that highlighted the
public secret’s nature as a “’known-unknown,’” “almost demanding defacement” and
always threatening to “erupt despite great strategies of concealment.”81 Connectors
faulted one another for “always being there whenever I go,” ironically opining that
“someone who takes so many patients can’t be trustworthy.” If “any objectification,
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instantiation, or entextualization of a secret—an ineluctable feature of its existence as a
social phenomenon—[created] risks of unintended communicability,”82 then more
prolific facilitation surely signaled greater risk of public visibility.
Similarly, Dr. Ranjit frequently rebuked Uma-masi for barging into the consultory
unannounced: “You have to be careful making entries like this! What if someone is
inside?... You come in and say, it’s like this, and we had this done, and this is left—if you
start discussing like this, people can figure it out!... How do you know who is in here?
Just now, I had the former mayor in here!” He privately expressed fear that some
connectors’ tendencies to “not think and just start talking” might expose his work to the
wrong eyes.
From the other side, many connectors voiced concerns that Dr. Ranjit’s network
had become too open to remain secure. The notorious Dr. Rajen once told me:
He looks freely, even with direct patients, but that’s risky business. If
some Health official makes an arrangement and sends a dummy client,
then the doctor is trapped!... Rohit-bhai got shut down because he was
famous. If you want to do this work, you have to do it in great confidence.
The doctor who starts taking patients directly—his career will end within
twelve months. Because ladies gossip. They’ll say they got it checked with
this doctor, they’ll tell their neighbors, so the word will circulate, via-via...
The doctor who cares about his career won’t take direct patients, because
there’s too much risk.
Uma-masi voiced similar worries about Dr. Ranjit’s willingness to “take anyone, direct,
without asking any questions,” noting that “his name is circulating a lot—all the patients,
all the sahebs, everyone knows” and suggesting that “it would be good if Saheb reduced a
little bit.” Each major raid became an occasion for reasserting the value of preventing
leaks—of concentrating capitalizable knowledge. Facilitators inevitably warning Dr.
Ranjit to stay “vigilant,” “stop accepting direct patients,” and “take only through people
like us.” According to connectors, Dr. Ranjit’s willingness to validate and act on leaky
knowledge—to bypass them and their commissions—put him in danger of state
apprehension.
But even as the state appeared to threaten sex selection and its practitioners,
individual officials participated in the underground practice. Dr. Ranjit served myriad
government functionaries—court clerks and police officers, teachers and engineers—
whose only PCPNDT-related concern was how to skirt the law. City and village
councilors, Collectors, judges, and others with at least some official responsibility for
combating sex selection also frequented the clinic shoulder-to-shoulder with “the public.”
And various public health functionaries charged with forming the first line of surveillance
sometimes appeared at Chetna seeking illegal services for friends, relatives, or
themselves. Dr. Ranjit laughed at my astonishment upon seeing him perform SD for
community health workers’ relatives, inevitably noting, “I’ve known this person for a
82

G. Jones 2014: 56.

94

long time, so I can trust!” He laughed, too, when recalling how a judge had hidden his
official position until after his wife’s SD was complete—“If he gave me his identity, I
would’ve avoided completely!”—and how a neighboring district’s collector had secured
SD by concealing his identity, only to have Dr. Ranjit and others refuse abortion upon
recognizing him. Government officials could access services at Chetna, but only if they
inspired confidence that they were entering the hidden enterprise without intentions of
exposing it.
The constellation of features that allowed ground-level public health workers to
effectively cross the public-private divide—local origins, longstanding relationships with
Dr. Ranjit, and official roles as interfaces between citizen-beneficiaries and the health
sector—became clear one afternoon at Chetna.83 A fortysomething woman in a rich sari
entered the consultory and announced she had brought two patients. Having already
performed SD for twenty-three clients in just a few hours, Dr. Ranjit wearily said he
would see one before lunch, one after. As the woman nodded and exited, he turned to me,
broke a smile, and said, “They are also provocating this type of thing!” Seeing my
confusion, he grinned more broadly and clarified with three letters: “FHW”—a Female
Health Worker. After some silence, he added, “Everyone is—opportunistic.” When I
asked how he could trust her, he explained, “I know her since ’96.”
Ushering in the first family, the FHW explained that the patient was from her
mother-in-law’s father’s village. As Dr. Ranjit scanned, the FHW lowered her voice to a
whisper and told him, “Last time we had a meeting, Babu-bhai said something, eh? ‘We
wanted to look with Ranjit-bhai, but my daughter refused.’ How can you say this?!”
Suddenly alarmed, the doctor asked if his sex selection practices had “become a rumor”
among local Health officials. The FHW reassured him, “No, no.” After a beat, she added
with a snicker, “But Babu-bhai did say, ‘Oh, it happens at nights and on holidays.’” The
doctor furrowed his brow. Had Babu-bhai—a Health bureaucrat who knew of Dr.
Ranjit’s services—broken the code of silence, making a locally known practice visible to
state policing?
After some minutes of silent scanning, Dr. Ranjit mumbled slowly, “Babu-bhai—
well, I did his niece’s. For free! So he was the one saying this?” The FHW averred. Dr.
Ranjit continued, “You know, one time, Babu-bhai brought a medical officer! I said no.
But he insisted: ‘There’s no problem. They won’t discuss it.’” It appeared that Babu-bhai
had filled a market niche much like the FHW’s, channeling sex selection clients to Dr.
Ranjit; now, in light of her revelation, the latter was reconsidering his trust.
Once the scan ended—a “good result”—the FHW handed over a wad of bills. Dr.
Ranjit departed for lunch.
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When he returned, I was alone in the consultory. Turning to me, he muttered
contemptuously, “I did so much for Babu-bhai, and then he was the one talking in their
meeting! ‘Not during the day, but on Sundays, and evenings.’ I did it for him for free!
And then he went and told in their local Health meeting—‘Saheb is doing it.’” He
grunted. Dr. Ranjit happily allowed low-level government officers to bring new clients to
Chetna, but it would be disastrous if those officers carried knowledge of his practice back
to their official institutions.
The FHW’s second patient was a “beneficiary” from her official area. During the
scan, the FHW said, “You know, Chandu-bhai was telling, too! He started saying his
relative got it done here. Saheb, there are some that you should not take, even by
accident. I would never tell, Sir! And these two—you did it for them, and then they
started telling.” I wondered: was the FHW’s revelation a way of reinforcing Dr. Ranjit’s
reliance upon her? Laughing, she continued, “They kept saying their relatives went
directly—that way, they wouldn’t get blamed! They said all this with the BHO listening.”
Mention of the BHO startled Dr. Ranjit, who asked whether the two men “told the
BHO directly.” The FHW nodded: “Yes, the BHO! During a meeting!” Desperation in
his voice, the doctor asked the officer’s response. With a seemingly forced smile, the
FHW recalled, “The BHO said, ‘We’ll have to pay a visit on a holiday!’” I later learned
that the menacing statement prompted the same question in Dr. Ranjit’s mind as in mine:
when might the BHO come to Chetna, and how would doctor and staff ensure that he did
not catch them “red-handed”?
After the second scan, Dr. Ranjit handed some cash back to the FHW. They had a
mumbled conversation, inaudible to me, in which he appeared to speak with great
urgency. Then, she left.
While exceptional in revealing the back-and-forth flow of knowledge between sex
selection enterprises and the government institutions charged with uncovering them, the
FHW’s visit was otherwise typical of facilitated visits to Chetna. Although the state
officially stood in opposition to sex selection, individual state functionaries frequently
participated in the market for the practice just as other clients and connectors did—
seeking, referring, profiting, expressing mistrust, and sometimes allowing information to
leak.

Requests, Deflections, Refusals, Referrals
Confronting SD Requests
Mahesana-area obstetricians who did not provide sex selection services
nonetheless faced constant pressure to visualize and reveal fetal sex, or to name someone
who would—to participate in recognizing the potential subject of kinship. Doctors’
responses to such pressure—refusal, polite deflection, surreptitious referral—implicitly
staked out positions vis-a-vis the generation and transmission of knowledge. Refusal and
deflection denied both a practitioner’s willingness to produce knowledge of sex and his
knowledge regarding who would; referral sidestepped the former while mobilizing the
latter.
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One afternoon, I was alone in the Nandini consultory when Sheela-ben, a patient
from Dr. Dilip’s gol, entered with her husband and Uma-masi. As the couple sat down to
wait for the doctor, Sheela-ben asked hesitantly whether “Saheb will look for us.” Umamasi shook her head firmly: “No, he doesn’t look!” When Sheela-ben noted that “he
looked for us before,” Uma-masi reminded her, “That was four years ago! Now he
doesn’t.” Smiling smugly, she continued, “Watch! He’ll send you with me.”
Once Dr. Dilip arrived and began examining Sheela-ben, the following exchange
ensued behind the curtain:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Sheela-ben: Saheb, we have to get the test done.
Dr. Dilip: Oh, we don’t do it any more. We don’t have the software!
The government took it away.
S: But you did it for us last time!
D: But that was four years ago! The government took away the
software after that.
S: Oh, come on!
D: Well, you look at the TV! Is anything visible?
S [chuckling]: Oh, Saheb—we can’t tell! You can.
D: That’s why I’m telling you, it’s not visible.
S: Oh, my! I was thinking, Saheb will do us this favor. Especially
since you did it last time.
D: But then the government took away the software, right?

Having deflected the request several times, Dr. Dilip emerged into the consultory, and the
patient followed.
Once seated, Sheela-ben resumed her insistence. Dr. Dilip just shook his head.
Eventually, he mused, “Now Uma, what will we do with her?” Uma-masi waved the
couple out, and Dr. Dilip said, “Go outside. Uma will explain everything!” The assistant
asked whether to fill a Form F for Sheela-ben’s sonography, and Dr. Dilip sighed, “Now
that they’re going to get a test, how can we fill the form?” Despite lack of direct
involvement in the couple’s pursuit of a son, it was easier for Dr. Dilip if their pregnancy
remained hidden from state surveillance.
Sheela-ben and her husband stepped outside with Uma-masi. After a brief silence,
Dr. Dilip said contemplatively, “They were bound to insist—my community, right? They
have just one girl, quite old—thirteen or fourteen. This is the last chance. They had one
of those, but it must have been five years ago, because we stopped four years back.”
Nowadays, Dr. Dilip deflected or outright refused every SD request. He even eschewed
referral, preferring to allow Uma-masi to assume both return and risk on utilization of
market knowledge.
While most obstetricians had stopped providing SD years earlier, patients
continued requesting it with regularity. Some families begged plaintively, pointing to one
or more girls as proof of need: “It’ll be good if you can tell us, so we know what to do.”
Others coyly insisted they were hoping for a girl—wasn’t the law just for boys? Most
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referenced longstanding kin-group, community, or therapeutic relationships, insisting that
the doctor would “have to look, for us.” Thick sociality sometimes proved irresistible:
several doctors admitted that “if someone close to me comes, I may have to do it,” with
the primary motive being moral obligation rather than financial profit. More often,
however, the PCPNDT Act trumped social bonds. Numerous obstetricians underscored
their complete cessation of sex selection practices by highlighting how they turned away
their own relatives. Dr. Dilip, for instance, once told me, “I have to be firm. Because if I
do for even one person, then he will go out and tell... If I do for one, I may have to do for
someone else. This is why I have kept the rule—do it for no one, even my own sister or
brother.” Obstetricians frequently violated the axiom of amity to avoid visibility as a sex
selection practitioner.
In line with a policy of total refusal, Dr. Dilip often anticipated SD demands when
confirming pregnancy for patients with daughters. “The child is good,” he would say,
“but I won’t be able to tell you boy-girl. I have to warn you, since you may be hoping... I
don’t have the equipment... You can find out after three months, but not here—make your
own inquiries.” When families did request SD, Dr. Dilip sometimes refused flatly, telling
people to “find it on your own.” More frequently, he demurred by claiming to not have
“the boy-girl software.” As in Sheela-ben’s case, the software excuse sometimes proved
too transparent, eliciting skeptical looks, frustrated chuckles, and cries of “Just this
once...!” or “You can see, you just don’t want to say!” All the same, the dodge functioned
to convey Dr. Dilip’s unwillingness.
I gradually learned that the software excuse was a widely shared tactic, with
several younger clinicians describing it as “a way our senior colleagues have taught us for
telling patients no.” One obstetrician explained:
I tell patients—even my friends—that the Modi government removed the
software for looking at boy-girl. See, if I say it’s possible but don’t do it,
it’s more of a hassle. Who wants to haggle with them? They’ll say,
‘We’ve come here for twenty years, and my delivery was here, and you
have to do this for us!’ Better to just not go there. I just tell them the
government flipped the switch, so I can’t see the boy-girl part. And people
accept it. Even educated patients will accept: ‘You need software to see,
and the software was deleted.’ How much do they know? We just look at
the genitalia at twelve weeks, but do they know that? So they mostly
swallow it.
The software explanation, whose plausibility rested on a presumed gap between the
sonographer’s expert sight and the lay person’s understanding of the image, served as a
polite deflection, particularly when thick, longstanding relationships made direct refusal
uncomfortable. Moreover, it displaced the locus of decision-making authority from the
obstetrician to the state, aligning the former with the patient as an empathetic but helpless
figure. The doctor was not refusing to “look” for the family; rather, the government had
deprived him of the visualizing capacity itself.
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Various other tactics filled out the shared repertoire for denying requests, with
some practitioners more forcefully discouraging SD through moral shaming, gestures
toward the law, and invocation of SR-based uncertainties regarding future population
“balance.” Doctors often had to explicitly deny referral as well as SD, reminding families
that sharing knowledge about the sex selection market was a crime just like sharing
knowledge generated by the practice.
Of course, while obstetricians sometimes resorted to “blunt language,” “strict
speech,” or “shocking words” in refusing, they also had to “take care not to have much
harder words for our patients,” since it could harm business to “make them hot” or
“disturb them.” And in speaking with me, many doctors immediately followed staunch
disavowals of sex selection participation with lamentations about the “loss of practice”
that such abstention brought. Dr. Dilip explained:
Since we don’t look, we’re going to lose some patients. Some stay with us,
but others leave, thinking, Saheb doesn’t look, so let’s go elsewhere.
Patients who go to Ranjit come back. But doctors who are doing on a
smaller scale, they will keep patients... So if there’s a family of three-four
women, and they find we don’t do it at all, they’ll all go elsewhere. There
are plenty of people who’ll look! That has a slow effect—not immediately,
but as people come to know I’m not doing it.
Families’ care-seeking patterns corroborated Dr. Dilip’s subjective account. Many
patients admitted that a regular obstetrician’s steadfast refusal around SD had prompted a
switch to another doctor in the “hope that he might do it for us.”
As in Sheela-ben’s case, Dr. Dilip mitigated losses by funneling patients toward
Uma-masi. A similar pattern prevailed at many clinics. Some staffers, like Uma-masi,
operated with employers’ tacit approval, while others hid their channeling of patients into
the sex selection market.
Additionally, doctors who generally refused to refer for sex selection might yield
under various social influences: kinship, friendship, an exceptionally old doctor-patient
relationship, or pity for a family’s economic and social hardships (including multiple
girls). In such cases, clinicians usually conveyed the names of practitioners without any
referral charge, instructing patients and relatives to avoid disclosing the disclosure.
Twice, on days when Uma-masi was absent from clinic, I saw Dr. Dilip tell close
relatives to take a chit of paper and write down the names and addresses of Dr. Navin, Dr.
Ranjit, and one other colleague—three options in three cities.
On another occasion, when I mentioned having interviewed Chandrika-ben
Chaudhary, who had recently had a healthy boy after losing a previous newborn son, Dr.
Dilip’s eyes widened, and he abruptly silenced me with a hand on the shoulder. He
recounted the circumstances surrounding the prior birth: Chandrika-ben had experienced
contractions just before the doctor was to depart for vacation, he had performed a
Caesarean delivery, and—despite having reached thirty-six weeks of gestation—the boy
had died some hours later. Looking at me somberly, Dr. Dilip continued:
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They had a boy expire at our place. So for them, I arranged something...
Since this happened, I had to come up with some damn setting for them.
Her husband must still badmouth me to everyone, and that’s
understandable. But this way, I feel I took care of them. Otherwise, they
would curse my name for the rest of their days—‘Our boy died at Saheb’s,
and then we ended up with just three girls.’ With a girl in this pregnancy,
they would have been very sad. So I felt a little soft for them, and I made
an arrangement.
The doctor arched his eyebrow, making his meaning clear. Uma-masi later confirmed that
he had referred Chandrika-ben elsewhere for SD. Along with fulfilling a moral debt, the
referral presumably assuaged the family’s anger, helping restore Dr. Dilip’s reputation
within their wide social circle. Other doctors similarly admitted to committing “the small
sin of pointing where to go” when faced with obligation, desperation, or persistence.
Special circumstances could overcome practitioners’ unwillingness to see or reveal.
Second-Trimester Abortion Requests and the Opacity of the Prior
Obstetricians found that avoiding the second stage of sex selection required
greater vigilance. Whereas the selective intent behind SD requests was transparent,
requests for selective abortion could arrive concealed as requests for routine abortion.
The opacity of a family’s prior activity forced clinicians to constantly apply a
hermeneutics of suspicion, interpolating the possibility of prior SD onto every
prospective second-trimester abortion. Doctors generally opted to steer clear of such
abortions, with serious consequences for both selective reproduction and general abortion
access.
One evening, a heavyset Rajput woman entered the Nandini consultory with her
daughter-in-law, whose delicately embroidered sari completely covered her face. The
older woman explained, “My daughter-in-law is pregnant. She doesn’t want to keep it.
She has been crying constantly for the past few days.”
Dr. Dilip scowled when the mother-in-law said the pregnancy was already at three
months. “How can it be,” he asked, “that you realize only at three months that you don’t
want to keep it? How is that acceptable?” Raising her voice, the older woman objected
that her daughter-in-law’s period was irregular, but Dr. Dilip kept shaking his head:
“How could she not know? How is that possible?”
The patient slid forward, adjusting her sari, but did not say anything. Groaning,
the mother-in-law admitted, “Alright, we have to the tell the truth with you. We got the
test done, and it’s not good.”
“Yes!” Dr. Dilip shouted sharply. “Then say that: ‘We got the test done!’”
“But now, Saheb, we’ll have to get rid of it somehow, right?”
The doctor shook his head vigorously and declared it “not possible here,” to
which the woman shook her head back and yelled, “For us, Saheb, you have to do it!” Dr.
Dilip and the mother-in-law repeated these same words several times, their voices rising
and running together.
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Eventually, the woman softened her tone. “Saheb,” she pleaded, “with you here
for us, why would we have to go somewhere else?”
“Why don’t you just get it done where you got the test done?”
“But Saheb, you’re here, aren’t you?”
Dr. Dilip scowled as he explained, “I have government problems. They come for
inspection daily. I don’t have the software, and still those uncles make their way here
daily!” After a pause, he softened his expression and asked where they had obtained SD.
Sighing in apparent resignation, the mother-in-law revealed that they had gone to Chetna.
The doctor frowned: “Well, then it’s certain. If it was someone else, I would still tell you
that it might be wrong—that you should keep it. But his work is 100% accurate.”
Now, it was Dr. Dilip’s turn to sigh. He suggested a return to Chetna: “Join your
hands in prayer and request him to do it for you as a package.” The mother-in-law asked
a few more questions—“Since she keeps having girls, is there any medication to have a
boy?”—and the visit was over. The patient had not spoken a word.
The Rajput women’s case raises two fundamental issues. One—the potential
silencing of the pregnant woman’s voice in sex selection processes—is a central concern
of Chapter 4. Here, I analyze the other: how requests for selective abortion posed a
different problematic than requests for fetal sexing.
Whereas an SD scan always had SD as its purpose, sex selection was but one use
of second-trimester abortions. How, then, could doctors avoid inadvertent entanglement
in selective reproduction? With disaggregation of SD and selective abortion possible,
how could they be certain of avoiding elimination of a gendered fetal subject? Such
concerns became especially consequential given the seeming nebulousness of local
PCPNDT enforcement, which left unclear what legal consequences might attach to an
unwitting sex-selective abortion.
Many doctors resolved the quandary as Dr. Dilip did, by providing abortions only
in the first trimester; if fetal sex was still invisible by sonography, they reasoned, the
abortion could not possibly be sex-motivated. One obstetrician explained:
See, in the first trimester, it is their right. SD is impossible until twelve
weeks, no?... Once it’s the second trimester, if it’s a normal pregnancy, I
always say no. Because if they’ve kept the pregnancy for three months,
it’s always presumed—in 99% of cases, and unless and until otherwise
proven—they’ve kept it to get the test done. Every woman knows when
she gets pregnant. She doesn’t want the pregnancy? She’ll come within ten
days—not at twelve weeks! At twelve weeks, you have to assume she’s
gotten it done....
See, after three months, it’s always a risky procedure—we’re
subject to government suspicion at any time. So I’ve just stopped. What
am I going to lose? If it’s a girl, the sex ratio will improve a bit. And if it’s
a boy, then that’s their luck! What’s it to me? I’ve developed this
mentality: if they come after three months with a normal fetus, then
assume they’ve gotten the test done and just say no.
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Pragmatic legal considerations led most doctors to dismiss and curtail women’s right to
access abortion.
Feminist scholars have long observed how anti-sex selection activity can
endanger the tenuous access emerging from the MTP Act’s failure-of-contraception
provision.84 The refusals by Dr. Dilip and colleagues represent a realization of this threat.
The impossibility of definitively seeing whether a patient had recently obtained SD,
coupled with the pervasiveness of the practice, encouraged doctors to read “malintention” into every second-trimester abortion request—to adopt the reasoning that “if
they come after three months, we know they have had SD done.” Research elsewhere
indicates that this is far from a locally isolated phenomenon.85
Mahesana-area doctors who still performed second-trimester abortions demanded
a “good reason” or “clear indication” for doing so: “fetal anomaly,” “hazard to the
mother,” miscarriage, or the like.86 They often required “authentic proof”—either
obvious signs of clinical emergency or a radiologist’s report of sonographically
diagnosed abnormality—“for our own safety, to keep a good reputation if there should be
any government inquiry.” As I discuss in Chapter 3, the fact that obstetricians considered
miscarriage a reasonable basis for second-trimester abortion drove some women with
“female” results to essentially stage emergencies by intentionally putting their bodies into
precarious states.
Doctors’ self-protective restriction of second-trimester abortion carried all-tooweighty consequences for women. In many cases, unwanted girls were born. In others,
women visited unqualified abortionists, took abortifacient pills beyond the safe window
for doing so, or staged bodily emergencies, assuming serious risks to eliminate daughtersto-be. Finally, in still other cases, the grave consequences of obstetricians’ refusal had
nothing to do with sex selection or unsafe abortion, and everything to do with the myriad
circumstances under which women might desperately wish to end a pregnancy in the
second trimester.87 One obstetrician teared up as she told me a cautionary tale in her
consultory, a sad smile running across her face:
84

Ganatra 2008; N. Menon 1995.
A recent study from western Maharashtra—entitled “If a woman has even one abortion, I refuse to
perform the abortion”—shows that uncertainty regarding PCPNDT enforcement actions has led doctors in
multiple locales to deny abortions to women with daughters or second-trimester pregnancies, and
professional organizations have even encouraged such denial (Potdar et al. 2015: 121-122, 123). Even more
alarming, an unpublished field study from Maharashtra found that public health facilities were refusing to
offer second-trimester abortion: “Members of the District Level MTP Committee said that most second
trimester abortions are sex-selective, and as government officials they were responsible for not letting these
happen. According to them, there was an informal understanding within public hospitals not to conduct any
second trimester abortions. In some districts women were not only denied second trimester abortion but
also tracked by health authorities till the time of their delivery” (cited in Ravindran and Khanna 2012: 12).
86
Once again, the PCPNDT Act’s legitimization of disability-selective abortion as a “use” of prenatal
diagnostic technology set against the “misuse” apparent in sex-selective abortion (Ghai and Johri 2008)
comes to the fore.
87
A recent review notes that two national data sets concur in placing the proportion of second-trimester
abortions in India just above ten percent of all abortions (Stillman et al. 2014: 17). Apart from sex
selection, women may be especially likely to seek abortion later in pregnancy under circumstances of
sexual abuse or incest; prior unsuccessful abortion attempts; adolescent, unmarried, widowed, or separated
85
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See, I avoid doing late MTP altogether, to stay away from all that. But I
had one case—there was a woman, a widow. My patient for years.
Extremely poor. She had a grown seventeen-year-old son, and she got
pregnant. You understand? She was a widow, and she got pregnant. So she
was in a very tricky situation. When she came to me, she was at twentyfour weeks. She said she wanted to get it taken out. I said, ‘We don’t do
it.’ She tried so hard to convince me! But since I just don’t do it, what
could I do? I told her she should inquire elsewhere; I wouldn’t be able to
do it. So she left.
Four-five days later, I learned the woman’s hut had burned down
with her inside. So what happened? Someone killed her, or she killed
herself—because of the pregnancy. So I feel—I keep thinking in my
mind— what if I had done just this one?
Self-imposed bans on second-trimester abortion usually calcified in the manner implied
by the doctor, with many obstetricians expressing the feeling that they had to “refuse
everyone,” lest “one patient tell two, and two tell four,” producing an “inverted pyramid”
of rumor that could harm one’s reputation and produce increased patient pressure for late
abortions. But a policy of categorical refusal, couched in terms of respect for a law aimed
at saving women-to-be, often left clinicians unresponsive to conditions of life-and-death
import for pregnant women.

Everyday Knowledge and the Sex Selection Landscape
The Tea Stall and the Circulation of Partial Knowledges
Chetna, Nandini, and most other clinics had at least one tea stall in the immediate
vicinity. The stall was usually a cramped area, and numerous patrons crammed together
and chatted while waiting for and sipping cha. The tea stall was a quintessential place of
casual interaction and discourse—a site for generation and transmission of everyday
knowledge about the sex selection market. It exemplified the social spaces—homes,
clinics, and gathering places—where patients, relatives, and others circulated rumors,
revealed the previously invisible, and cobbled together partial perspectives.
Although people often responded to my initial questions about selective
reproduction with wariness and denialism, gradual insinuation into various literal and
metaphorical tea stalls permitted me to piece together a map of the Mahesana sex
selection market. Through conversations in these spaces, countless people brought me
into confidence, imparting fragmentary knowledge while allowing me to interact with
them as a member of a knowing public.88 I immersed myself in the system, mimetically
status; changing conditions of financial and familial stability; menopause or post-partum absence of
periods; and limited access due to geographical distance, poverty, and limited decision-making power
within the family (Dalvie 2008: 40-42; Stillman et al. 2014: 17; Zavier et al. 2012).
88
In addition to providing substantive information about sex selection practitioners—names, notoriety,
pricing, and methods—such conversations indexed complex relationships among doctors, patients,
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following the paths that clients, connectors, and collaborators traversed in accessing sex
selection services.89
Much knowledge of the landscape emerged from conversations with doctors and
facilitators in their clinics and homes. Given their constant patient contact, many
possessed a grounded sense of the black market’s dynamics. Some information came to
their attention when patients disclosed prior SD while requesting second opinions or
selective abortions. Occasionally, clinicians could also draw inferences from observed
patterns: an obstetrician might be providing sex selection services if his patients never
came requesting SD, or if they frequently exhibited complications associated almost
exclusively with second-trimester abortions. Dr. Dilip and Uma-masi could rattle off
nearly a dozen local clinicians who continued to “check” and “cancel,” and most doctors
could name at least a few. Exchanges with practitioners therefore yielded partial
knowledges of who, how, and how much.
Obstetricians seemed particularly eager to expose and denounce colleagues who
ran major sex selection enterprises. Many named Dr. Ranjit as someone “who is doing a
lot of these,” with one’s voice crescendoing to a bellow as he cried, “Everyone goes to
Ranjit! People go from everywhere to that town—write it down, mark my words! Years
ago, there was a dacoit born in Vijapur. After he was killed, Dr. Ganpat was born. He was
born and finished off—story over. Now, a dacoit named Ranjit has been born!” Though
seemingly invisible to official policing efforts, practitioners like Dr. Ranjit were all-toovisible to colleagues.
Of course, as invocation of the tea stall suggests, clinicians were not the only ones
who possessed and shared fragmentary knowledge of the market. In fact, non-clinicians
often spoke more openly: they were not direct subjects of government surveillance,
and—in contrast to professional “insiders” in possession of specialized secrets—they
could treat their knowledge as public information. Conversations with families in tea
stalls, fields, and homes illuminated significant bits of the sex selection landscape.
Clients were not the only ones to speak with confidence about who was and was not
performing sex selection; pharmaceutical marketing representatives, sonography
salespeople, journalists, a wealthy poultry farmer, and the boutique owner who tailored
my wife’s sari blouses could do so as well. Along with first- or second-hand experience,
such people drew on widespread rumors that made various doctors’ illegal activities
publicly recognized. Given how such rumors circulated, the cynical saws generally
proved true: “every rickshaw-wallah,” “every pān parlour owner,” and “every chawallah” could, indeed, “tell you who is checking.”
From the everyday knowledge of clinics, homes, tea stalls, and various other
spaces, I eventually stitched together a map of the sex selection landscape.
connectors, and the state. Denial of a particular doctor’s participation in the market, for instance, might
reflect a factual state, but it might also reflect respect for the doctor, the speaker’s obliviousness, or my
status as an untrustworthy listener. Similarly, the reverse might suggest a negative view of the practitioner,
the speaker’s insider knowledge, or confidence in my trustworthiness. Moreover, claims about sex
selection—who, how, and how much—also implied evaluations of the effectiveness and integrity of state
regulations and the officials charged with enforcing them.
89
Cf. Favret-Saada 1980, 2015.
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Geographically, SD and selective abortion took place in places large and small
throughout North Gujarat. Just as Ahmedabad families flocked to Chetna, many
Mahesana-area families went to the megacity, where numerous enterprises flourished
underground. District-level cities like Mahesana generally housed at least one large-scale
practitioner, as did half the smaller towns in Mahesana District. Beyond geography, I
learned about an array of characters: the “desperate” man, who performed SD for just
3,000 rupees because “he has no other business”; the “silent killer,” who “takes very
selectively, only two-three every month” but “makes a hefty pile” on those cases by
charging 25,000 rupees; the former MOGS office-bearer who was clandestinely
providing the services he had publicly denounced; the senior doctor who conducted
multiple SD scans per day while complaining to anyone who would listen about Dr.
Ranjit’s “boldness”; and the woman who refused to disclose sex with female fetuses, but
revealed it with males “so as not to lose the patient.” Like Dr. Ranjit, most providers
charged roughly 10,000 rupees for each stage of sex selection, albeit with considerable
variation by clinic and client.
The distribution of clinicians in the market was such that that those foreswearing
sex selection outnumbered those dabbling in it “here and there,” who in turn
outnumbered large-scale practitioners. In the space between abstainers like Dr. Dilip and
“professional” providers like Dr. Ranjit, some obstetricians offered the service
selectively, “taking care of” friends, relatives, and longstanding patients. Several doctors
echoed Uma-masi’s former referral partner Dr. Vinay, who casually told me with an
upturned palm, “Of course people are doing it secretly! And that’s not something that can
be caught. I do it for my close patients, the longstanding ones, and it never gets out—no
one objects. The problem is the people who do it on a large scale. As long as I do it for
my own patients, the information doesn’t get out.” Thickness of social connection
fostered faith in discretion.
I also found that the accumulating information placed me in a logistically,
ethically, and legally vexing position. I carried around dangerous knowledge and, unlike
my tea stall interlocutors, had to ensure it all remained confidential. Dr. Dilip joked that I
had to “be like Sahadev,” invoking a mythological character who possessed full
knowledge of the future but was barred, on pain of death, from disclosing any of it. I
learned to code, conceal, and selectively reveal my knowledge when speaking with Umamasi in the presence of others, dispensing almost entirely with precise referents—only
“that work,” “over there,” “that other saheb.” In exchanges with providers, I learned to
carefully calibrate my discretion, flashing shared prior knowledge to solicit greater
comfort and openness without inadvertently disclosing new information.90 I had to
90
I was operating in a mode of discretion strikingly similar to that which Lilith Mahmud has described in
reflecting on fieldwork among Italian Freemasons:
Esoteric teachings are reserved for the initiated, and most of my informants never openly
discussed with me the contents of that knowledge... At times, however, my interlocutors
would make a small reference or comment that would prompt me to inquire about...
esoteric practices—and most of the time they would answer me, if only vaguely... As
exceptions increased with time, along with our sense of intimacy, I found that most
Freemasons were generally comfortable talking with me about esotericism, as long as I
could demonstrate some prior knowledge. What seemed to worry most of my
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demonstrate my initiation very carefully: perform insider knowledge too hastily, and I
might end up violating someone’s confidentiality. It was the situation in which “the
ethnographer has become a ritual extension of that which he studies,” constantly
perseverating over the question of “who knows what and how much... in this maze of
deceit.”91
Notoriety: Dr. Navin
Within the Mahesana-area sex selection landscape, one name circulated most
prominently in clinical exchanges, neighborhood gossip, tea stall chats, and surreptitious
phone conversations. Far outstripping Dr. Ranjit and every other practitioner, Dr. Navin
was a near-mythical figure in local discourse. When obstetricians stated that “some
people in Mahesana are doing huge practice” or that “everyone—even the government—
knows who is doing it,” they were inevitably referring to him. Any local facilitator could
tell several stories about his brazenness and naked avarice. Government officials, from
community health workers to the CDHO himself, grudgingly acknowledged the audacity
of Dr. Navin’s practice and the difficulty of apprehending him. And countless patients,
relatives, and other community members pointed to him as a stand-in for sex selection as
a whole. He was the illustration par excellence of selective reproduction’s status as
nominally forbidden and practically pervasive.
Dr. Navin operated out of a nondescript clinic in Mahesana city. I first heard
mention of him from Uma-masi and other connectors, who harshly criticized his
personality and behavior: “He’s no better than a dog!” “He makes you put your mobile
phone outside, all your stuff outside.” “Navin-bhai is so lowly! He just takes everyone’s
money. You have to put the notes—25,000—on the table first!” According to the
connectors, Dr. Navin’s reputation and seeming immunity empowered him to demand
high prices and maltreat patients without fearing apprehension or loss of practice.
I learned much more one day at the tea stall near Nandini. I was sitting with
Sagar-bhai, a local medical supplies distributor whose wife had undergone SD and
selective abortion with Dr. Navin. As we waited for cha, Sagar-bhai discussed their
experience, which I examine in Chapter 2. At one point, he said:
interlocutors was that that they might violate their oath by divulging esoteric secrets to a
profane like me. If I could prove, however, that I was already somewhat informed about
an esoteric topic, most Freemasons were typically willing to discuss it further with me. I
therefore spent a lot of my time reading esoteric books, following up on clues, keywords,
or strange phrases that I heard in conversation (2012: 422-423).
While not a formal society with officially coded “secrets,” the Mahesana-area obstetric fraternity did mark
out a certain collegial space.
91
M. Taussig 1999: 121, 203. Occasionally, entanglement posed more obvious conundrums for me. Twice,
Uma-masi asked me, for reasons of convenience, to take clients to Chetna for her—to “help me out by
doing my work today.” The first time it happened, I panicked and made an excuse to remain at home,
forcing her to postpone the visit. The second time, I bluntly said I could not—would not—and braced for
her anger. Instead, she smiled and acknowledged my refusal with a casual wave before moving on to an
accounting of her recent earnings. Similarly, families I met at Chetna sometimes called me months later to
request Dr. Ranjit’s name, phone number, and address so that they might take “a ben who needs to get a
check.” I always deflected such inquiries, suggesting they contact their original referrer, and inevitably felt
uneasy as I hung up.
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See, all Navin-bhai cares about is money. And looking is the only thing he
does! He does less deliveries, surgeries, things like that... Once he’s done
with outpatient visits, time to go home! He closes up the hospital. Not like
Dilip-bhai, who might be there all night. Navin-bhai makes plenty of
money during the day, so why come running at night?
At his clinic, you have to put the money on the table first!
Otherwise, he assumes you might be linked with Health. Even with me—
even though I knew him—he made us put the money on the table before
doing anything!
His is a huge operation. If you don’t have a connection, it might
cost you 25,000! He charged us only 10,000, because he knew me. But
with VIP patients, or those who don’t know better, he may even take
50,000! That’s just for looking—if it’s a girl and you have to do
something, that’s separate.
The first-hand account corroborated facilitators’ portrait of a ruthlessly pragmatic earner.
I visited Dr. Navin’s clinic toward the end of fieldwork, having delayed the trip
after multiple colleagues warned (perhaps overly cautiously) that a meeting with him
might set in motion forces—powerful forces—that could jeopardize my work and safety.
The waiting room contained the PCPNDT-mandated sign publicizing that SD was a
crime. The compounder withdrew to inform the doctor of my presence. On returning, he
instructed, “Put down your mobile and everything else.” I emptied my pockets onto a
bench. As I started toward the consultory, the man suddenly asked, “Did you put down
your phone?” I ran back and lifted my notebook to show that the potential recording
device was safely outside. He nodded—“Yes, yes, okay”—and sent me back.
Inside, I finally saw Dr. Navin. He was aimlessly shuffling a few pharmaceutical
advertisement cards on his desk. Reiterating that I wanted to speak privately, I asked
whether to close the door. He shook his hand casually and laughed, “No, no. There’s no
need here. You can say whatever you like.” I explained my research purpose, and the
conversation was essentially over before it began. Dr. Navin sharply insisted he had “no
interest in academic things” and suggested I leave. Once I got up, he rambled for several
minutes about his “hate for research,” one eyelid periodically twitching. Then, putting his
hand on my back, he pushed me toward the door. After stepping out, picking up my
belongings, and nodding toward the compounder, I departed, having received the
harshest—and last—response of my research.
By the time I visited Dr. Navin, I had also heard much about him from colleagues.
Almost every local obstetrician condemned him, whether obliquely or by name. Doctors
spoke of him with a combination of wonder at the “fantastic amount” he earned and
disdain for his “exclusive” practice of sex selection, which had allegedly made him so
“single-minded” that he felt “afraid” of Caesareans, routine surgeries, and other
fundamental obstetric-gynecologic procedures. Several speculated that he earned several
million rupees per month—“a multiple of regular clinic income!”
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Colleagues also expressed marked frustration at the persistence of Dr. Navin’s
practice. Several recounted a recent MOGS meeting in which he “was told to stop on
behalf of all the doctors”; an officeholder in the society “even named him and made him
stand up, and everyone said, you stop, because we are being harassed on account of you!”
In response, “he threw a fit and started crying—what an actor!—‘Yes, I am doing! But
because I see the difficulties with girls in my extended family, I feel pity for people.
That’s why I do it. I understand the difficulties that a father of two girls experiences.’”
Dr. Navin allegedly continued, “’I have so many household costs, and I have to gather
this much cash, and I have to do this practice compulsorily!’” According to one doctor’s
recollection, “after admitting to doing it, he said, ‘Others are doing too, including some of
the bigwigs,’ and started naming names.”
Recollections of Dr. Navin’s intransigence in professional meetings dovetailed
with a suspicion that strategic bribes had made government officials willing to un-see his
enterprise:
• “Why don’t they ever check the scoundrel who is doing it?”
• “He has become confident. Everyone knows—the Collector, the CDHO,
everyone—but nothing has been done. Maybe if a Delhi team comes.
Otherwise, with millions in business a month, so what if he has to hand
over 500,000 for corruption? He does it openly!”
• “Navin-bhai must have a setting—an understanding, an arrangement—
with someone in the Health Department. He must be giving them money.
Otherwise, how could he do it so boldly? How could it be that no one
knows? He can do this much only if he has arranged something
beforehand.”
• “The government is not sincere… See, if any cha-wallah is knowing
where SD is being done, then naturally, government machinery must be
knowing!”
Such allegations fit into a broader sense, shared by doctors and patients, that the
PCPNDT Act was vitiated by bribery. Notorious practitioners remained safe even as
government officials painstakingly scrutinized others’ clinical records for supposed proxy
markers of criminal activity. Corruption seemed the only plausible explanation for how a
practice so visible in everyday life—in the knowledge of tea stall and consultory,
household and village plaza—could remain invisible to the state gaze.

Vectors of Blame
The persistence and prevalence of sex selection in Mahesana posed a troubling
question for the various actors with whom I spoke: Who was really culpable?
Technology? Biomedical practitioners? Clients and the communities to which they
belonged? Or an ineffectual state?92
92

In tracing “vectors of blame,” I am undertaking a project akin to Sundar’s “anthropology of culpability,”
which takes culpability as “guilt in a larger moral, and not merely legal sense” and seeks to “understand
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Many observers endorsed some form of technological determinism when
discussing sex selection in general terms, at some remove from the practice itself.93 By
contrast, in more embedded reflections, doctors, reproducing families, and the
government officials charged with controlling them typically subordinated technology’s
key role to a more expansive moral world. Vectors of blame enunciated by these actors
tended to alight on people (Figure 1). For instance, women and their relatives frequently
remarked that “all this trouble started when sonography arrived, because in today’s era,
you have to get this done,” but such statements primarily periodized, identifying a
specific moment of technological possibility as the background for more proximal
deliberations—social, economic, moral—around SD. Similarly, obstetricians almost
universally ascribed responsibility for sex selection to colleagues, clients, or government
officials. Many echoed a senior doctor who said:
Once the technology was developed, this social problem became very
profound. Take atomic energy—you can use it two ways. You can put it in
a reactor and generate energy, and you can make a bomb—you can make
Hiroshima-Nagasaki. It’s a matter of who’s using it, and how. Technology

when and how and to what extent people become culpable for acts of violence they have committed or that
are committed in their name—while at the same time exploring the inequalities in attributions of culpability
that are an essential part of the new world order" (2004: 145). Like Sundar, I am interested in overcoming
culturalist explanations of violence, understanding how state formations mask their own complicity in
violent processes, and recovering how states may nonetheless become targets of blame.
93
In invoking “technological determinism,” I am referring to a set of explanatory discourses that concretize
“a vivide sense of the efficacy of technology as a driving force of history: a technical innovation suddenly
appears and causes important things to happen” (Marx and Smith 1994: x). In such narratives, “the
thingness or tangibility of mechanical devices—their accessibility via sense perception—helps to create a
sense of causal efficacy made visible,” such that “’technology,’ or a surrogate like ‘the machine,’ is made
the subject of an active predicate,” producing a “situation of inescapable necessity” (Marx and Smith 1994:
xi, xii). Elaborating on this description, Marx notes:
The chief hazard attributable to the concept of technology, as currently used, is the
mystification, passivity, and fatalism it helps to engender... Although we cannot say
exactly what that "it" really is, it nonetheless serves as a surrogate agent, as well as a
mask, for the human actors actually responsible for the developments in question.
Because of its peculiar susceptibility to reification, to being endowed with the magical
power of an autonomous entity, technology is a major contributant to that gathering
sense... of political impotence. By attributing autonomy and agency to technology, we
make ourselves vulnerable to feeling that our collective life in society is uncontrollable
(1997: 984).
More recently, Dafoe (2015) has argued for a recuperation of technological determinism as one pole of an
explanatory spectrum also encompassing social constructivism, helpfully pointing out that that the
approach may provide complementary analyses of social change at more macrosocial or emergent levels.
While mindful of Dafoe’s corrective to blanket rejection of technological determinism, I focus on
more experience-near explanations for two reasons. First, these were the ones most vividly invoked by the
people with whom I spoke. And second, given the plethora of technological determinist explanations
already in circulation in activist, governmental, academic, and media discourses about sex selection, I
believe the granular perspective, examining how people embrace, reject, and otherwise contend with
technology, provides a valuable corrective.
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is a weapon, made by man; it’s his slave. It’ll do whatever you tell it. And
if you misuse that technology, sooner or later it’ll burn you up.
Doctors tended to echo the law in neatly distinguishing “use” of ultrasound for “lifesaving,” “routine,” or “fetal wellbeing” purposes from “misuse,” with SD definitively
placed outside the realm of “good practice.” Several older practitioners said they had
come to terms with ceasing SD by imagining it as a return to the earlier part of their
careers, “when the technology was not there, and this was simply not a part of our
earning”; in claiming this, they simultaneously acknowledged and denied the profound
shift in expectations and possibilities that ultrasound technology had inaugurated.
Most obstetricians who had foresworn sex selection directed blame toward
colleagues like Dr. Navin and Dr. Ranjit, whom they described as “greedy,” “shameless,”
“unconcerned about reputation,” “unethical,” “criminal-minded,” and “fearless.” As long
as such doctors provided services “openly” or “on a large scale,” they said, sex selection
would continue unchecked.
Collegial condemnation of practitioners consistently dovetailed with critique of an
ineffectual state. One Unjha doctor pithily encapsulated such critique when he said any
government body “failing as completely” as the Health Department was with PCPNDT
enforcement “must be either inefficient, ignorant, or corrupt.” On the matter of
“inefficiency,” doctors decried recordkeeping requirements as burdensome and useless,
noting, “Where is it written that by mandating filling of Form F, you automatically stop
SD?” According to clinicians, implementation efforts could better fulfill the PCPNDT
Act’s aims by reducing emphasis on paperwork and increasing emphasis on stings94—
after all, what better way to stop the “large-scale criminals” and create a “deterrent
effect” than to “knock down two-three” by catching them “red-handed”? Official
“ignorance” was not a plausible excuse for inaction, given that the identities of sex
selection providers were common knowledge. Many doctors explained persistent
inefficiency amid the impossibility of ignorance by invoking the third option—
“corruption.” They murmured about bribes performing a “compensating” or “balancing”
function between practitioners like Dr. Navin and the government officials tasked with
monitoring them.
But most obstetricians also expressed a more fundamental critique of local
reproductive governance, one that shifted blame from the state and colleagues toward
“the public.” Why, doctors asked, did the government focus so heavily on the supply of
sex selection services, rather than tackling the demand for them?
One afternoon at Chetna, Dr. Ranjit passed me his phone and snorted, “Read this!
It is for your topic.” Looking at the screen, I saw a new message in his medical school
class’s Whatsapp messaging thread—a poem, attributed to a Maharashtra obstetrician. It
read:

94

For early and recent echoes of this complaint regarding paperwork, see Joseph and CYDA (2007: 40-43)
and Potdar et al. (2015: 119-120).
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I am an Ultrasonologist,
Trained to help mothers know their baby is fine
That’s all that is my concern,
Why should I be the one to pay the fine?
I don’t have to raise your daughter,
I don’t have to pay her fees,
I’m not the one who needs to raise her dowry,
It’s not my job for her in-laws to please.
Neither is your son going take care for me,
When I am old and lame,
Nor is he going to carry forward,
My family name.
Why in the world would it matter to me,
Whether you have a daughter or son,
It is YOU who want to know,
Unless you ask, my interest is none!
And if I don’t tell you,
You’ll take the poor girl to some one,
Who is less trained or maybe a quack,
Her life is at stake for that much desired son!
So who is at fault here?
Me or your male chauvinism?
Then why is it that I am criminalized,
While you are having all the fun!
Wake up you murderers,
It’s time you realized,
Don’t ask us for the child’s gender,
A daughter is more prized.
So allow us to do our job,
Helping mothers and babies...
Don’t blame an entire nation’s convoluted mentality
On us Ultrasonologists...
The message, which circulated widely among local obstetricians, captured a sentiment
that Dr. Ranjit later voiced during our last meeting: “Actually, this is a social issue only.
And only society has a solution—rather than doctors and government.”
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Characterization of sex selection as primarily a “demand problem”—a move that
bracketed the role of clinicians and their technological property in creating possibilities
for selective reproduction—was common among obstetricians. For example, Uma-masi’s
abortion referral partner Dr. Harnish told me:
Instead of just doctors, you should focus on the public in your study... If
you ask why doctors do it—well it’s obviously for money, right? What
else is there? It’s a simple thing. Doctors do SD and MTP for money.
What the patient’s demand is—that’s what you should ask.
See, the law says you should get abortion without knowing sex.
But the person having a need will say, this is my need!... Until that
mentality is banished from the public, this supply-demand question will
remain. Only when that issue ceases will the wish to see sex in sonography
cease. Then, if people come to me for sonography, they will only look at
whether the child is good or not, because that’s the only thing they need...
If this thing is banished from society, then there’s no need for the law...
Demand is the main thing.
In this view, clinicians’ participation in sex selection boiled down to a simple economic
act, and the thorny issues lay in the household and the community.
Placement of blame on “demand” implied, as a straightforward corollary, critique
of government activity as overly focused on “supply.” For example, one doctor said:
The thing with this law is that our government prefers soft targets. If you
want to really stop this practice, you have to educate the public, change
attitudes, raise awareness—you have to intervene on tens of millions of
people. But how many sonologists are there in all India? Maybe 40,000
gynies, and add in 10,000 radiologists—so 50,000. The problem is
everyone’s, but if you control this many people, everything will
supposedly stop.
Numerous doctors lamented the fact that because “demand is mass population, while
supply is only doctors,” the latter became the “sole target of authority.” Advocating a
shift toward “highlighting the public,” they called for “trapping” clients in stings and
“bringing the law down on families.” They noted that while the PCPNDT Act included
provisions for prosecuting patient relatives, no such proceedings had ever been initiated
in Gujarat.
Many doctors linked blame of the “public” and the state with a call to recognize
and change the social factors that contributed to sex selection. They suggested
transforming people’s “mindset,” “mentality,” or “thoughts” regarding gender by raising
“education,” “awareness,” and “understanding that the female is just as necessary a part
of our society.” In this view, pure supply-side regulation would prove meaningless
without social transformation. As one doctor put it, invoking Gujarat’s notoriously
ineffective Prohibition: “Wherever there are alcoholics, there will be alcohol.”
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For their part, the state officials and activists with whom I spoke fully endorsed
the importance of reducing demand for sex selection. Variously faulting “the public,”
“patients,” “families,” and “social structure,” they recognized the need to couple
PCPNDT enforcement with efforts to promote a different valuation of potential
daughters. Their demand-side interventions form the heart of Chapter 8.
And what of “the public”—the families that sought sex selection? Like doctors,
who drew vectors of blame to their own colleagues, women and relatives tended to
ascribe responsibility for sex selection to themselves, or at least to others within the
family. For instance, Ishwar-bhai—the teacher who lamented the 25,000-rupee cost of
sex selection at Chetna—muttered while waiting for his wife to emerge from anesthesia,
“This is us speaking the language of money. If you look at it, it’s really one kind of
corruption. We are the reason for the doctor doing wrong. We are making him weak.
How? By asking him to look at it for money.” Of course, not every client accepted
culpability equally. Family members sometimes blamed women who insisted on pursuing
sex selection, and women forced to endure the ordeal faulted the coercive relatives and
complicit doctors. Yet even when people refused responsibility personally, their posited
vectors of blame generally landed on someone in the family. I return to intra-familial
accusations in Chapter 4, and to the anguish of self-blame at the end of Chapter 5.
But women and relatives did not blame solely themselves. Families seeking sex
selection frequently explained their motives by pointing to the crushing force of genderkinship arrangements that stretched well beyond the household. They identified various
structural exigencies—sometimes explicitly identified as “social structure” or “society’s
rules”—that disadvantaged sonless families with multiple daughters. These exigencies
made sex selection appear as a rational, tragically pragmatic choice, and families
pursuing the practice tended to critique the state not for the ineffectuality of its
prohibition, but for that prohibition’s seeming indifference to the difficulties that
compelled ordinary people to seek SD and selective abortion.
What, then, were the components of social demand for selective reproduction?
How did women and their relatives come to see sex selection as an obvious, commonsense choice? What elements of the moral economy of gender-kinship drove differential
valuation of sons and daughters? What, in short, made male and female potentiality
manifestly unequal?
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Figure 1 – Vectors of Blame Around Sex Selection

Chapter 2: The Moral Economy of Gender-Kinship
A: A daughter has more affection for her parents...
Girls have more affection... A son should be there
as a lamp, a creeper plant. There is expansion when
a son is there.
Q: What is the meaning of ‘expansion’?
A: He gets married, gets children, as the creeper
grows. The girl goes out, if there is no son, what
remains? Nothing. The house is locked and
deserted. Who will be there? The daughter goes
away, then who remains? A boy is the light of the
family.
Q: Does it mean that a girl is like darkness?
A: Darkness. A girl is like the shade of a tamarind
tree, a boy is like that of a mango tree. Mango is
sweet and tamarind is sour...
Q: But do you agree with these thoughts and beliefs
about a girls and a boy?
A: Yes, I do.
Q: But don’t you think that these belittle a girl?
Seeing the girl as an outsider, a tamarind tree and
so on? What does she lack for her to be considered
of less importance?
A: She belongs to others, she is not ours.
Q: Why doesn’t she have anything of her own?
A: She doesn’t have anything. Who is going to give
her any land or property?...
Q: Do you think it should be changed?
A: How does it matter how I feel it or how you feel?
The entire system should change... If I alone feel
that, will they agree?1
— From Sharmila Joshi’s “Interview with
Satyabhama ‘Nani’ Lawand”

“A Necessary Sin”
One monsoon morning, I caught a rickshaw shuttle from Mahesana toward Patan.
My destination was a village between the two cities, home to Nandini Clinic patient
Viral-ben and her mother-in-law, Gita-masi. Uma-masi and Dr. Dilip had introduced us
two days earlier, and they had invited me to visit to “chat about our experience.”
1

Sharmila Joshi 2008: 89-90.
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The built environment soon gave way to trees and vast stretches of fields.
Everything became highway, greenery, gray sky, and drizzle.
After half an hour, I stepped out into a thicket of trucks, buses, cars, motorcycles,
mopeds, bullock carts, and people—the village’s main intersection. Asking my way, I
walked down twisting, muddy roads past wooden houses, tiny shops, and the occasional
temple to arrive at a cluster of concrete-and-brick houses.
Gita-masi’s house stood at one corner of the neighborhood. She, Viral-ben, and
both young granddaughters were sitting on cots in the patio area. Greeting me with
smiles, they ushered me into a plastic chair.
Squeezing her five-year old, Viral-ben proudly reported they had placed her in
preschool. They were also paying a college student from the neighborhood 100 rupees
monthly to give her basic “tuition.” She named animals in Gujarati, cajoling the girl to
repeat them in English: “Dog!... Cat!... Lizar!... Onkey!” Although the words themselves
were foreign to the mother, she valued them as marks of her daughter’s brightness and
upward mobility. Over the ensuing months, Gita-masi and Viral-ben would elicit
countless similar demonstrations of the young girl’s educational prowess.
Before I even settled in fully, Gita-masi said, “You can ask whatever you want
about checking!” Alarmed, I looked around and leaned forward. She laughed. “There’s
no problem. Who’s listening? The government’s not here, right?” I slowly relaxed my
body. In everyday domestic spaces, talk of sex selection was hardly forbidden.
As I asked questions, the women narrated their experience. Viral-ben had become
pregnant six months earlier. With two young children, she and her husband wanted to
abort the pregnancy straightaway, but Gita-masi had suggested they instead wait some
months: why “commit the sin of getting it taken out” if God might bestow a son? Given
the limited income from the son’s job as a shipping clerk and Gita-masi’s farming on a
meager plot of land, they had deemed the prices around Mahesana too steep and made
inquiries with relatives elsewhere. Gita-masi’s niece had found an obstetrician willing to
perform the scan for 5,000 rupees. (From the name, I recognized the doctor as a leading
figure of the Surat medical community.) After a quick scan, he had offered
congratulations: “It’s a boy! But don’t tell anybody you came here.”
By this point in the story, a crowd had gathered. One by one, a dozen young and
middle-aged women from neighboring houses had trickled in and taken seats on the tiled
patio. They nodded along as Gita-masi and Viral-ben narrated details they already knew.
After concluding the story, the two women introduced me to the crowd as a
researcher from the U.S., visiting to “gather some experiences about getting it looked at.”
Upon explaining my study, I encountered immediate wariness. Some of the women
laughed sardonically, while others asked pointed questions: “How do we know you’re not
going to cause problems for us?... With all the government checking, how can we trust
anyone?” My reassurances regarding confidentiality protocols rang hollow, with many
women murmuring, “How would we know about that?”
At that point, I stepped out of my chair and sat, cross-legged, on the floor. Gitamasi objected loudly, and several of the neighbors laughed awkwardly. But I insisted on
remaining on the ground with them, and the dynamics shifted—tacitly and decisively.
Finding me at their eye level, the neighbors grudgingly and then animatedly began
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narrating known experiences with SD and selective abortion. Over the ensuing months,
gossip-on-the-ground remained our standard interactional mode.
One woman declared, “My daughter-in-law’s pregnant right now. If she has a girl,
we’ll have to get it checked next time.” Before I could ask, the group generalized a
pattern I would hear, nearly verbatim, hundreds of times: “Yes, yes. No one gets it
checked in the first one. Whatever God gives... And even in the second, not with a
firstborn boy... People check only after two daughters—maybe one.” The women listed
off neighbors and other villagers who had recently pursued SD or selective abortion. In
some cases, they could recount in great detail when, how, for how much, and with what
complications. Several cited instances of relatives who bore known girls because of a
desire to avoid sinning.
At some point, a middle-aged man sauntered over, looked around quizzically, and
asked his wife what was happening. After she explained I had come to “ask about
pregnancy experiences,” the man continued listening for a bit. Then he walked away,
snorting, “What is there to listen to in all this lady-talk?”
During many subsequent visits, the men of the neighborhood hardly paid me
mind. As we became closer, Gita-masi intimated that they thought me “not right” for
sitting with women all the time. Given the group setting, they did not interpret my
behavior as sexually threatening; rather, they considered me emasculated by “being so
interested in this kind of talk.” But as on that first day, the women consistently took it
upon themselves to educate me and dispel my naiveté. “Even if you know your doctor
stuff,” they would tell me with a laugh, “we can teach you our stuff.”
An hour into that first conversation, and with some goading from others, Gitamasi’s next-door neighbor—initially the wariest of all—related her daughter’s story:
My daughter has a six-year-old girl. And after that, she got it checked and
taken out twice. The first time, Dilip-saheb looked and did the taking out. I
saw the child after it came out, and—oh!—how I cried. The second time,
she got both things with Dr. Ganpat-bhai, but he didn’t do it right. There
was something left inside. She had bleeding and became so weak. Dilipsaheb had to clean out her uterus. I went to visit her in the hospital then,
too. This ruins the body, but the doctor’s not responsible, because we
asked him to do something illegal.
Honestly, it’s hard to watch all this. I say she should accept
whatever now, but she doesn’t want another girl. Even her in-laws don’t
care! But she wants a son. And her daughter keeps asking for a brother,
like all the other girls have.
The neighbor asked if I knew of medications to ensure a boy; I admitted I did not.
Another woman suggested to “not even get it checked this time—just accept whatever it
is.” The neighbor smiled ruefully.
As if on cue, the neighbor’s daughter appeared from next-door with a young girl
in tow. Introducing herself and her daughter, she explained that they were visiting from
Mahesana, where her husband co-owned a small electronics shop with his brother.

117

Pushing the girl toward me, she bragged about her intelligence and strong performance in
kindergarten, rattling off the accolades from her teacher’s reports.
Then, upon learning my research topic from her mother, she shook her head and
renarrated her story. Hugging her daughter, she explained, “I’m tired of all this sin. But
there’s no point in gathering too many girls.”
The others grunted and nodded in unison, setting off an animated discussion of
reasons for “getting it looked at.” For the next half hour, many statements from the group
focused on the reasons for wanting a son: “He carries on our lineage... Our home remains
open. Even after death, our name remains... And that way, your daughters have a place to
go from their husband’s home. A daughter needs someone to give her support... People
have a bad habit of gossiping if you don’t have a son. They say your house is barren...
Also, in old age, our son is a staff—the son and daughter-in-law take care of us.” Several
women interjected that “there’s no guarantee any more”—that many sons and daughtersin-law refused to care for aged parents, and that some even stuck them in “old age
homes”; no one personally knew any cases like the latter, but “you hear about it all the
time—in the paper, on TV.” But caveats regarding the dominant reasoning circled back
to the same refrain: “Still, with a son, you have the hope.”
In contrast, “you can’t expect anything from a girl, because she has to go care for
her in-laws.” The next-door neighbor’s daughter explained:
After marriage, a daughter becomes an outsider. And it takes lots of hard
work to raise even one to that point! We have to feed her, clothe her,
educate her, teach her housework, teach her how to speak politely to her
in-laws, give her good sanskār [culture, manners] so she maintains our
family’s honor before and after marrying.
And in this jamāno [era], these bad times, do you know how hard
it is to take care of girls? They are so forward! We have to make sure she
doesn’t do any bad deeds—you understand me? Many girls get involved
with boys while in school! After marriage, too—her husband may have
vices. Drinking, gambling, affairs—all those things have increased. Then
he may hit her, or even kick her out! What’ll you do then? You have to
witness your daughter’s unhappiness. Even if he’s good, what if her inlaws treat her poorly? After sending her to her husband’s home, it’s a
matter of luck.
Murmuring assent, others cited corroborating examples: women stuck in downwardly
mobile trajectories because of husbands’ improvidence, girls tarnished by public gossip
about college dalliances, acquaintances harassed into nervous breakdowns by mothers-inlaw, and so on.
The women noted that times were changing rapidly, and that girls now attended
college and even worked professionally. They quickly added, however, that many “abuse
this, and stray onto the wrong path.”
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Eventually, the other women dispersed for lunch. Nodding toward the next-door
house, Viral-ben muttered, “Watch, she says she wants to stop. But as soon as she’s
pregnant, she’ll go get it looked at!”
Gita-masi snorted in agreement. Then she added, “But in this jamāno of high
costs, who’ll have more than one girl? Food, clothing, transport—everything’s so
expensive! Who can afford more than two kids?” Viral-ben groaned in agreement.
“In the old jamāno,” Gita-masi told me, “people had four-five kids, no problem.”
She had borne four daughters before having a son and finally undergoing “the
operation”—tubal ligation. Viral-ben was also one among four sisters with a youngest
brother. “Now,” Gita-masi said, “no one’ll gather that many. Two—at most three. In this
pricy jamāno, no one can afford it.” Nodding toward her older granddaughter, she
chuckled, “The girls in this era, they demand so much! Packets of Kurkure and wafers,
Cadbury and Fanta. With that, and the cost of education rising, how can you take care of
them? And the jamāno is bad—that too.”
When we sat down to lunch shortly thereafter, Gita-masi mused, “It’s good we
got a good result. I didn’t want us to accrue sin. Some people say it becomes living at
three months, but that’s wrong! The life’s in it from the beginning.” Viral-ben nodded
along.
“But if it was a girl,” Gita-masi said matter-of-factly, “we would’ve gotten it out.”
Viral-ben repeated the words.
“What about it being a sin?” I asked.
Gita-masi practically shouted her answer: “We would’ve had to do some penance,
but we would’ve had to get it done! It’s a sin. But it’s a necessary sin.”
*
Viral-ben, her neighbor’s daughter, and countless others sought SD on the basis of
certain imaginings. Reciprocally, they interpreted the clinical practice’s results through
those imaginings. This chapter examines the gender-kinship logics that made selective
reproduction so desirable. Put differently, what was the necessity of the necessary sin?
(Its sinfulness is discussed in Chapter 5.) In what follows, I outline the Mahesana
region’s moral economy of gender-kinship—a system that subjected male and female
bodies to over-determining affective dichotomies: necessity-dispensability, desireaversion, possession-alienation, hope-fear, security-danger, continuity-rupture, self-other,
and reciprocated care versus unreciprocated care.
In qualitative research on sex selection in India, the phenomenon’s familial and
community-level causes may be its most thoroughly analyzed. For instance, Mary John
and colleagues have offered a practice theory analysis of continuities, changes, and
contradictions in the gender-kinship practices driving sex selection across northwestern
India, ultimately concluding:
Unintended consequences of contemporary social processes, when
combined with parental fears of the unattached sexuality of adult
daughters in a context of a highly competitive and differentiated marriage
market, are compounding the sense of burden represented by the birth of a
daughter. She now requires many more years at home with higher

119

investments in nutrition, health and education. Parental responsibility
continues to rest on ensuring a ‘good’ marriage, which takes her away
from them, even though this does not necessarily represent the end of their
responsibilities. Sons, on the other hand, embody a range of ritual and
economic roles. If the current climate of economic volatility and
masculine anomie makes them often fall short of expectations,
nonetheless, at least one is essential for the future of the family.2
“It is this conjuncture,” they conclude, “that is producing a falling child sex
ratio.”3
Among other studies, Sunil Khanna has connected sex-selective family planning
to changing political economy in periurban Delhi,4 while Navtej Purewal has discursively
deconstructed Punjabi ideologies of son preference.5 Mattias Larsen has identified two
distinct pathways to skewed sex ratios (SRs) amid rapid economic transformation in
Himachal Pradesh: changes in intergenerational authority structures, or dowry in the
absence of women’s empowerment.6 Numerous essays have also situated sex selection
vis-a-vis some combination of patrilineal ideology, marriage practice, domestic
hierarchy, and economic change.7
This body of research meticulously excavates the gender-kinship norms and
practices underlying sex selection, often contextualizing them within broader economic
changes. Moreover, it dovetails with vast ethnographic literatures on valorization of sons
over daughters in Hindu patrilineal settings8 and on more general gender inequality in
such settings.9 The purpose of this chapter is not to retread the existing work on causes of
sex selection, or on Indian gender inequality more generally. Instead, I aim to show how
such causes manifested in the concrete experiences of people pursuing, practicing, and
evaluating selective reproduction.
In discussing the reasons for sex selection, people around Mahesana often
oscillated—as Gita-masi, Viral-ben, and their neighbors did—between a first-person
voice that expressed direct experience and a third-person voice that situated such
experience within a universalized gender-kinship rationality.10 The movement between
the two indexed how sex-selective acts partook of broader moral-economic logics, whose
regularities lay far outside the control of individual or familial choices. In this sense,
2
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families’ imaginings of children-to-be relied on the “historically constructed and
historically defined standards of judgment” that congealed as cultural “common sense.”11
Importantly, the common sense in question was hardly a timeless “tradition,” as
many facile commentaries and Beti Bachāvo interventions would have it. As in many
other situations, “the gender dimensions of reproductive values” emerged “not as
contemporary manifestations of traditional culture but as something newly constructed
out of the residues of the past and the exigencies of contemporary life.”12 As in the
conversations at Gita-masi’s house, people repeatedly articulated the undesirable
daughter as a distinctly modern problem, situated within a particular historical jamāno
[era].
In the chapter’s first section, I outline the principles of marriage and descent that
structured son necessity and daughter dispensability, analyzing the local moral economy
as a system of reproductive labor and material ontology. The second section examines
how falling fertility squeezed parents toward selective reproduction, sharpening the son
pursuit and daughter avoidance latent in kinship principles; it also considers SD’s
routinization as an everyday practice and the consequent split between high-fertility and
low-fertility pathways of son pursuit. In the third section, I move from structural
considerations (kinship principles and fertility regimes) toward people’s subjective
contemplations of gendered fetal potentiality, focusing on ontology and old age care as
themes in son necessity and cost and care as intertwined factors in daughter aversion. The
final section examines ambivalence, uncertainty and alternatives regarding rigid gender
determinism and how it might be expressed or repressed.

Descent, Marriage, and Alienation
How much do we pierce a girl? Her ears, her
nose—and then by her hands and feet, we pierce her
into the community.
— A Mahesana-area bhuvā
“Ek Chhokaro to Joie”
The afternoon of the Dhuleti festival, the fourth SD at Chetna Clinic was for a
Soni [traditional goldsmith] family from a village just outside Patan. When Dr. Ranjit
rang the bell, a grim-looking woman—Kinjal-ben—entered. The man accompanying her
bore a pink powder streak on his right cheek. The infant girl he carried had a matching
purple streak across her left cheek. “Hap-py Holi!” he said festively. Then, growing
serious, he explained that they were returning for a “final check” and abortion.
After a quick scan, the doctor confirmed: the fetus was female. The couple
nodded softly. Dr. Ranjit instructed them to step out with a nurse, who would initiate the
abortion process.
An hour later, I found the couple on adjoining cots in a general ward. When I
asked, Kinjal-ben said her pain was “okay.” She cringed. They invited me to sit next to
the husband, Gaurav-bhai.
11
12
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Kinjal-ben and Gaurav-bhai were in their early thirties. He worked as a mid-level
manager in insurance sales. She was an aspiring commerce professor, with consistently
distinguished results in her graduate studies. But childbearing had sidetracked her career.
Along with the infant, they had two older daughters, five and seven.
As I explained my research, Gaurav-bhai interjected:
We ended up having to do this because we had no alternative! We have
three girls. And our family is educated—everyone, minimum college. But
this problem—like I said, we had no alternative. Otherwise, we’re all
educated. We know all this shouldn’t happen. There’re advertisements on
radio, TV, everything. But then, sometimes, there comes a time when you
have to become weak.
And really, if you look at it—this shouldn’t be done in the first
pregnancy. Girls are also necessary! Girls and boys—only if the
population ratio is even will this world continue. Otherwise, there’ll be
lots of problems. If there’re fewer ladies, and more gents, then many
issues—this, that, the other thing, there can be a lot of problems in
society... If you look at it, the number of both should be the same.
Husband and wife began animatedly discussing the problem of men not finding brides
due to “shortage of girls”
After a silence, Kinjal-ben explained, “We never got it looked at before. In all
three deliveries, we had hope: ‘God’ll give a boy.’ But this time, we took the decision—
‘Let’s get it looked it.’” Much like Viral-ben and her husband, they had faced an
unplanned pregnancy and intended on summary abortion, given the infant’s still-young
age. But like Gita-masi, their relatives had persuaded them to wait some months and “get
it checked”: what if it was a boy? Although generally reluctant to facilitate SD, their
Patan obstetrician had provided the names of three doctors, all in Mahesana District,
because of the couple’s “genuine problem—three daughters.”
Gaurav-bhai sighed. “You have to have one son [ek chhokaro to joie]!” he said.
“That way, everything from our forefathers continues forward; he can take it up.” Quite
scholastically, he noted how sonless women might face taunts from conjugal relatives
and neighbors. Before I could ask, he and his wife quickly clarified: with everyone in
their family being “educated,” this was not something they had experienced. Kinjal-ben
reassured me everyone in the family knew that “it’s not on the woman anyway,” but
rather “in the man,” since “eggs are all the same.”
Gaurav-bhai mused, “Before, if a girl was born, they made her dudh-piti—killed
her off. No one liked girls. Now, the proportion of that’s much lower. Compared to
before, people have started understanding girls, accepting girls. But there’s a limitation—
they still prefer boys.”
Leaning forward, Kinjal-ben explained, “Whatever else is true, a girl’ll go away
to her sāsri [conjugal household]. And then her father’s name won’t come after hers; her
husband’s will. And kids—the wife’s name isn’t going to be the one after theirs, right?
It’s always the father’s. His lineage [vansh-velo] keeps going.” Smiling, she continued:
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Even with so much education, nobody changes this! A son remains with
his parents for life. A daughter doesn’t; she’ll inevitably go to her sāsri.
And only the son can care for his parents. A girl can’t come running from
sāsri to piyar [natal household]. Many sons don’t care for parents! But
still, parents say, ‘He’ll take care of us.’ Everyone feels, ‘He’ll take care
of us in our old age. So everyone prefers a boy.
She concluded emphatically, “One son is necessary [ek chhokaro to joie ja].” Like her
husband, Kinjal-ben offered third-person explanations for their son pursuit, implicitly
locating herself amid a widely shared kinship rationality.
Gently placing a hand on my shoulder, Gaurav-bhai provided a further
explanation through narrative:
Let me tell you a story from our village. There’s a family with only
daughters—four, all with sāsris in the U.S.A. The old man and old lady
did everything as long as they could—did housework, hired a maid, all
that. Plenty of money! But what if they’d had a son instead? Someone
would have been there, right?
Now, the old man died—the father whose four daughters were in
America. For three days, they had to keep the corpse in cold storage.
When his daughters came from the U.S.A., only then could they hold his
funeral.
Then, the daughters asked his brother’s sons to live with the old
lady, because she was alone. She went on like that for a year. Then she
died, too. She felt it in her heart—being alone, with the nephews. She
died, leaving the property to them.
Gaurav-bhai concluded, “So when other people—like us, or others—see this, it poses a
scenario, an example: what’ll happen to us at a time like this? Their lineage ended
abruptly, right? Now, the old man’s name is finished. Since they had just daughters, their
family‘s ended, right?”
Kissing her baby girl, Kinjal-ben added, “No matter how educated people are,
how good their job, how good their income, they’ll still say, ‘It’d be good to have one
son.’ And I feel that way too. The desire for one son is there [ek chhokaro to joie].”
Daughters and Sons: Alienation and Retention
Anthropological research on Hindu India has extensively documented the
patrilineal, patrivirilocal gender-kinship system that Kinjal-ben and Gaurav-bhai
repeatedly invoked to explain sex selection.13 Mahesana-area households generally
centered on lineal male relatives, with many spanning three or more generations. Sons
13
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husband and his parents.
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normatively remained with parents until the latter’s death. Daughters, meanwhile,
married out, relocating their residence, labor, and identity to what people called their
“real” families— sāsris.14 As Kinjal-ben described, the father’s name became a newborn
child’s middle name; a son retained it forever, but for a daughter, it was replaced by the
husband’s first name post-maritally. The naming and residence conventions were parts of
a moral-economy of gender-kinship that established continuity through sons and required
separation of daughters. For parents, the structure attached the two core kinship principles
to two kinds of filial bodies: boys became figures of descent, girls figures of marriage.
In formalistic terms, the moral economy was partly a system of daughter
exchange.15 Different caste and class groupings exhibited variation around the general
principle. Chaudharys and the poorer strata of other communities typically practiced
direct exchange marriage. Others, like Rabaris and Patels, gave daughters into a
community of nominal equals, although there was a strong tendency toward de facto
socioeconomic hypergamy. And still others—most notably Thakors and Rajputs—
married daughters “up” according to formalized marriage hierarchies.
Regardless of the specific form, people consistently articulated a sense of
releasing daughters into a social order that would reliabily return daughters-in-law,
whether directly or indirectly. Scholarship on kanyādān [the “gift of a virgin”] has often
portrayed it as given without expectation of return.16 In discussing sex selection, families
around Mahesana consistently undercut the ideology of non-reciprocal gifting,
emphasizing the powerful and obvious expectation that out-marriage of daughters
guaranteed in-marriage of wives.
The moral economy was fundamentally a material economy organizing the
distribution of gendered bodies across households.17 The gender-kinship system
structured alienation and appropriation of parents’ reproductive labor, as embodied in
daughters. The social order demanded the violent uprooting of bodies for its smooth
functioning, and women and their parents bore the burdens. Principles of matrimonial
mobility and filiation represented the operation of a political enterprise—a system of
power that regulated social reproduction in a manner that overlapped with broader
political economy.18 The moral-economic order connected appropriation of reproductive
labor with landholding, inheritance, dowry, gifting, gendered divisions of labor, and other
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aspects of “son-centered accumulation.”19 In redistributing bodies, labor, and capital, the
system organized reproduction of not just households, but entire sub-caste communities,
the broader society, and the nation-state.
The material arrangements of the moral economy functioned efficiently because
of their dialectical interrelations with gender-kinship ideologies that legitimated or
euphemized the violent processes of alienation and appropriation.20 Such mystification
reconfigured exploitation as gifting—or more cynically, one part of a nebulously
conceptualized and ultimately “right” indirect exchange. Violent processes became
valorized—and their violence officially repressed—through reconceptualization as
“tradition.” Separation of daughters remained within the realm of doxa—the unspoken
and unquestionable assumptions people shared simply by existing within a community;
though its various downstream consequences might become enter a gender orthodoxyheterodoxy debate whose poles were themselves always shifting, the inevitability of a
girl’s alienation was a simple fact of life.21 The domination of wife-givers over wifetakers became hegemonic, organizing the entire lived process of reproduction.22
Notably, the economy of gender-kinship did not contain a subordinated class per
se. Instead, most people acted as both exploiter and exploited by virtue of their roles as
parents to both sons and daughters. Families aspired to improve their position by
obtaining sons, but such “mobility” hardly removed them from simultaneously occupying
the disadvantaged position engendered by having girls. Nor did it transform the
conditions of exploitation; to the contrary, it reinforced them by vesting appropriative
interests in still more social actors. Son possession and daughter alienation remained the
common framework within which people maneuvered to improve household prospects.
Selective reproduction emerged as a tactical manipulation within the shared
framework of the moral economy.23 Confronting the objectivized, violent structures of
marriage and descent, parents could avoid further disadvantages by recognizing and
rejecting potential girls prenatally. As I discuss below, such manipulation proved
especially appealing when low levels of fertility and high reproductive investment in
individual children heightened the dangers of imbalance between contributions to and
extractions from the system. Devaluation of girls among families pursuing sex selection
emerged not from individual discriminatory “mentalities,” as many held, but from what
moral-economic arrangements forced them and their parents to be.
Families pursuing sex selection constantly invoked the imagined daughter’s
inevitable separation. Understood as always-already to-be-given-away, she nonetheless
demanded care and expenditure, leading to ongoing emotional liabilities and
19
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uncompensated economic losses. Referring to girls as the dhan [property] of a pārku
[alien] household, clients like Kinjal-ben repeatedly invoked their unavoidable relocation
after marriage. Parents engaging in acts of care and indulgence for an accompanying
daughter—purchasing a new toy, wiping away food, giving kisses—wistfully observed
that such acts of love were “just for now, since there’s nothing after she goes away.”
They observed, too, how the ontological rupture of marriage left a woman perpetually in
exile, never quite belonging in sāsri or piyar. And such rupture left parents feeling the
pain of separation, particularly when in-laws maltreated their hostage.24 As suggested by
the epigraph to this section, yielding a daughter to the community—her hand in her
husband’s, her feet on the path to her sāsri—entailed piercing pain for both her and her
parents.
By contrast, prevailing moral-economic arrangements made the son a permanent
possession—a figure of continuity, support, and recognition. The first patient I ever
accompanied with Uma-masi explained during the ride to Chetna:
A son’s a necessary thing. A daughter belongs to a pārku household. She
won’t remain with us. Her father’s name is erased, and her husband’s
name added. But a son’s ours. He perpetuates the father’s name. If there’s
a boy, the door to your home remains open. Without a son, everything’s
finished. You need an heir! And when we get old, a son and daughter-inlaw care for us.
Concluding, the woman nodded and declared, “Ek chhokaro to joie!”
The patient’s statement encapsulated the rationales I heard again and again for son
necessity. The moral-economic expectation of the son and in-marrying daughter-in-law
as guarantors of old age care pervaded social life.25 But the significance of a boy-to-be
extended well beyond the narrowly economic. Patrilineal social ontology also made boys
key nodes of social recognition.26 Couples like Kinjal-ben and Gaurav-bhai pervasively
noted the importance of continuing the parents’ name or lineage through the son. Others
explained a son’s indispensability by emphasizing how he kept open one’s ghar [home,
house, household], gharnu bārnu [door to the home], or gharno umbaro [threshold to the
home], or kept lit a familial divo [lamp]. With their connotations of replication,
continuity, extinction, and social interfacing, such metaphors underlined boys as the sine
qua non for establishing a lasting, meaningful existence within society. In an inversion of
literal reproduction, male offspring produced their parents as fully actualized persons,
24
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mediating recognition across the threshold separating the household and its surrounding
milieu.27
In discussions around selective reproduction, son necessity came into relief
against the figure of the household disparagingly described as “nakhodiyu”—sonless,
with connotations of barrenness, emptiness, and uselessness. Cautionary narratives like
the one recounted by Gaurav-bhai highlighted the misfortune of sonlessness: inheritance
and last rites gone awry became metonyms for a sad social existence in which name,
lineage, and household all ceased to exist, leaving people “alone, with the nephews.”
Even if one succeeded in marrying daughters into prosperous sāsris—the U.S. being the
epitome—they could not provide support, care, and companionship as a son would. The
desire to obtain the necessary son without having too many daughters was what drove
people to sex selection.
Practicing Inequality
Despite what governance initiatives, widespread slogans, and some scholarly
works might suggest, the gender-differentiated valuation of filial bodies could not be
corrected through a simple shift in “mentality,” given moral-economic imperatives.
Marriage and descent principles meant daughters and sons were manifestly unequal.
The pervasive reality of gender inequality undermined anti-sex selection
messages from government institutions, NGOs, and the media. Centered on exhortations
to “treat boys and girls as equal” or “giv them the same welcome,” such messages rang
false for families situated within a gender-kinship system that made male and female
bodies structurally unequal. Even if parents treated sons and daughters equally (to a
point) when providing love, care, and material resources, the two necessarily diverged in
their socially permissible roles and their resultant relations to parents. Public calls for
heroic individual resistance to systemic inequality merely forced an acknowledgement
from couples like Kinjal-ben and Gaurav-bhai (“we know... this shouldn’t happen”)
before they could articulate the common sense of reproductive striving (“there comes a
time when you have to become weak”).28
This pattern became clear one afternoon in the Nandini Clinic consultory, as I
chatted with a couple experiencing their first pregnancy. When I asked if they had
considered “getting it looked at,” the husband shook his head—“No, no, nothing like
that!” Smiling, the wife assured me, “For us, boy-girl are equal! Come visit us, and we’ll
show you. Everyone in our family has one girl, one boy.” I pressed a bit further, asking
what they would do if they had a firstborn daughter. Both laughed sheepishly and
shrugged. The husband started a sentence—“Well, in that case...”—and his wife finished
it: “Of course, we’d have to think about it.”
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I repeatedly encountered this juxtaposition of idealized gender equality and
pragmatic willingness to consider SD. Dr. Dilip captured it when he told me, “Now,
there’s no difference to people if it’s boy or girl! But yes, there’s a mentality that there
should be at least one boy. In this era, boys and girls are the same. But ek chhokaro to
joie! There may well be no girls, lots of girls, however many girls. But at least one boy—
ek chhokaro to joie ja.”
One evening, I sat in a Nandini inpatient room with a family I knew well. After
undergoing selective abortions in two prior pregnancies, the patient—a teacher’s wife—
had just birthed a daughter. The woman, her husband, and both their mothers fawned
over the newborn girl, but a hint of disappointment tinged their words. The patient’s
mother sighed as she explained:
We were hoping for a boy. If this was a boy, full-stop! No need to have
any more. Now that she’s arrived, we’ll have to think about it, down the
road... Who knows? Maybe after twenty years, girls’ll exceed boys! It
could be a girls’ jamāno. For us, sons and daughters are equal. We don’t
feel like you have to have a boy. But that’s not the way it works in society.
So we have to keep hoping for one boy. Not more, but you have to have
one boy [ek chhokaro joie].
I pondered the woman’s words, wondering at the complex merging of individual
orientation and structural compulsion
The patient’s mother used the same phrase as Dr. Dilip, Kinjal-ben, Gaurav-bhai,
and countless others to explain the need for sex selection: ek chhokaro joie. The
predicate, joie, brings together notions of desire, need, and normativity.29 Consequently,
the basic phrase chhokaro joie covered the semantic range of “want a son,” “need a son,”
and “should have a son.” When prefixed, the number ek [one] emphasized the sufficiency
of a single boy for completing a family. And when infixed or suffixed, the emphatic
particles to and ja highlighted the intensity and inescapability of desire, requirement, and
normativity: chhokaro to joie, chhokaro joie ja, ek chhokaro to joie ja. Finally, joie
permitted optional qualification with a pronoun indicating the subject of desire or
obligation; the pronoun’s facultative character captures how son necessity, son desire,
and son expectation blurred boundaries between third-person and first-person—between
a general system and particular individuals or households.
Outside of conversations with government officials, activists, and reformed
obstetricians extolling the virtues of daughter acceptance, I heard joie in conjunction with
“girl” quite infrequently, and always in three specific configurations. First, families
pursuing SD or selective abortion often joined chhokaro joie with a doubly negative
denial of misogyny: “It’s not that a girl is not wanted/needed.” They might
simultaneously gesture, metaphorically or literally, to already-existing offspring as
evidence for their embrace of daughters.
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Second, some women and relatives used chhokari joie as a pivot into advocating
for household “balance”—a “one boy, one girl” ideal. Again, they gestured toward
existing daughters before reiterating the need for a son.
Finally, some families described daughters as necessary in the context of the
marriage system. One Nandini patient, having undergone four selective abortions after
the birth of her daughter, said to me, “Chhokari to joie! Girls are necessary in society. If
we take someone else’s daughter we have to give in exchange, right?” Juxtaposed with
her history, the woman’s statement illuminated the hard reality underlying sex selection.
While making potential sons and daughters-in-law necessary for household reproduction,
the moral economy of gender-kinship rendered potential daughters an embodied
reproductive externality—valuable to the community, but dispensable to parents.30

A Modern Reproductive Regime
I have two girls and a boy. We got it looked at with
the last one—the boy. We got it looked at with the
second girl, too, but kept it. I said, ‘We can’t sin
like that. If God’s giving it, we have to take it.’
But now, my daughters would have to do it.
In today’s jamāno, you have to do it. There’s no
choice. With one girl, you can’t bring home
another.
— A Nandini patient’s mother
“What Was the Point of Bringing Home Another Kid?”
“There was one before this—“ the woman began.
Her husband finished the sentence: “—and we got an abortion done. ‘Female’
result, so we got it taken out. This time, we got it looked at again, and Saheb said it was a
boy.”
I was sitting across from Esha-ben and Sagar-bhai in an unoccupied Nandini
room. Uma-masi had suggested they meet with me while waiting for an antenatal visit.
Esha-ben, a short, jolly woman in a salvaar-kameez, was visibly pregnant, though not yet
near term—around six months, by my guess. Sagar-bhai, dressed in a crisp checked shirt
and jeans, appeared quiet and contemplative.
They were Patels. Sagar-bhai’s family hailed from Gita-masi’s village. Esha-ben
had grown up near Unjha, one of five children—four sisters and a youngest brother.
Sagar-bhai owned a medical supply distributorship in Mahesana, where his father had
previously run a small hardware store.
In the couple’s previous pregnancy, two years earlier, Dr. Dilip had provided the
names of three colleagues who still performed SD. The couple had chosen Dr. Narendra,
whom they knew personally through Sagar-bhai’s business. After SD had revealed a
daughter-to-be, Esha-ben had undergone abortion.
Sagar-bhai recalled:
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We had one girl. We were sure we definitely didn’t want more than two
children. What’s the point of gathering together so many? It becomes hard
to take care of them. That was our thinking. So then what?
Once he told us it was definitely a girl, we came home. Mammi
said, ‘What’s the problem? So many people in the world get it done.
What’s the big deal?’ Since this was the first time, Esha was bound to feel
afraid, right? But we agreed: what was the point of bringing home another
kid?
Nodding emphatically, he sat back in his chair.
Esha-ben continued the story: “So then, with this one, it was a relief. Naturally,
we were worried about the result—‘What’ll it be? Good or bad?’ If it was another girl,
we would’ve had to get another abortion.”
Her husband picked up the thread:
She was really worried when we got it looked at—if the doctor had said
the same thing again, it would’ve been another abortion. But two-three
abortions like that can really damage a woman’s body.
We have a neighbor who had it done four-five times. There ended
up being a huge gap—they married off their daughter, and their son’s just
now in ninth grade! Seeing things like that made us worry—‘What’ll we
do if that happens to us?’
We ended up calling that lady to come provide some comfort after
the abortion two years ago. She said, ‘What’s the problem? This happened
to you for the first time! I had it happen four-five times. And your
daughter’s still young. Don’t worry.’ So that made Esha feel a bit better.
As Sagar-bhai spoke, his wife smiled softly, nodding and shaking her head by turns.
Tracking back to the previous SD, I asked whether they had decided beforehand
to pursue selective abortion with a “female” result. Esha-ben chuckled, perhaps at my
apparent naiveté. “Of course!” she said. “How else would it be? We already had one
daughter. What would we do with another?”
Sagar-bhai interjected with a popular family planning slogan: “’A Small Family Is
a Happy Family!’”
“Two children is appropriate,” his wife elaborated. “In this jamāno of monghvāri
[high costs], you can’t keep too many.”
“You see how it is in India.” Sagar-bhai scoffed and pointed at me with an
upturned hand. “If I was an American citizen, I would gather together five girls, no
problem! But here, the jamāno is such—”
“So much monghvāri! If you bring home two daughters, then raising them,
feeding them, clothing them, educating them, paying their school fees—“
“We have to remain in comparison with everyone else. We have to move in
accordance with that. If my daughter is in a Gujarati-medium school, she’ll say, ‘Get me
tuition, put me in English-medium.’ Then how can we say no?”
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“In the end,” Esha-ben opined, “we have to remain within our means, right?
Based on the jamāno, two children is appropriate—one girl, one boy. That’s the way it
should be.”
“As the times change,” Sagar-bhai concluded, “we have to change with them,
no?”
I continued to see the couple over the ensuing months, congratulating them on the
birth of their son and occasionally chatting with Sagar-bhai at the tea stall near Nandini.
One day, as he and I sat sipping cha, he noted:
It’s good that one-two sahebs are still doing this, or it’d be
difficult. In fact, this keeps the population in control. If this weren’t
happening, the population would increase too much! So there’s that, too.
And one boy, one girl—that kind of balance is good. In today’s
day and age, who can afford more than two kids? My daughter’s five years
old, and still, she wants everything to be fancy! And with a kid, you get
them medical care, get them this and that—with today’s kids, any old
thing won’t do. Now you educate them, give them fancy food—my
daughter won’t eat old-fashioned pāpad at home! Every day, she wants a
bag of chips! She won’t take simple snacks to school. She needs
everything fancy. So in this monghvāri, no one can afford more than two
little ones. And within that, ek chhokaro to joie. So people get this done.
The Squeeze of Falling Fertility
Esha-ben and Sagar-bhai’s comments illustrate how more than just marriage and
descent principles ordered the gender-kinship system that gave rise to sex selection. The
moral economy also encompassed a specific modern reproductive regime. Selective
abortion emerged from the convergence of son necessity and daughter dispensability with
rationalities and practices of limited childbearing.31
Shortly after our initial meeting, Sagar-bhai neatly summarized this convergence:
My feeling is, families now accept girls more—educating them, bringing
them up, all that. It’s not that they don’t accept. But within limits. Take
our family—there ends up being a limitation. In today’s jamāno, people’s
feeling is—well, like the government says: “We Two and Our Two!” Now
who fits into “two”? It should be either two boys, or girl-boy; no one feels
it should be two girls!
In providing an on-the-ground interpretation of the famous government family planning
slogan, Sagar-bhai highlighted how the needs of fertility limitation and son production—
one focused on number of children, the other on type of children—often pulled in
opposite directions. Repeated childbearing in pursuit of a boy could drive up family size,
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while limiting the number of children could jeopardize the ability to attain the necessary
son. Into the gap between the two ideals entered sex selection.
Demographer Christophe Guilmoto has recently proposed the notion of a “sex
ratio transition” driven by families being “ready” (willing and motivated), “able”
(possessing access to technology), and “squeezed” (compelled to keep families small).32
Guilmoto’s model resonates with earlier Indian scholarship that established an
association between fertility decline and skewed SRs by showing how decreases in
family size worsened prospects for girls at any given birth order.33 The model also
captures the dynamics of sex selection’s emergence in Mahesana. Motivation and access
derived from the abovementioned kinship principles and the market outlined in Chapter
1; low fertility preference provided the “squeeze.”
In invoking “fertility preferences,” I am not suggesting that couples always
operated with a fixed, rationalistic plan for number and type of offspring.34 Factors as
diverse as pressure from elders, difficult pregnancy experiences, and the gender of the
most recent born child could heavily influence preferences, and people often operated in
a space of ambiguity, uncertainty, and ambivalence. Nonetheless, couples seeking sex
selection services had more often than not decided that they did not wish for any more
than one child. For them, one son was sufficient as the end—both goal and completion—
of reproduction; any daughter was superfluous. As Mary John has put it, “families [were]
actually ‘planning’ to have at least one son and at most one daughter.”35
Women had to become pregnant—often repeatedly—in order to pursue a son.
Explaining her trepidation regarding the bodily wear of an imminent Caesarean delivery,
a first-time mother at Nandini said, “If this is a boy, then it’s okay. But if it’s a girl, then
according to society’s rules, I have to get pregnant again for a boy, right?” Obstetricians
and clients often invoked or indexed “society’s rules,” treating as obvious the idea that
that sonless couples would pursue further pregnancies. When doctors asked patients
whether they wanted to conceive, or to keep an unplanned pregnancy, they could simply
answer, “We only have a girl, so...” Families pervasively referred to a recent or
anticipated newborn’s maleness in conjunction with words like “enough,” “complete,”
“finished,” and “full-stop”; for instance, when I visited Gita-masi after her grandson’s
birth she thrust him into my arms and exclaimed gleefully, “Now our family’s complete!”
The focus on son production, rather than gender-neutral reproduction, meant
sonless couples often desired fertility only contingently. Clients often informed doctors
they had conceived “with the calculus of a boy” or “in order to have a boy,” indexing a
high likelihood of eventually seeking sex selection. In cases like Viral-ben’s or Kinjalben’s, couples might continue unplanned pregnancies with the intention of allowing SD
to dictate whether the children-to-be were truly wanted or not.
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The gender contingency of pregnancies exemplified son pursuit within a modern,
low-fertility reproductive regime. There were, in fact, two paths—high-fertility and lowfertility—to the necessary son. Neither challenged the cultural common sense of a boy as
the end of reproduction. But each suggested a distinctive modality for reaching the goal:
repeated pregnancies and repeated births, or repeated pregnancies and selective
abortions.36
Fertility has fallen drastically in Mahesana, Gujarat, and India as a whole since
the advent of sex selection, part of a broader trend dating back to the 1970s. Since 1981,
India and Gujarat’s child SRs and total fertility rates (TFRs) fell in parallel (Figure 2).37
By the 2011 Census, Gujarat’s (TFR) stood at a near-replacement level of 2.4—a major
drop from 4.3 in 1981. Having declined more rapidly over the previous decade,
Mahesana’s TFR in 2011 was even lower: 2.0.38 Low fertility was even more apparent
among the affluent. A mid-2000s survey, for instance, found that while TFRs for Gujarati
women without education or in lower wealth quintiles were over 3.0, those for women in
the top wealth quintile and with ten-plus years of education were below 2.0.39
In my observation, couples pursuing sex selection cited various reasons for their
desire to limit childbearing. Most prominent among these were questions of cost and
care. Sagar-bhai explained:
See, the thing is, if you look at our country before, everyone had five-six
children. At that time, education was not so important. Now that I’m
educated, I’ll wish for my child to be well-settled, well-nourished, schoolgoing. Before, when there were six-seven kids, one would go to work at a
tea stall, and so on—now, it shouldn’t be that way. I’ll want my son to be
well-settled—to become an engineer, a doctor. I won’t make him live the
life I’m living—something better instead. We have everything now, but
his should be better than ours. If there are too many children, then we
can’t plan properly. If there are fewer—one-two—we can give them time,
spend money on them.
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Like Sagar-bhai, many couples noted the financial, emotional, and time costs of raising a
child “in this jamāno.”40 Discourses of aspiration, struggle, and fertility control united
upwardly mobile sex selection clients like Sagar-bhai with those experiencing grinding
poverty, downward mobility, or stagnation. All agreed that “children are best within
limits,” given the difficulty of birthing, clothing, feeding, educating, indulging, marrying,
and otherwise caring for them.41
That people like Sagar-bhai invoked population control rationales and timehonored family planning slogans to justify sex selection reflects how reproductive
governance shaped the low-fertility regime. Since independence, the Indian government’s
construction of state, society, development, and modernity itself has rested largely on
aggressively promoting population control, proliferating public and private family
planning services, and circulating messages extolling the virtues of small families for
household and national economic wellbeing.42 The recirculation of family planning
messages in places like Chetna reflects the extent to which the superfluous daughter was
a distinctly modern problem, and how sex selection, though illegal, was very much in line
with certain state rationalities of reproduction. (I return to the tension between family
planning and anti-sex selection efforts in Chapter 7.)
The modernity of sex selection is also evident in the association between fertility
squeeze and economic change. Families’ invocations of monghvāri and the present
jamāno point to broader political-economic shifts encompassing the Green Revolution,
land reorganization, market liberalization, and the growing importance (and costs) of
education and other investments in children. At the time of my fieldwork, Gujarat had
experienced several decades of capital-intensive growth—with attracting one-fifth of the
country’s private industrial investments between 1991 and 2011—that produced rising
costs alongside agricultural stagnation, land alienation, limited job creation, state
withdrawal of food and other subsidies, uneven poverty reduction, and rising
malnutrition.43 In this context, fertility limitation became a hinge articulating broader
political economy with the moral economy of gender-kinship.
At the confluence of liberal political economy, population governance,
biomedicalized reproduction, and familial aspirations, low fertility became an imperative
hallmark of responsible household economy and virtuous modern subjectivity.44
Discourse among sex selection practitioners and clients often located the high-fertility
path of son pursuit in the past, temporally bracketing those who “don’t go for SD” as
“backward” or “uneducated holdovers from a premodern era. Drawing contrasts between
“this jamāno” and “back then,” they gestured to the inconceivability and imprudence of
having larger families in the contemporary moment.
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In fact, the non-selective and selective tactics of son pursuit coexisted in time.
One obstetrician observed:
The basic mentality is this, that one boy should be there in the family.
Every Indian will say this. Even if they don’t get SD done, everyone will
say this. Patients with five-six females will want to keep pregnancy again
at age thirty-five or forty years to have a male child. They don’t go for
family planning, but they also don’t go for SD and female foeticide. If
they have a first girl, second girl, they’ll keep trying. And then those who
have reached enough will get SD.
The doctor’s comment highlights the lack of fixity in what I have described as highfertility and low-fertility “pathways”; rather than formalized tactics, the two were actually
temporary orientations to action, meaningful as guiding principles but nonetheless subject
to change over time. Families often switched from the former to the latter when they
“reached enough”; more rarely, they switched in the opposite direction upon growing
frustrated with sex-selective abortions.
I also observed a general sense that falling fertility was pushing more and more
families into sex selection. As Dr. Dilip put it:
Even those who were having four-five-six children before, they are going
for two-three—they also think it is difficult to raise a child,
economically… Even in the poorer sections, some patients are now
requesting SD, because they want to reduce family size. That was not the
case fifteen years ago, because people were not so worried about family
size—poor, rich, everyone... I can say each and every community is now
resorting for fewer children than fifteen years before. Those who were
going for five-six now go for two-three. Those who were going for twothree now go for two—one if first is male.
Numerous colleagues echoed Dr. Dilip’s observation, with many specifically noting a
rise in SD among less affluent families and a shift in the normative timing for SD from
the third pregnancy to the second.
Demographic data corroborate the trends and patterns described above. Analyses
from late-1990s data clearly demonstrated the coexistence of high-fertility and lowfertility son pursuit in several states, including Gujarat: SRs at birth (SRBs) nadired at
second parity, suggesting resort to sex selection in second pregnancies among some
women alongside repeated childbearing for a boy among others.45 But overall trends also
suggest the increasing currency of the selective route with time. The decline in TFR since
45
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the 1980s advent of SD technology correlated with markedly lower SRs in Gujarat and
Mahesana District. Falling fertility selectively squeezed out girls, as each additional
daughter in pursuit of the inevitable son became dispensable.
Selective Reproduction as Routine Practice
Within the low-fertility regime that predominated in Mahesana, people calibrated
family composition in one of two ways, depending on the sex of the firstborn child.46
Many couples with a firstborn son simply avoided further pregnancy.47 I heard a
common refrain from many obstetricians, often in needling reproaches to couples seeking
contraception: “If the first child is male, no one’s quick to have another!” Dr. Dilip
sometimes playfully scolded single-son couples in a similar vein when they sought
abortion of an unplanned pregnancy: “Keep it! If all you people with boys don’t have any
more kids, how will your sons get married?” While sometimes acknowledging the grave
SR skewing, patients and relatives invariably laughed off doctors’ jesting opposition to
their fertility control requests. Their son could not marry his imagined sister; no one in
the family had encountered difficulty marrying; there was no real need for a daughter;
and at any rate, what if the second child was also a boy? Single-son couples further
retorted that they would be better able to care for and invest in a son if he was an only
child. Many specifically voiced wanting to maximize educational investments and avoid
fragmentation of patrimony, with the latter concern becoming particularly acute among
urban families that had invested considerable wealth in impartible houses (rather than the
gold, land, and other inheritables of agrarian village life).48 Ultimately, couples’ diverse
stated reasons boiled down to one fundamental principle: an additional child of either
gender was unnecessary and would impose unnecessary costs on the family. In a pattern
seen across time and region in India, “the number of sons desired was by no means
unlimited.”49 One boy was necessary and sufficient. As many sex selection clients said,
“ek ja joie”—“you only need one.”
Nevertheless, the primary contributor to Mahesana’s skewed SRs was not the
“first son, only child” phenomenon, but its gender-opposed counterpart: pursuit of SD
and selective abortion after a firstborn (or higher-order) daughter. Routinized sex
selection rested on and reinforced a sense of girls beyond the first as superfluous.
Whenever I asked Uma-masi about the Beti Bachāvo program, she frowned and
shouted, “It’s wrong! In this jamāno, who’ll gather together three or four girls?” The
predicate she used to describe what parents would do with girls if they did not undertake
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sex selection—bhegi karvi—denoted gathering, collecting, or piling up, often with
connotations of excess. I heard the construction countless times from couples like Eshaben and Sagar-bhai: “It’s not reasonable to gather that many girls. You see how it is in
our society.” “Who’ll gather six girls to have a boy, in this day and age?” “What’s the
point of gathering five-six? Four, we already have.” “If you gather too many girls, it
becomes tough to care for them.” “In this monghvāri, what’s the point of gathering them,
over and over gain, to have a son?” These statements, along with countless others like
them, were commentaries about collecting excess costs and liabilities, about bringing
home someone that had to be given away, about gathering subjects whose care exposed
one to the violence of alienation. Looking at the life course over-determined for girls and
their parents, many couples decided it was better to eliminate potential daughters
prenatally than to bear them, care for them, support them, love them, and ultimately lose
them—especially when having an additional daughter would do nothing to obviate the
still-pressing need for a son.
Entering the gap between low fertility preference and son necessity, sex selection
allowed identification and elimination of dispensable daughters prenatally, before their
entry into the world as more fully-fledged persons. Though universally lamented as
physically, emotionally, and morally troubling (as I discuss in subsequent chapters),
selective abortion permitted families to reject potential daughters at a stage when such
rejection was still thinkable. People experienced the practice as an act of tragic
pragmatism, chosen despite profound love for existing daughters—and with considerable
ambivalence toward the rejected daughter-to-be. One man explained his and his wife’s
choice for a second consecutive selective abortion by noting:
It’s not like we don’t love daughters! We have our daughter, and she’s so
dear to us. Once she’s out, living, then a relationship binds you to her
[sambandh bandhāy]. But if you don’t even have her, there’s not the same
issue. If we feed her, play with her, then we develop affection for her. But
that’s a different matter. There’s not that kind of relationship before
having her.
Centering on a phrase literally denoting the processual tying of a durable bond between
people, this statement pithily condenses the moral and pragmatic grounds for proceeding
with selective abortions. Countless families similarly endorsed the need to “consider
these things before another girl is standing in front of you.” Birth brought daughters out
of liminal personhood, making it legally homicidal and morally unthinkable to kill them
or withhold the care incumbent on parents. Once in the world, a daughter bound parents
to love her, care for her, and endure the eventual agony of separation.
The avoidance of superfluous daughters through SD was a commonsensical
feature of life for many people around Mahesana. One evening, during a break in a
neighborhood function, the six-year-old from next door and her eight-year-old cousin
approached me and my wife, eagerly sat us down on the bench in front of our house, and
began asking questions about life in America. As we reciprocated by asking about their
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lives, the older girl explained their relationship and noted that they each had younger
brother. She continued, “And once our aunt has a boy—“
The other girl finished her statement: “Yes, once Bucky’s mom has a boy, we’ll
be three girls and three boys.”
Intrigued by their certainty, I asked, “Three and three?”
The younger girl continued excitedly, “Me, her, and Bucky; and then her brother,
my brother, and the new brother! She’s pregnant right now.”
“Right now?” I asked innocently. “So they must not know, boy-girl.”
Furrowing her brow, the older girl raising an open palm to signal the triviality of
the explanation she was about to deliver: “She had the test done!” She smiled and shook
her head, as if in disbelief at my ignorance. Our conversation quickly moved on to
discussion of smartphone games, but I was left with a new appreciation of my research
topic. SD was so routine, even grade-schoolers treated it as common sense.
In the clinic, doctors and clients generally operated on a shared understanding of
SD as an obvious choice for those with at least one girl. When Dr. Dilip asked couples
whether he should fill the mandatory Form F for an early-gestation ultrasound (and
thereby render the pregnancy visible to the government), they would often reply by
simply saying, “We only have this one girl, so...” The remainder of the sentence usually
remained implicit but apparent. Similarly, I heard countless Nandini and Chetna patients
recite obstetric histories that included the line, “That time, we were told it was a girl,
so...” Again, the implication was generally unspoken but clear. Families spoke frequently
and matter-of-factly about how they would pursue SD after conceiving. And Uma-masi’s
expressed a common sentiment when she told me one night of her fervent hope for a
firstborn son—not because she would not love a girl, but because “a boy is a relief, and if
you have a girl, you have to get it checked in the second one and do all that.”
The routinization of selective reproduction also colored people’s interpretations of
observed reproductive outcomes. Sitting on my balcony one evening, I overheard a
neighbor deliver a dry response to a relative’s telephone inquiry about his daughter’s
recent delivery: “It’s a boy. For those with a previous girl, it’s always a boy.” (On
learning of my research topic some months earlier, his wife had intimated in whispers
that their daughter had undergone SD and been promised a male.) Whenever a Nandini
patient delivered a second girl, one nurse—herself the oldest of three sisters with a
youngest brother—always asked incredulously, “A second girl? Didn’t they get it looked
at?” In a similar vein, couples with a large gap between daughter and son attracted a
particular hermeneutics of suspicion in gossip: yes, the gap might have resulted from
infertility or intentional spacing, but what was the more likely explanation?
Especially among women, sex selection practices had become the subject of a
considerable body of everyday knowledge. In the comfort of kitchens, patios, and family
gatherings, people spoke in great detail about the logistics and experiences of sex
selection: who did it and who had stopped, prevailing charges, different experts’
reliability, reasons for error, the fact that “the sahebs can’t see until after three months,”
the utility of a full bladder, and the “bodily ruination” of second-trimester abortion. There
was also the ever-present matter of who had gotten it done. On the afternoon of the event
at which my neighbor’s niece schooled me in the banality of sex selection, another

138

neighbor, Megha-ben, had visited Chetna with Uma-masi. During the function, the
neighborhood women, lounging on tarpaulins in the common plot, whispered and nodded
over toward where Megha-ben sat in a plastic chair, smiling quietly: “Yes!... Megha...
She got the sonography done!... It happened... She had the sonography done, she did.”
Patterning Selective Reproduction
While I saw families from every caste, affluence level, and family size seeking
sex selection, my observation and obstetricians’ impressions suggested certain definite
tendencies with regard to background characteristics. Couples seeking sex selection
services tended to hail from the middle, upper, and upwardly mobile classes. In terms of
caste, Patels, Chaudharys, and affluent families from the Rabari, Rajput, and artisanal
castes were frequent clients; Thakors and scheduled castes were underrepresented,
though still common due to their numerical preponderance, while Brahmins and Vaniyas
were represented at levels disproportionate to their population numbers. Almost no one
pursued SD in a first pregnancy, or with an existing son; instead, as per the discussion
above, selective reproduction emerged as a pragmatic tactic among families with
daughters—one or two in the vast majority of cases—who wished to avoid any more.50
This impressionistic profile of sex selection seekers in Mahesana aligns with the
broader demographic research. Nationwide studies have decisively correlated skewed
SRBs to family composition and affluence. While prenatal sex selection is rare in first
pregnancies, or with living sons, it becomes increasingly common as daughters
accumulate.51 For instance, in 2005, the countrywide SRB was 836 for births after a
firstborn girl, compared to well over 950 for firstborns and births after a firstborn boy.52
In stark contrast to the widespread discourses portraying sex selection as practiced by
50
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poor, uneducated, “unaware,” or “backward” people, there is also a “prosperity effect,”53
with lower SRBs corresponding to urban residence, maternal education, wealth,
landholding, expenditure, standard of living, and upper-caste status; moreover, prosperity
and family composition may interact, leading to particularly skewed SRBs among
affluent families with only daughters.54 In other words, sex selection in India is most
likely among couples like Esha-ben and Sagar-bhai, or Asha-ben and Jiten-bhai: at leastmiddle class, with one or two daughters.
Leela Visaria’s research has specifically demonstrated these tendencies for the
Mahesana region (Table 4).55 Her early-2000s field study of 3,708 births among women
in six villages near Unjha and Vijapur found that SRB decreased with each increment in
birth order. Overall and at any given parity, SRBs were almost always lowest among
women and families with higher caste status, land ownership, and higher education. For
instance, SRB at second birth was 659 for women with secondary education, versus 993
for women classed as illiterate. It was 778 for women from landholding families, against
956 among landless counterparts. And it was 654 for upper-caste women, compared to
952 for those from the “other backward caste” (OBC) classification. But even women
from landless, OBC, and limited-education backgrounds exhibited drastic drops in SRBs
by fourth and higher parities, suggesting a limitation on the willingness to undergo
indefinitely prolonged childbearing for a boy; at some point, most families had “reached
enough.” And the SRB at last birth was 479 overall, 353 among women thirty-five or
older (who were most likely to have completed childbearing), and below 600 for virtually
every demographic subcategory. A son was, indeed, the end of reproduction.

Envisioning Fetal Futures
Horizoning Work within the Moral Economy
Selective reproduction emerged as a logical choice at the confluence of particular
gender-kinship principles and a particular low-fertility reproductive regime. But families
pursuing sex selection were not automata, merely acting out large-scale demographic
patterns or norms of marriage and descent. They behaved as constrained but nonetheless
active subjects, constructing and contending with imagined fetal futures.
In moving back and forth between present reproduction and future kinship,
families engaged in what Adriana Petryna has called “horizoning work.”56 Through
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detailed ethnographic engagement with the praxis of scientists, emergency planners, and
other actors doing “risk management” around twenty-first century ecological
transformations, Petryna has demonstrated how the retrieval of future horizons—“fleeting
if somewhat arbitrary endpoints, where vision literally disappears”—permits present
speculation and intervention amidst uncertainty.57 By “retool[ing]... complexity and
make[ing] it temporarily usable within a particular human or technical frame,”58 such
labor marks out a present space for “modeling, managing, and facing a complex future
that is seemingly right at hand.”59
Horizoning bears affinities with “anticipatory modes,” in which “the future is
inhabited in the present.”60 Anticipation always involves movements across past, present,
and future that render the experienced and the unknown as the “unavoidable template”
for writing “histories of the future.”61 Where “anticipation” refers to affect-laden modes
of orientation toward to the future, “horizoning” captures the multi-layered labor that
takes place within and concretizes those modes.
In this dissertation, I use Petryna’s concept of “horizoning” to analyze the process
by which the sonographic image became a touchstone for prospective relatives’
reckonings with gendered potentiality. Despite the unpredictability of actual futures, the
compelling dichotomy emerging from SD permitted “coordinations of human action
amidst... physical and moral worlds... on edge.”62 Drawing on personal experiences and
understandings of the gender-kinship built up from the past and present, families
interpellated the gendered fetal subject as a particular kind of child, spouse, and
community member; inhabited potential marriage and descent trajectories in imagined
form; and accepted some persons and trajectories while rejecting others.
The core question for understanding familial “horizoning” within the moral
economy of gender-kinship becomes: who was the desired son, and who was the daughter
eliminated in his pursuit? In many prenatal diagnosis contexts, the combination of
informational ambiguity and disjunctures between medical and everyday knowledge
produces a situation in which parents must undertake considerable labor to imagine a
child’s future life; by contrast, the dichotomous gender classification emerging from SD
lent itself to ready application of over-determined stereotypes.63 Discussing sex
selection’s “phantasmatic future imaginaries,” Kumkum Sangari has argued:
The foetus... already has more than a biological sex. It is given a
corporeity, a gendered ‘fate,’ and a future that needs to be curtailed... It is
this positionality and... embodiment of gender, read as perennial
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disadvantage, that is sought to be eliminated. The unborn foetus comes to
be personified and feared: as the daughter to be brought up, educated and
‘given’ away, i.e., a unilateral expense or an investment without returns; a
claimant to property; a gendered reproductive body that has to be guarded
and policed...; the dowry-carrying bride; the insecure daughter-in-law
subject to ill-treatment or dowry harassment;... the ‘temporary’ member of
a family becoming a permanent conduit for marriage demands; and the
producer of expensive granddaughters and nieces.64
In my ethnographic observation, sonographically materialized fetal bodies did, indeed,
elicit these forceful constructions of daughter aversion, as well as obverse constructions
of son necessity. In what follows, I discuss how prospective relatives utilized such
socially given templates for seeing fetal images.
That templates were socially given does not mean they expressed a timeless
“tradition” of gender bias. Pervasive references to the jamāno reflect just how much
people understood their “horizoning” as situated within a particular historical present.
The imagined daughter of SD represented a distinctly modern problem—not just in
fertility-limitation terms, but in her very potentiality.
Families pursuing sex selection described “horizoning” around three themes: the
indispensability of a son, the cost of a daughter, and the care and emotional liability
attached to a daughter. Like the models of ecologists and emergency planners in
Petryna’s analysis, this tripartite model organized “work that reconfigure[d] pathways of
social inquiry, show[ed] the costs of inaction, and inform[ed] prospective thinking about..
[how to] reckon with complex futures.”65 Although people themselves often framed their
reasoning around the three broad themes according to neat divisions between
instrumental and affective motivations, all three categories thoroughly destabilized such a
distinction, braiding together ontological, economic, and emotional concerns.66
Moreover, the categories often blended into one another, as in the following fragmentary
glimpses of “horizoning.”
Five Glimpses of the Future
Early in my fieldwork, I discussed SD with a Rabari woman who had just given
birth to her first child—a girl—at Nandini. The woman explained why her sister-in-law
had unsuccessfully sought SD a few months earlier:
She figured, what’s the point of gathering a lot? Don’t the costs build up—
to educate them, feed them, clothe them? She felt it would be easier to
take care of just two. And what kind of jamāno is this? Aren’t there
incidents of girls eloping, getting kidnapped? That’s why she felt it’s more
possible to care for two.
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And even if you have to spend money to marry a son in our
community, he remains with us, right? A daughter goes to a pārku home
after marrying. But a son brings in a daughter-in-law, and they’ll care for
us, right? We need someone when we get old, no?
Describing third-person rationales that might become hers in the next pregnancy, the
woman highlighted a son’s indispensability for ontological continuity and elder care, the
costs of raising girls, and the dangers of protecting young women in modern times.
*
I learned more about configurations of continuity and care in the same Nandini
room several months later, from Esha-ben. When I spoke to her and Sagar-bhai together,
or to him alone, the emphasis tended to fall on the costs associated with too many girls,
and the hindrance they posed to aspiration toward a “better life.” When Sagar-bhai
stepped out to pick up medications, however, Esha-ben foregrounded different factors.
Explaining her prior selective abortion and recent SD, she said:
Ek chhokaro to joie, to perpetuate the lineage. With only girls, no boy, our
lineage would end, right? Our girls would be left alone. Because you exist,
Utpal-bhai, your sister can think to go to her brother’s house. In good
times and bad, a brother can support a sister.
And if we bring home too many girls, it becomes hard to take care
of them in this jamāno. This jamāno isn’t right—that’s why it’s
unappealing to have a girl. Otherwise, having her, raising her, all those
costs are not too much. But you have to take great care of her. Otherwise,
people kidnap her from her own home! So you’re constantly in tension...
Boys are easy. Girls—I mean, they’re still ours. Girls are no
difficulty. But taking care of them is difficult in this era. And we already
have one girl. So what’s the point of bringing home a lot? Once it gets to
one boy and one girl, that’s plenty for us.
Shaking her head, Esha-ben sounded weary as she ended: “Even keeping the one before,
we definitely would’ve had another, no?”
Complementing Sagar-bhai’s individual explanations, which emphasized cost,
Esha-ben emphasized the desirability of a boy to his parents and sisters, along with the
undesirability and dispensability of an additional daughter. Precisely because a daughter
was loved as one’s own and yet also always-already alienated, caring for her became a
constant threat—especially amid the danger of a “not right” jamāno.
*
Shortly thereafter, I sat in a Chetna general ward with a Patel woman from a
village near Patan, keeping her company while her husband placed calls informing
relatives of the impending abortion. Hugging her knees, she sobbed, “Right now, the
jamāno’s no good for taking care of girls—don’t you have to look at that? If it’s like this
now, how’ll it be in twenty years? And right now, how many costs are attached to girls?
All the costs—to educate her, all that. To get her taken out, the cost’s 20,000. And if you
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look at a girl, the cost’s 1,000,000!” While invoking the vague dangers of a “no good”
jamāno, the woman also explicitly expressed the cost weighing that remained implicit but
strongly present in so many cases. Her “horizoning” provided a “re-entry into the present
and a way toward the difficult necessity of making the future less remote”67 by bringing
the care and costs of the future daughter into the present—when the potential daughter
could still be eliminated.
*
Sometimes, cost and care appeared in a different form. The day after my
encounter with the sobbing Patel patient, I sat in the same ward with a family of six
Rajput women from near Gandhinagar. Two of them—wives of two brothers—were
simultaneously undergoing selective abortions of their second pregnancies.
The women sat on the cots of squatted on the ground, the younger ones pulling
their saris over their heads. A mournful quiet pervaded the room. Eventually, the patients’
aunt-in-law [kākiji] arched her eyebrows and broke the silence, turning to speak directly
to me: “You know how it is for us Rajputs. Girls mean death! You have to give so much:
lots of gold, lots of money! Then what’s left for your own son?”
The patients’ mother-in-law scoffed, “There’s no limit to the giving! At the very
least, twenty tolā68 gold—all at once! Then furniture, and this, and—“
A third woman chimed in, “Then it’s all good if our daughters end up happy. But if
the men don’t turn out the way you expected—all trouble! Then, the girl has to make do
wherever we’ve married her.”
“We don’t have even 100,00 for my daughter,” the first woman explained, “and
we can’t get her married! What can we do if we can’t buy even five-six tolā gold? We
just don’t have the means.”
Now, all three women spoke animatedly, often overlapping.
“And in other castes, if it’s bad, you can get a divorce—if the in-laws are bad, the
girl won’t stay!”
“Hm! And among us Rajputs, you can’t get a divorce.”
“That’s the problem, isn’t it?”
“So much trouble.”
“You have to look very carefully—is the boy good or not?”
“You have to look for a good family.”
Embedded in a social world of lavish dowry and pervasive dowry demands, the
Rajput women emphasized marriage-related costs, rather than costs of upbringing, as a
chief danger of too many girls. And unlike the Patan-area patient, Esha-ben, or the Rabari
woman, they invoked care and its ensuing emotional liabilities with a different focus: the
possibility of choosing the wrong sāsri for one’s daughter and subsequently being forced
to witness her enduring unhappiness.
*
Around the same time, I gained further perspective on the problem of care in the
present jamāno while sipping cha with Chandrika-ben’s husband Hemu-bhai. Leaning
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back in a plastic lounge chair set against the counter of his modest shop, he explained the
couple’s reasoning in choosing selective abortion during their prior pregnancy, just a year
after tragically losing a newborn boy due to Dr. Dilip’s insistence on premature
Caesarean.
“It’s not reasonable to gather too many girls,” he began. “On social occasions,
you have to spend money for her. And there are so many costs associated with feeding
and educating them. Then she becomes pārki. If you educate a son, prepare him, the
benefit accrues to you, right? You can educate a girl, but she’s destined to go to a pārku
household.” It was a familiar refrain: the daughter and her labor as inevitably
expropriated, leaving the parents with nothing except past expenditures and future
liabilities.
But then, Hemu-bhai pivoted to explicit “horizoning”69 regarding dangerous
female sexuality:
And in the current jamāno there’s a lot of risk if you gather three-four
girls. To take care of so many—it’s very difficult. In these bad times, it’s
tough to tend to them. You know how many incidents [kissā] of rape there
are in today’s era! Men get desperate and start that funny business! And
then some girls run away with boys from inferior castes. If a girl’s in
school, you have to keep constant vigilance on her. A father has no
peace—where she is, who she’s with, whether she could get raped, all this.
If she goes anywhere without asking or elopes outside the caste, our
honor’s gone, right? And if she jumps into it blindly, if they aren’t
prosperous, then she’ll be unhappy.
As a father of two teenage girls, Hemu-bhai had already begun living the future he was
horizoning, keeping a close watch on the dangerous daughters. For parents, rape,
conjugal infelicity, romantic dalliances, and elopment—all drastically different
experiences from a woman’s first-person perspective—occupied the same space of
anxiety, which was shaped by marriage practices, community prestige norms, and the
menacing jamāno.
The Indispensable Son
The elimination of a daughter-to-be always rested on the impossibility of her
fulfilling a son’s social roles—even if only implicitly, as in the comments from Hemubhai, the Rajput women, and the Patan-area patient.70 People contrasted the potential
girl—always-already pārki—with the potential boy, who would support his parents to
their deaths and secure enduring social recognition.
Popular and scholarly analyses of “son preference” and sex selection often
emphasize the ritual-symbolic importance of male offspring, with “carrying on the
name,” “lighting the funeral pyre,” “inheriting property,” and the like construed as quasiautonomous determinative forces. Some accounts tie such factors to a discriminatory
69
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“mindset” or “mentality,” while others leave the connection tacit. Either way, the ritual
and symbolic significance of a son becomes an arbitrary cultural feature, rooted in mental
dispositions that value lineage propagation, material inheritance, and fulfillment of ritual
obligations.
Such accounts of gender bias miss how isolable “cultural” practices reflect a
much larger economy for distribution of ontological significance and social security
according to offspring sex. For every family that imagined a future son performing last
rights, inheriting property, or soliciting and updating a genealogy with the local Barot, I
encountered dozens who scoffed at such notions. Several couples literally burst out
laughing when I asked about funerary rites as motivations, with at least one spouse
always asking the same incredulous question: “Who looks at all that after we’re dead?”
For most people, a boy’s symbolic roles indexed his centrality in social recognition and
material support. Given the out-marriage of daughters, a sonless household would
disappear upon the parents’ death. Sonlessness subjected parents not only to pity, but to
an existence in which their future erasure from the community was already palpably
present. When people like Esha-ben invoked notions like “lineage” or “heir,” they
generally spoke not about genealogy or property per se, but about establishing enduring
forms of belonging—avoiding oblivion both before and after death.
In “horizoning”71 around a son-to-be, the chief economic consideration was not
inheritance, but the flow of support from children to aged parents. Tightly cinching
together ontology, economics, and affectivity, normative residential patterns made the
son and daughter-in-law’s domestic and extra-domestic labor the assumed bases of social
security. One of the verbs used to describe old age care—sāchavvu—was the same one
used to describe care, policing, and protection of unmarried daughters, pointing to a
transitivity within the moral-economy of gender-kinship; vectors of care ran from parents
to girls, from women to their husband’s parents, and from the husband’s parents to their
girls, with care of a daughter (unlike that of a son) never directly reciprocated, but always
paid forward as an externality.72 Because the economy allocated women’s human capital
and labor to the sāsri, it left even highly educated, working women feeling helpless.
Teachers, lawyers, bureaucrats, and other professional women explained their avid desire
for a boy by pointing to how separation prevented them from financially supporting or
physically caring for their parents. The dependability of the system, which normatively
ensured support to any couple with at least one son, rested on the requirement that
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daughters invariably serve her in-laws, regardless of how much parents invested in them.
A son thus guaranteed parents the ability to appropriate others’ reproductive labor.
Couples pursuing a son envisioned a profoundly uncertain future if their quest
failed. Some—usually Thakors, Rabaris, and Chaudharys—said they would fall back on
bequeathing property to agnatic nephews in exchange for support in old age. But most
dismissed the possibility as undesirable, citing either the undependability of nephews’
wives or the rising tendency to leave inheritance to daughters and sons-in-law with the
weakening of joint householding.
Some suggested that property could entice a son-in-law to move into his sāsri,
which would allow him and the daughter to provide care. But as in many Indian settings,
the uxorilocally residing man—the ghar-jamāi—was a man out-of-place, a figure of
derision and untrustworthiness.73 One Chetna patient, relieved at a “male” SD result after
a decade of arduous fertility treatment, told me, “All this will change only when the
marriage system changes. My daughter may want to care for me, but I won’t find a sonin-law like that. And even if I do, society won’t accept it. Why would my daughter’s inlaws let her stay with me? Why would they want their son to go to his sāsri?” Hemu-bhai
was even more blunt, suggesting that only the “bad”—greedy, poor, men of questionable
character—would consider leaving “their own home” to become ghar-jamāis; only
parents who had married their girls unforgivably badly, into desperation and downward
mobility, could turn to daughters and sons-in-law. Future material support from a
daughter and son-in-law was considered structurally implausible, morally shameful, and
ultimately impossible to predict with certainty. Consequently, depending on daughters in
lieu of a son became difficult to imagine, especially when undertaking mere “increments
of action” in the face of “multidimensional uncertainties”74 regarding how personal and
social circumstances might change.
A third alternative haunted the imagination of sonless couples. I perceived a
widespread moral panic centered on the specter of the ghardā-ghar, or “old age home.”
Although none of the sex selection clients I encountered could name any acquaintances in
ghardā-ghars, many highlighted them as concrete symbols of son necessity.75 They
pointed to the figure of the abandoned, isolated elder as a warning regarding the
importance of a boy for securing material support and social belonging.
Prospective parents’ meditations on son necessity also reached beyond their own
deaths, to existing daughters’ later lives. Many told me, “We want a boy not for
ourselves, but for these girls.” They echoed Esha-ben in emphasizing the importance of a
brother for sisters. Sonless households “closed” after a couple’s passing, leaving
daughters without a tangible natal source of emotional and material support. Released
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into society, brotherless women eventually lost their tangible point of attachment in the
piyar, leaving them adrift as perpetual outsiders in the sāsri. The notion that existing girls
necessitated production of a boy uniquely highlights not only son compulsion, but also
the extent to which daughters appeared as burdens of cost and care.
The Burdensome Daughter
Against the son as a necessary anchor of social security and social recognition,
couples pursuing SD usually spoke of the additional daughter as representing an
unnecessary burden of intertwined cost and care. Like the tearful Patan-area patient,
people often weighed the cost of sex selection against the tremendous financial costs and
taxing care entailed by a lifelong relationship with another potential daughter.
The acts of care involved in raising a daughter—birthing, clothing, feeding,
providing constant supervision, indulging, and educating—were also acts of economic
expenditure. Ishwar-bhai, whose lamentation regarding the costs of sex selection I
presented in Chapter 1, commented to me as we stepped out from Chetna to buy apples
for his hungry younger daughter:
For middle-class people like us without too much financial capacity—
maybe just laboring, or even if salaried—imagine they end up with three
girls before having a boy, like if we had kept this one. So it’s four kids?
And the man himself, and his wife, so six people? Now the amount needed
to support them will be more than his daily income... So he’ll go into debt.
Girls prove burdensome because of this.
And no matter how much I educate my daughter, I won’t have any
expectation of her earning till she reaches maturity. Once she starts
earning, it’ll all go to her sāsri! So this is why another girl was
burdensome to us.
Ishwar-bhai went on to explain how he was losing considerable money because of failed
investments and ongoing family medical debt. He and his wife Nayna-ben had interpreted
their scan result in light of ongoing financial difficulties; the necessary son might
override such difficulties, but yet another daughter could only exacerbate them. Whereas
investments in a boy brought direct benefits because of his retention within the
patrilineage and household, expenditures on a girl represented lost labor; her income and
domestic labor would generally benefit her sāsri. Because the reproductive economy
required alienation of daughters, each additional girl detracted from investment in or
endowment for the inevitable son.
In discussing costs, people like Ishwar-bhai often tied together monghvāri,
jamāno, rising education, and the problem of “gathering” too many girls, thereby
situating daughter aversion within a particular economic moment. Cost-of-living
increases, consumption aspirations, delayed marriage, and rising educational expenses
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made daughters seem particularly threatening to household flourishing.76 More than ever
before, investment in girls represented a unidirectional drain from the piyar to the sāsri.
Just as educational fees recurred as the most prominent pre-marital cost of
imagined girls, marriage expenditures and associated gifting also weighed heavily on
prospective parents. Gaurav-bhai, the father of three daughters, explained:
In this jamāno, the monghvāri’s really increased. Not just cost of
schooling; in a middle-class family, it’s hard to manage wedding costs for
three-four girls. You look at any well-off community, and marrying one
girl in good fashion requires a minimum of 800,000. With community
expectations, you have to give a certain amount of gold—you have to stay
according to your status, right?
Though wedding costs varied considerably by caste and class, sex selection clients from
diverse backgrounds shared a sense that they outstripped familial capacity to spend. Poor
laboring families might spend as little as 50,000 rupees on a simple ceremony and
communal meal at home—still more than a year’s income, and almost triple what Dr.
Ranjit charged for SD and selective abortion. I also knew of weddings for which
Mahesana-area families spent over 10,000,000 meeting and exceeding “community
expectations.” Between these two poles, most Chetna clients saw peer families spending
between 500,000 and 1,000,000 rupees. Like education, wedding expenditure garnered a
daughter’s parents some social recognition, but always at tremendous cost.
As indicated by Gaurav-bhai’s comment, prospective parents “horizoned”77
wedding costs from a present of already-rampant monghvāri. The wedding-commercial
complex’s efflorescence in North Gujarat and elsewhere was embedded in post-1990
market liberalization. The generation pursuing sex selection in the mid-2010s was old
enough to recall the rise of full-blown consumer culture—including rapidly escalating
wedding-related ostentation—and to incorporate that history into anxiety regarding the
future.78
76

Cf. John et al. 2008: 74-76.
Petryna 2015, 2016, book ms.
78
Since the 1990s, numerous sub-caste organizations have attempted to stem ruinous wedding outlays by
organizing and promoting joint weddings, in which multiple couples marry at the same time with
sponsorship from community donations. Activists and community leaders have heralded joint weddings as
mitigators of pressures for selective reproduction, often celebrating them as direct responses to the
problem.78 In fact, a number of couples pursuing sex selection assured me, “Just watch—bhrunhatyā will
decrease because of joint weddings.” While I admire the undertaking, three reasons make me skeptical of
its specific impact on SD and sex-selective abortion. First, the rise of joint weddings in the 1990s, before
sex selection’s ascendance to crisis-status in the public imaginary, reveals them as pressure-release valves
created to help lower-middle-class and downwardly mobile families cope with sudden post-liberalization
rises in prices and extravagance; as such, they were generally already be “priced-in” to families’ horizoning
around future wedding costs. Second, joint weddings have succeeded unevenly, with a certain degree of
normative participation in some communities juxtaposed with an ongoing sense of their connoting
economic weakness and inferiority. Finally, and most importantly, the discrete joint wedding intervention
may have limited impact on selective reproduction because of the practice’s over-determination within the
local moral economy. Numerous couples lauded joint weddings while still pursuing SD, citing the costs and
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Furthermore, prospective parents did not worry only about wedding costs per se,
but also about the obligation to give ritual gifts at marriage and throughout the daughter’s
lifetime. Rajputs such as the above-cited women emphasized “how much we have to
give,” along with the possibility of explicit demands from a daughter’s sāsri, to a unique
extent. Though not granting the factor primacy, sex selection clients from other caste
groups also mentioned the normative expectation that parents would give daughters
substantial endowments of gold, jewelry, and other goods upon marriage. No one (even
among Rajputs) referred to such endowments as dahej [“dowry”], since they knew the
term connoted backwardness and illegality. Instead, marital and post-marital gifting
consistently fell under the euphemism vahevār—“social intercourse,” with a distinctly
transactional flavor. Whenever I let slip the term dahej, families corrected me,
substituting the term that linguistically figured gifts as materializations of social
relations—between parents and daughters, between parents and parents-in-law, and
between parents and the community that granted them status and recognition. Families
pursuing sex selection often portrayed vahevār as an act of love and care for a daughter,
noting that people gave according to their “capacity” or “will”; the compatibility implied
by people’s frequent invocation of ability and desire in the same statement undercut the
fact that the latter almost always outstripped the former. Because marriage gifting offered
a unique opportunity for reinforcing and enhancing social prestige, prospective parents
embraced it as an institution and thereby rejected its specific embodiment in yet another
girl.
In “horizoning”79 around daughters-to-be, families recognized marriage as not the
end of vahevār, but merely its beginning. Observing that gifts would have to continue “as
long as she lives,” couples listed off the various “social occasions” to which Hemu-bhai
alluded: childbirth, every parental visit to the sāsri, every daughterly visit to the piyar,
children’s marriages, and even the daughter’s own funeral, for which her piyar provided
the shroud. The māmeru, or gifting on the occasion of a daughter’s children’s marriages,
figured especially prominently, since its costs could approach those of marrying one’s
own child—between 100,000 and 1,000,000 rupees for a middle-class family. People
noted how such costs could weigh down the eventual son, who would retain less for “our
own” household (including, of course, the aged parents). In other words, the burden of
too many daughters echoed intergenerationally. Patients sometimes gestured toward
sisters or sisters-in-law in explaining their pursuit of sex selection, tying first-hand
experience within a multi-daughter piyar or sāsri to horizoning regarding how one’s own
daughters might hamper a son’s economic stability and upward mobility. “The brother
with many sisters,” several told me, “can never rise up.” Some referenced the widely
accepted fact that men with multiple sisters often encountered greater difficulties in
finding “good” in-laws and often had to settle for wives from poorer, lower-status
families with limited capacity to enrich him with extensive vahevār.

care of girls alongside son necessity; this suggests the extent to which adjusting a specific element of
imagined kinship futures might exert little effect on overall horizoning.
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The danger potential daughters posed to the inevitable son’s prosperity also
extended to the ultimate inter-generational transfer: inheritance.80 While families
generally agreed that “in our community, good girls still take what is given and don’t ask
for their share,” they also acknowledged that “nobody can say in today’s jamāno.” In the
views of sex selection clients, patrilineal property bequeathal remained largely untouched
by legal provisions for female inheritance, but each additional daughter still represented a
threat to the patrimony, especially since scheming conjugal relatives could harass her into
making claims. Even if a daughter forsook inheritance, however, her mere existence—
and the normative vahevār it entailed—represented real encroachments on household
endowments.
Families viewed vahevār not only as a parental status-enhancer, but also as an act
of care. Some noted that money, gold, or jewelry from marriage gifts provided security
against a bad husband or financial hardship (though a woman’s ability to leverage such
security depended on whether she retained control over the assets). Many more observed
that substantial gifts secured the daughter respect within a pārku household. Bhanu-bhai,
whose wife had undergone three selective abortions, explained:
If we give our girl stuff, she’ll receive a warm welcome. In her sāsri,
they’ll feel, ‘Okay, her father’s given this much.’ If we give her less, then
there’s going to be bickering. If two plates remain side by side, they’re
bound to clang, right? Her mother-in-law can say things, taunt her—‘What
did you bring from your piyar?!’
A glance at vernacular newspapers corroborated Bhanu-bhai’s account, revealing how
conjugal dissatisfaction with level of vahevār could lead to a daughter’s separation,
divorce, or even suicide.
Vahevār’s role in securing conjugal felicity pointed to a broader dynamic that
overlapped with cost as a driver of sex selection: the burden of care and lifelong
emotional liability. Far from being mere objects of exchange, daughters were intimately
related human beings that required care. Caring for girls, in turn, led to caring about
them, which produced feelings of helplessness and anxiety within a system mandating
their alienation. Until marriage, parents cared for girls and policed their bodies;
afterward, they dealt with the fallout of radical rupture, including the ever-present
possibility of having to witness suffering without the ability to intervene.
Like the Rajput family, many clients justified sex selection by reference to the
unpredictability of a daughter’s conjugal future. “Who knows how her husband, her
sāsri, will turn out?” they asked. “It’s a matter of luck. But if she’s unhappy, we’ll have
to keep seeing it forever.” Unspoken but widely understood in most families’
“horizoning”81 was the fact that marriage involved a degree of normative suffering for
women, forced to uproot themselves from the piyar and enter an alien and often-hostile
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sāsri. Even without spectacular incidents of harassment or other violence, a daughter-inlaw’s position was one of subjugation, and the ordinary tension of “two plates clanging
together,” as people called conflict with the mother-in-law, pulled disproportionately on
younger women and their parents. As an old Gujarati saying went, fathers of daughters
had to always remain bowed.
Moreover, in a jamāno supposedly full of “bad boys” and indulgence in vice—
alcoholism, gambling, sexual dalliances—one could hardly guarantee that daughters’
suffering would be limited to the socially normative. People cited numerous kissā [cases,
incidents] from everyday experience and media accounts to underscore their fears
regarding the future emotional liability wrapped up in a female fetus’s potentiality: the
acquaintance who immolated herself after her husband wagered her when gambling; the
cousin “sent back” from sāsri to piyar, with stigma attached to both woman and parents;
or the neighbor who barely supported her two children with hard labor after her husband
absconded and the in-laws cast her out. References to such incidents highlighted the
disadvantages imposed on women and their parents by arrangements that centered both
social recognition and household economy on husbands and fathers.
In addition to instances of conjugal misery, people also included in kissā the
various misfortunes that might befall parents before their daughters’ marriages. In this
context, “taking care of” daughters largely meant monitoring, protecting, and controlling
their nascent sexuality. As Esha-ben and Hemu-bhai indicated, pre-marital kissā included
kidnapping, rape, and other violence done unto the girl; families’ reference to this danger
often invoked the 2012 Nirbhaya gang rape in Delhi and other similar instances to
underscore the sense of a “bad jamāno.” But as Hemu-bhai and the Rabari patient’s
juxtaposition of violence and elopement suggests, the dangers of care also encompassed
instances of daughters, as independently willing persons, pursuing their own wishes to
the detriment of familial status.82 Whereas sons’ dalliances rarely attracted opprobrium,
daughters’ affairs or elopements could prove catastrophic for parents, sometimes driving
them to shift residence or withdraw from the community in order to avoid stigma. People
also cited the changing jamāno in this respect, noting that later marriage and increasing
women’s education—worthy developments in themselves—made school- and collegegoing girls weightier burdens on their parents. Given that many girls aspired to and
crafted new middle-class femininities through consumption and romantic involvement,
public spaces became threats to female chastity, in turn making girls threats to familial
status.83 Additional girls multiplied parents’ anxieties around “taking care of so many” in
order to “make sure they don’t do bad things.”
Two threads ran through people’s reflections on care: an anxiety regarding loss of
control and a sense of contemporary boys (and perhaps girls) as particularly
untrustworthy. A line I heard frequently from sex selection—“The boys in this jamāno
are no good, so no one wants to have girls”—pithily captured the structurally and
symbolically violent dynamics that made caring for and about daughters such a burden.
By making parents caretakers of an inevitably to-be-alienated daughter, the exchange
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system subjected them to the violence of expropriation. A dynamic of euphemization and
displacement resulted, with kissā synecdochically standing in for the larger fears of
parents facing uncertainty about a daughter’s premarital behavior and post-marital
suffering. Marriage principles themselves generally lay outside the domain of explicit
interrogation and challenge, with people upholding them as “our tradition,” “our Indian
culture”; consequently the normative, barely-submerged violence of the structure became
displaced onto some of its downstream manifestations. The liabilities imposed by
patrilineality, patrivirilocality, and “today’s boys” became inscribed upon women’s
bodies. In an exemplary enactment of symbolically violent patriarchy, the future effects
of masculine domination drove parents to reject potential girls in the present. The socially
threatened future daughter became the familially threatening future daughter—and hence,
through the work of “horizoning,”84 a clinically threatened female fetus.
In the act of sex-selective abortion, families rejected the valorized (and
subordinated) role of conservatorship, taking full possession of otherwise pārki
daughters-to-be by preventing them from coming into existence.85 Such appropriation
appeared to many as the only solution, given the expropriation to which the moraleconomic structure otherwise subjected their reproductive labor as congealed in
daughters. Families thus became the intimate administrators of a gendered violence with
community- and society-wide roots, one that was visited upon female bodies before they
even came into full being. While rarely calling into question the marriage and descent
principles that organized the system, prospective parents often spoke in anguished tones
about feeling “forced” or “without any other choice” in their undertaking of sex
selection.86 It was, as many reiterated, a necessary sin.
The Chaudhary Paradox
During my fieldwork, several sociologists familiar with the Mahesana region
asked me the some question: “But why do the Chaudharys have a skewed sex ratio?” As
they pointed out, the community presented a seeming paradox. Chaudharys practiced
direct exchange marriage between kin groups, making daughters necessary to secure
daughters-in-law for one’s own patriline. Inverting the formal or de facto dowry practices
prevailing in many other communities, Chaudharys required payment of up to 1,000,000
rupees in brideprice by wife-takers who could not offer a bride in exchange. And, as one
scholar put it, “the father of a daughter is a respected position within that community.”
My observations among Mahesana-area families corroborated these elements of
the apparent paradox. Reciprocal exchange made Chaudhary affines equals, eliminating
the need for a wife-giver to “keep his head bowed.” Juxtaposing their own vahevār
against the brideprice bustom, Rajputs and Patels often sardonically observed that
Chaudharys “don’t do like us, because girls are blank checks for them!” Community
members themselves highlighted the same contrast in a positive light, often noting, “Girls
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are welcome in our community!... We don’t have dowry, like the others... So girls are no
burden to us.”
Yet the fact was that Chaudharys also pursued female-selective abortion with
great frequency. Observations at Chetna, conversations with clinicians and families, and
caste statistics confirmed the pattern as evident. Many families enacted the paradox rather
literally, professing greater acceptance of girls even in the midst of undergoing SD or
aborting daughters-to-be. What, then, should we make of the Chaudhary paradox—of a
community understood by itself and others to more readily accept girls that nonetheless
rejected them with regularity?
The puzzle highlights the over-determination of gendered futures that I have
attempted to convey throughout this chapter. Selective reproduction emerged from the
conjunction of daughter alienation, son retention, affinal power dynamics, social
recognition norms, social security expectations, diverse childrearing costs, perceived
burdens of care, and falling fertility. Removal of dowry and affinal inequality from the
range of considerations did not alter the fundamental patrilineal, patrivirilocal kinship
parameters or most of their downstream manifestations. These features, shared by
Chaudharys and other local communities, still made one boy indispensable and more than
one girl burdensome. In positing greater “acceptance,” Chaudharys and non-Chaudharys
recirculated discourses that monocausally ascribed sex selection to the “backward” or
“traditional” practices of dowry and hypergamy. But parents of every caste community
normatively relied on sons for elder care and social recognition. Regardless of the
specific form of marriage exchange or the net flow of associated gifts, daughters always
posed threats to a family’s integrity, reputation, and material wellbeing through their
separation, sexuality, and ongoing costs (including post-marital vahevār).
Chaudhary resort to female-selective abortion revealed the shared substrate of
kinship norms and practices that structured gender inequality. Even the construction of a
woman’s father as a respected figure indexes this inequality. Chaudhary fathers remained
unbowed because reciprocal marriage exchanges created a mutual hostage situation, with
in-laws wielding equal power over one another’s daughters. Though wife-givers avoided
inferiority by simultaneously becoming wife-takers, wives themselves continued to
occupy subordinate positions within households.
Modern social transformations had significantly eroded the mutual hostage-taking
dynamic and other potential mitigators of daughter-associated liabilities within the
Chaudhary community. In a process of Sanskritization, many prospective parents aspired
to give their daughters in marriage without accepting brideprice or a daughter-in-law in
exchange—as a “true” gift.87 Among families that continued to imagine direct exchange
marriages for their children, the social breadth of such exchanges had narrowed from all
the children of an extended family or even village to much smaller groups—first cousins,
or even just siblings; in conjunction with falling fertility, this contracture reduced the
value of additional girls, who were superfluous for the purpose of marrying the inevitable
(and usually sole) son. More generally, Chaudharys partook of the same fertility trends as
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other groups, with each child requiring higher investment and each girl beyond the first
hampering the son’s (and hence the household’s) prospects for advancement.
To be sure, Chaudharys’ distinctive marriage practices did produce a partially
distinctive pattern of selective reproduction. Much as in other communities, families with
firstborn daughters typically practiced female-selective abortion if a second or third
pregnancy was recognized as “female.” But in a stark divergence from other castes,
families with two sons sometimes pursued male-selective abortion.88 Chaudhary couples
with multiple sons used the otherwise-rare practice as part of a fertility strategy aimed at
producing a daughter who could secure daughters-in-law—especially when poverty made
payment of brideprice a non-possibility. One woman I knew underwent four consecutive
male-selective abortions in the ultimately fruitless pursuit of a sister for her two sons.
But such cases were exceptions set against the shared backdrop of femaleselective abortion. Clinicians and community members agreed that even among
Chaudharys, a vast majority of selective reproduction was aimed at producing a boy.
Although the group’s brideprice and direct exchange practices mildly attenuated the
pressure for daughter avoidance and even generated son avoidance pressures in
exceptional circumstances, the general tendency remained one of son necessity and
daughter aversion. Far from being paradoxical, female-selective abortion among
Chaudharys vividly illustrated the over-determination of son necessity and daughter by
moral-economic structures common to all local caste communities.

Ambivalence, Uncertainty, and the Imposition of Gender
While over-determined, gender-kinship futures hardly formed a seamless whole.
In a psychoanalytic examination of sex selection in Vietnam,89 Tine Gammeltoft has
argued for seeing the phenomenon as an expression of personal and social ambivalence
toward daughters. In her view, positive attitudes and experiences in relation to daughters
stand in tension with the fantasy of patriliny—an “instituted fantasy” that orders reality,
repressing other possibilities for familial attachment and thereby encouraging selective
reproduction.90 In this concluding section, I examine ambivalences, uncertainties, and
alternative possibilities—both expressed and submerged—within Mahesana’s moral
economy of gender-kinship. I consider what they reveal about not only the kinship
structure, but also the fragility of gender itself.
In Petryna’s analysis of ecological “horizoning,” the “superimposition of
imprecise forecasting on actual events suggests that there are limits of actuarial
performances of risk.”91 Similarly, examination of familial horizoning around gendered
potentiality reveals how they could ultimately access “only imagined futures,” full of
“paradoxes and contradictions.”92 Unpredictability and equivocality constantly troubled
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horizoning work. For instance, people often said, “This is the jamāno now, but who
knows what it’ll be like in twenty years?” Some ventured that it might be a “girl’s
jamāno,” while others insisted that it would be “so much worse for women.” People
shared a sense of fast-paced and unpredictable transformations in gender-kinship
regularities, including maturation of a small-family model, declines in joint family living,
weakening of marriages, higher education for young women, work participation by
women in unprecedented numbers, shifts in elders’ authority vis-a-vis younger
generations, and increasing uncertainty regarding the dependability of sons for support in
old age. Yet the sense of uncertainty could entrench or feed sentiments of son necessity
and daughter aversion just as easily as it could undermine them.
Couples seeking to avoid daughters expressed many positive feelings toward
girls—both their own and in general. Some cited classic gendered tropes of symbolic
valorization, claiming that “Lakshmis” brought household prosperity, guaranteed good
fortune, or embodied sanskār [manners, good culture]. Others emphasized how “warm”
daughters cared about parents more than “cold” sons—even if separation prevented them
from always acting on their affection. More specifically, couples’ love and admiration for
existing daughters manifested concretely in their behavior on trips to Chetna for SD and
selective abortion. They bragged about girls’ school results and intelligence; called home
repeatedly to check on them; hugged, kissed, held, squeezed, and otherwise demonstrated
embodied affection toward them; and rushed home despite discomfort to reunite with
them. For many families, young girls remained the center of attention, activity, and cheer
during the otherwise-grim proceedings of rejecting a future girl.
In discussing their “horizoning work,”93 couples also acknowledged
unpredictability regarding daughters-to-be, given the rapidly changing jamāno. As noted,
many said, “Who knows how it’ll be in twenty years? Perhaps it’ll be a girls’ jamāno!”
They characterized young women as smart, advancing, and capable of attaining
tremendous personal and professional success.
Against the possible success of the imagined daughter, prospective parents
contrasted “the bad sons and daughters-in-law of today.”94 In a splitting of ambivalent
feelings across two differently related bodies, couples characterized daughters-in-law as
necessary but uncaring, and daughters as loving but socially restricted from providing
care. The women’s education and advancement that made the future so promising for
daughters took on a negative valence, with highly educated, spoiled daughters-in-law
behaving “boldly,” “arrogantly,” and without regard for their prescribed obligations.
“You can’t trust sons and daughters-in-law in this jamāno,” people told me. “They put
their parents in ghardā-ghars!” Even short of institutionalization, many warned,
daughters-in-law might insist on separating from in-laws and providing them only
minimal care. The very transformations that made parents more hopeful regarding
daughters’ prospects for autonomy made them fearful of abandonment and suffering.
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In such reflections, sons sometimes appeared alongside daughters-in-law as dutyshirkers, willing to go along with anything due to “wife-craziness.” Some people also
commented on the possibility of a son poisoning his ontological role, bringing shame—
negative recognition—to his parents and patriline through vicious behavior.
Enunciations of alternate futures—the powerful daughter, the wastrel son, the
faithless daughter-in-law—in fact expressed ambivalences built into gender-kinship
structure. Although couples recognized the inherent tensions at play, they could not
resolve such tensions by choosing to have more daughters, or by foregoing the necessary
son. The system’s dominant parameters remained unchanged, and outside their personal
control.
To be sure, some Mahesana-area couples did voluntarily cease childbearing with
just one or two daughters. Although statistical evidence on this is difficult to procure, my
observation and others’ opinions are in agreement that such couples largely came from
affluent backgrounds, often with cosmopolitan professional and social networks.
Although these characteristics were neither necessary nor sufficient for satisfaction with
only daughters, they widened the scope for imagining a future in which social recognition
and social security did not depend on a son. Many community leaders admitted they had
to disproportionately rely on such families when organizing Beti Bachāvo-related
functions centered on felicitating families with only girls, leading to a situation in which,
as one put it, “the audience people receive an example, though they may not see their own
situation in it.” Government functions also included public honoring of (generally poor)
women who had undergone tubal ligation with only daughters; after one such program,
an official intimated to me, “We can always find one-two like that in the district—maybe
those whose bodies can’t handle having more kids. But it’s hard, especially because
people don’t want to have it declared in public, ‘Oh, this woman will never have a son.’”
As the government officer’s comment might suggest, people more often than not
resolved ambivalence regarding children-to-be by reimposing the instituted fantasy of
kinship on the future and continuing son pursuit. Even in times of unpredictability, the
fantasy interpellated daughters as lost labor, and sons as normative continuity and
support. “You can’t say for sure,” many sex selection clients told me, “but with a boy, at
least you can hope, no? You can’t keep any expectations of daughters and sons-in-law.”
In a pair of studies, Mattias Larsen and colleagues have highlighted a parental
tendency to paradoxically “fall back” on normative arrangements (and hence select for
and heavily invest in sons) amid the uncertainties of economic liberalization and rapidly
changing gender norms.95 Applying Gammeltoft’s insight, one could interpret such
“falling back” as an act of repressing ambivalences and submerged alternatives in favor
of the perhaps illusory certainties of normative kinship arrangements. Where Gammeltoft
has emphasized community-level “reproductive intimidation” as a regulatory mechanism
for ironing out ambivalences, I propose that we may also find repression in the very
personal acts of reasoning around sex selection. Families intimately enacted the instituted
fantasy of kinship through their selective reproduction practices, pushing aside
uncertainties in favor of the default pathway. In doing so, they materialized the
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patriarchy’s ideological reality, imposing son-associated social recognition and social
security as structuring principles atop the irreducible fragility of human existence.
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Figure 2 - Child Sex Ratio and Total Fertility Rate, 1981-2011

Source: CSR from Census of India; TFR from Sample Registration System
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Table 4 – Sex Ratio of Births in Three Mahesana-Area Villages (Early-2000s Survey)

Source: L. Visaria 2007b: 148-149

Chapter 3: The Clinical Practice of Sex Selection
Seeing Inside the Black Box
I woke up to twittering sparrows and warm light in the window—the same
window through which we had stared during the interminable wait for Asha-ben’s
abortion.
A bang on the door. I sat up groggily on the cot where Asha-ben had lay a week
earlier. The “night halt” Dr. Ranjit had stipulated as a condition of further engagement
was complete.
Now, in the daylight, I could see drops of dried blood on the ground. I shuffled
into the bathroom, which smelled heavily of feces and urine, and splashed water on my
face. The drainage from the sink fell straight onto the floor. Throwing on a fresh shirt, I
stepped out to the hallway.
A nurse greeted me with a smile. We walked to the procedure room, where a
patient was waiting for Dr. Ranjit. Two or three mice scurried across the floor, passing
under the table where the woman lay. The nurse pointed them out for my benefit and
chuckled. The woman glanced from side to side, sighing heavily and inspiring sharply.
She was waiting for Dr. Ranjit. The previous evening, he had given her the dreaded news:
“It’s a girl.”
Turning around, I took in the waiting room. A dozen young women and their
accompanying relatives were already sitting on the benches or spilling out onto the patio.
At least five girls, ranging from toddlers to elementary schoolers, fidgeted in their
parents’ laps, or ran around the waiting room and patio yelling boisterously. I did not see
a single boy.
Dr. Ranjit arrived at the clinic. A nurse injected a sedative and short-acting
anesthetic into a vein in the patient’s left arm. Donning an apron and gloves, the doctor
took his seat on a stool in the procedure room. As he performed the abortion—a matter of
a few minutes—his face twitched, sometimes hardening into a scowl. The patient did not
stir or let out a sound.
I found myself looking back and forth from the patient’s face to Dr. Ranjit, from
the emerging bodily matter to the nurses holding down the patient’s limp arms and legs.
As with Asha-ben’s abortion, I felt a tightness in my throat and chest, but also a
puzzlement at my sense of discomfort. The procedure itself was no different from what I
had observed on scores of occasions during medical training and fieldwork. And yet,
knowledge of the intention behind it threw me into moral equivocation.
I silently stewed over questions I would revisit again and again over the course of
my observation at Chetna Clinic: How, materially, had this particular fetus become an
eliminable daughter-to-be? What clinical uncertainties and risks were the patient and Dr.
Ranjit navigating in that procedure room, and in that everyday procedure? And what
alternatives might have been possible, if only...?
*
160

161

Clinical action subjected fetal matter to the moral economy of gender-kinship
described in Chapter 2. Gender-kinship norms impelled families to solicit sex
determination (SD) scans, in which ultrasound technology and expert sight interacted to
visualize the fetal body. Alchemic materialization transformed the image into a body, a
genital region, a sex, a gender, and an imagined kinship future. Sonographic recognition
of the fetus’s gendered potentiality both presumed and enabled further biomedical
intervention on the inchoate subject: selective abortion of daughters-to-be, selective
nurturance of sons-to-be. Within the governance-shaped black market outlined in Chapter
1, specific biomedical practices revealed, concealed, and disappeared the gendered fetal
subject.
Sonography made visible a threshold person—recognizable, but still eliminable.
Ethnographers have highlighted ultrasound technology’s double-edged character: it
personifies incipient life through concretizing specification, but the fetal particulars
thereby produced always have the potential to imperil the emerging person’s continued
existence.1 This paradox—heightened personhood, heightened contingency—obtains
because the ultrasound fetus is “available for public viewing and commentary at a much
earlier stage than [otherwise].”2 Through biomedical visualization and familial
interpellation, the potential child becomes “a social actor with a distinctive identity—‘the
baby’—enmeshed in a social network of kin.”3
Qualitative clinical research across the world has generated what we might call
“technology-near” accounts of experiences with ultrasound SD.4 It has highlighted
clients’ curiosity around fetal sex, the gendered meanings attached to SD results, and
sonographers’ occasional ambivalence—including reluctance to provide the desired
information when perceiving the requests as driven by “frivolous” or sex-selective
intent.5 Conversely, fieldwork on SD in India, being based in communities rather than
clinics, has tended to produce “technology-distant” accounts; these focus less on the
scanning event itself and more on contextual factors such as care-seeking, patterns of use,
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1999: 121-123; Taylor 2008: 29, 39, 42, 122-123, 125-126), Canada (L. Mitchell 2001: 127-130), Greece
(Georges 1996: 162), Ecuador (Morgan 1994: 12, cited in L. Mitchell 2001: 189), the Philippines (L.
Mitchell 2001: 190), Botswana (Tautz et al. 2000: 694, 696), Vietnam (Gammeltoft 2007b: 143-144), Iran
(Ranji and Dykes 2012), and Syria (Bashour et al. 2005: 150-151, 152). The Syrian study noted the
importance of a son in “local culture” but did not mention any evidence of sex-selective abortion. Rothman
(1986: 116-154) devotes an entire chapter to SD by amniocentesis and the (hypothetical) possibility of sex
selection in the U.S.
5
For examples of sonographer reluctance in the face of “frivolous” requests and the class-stratification of
perceptions of frivolousness, see Tautz et al. (2000: 694), L. Mitchell (2001: 135), and Taylor (2008: 138140). For examples of concern about women—especially Asian immigrant women—wanting to know sex
with the purpose of undergoing selective abortion, see Rapp (1999: 94-95, 324-325en319) on
amniocentesis in the U.S. and L. Mitchell (2001: 138) on ultrasound in Canada.
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and consequent abortion.6 Notably, neither body of research has detailed precisely how
shadowy images materialize fetal bodies in all their gendered futurity.
In this chapter, I peer inside the black box of clinical sex selection, describing
how gender was made visible and acted on through biomedical practices that subjected
fetal matter to the gender-kinship system. Building on the insight that ultrasound is never
a “neutral and passive... ‘window,’”7 I examine how scans “did” gender, subjecting the
fetus to systems of power. 8 Analysis of sonographic SD vividly illustrates the broader
point that it takes active bioscientific and bioclinical work to produce, maintain, and
naturalize genital anatomy as a site of embodied sex-gender dichotomies.9
Janelle Taylor has argued that “to inquire into the ordering of materializing
practices is to ask how, in the same movement that bodies are enacted, relations of power
are forged”; consequently, “at stake... in how even a humble technology like ultrasound
gets incorporated into social life, is nothing less than what sort of bodies and what sort of
social world get created.”10 At Chetna, the gendered fetal subject materialized through a
process that forcibly reiterated specific corporeal and kinship forms as culturally
intelligible, producing those forms as effects of biomedical and patriarchal power.11
Ultrasound mediated the interpellation of potential sons and potential daughters at the
very limits of sociality. Sexed fetal bodies became the surfaces of social boundaries.
Demarcation of sex-gender-kinship proceeded through “[imposition of] system on an
inherently untidy experience”12 of ambiguous images. If society could be seen as “a
series of forms contrasted with surrounding non-form,” there lay “a power in the forms
and other power in the inarticulate area, margins, confused lines, and beyond the external
boundaries.”13 The process of visualization materialized a gendered body from the
nebulous, ephemeral shapes on the ultrasound screen and incorporated it into systems of
medical and patriarchal power.
As a consequence of its classification through the concerted activity of families,
clinicians, and ultrasound machines, the fetus took on a fetishistic character,14 seemingly
acquiring the power to authorize and mediate subsequent intervention. Such intervention
most visibly took the form of sex-selective abortion—a biomedical inscription of genderkinship norms on female bodies, fetal and maternal.15 Selective abortion extended and
enacted the moral economy of gender-kinship prenatally; at the same time, it
incrementally reconfigured the distribution of bodies that formed the moral economy’s
material substrate.
Because sonographic SD always presumed selective abortion as its “barely hidden
6

Ganatra et al. 2001: 116-121; John et al. 2008: 55-57, 61-62; Khanna 1997, 2009: 88-92, 99-106; T. Patel
2007b: 253-258.
7
L. Mitchell 2001: 5.
8
Butler 1999; West and Zimmerman 1987.
9
Fausto-Sterling 2000; L. Moore and Clarke 1995.
10
Taylor 2008: 16. See also Barad 1998.
11
Cf. Butler 2011: x, xviii-xix; Mills 2014: 99.
12
Douglas 1984: 4.
13
Douglas 1984: 99.
14
Cf. Taylor 2008: 17-18.
15
Cf. Balsamo 1996: 11-12, 62-79; Casper and Moore 1992.
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interlocutor,”16 the scan was always a watershed moment. The image of a topographic
ridge separating water basins is apt. Through visualization, (metaphorically) fluid fetal
matter condensed in a moment and at a place that imbued it with potential energy. From
that location in space-time, the gendered potentiality of the inchoate person might be
driven in either direction: toward dissolution and disappearance, or toward elaboration
and manifestation. Once recognized, the limit subject could be rejected or nurtured, with
the moment’s bivalent possibility resting precisely on the incipient person’s liminality.
As a method of protecting familial positioning within the moral economy of
gender-kinship, sex-selective abortion could be seen as a form of risk management. But
the practice also raised new configurations of risk and risk management around bodily
and legal harm. So, too, exposure of the fetal subject’s gender, far from merely
disambiguating, simultaneously produced new uncertainties and anxieties. In addition to
creating new possibilities of care, sonographic revelation could also compel new forms of
concealment—from the state, from routine clinicians, even from the pregnant woman
herself. And the narrowly clinical practices of selective reproduction inevitably became
bound up in contention between women and their families (Chapter 4) and between
families and reproductive destiny (Chapter 5).
This chapter’s account of SD and its consequences draws from observation in
which I employed a hybrid biomedical-ethnographic gaze, oscillating between (and
sometimes struggling to hold together together) my identities as anthropologist and
clinician-in-training. Beginning with a glimpse from the day after my overnight stay at
Chetna, the first section tackles the dynamics of “seeing sex”—the process by which
biomedical expertise, ultrasound technology, and kinship norms came together to visually
materialize a gendered fetal subject. The second glimpse leads into a discussion of
clinicians’ and clients’ awareness and anxieties around the possibility of error: what if a
fetal subject was misclassified? The third glimpse frames an exploration of selective
abortion as a risk management technique that itself created new risks amid the prevailing
environment of reproductive governance. The fourth section moves away from Chetna,
returning to Dr. Dilip’s Nandini Clinic in order to examine the inverse of selective
elimination—selective nurturance—and how it entailed an elaborate interplay of
concealment and revelation around previous SD. In the concluding section, I examine the
cutting edge of SD, reviewing possible but improbable methods for rendering gender
visible prenatally. In what follows, I discuss the enigmatic images, pervasive
uncertainties, and shifting risks that lie hidden in the black box of clinical sex selection.

Learning to See Fetal Sex
After settling in at his desk, Dr. Ranjit told the nurse to summon the day’s first SD
clients, a Sindhi Muslim couple from Surat. In came Asif-bhai—a tall man, square-jawed
and stubbly. He was followed by Rajni-ben, somewhat shorter but stout. Both smiled
broadly.
Dr. Ranjit directed them behind the curtain, to the small examining area. He and I
followed. He sat on the stool in front of the machine, I on the stool in the back corner.
16

Rapp 1999: 129.
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Rajni-ben lay down on the examining table along the far wall, and Asif-bhai stood to my
right, just behind the doctor.
After squeezing ultrasound jelly onto the transducer, Dr. Ranjit applied it to the
Rajni-ben’s belly. He adjusted his elbow and wrist, shifting position and angle. An
oscillating image appeared on the screen: bright white and darker gray areas,
interconnected and set against a black background. The doctor pushed a button to zoom
in on part of the picture, simultaneously manipulating the transducer to obtain a clearer
view of the fetal genitals. By this point in my experience, I could recognize what the
drifting white shapes on the screen represented: feet, shins, thighs
While scanning, the doctor asked a few questions. The couple had one daughter,
delivered four years ago by Caesarean. They had travelled hundreds of kilometers to
Mahesana District after failing to locate anyone willing to “look” in Surat.
A few minutes in, I saw a clear view of the area between the splayed fetal legs.
Dr. Ranjit clicked a button to freeze the image. Looking straight ahead at the screen, he
pursed his lips and mumbled, “It’s a girl.”
Rajni-ben did not stir, but Asif-bhai leaned forward and furrowed his brow
questioningly. The doctor frowned: “It’s a negative report. Female.” Now, Rajni-ben
looked up at a corner of the ceiling. Her eyes, wide open in anticipation a moment earlier,
drooped shut.
Asif-bhai asked, “Is it sure, Saheb? Because if it’s sure then”—a flipping gesture
of the hand—“it’s to be taken out.”
“It’s sure, it’s sure. 110%.”
“No, because if you say it, then it’s definitely to be taken out. But maybe check
one more time? Tell us the final answer.”
“Well, it’s already final,” Dr. Ranjit replied. “But we can check once from
below.” He instructed the patient to step out and urinate so that could confirm the result
with a transvaginal scan.
After the couple left, Dr. Ranjit turned to me and shook his head: “Actually, it’s
final. Look at this.” He pointed to the screen, where the image from a moment earlier
remained frozen. The central shapes almost resembled an arch—two gray projections
extending downward at thirty-degree angles to vertical, connected across the top by a
gray curve with a small white V at the apex. The triangular space between the projections
was black. Tracing the shapes with his finger, the doctor explained, “This is one thigh.
This is the other thigh.” Now, the arch across the top. “Here we are seeing the perineal
region.” And the triangular area? “In between, there is nothing—only space. If this were
male, we would see scrotal shadow and penile shadow on top of it.” He drew my
attention to the apical white V. “See, in female, there are only these white lines—labia. In
male, we would have scrotal shadow coming from here, and just below it, penile
shadow.” He concluded, “It’s actually final. But we’ll do it again so that the patient is
satisfied.”
The couple soon returned. Within seconds of starting the confirmatory scan, Dr.
Ranjit zoomed in again. He froze the view, producing another image with the legs
splayed. Tracing the fetal parts, he delivered an explanation nearly identical to the one he
had given me. Asif-bhai, who was leaning toward the machine and squinting, turned one
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side of his mouth down. “So space—blank space,” he muttered. “So it’s a girl, final.”
With a sigh, he continued, “Well, then, we have to do the removal. Whatever the process
is—let’s get it started.” Rajni-ben sat up and dangled her legs off the table. She looked at
the screen, then at me for a moment, and then down. Without saying a word, she shook
her head and closed her eyes.
Asif-bhai leaned toward me and scowled: “Bad luck.” I pursed my lips, unsure of
what to say, and he repeated the words. I wondered what his wife was thinking in her
silence.
The doctor exited to the consultory. Asif-bhai frowned, sighed, and walked out. I
was left in the examination area with Rajni-ben. I turned and looked. Her head still hung
down. I shuffled out through the curtain, half exiting and half lingering, not sure whether
to make her feel like she was not alone, or to leave her alone. She followed a moment
later.
Images: Elicitation and Containment
Dr. Ranjit’s scan of Rajni-ben encapsulates the alchemy by which sonographic
SD and activity around it serially converted echoes into images, bodies, sex, gender, and
kinship futures. In the scan and its interpretation, the expert clinician not only secured an
often-elusive image, but also transformed the image—opaque or inscrutable for
families—into actionable knowledge. Through the interpretive acts of clinician and
clients, fetal genitals came to stand in for a host of future events, interpellating the
gendered fetal subject as one whose life course was already apprehended.
Far from a straightforward case of “nature unveiling before science,”17 the
visualization of the gendered fetal subject was a process in which meanings were elicited
as much as matter was revealed. In discussing the significance of “thinking and feeling in
images,” Roy Wagner has argued:
An image has the power of synthesis: it condenses whole realms of
possible ideas and interpretations and allows complex relationships to be
perceived and grasped in an instant... It has the power of eliciting (causing
to perceive) all sorts of meanings in those who use and hear it, as well as
the power of containing all the possible meanings that may be so elicited;
for the image itself, and only the image itself, is equal to all of them.18
Crucial here are the notions of elicitation and containment, which refigure the revelationconcealment dichotomy by placing the object—the image—at the center of action. As an
elicitory process, Dr. Ranjit’s SD drew out and condensed kinship meanings around
visual materializations of fetal relatives-to-be. In turn, such meanings at least briefly
animated an inchoate person—with animation understood as “the elicitation of life
process within... the other.”19
17

Jordanova 1989: 87-110. It bears noting that Jordanova’s deft analysis problematizes any notion of a
“straightforward” unveiling.
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Wagner 2012: 535.
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Wagner 2012: 538.
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Wagner’s fellow Melanesianist Marilyn Strathern has complemented his
perspective by emphasizing how “the visible body is observed in terms of a two-way
flow.”20 On one hand, “observation is elicited, an audience is asked to see.”21 On the
other, “getting objects to appear requires work from the spectator”—“that objects are
produced for people to see means that people wishing to see elicit these objects.”22
Consequently, aspects of the bodily surface have “simultaneously (1) been brought forth
from inside and (2) come from elsewhere.”23 Of note, Strathern has directly applied her
visual approach to ultrasound (in Euro-America), observing:
Sight is a means of access and supplier of raw material... Interpreting an
ultrasound “image” is notoriously difficult unless you already have some
sense of what it is that you are going to “see.” And when Euro-Americans
interpret or depict what is seen, their comprehension becomes a means of
organizing this piece of information about the world... Artifacts produced
for display... become a particular medium for conveying knowledge.24
In SD at Chetna, the visual artifact and kinship understandings mutually elicited and
contained one another. Sociality materialized in a two-way process of spectatorship that
made potential persons manifest. The gendered fetus became recognizable because its
bodily surface became the observational interface of internal and external, personified
and inert, elicited and contained.
Locating Sex Determination
My observation of sonographic observation took place in the Chetna consultory’s
examining area, a curtained-off space that measured hardly eight feet to a side. A wooden
examining table—paint chipping, old cotton-filled cushions still surprisingly soft—sat
opposite the curtain, under the one tiny window. The positioning of women like Rajniben on the table—bellies central to the unfolding action, heads literally blocked from
engagement with the scan or anyone else—epitomized how they were too often
physically and interactionally marginalized amid a process that operated on their
bodies.25
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The pattern of women lacking visual access to the screen during the scan is one documented in
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In the examining area, I observed scans for 170 different families—a tutelage in
seeing the sex of potential persons. Dr. Ranjit adopted a Socratic pedagogy, pushing me
to guess at the sex of the fetus or to identify what factors were impeding its apprehension.
He asked what I saw, explained sonographic nuances, and chuckled at my confused
interpretive attempts. Sometimes, he shared preliminary thoughts in whispered or
medically coded asides, bringing me into a biomedical backstage that excluded clients.
When he spoke to patients or their relatives, it was generally to obtain a reproductive
history or to confirm their awareness of the expected payments for the scan and “if
anything else is to be done.”
Early on, I saw little more than the generalities of a bright fetus, a black amniotic
cavity, and a gray background field—the patient’s uterine wall and abdomen. Objects
flickered, oscillated, wobbled, shifted back and forth. At points, the developing child
seemed to shapeshift phantasmagorically: a frog, a plucked turkey, a sack of fruit, a
cascade of ruffles. Without Dr. Ranjit’s interpretation, I hardly knew what to elicit from
the image.26
I gradually learned to discern fetal body parts, but this was just a precursor to
seeing sex. In contrast to routine antenatal scans, which involved quickly glancing at a
few “major structures,” and extended anomaly scans, which entailed painstakingly
examining every body part, SD consisted of a single-minded quest for what Dr. Ranjit
called the “perfect vision”: a view of the fetus’s genital area, exposed by spread legs.
Uma-masi once explained that “checking” required “separating out everything else out,
so you can see this thing.” The expert operator had to impose a proper aesthetic form on
the ultrasound image, drawing out the desired marker of personhood. Visualizing gender
became a matter of marking limits, of separating the locus of fetal sex from the
surroundings.
Watching Dr. Ranjit perform scans, I received lessons in how he cast sound in
search of an ideal view. By subtly altering the transducer’s position and angle, he altered
the trajectories along which the machine sent ultrasonic waves and detected their echoes.
The fetus’s intrauterine localization and a variety of positional factors—the umbilical
cord, crossed legs, stray arms, a lateral view—could obscure the view or create an
“artifact” masquerading as male genitals. Conversely, SD proved easiest when the fetal
legs moved into “space” (the uterus’s wide upper portion), drifted forward, and offered a
perpendicular presentation to the direction of the ultrasonic beam.27 If the genitals came
into view quickly, Dr. Ranjit would macabrely remark that a particular fetus was
“cooperating” or “favorable to us”; 28 if the fetus did not cooperate in its own
classification, he shook the transducer against the patient’s abdomen in the hope of
26
Cf. Mitchell’s account of similar perplexity during early fieldwork in a Canadian sonography suite (2001:
60).
27
In some cases—with the placenta blocking the view, or the fetal legs pressed into the back of the
uterus—Dr. Ranjit switched to utilizing the transvaginal transducer, which transmitted and detected sound
waves across the cervix, thereby providing better views of the posterior uterine wall. Being more
corporeally invasive, transvaginal scans often posed considerable discomfort for pregnant women.
28
Dr. Ranjit’s macabre imputation of fetal subjectivity stands in stark contrast to the more light-hearted
(but nonetheless socially significant) examples from Euro-American studies (Harris et al. 2004: 39-40; L.
Mitchell 2001: 125-127, 130-131; Taylor 2008: 137-138).
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eliciting fetal movement to a different position. The amount of urine in the patient’s
bladder could also condition sonographic sight, and as in Rajni-ben’s second scan, Dr.
Ranjit sometimes repeated scans after having patients pass urine or wait for it to
accumulate.29
More generally, rescans were the norm, rather than the exception. If the doctor
could not clearly visualize the genitals after about ten minutes, he asked patients to sit
outside in the hope that fetal movement or accumulation of urine would permit a
definitive scan. Some women endured more than half a dozen scans—including
uncomfortable transvaginal ones—in a single visit. A few still had to wait until a
subsequent visit to receive any result. SD sometimes spread out into hours or even days
of indeterminacy.
Repeated scans and deferred results heightened an acute anticipation among
clients, turning the clinical experience into one of anxiety, tedium, and frustration. When
told to sit and wait for yet another scan, patients often turned to me and complained,
“This is torture!” The affective charges of desire and aversion, hope and fear described in
Chapter 2 suffused scanning trajectories. This was particularly so for pregnant women
themselves, who nonetheless could follow the ongoing scans only indirectly, by reading
the faces of Dr. Ranjit and family members.30 In waiting for the doctor to obtain a
favorable image, women and their families were waited for nothing less than the
knowledge that would determine a pregnancy’s wantedness.
Classification at the Limits
Even with an unobscured view, SD required a further expert skill: the ability to
classify developing genitals. In Uma-masi’s telling, the method was obvious. “Once it’s
in a position, you get a sense,” she explained, splaying her right index and middle fingers
in an inverted V. “If it’s a girl, it’s like this.” Then, she pushed her left index finger into
the crook of the V. “And if it’s a boy, like this. Then this part is erect—it’s visible. From
that, you can know. If it’s a girl, that part isn’t there.” Uma-masi’s digital representation
figured the self-evident anatomy that was to be elicited from the digital representation on
the sonographic screen.
In explaining their own past or present SD techniques, various obstetricians
provided substantially similar explanations. They said they would look for a “penile
shadow” and a “scrotal shadow” between the fetal legs. Some also noted that vulvar
tissue—“hard,” “dense,” “echogenic”—strongly reflected sound waves and hence
appeared brightly white. Most considered the appearance of fetal genitals and fetal sex so
obvious as to hardly merit explanation.

29

Sonographers found transabdominal scans easier when the patient had a full bladder, which pushed the
intestines out of the way and created a clear “sonic window” to the uterus and fetus. By contrast,
transvaginal scans generally proved easier with an empty bladder, which relieved compression of the fetus
against the uterine wall, allowing it to better move in “space.” Many clients knew the importance of
calibrating the mother’s urine for optimal SD, and patients sometimes endured considerable discomfort
during long journeys to arrive at Chetna with full bladders.
30
Cf. Georges 1996: 162; L. Mitchell 2001: 144-145; Morgan 1994, cited in L. Mitchell 2001: 189.
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Grounded in a taken-for-granted correlation between sonographic images and
human anatomy, assumptions of obviousness belay the complexities and ambiguities of
“reading” an early second-trimester fetus. In the fourth gestational month, the fetal tissue
was just beginning to form sonographically distinctive genitals. (The temporal limitation
had percolated extensively into everyday knowledge: “The sahebs can’t tell boy-girl until
you’ve let a few days go past three full months.”31) It required minimal expert effort to
identify genitals later in pregnancy, once penile and scrotal shadows became more
prominent, but commercial SD had to occur as early as possible to facilitate easier, less
risky abortions. Consequently, sonographers like Dr. Ranjit were always eliciting
something only barely formed—at the limits of its material existence.
Coupled with the idiosyncrasies of individual fetal development, the inchoate
character of fetal genitals made SD a process rife with ambiguities. Several obstetricians
noted that they could rule in a “male” result early in the fourth month, but felt reluctant to
rule it out until several weeks had passed: what if the penis was late-developing? Dr.
Ranjit frequently called patients back if they were “early”, citing the need to confirm a
result after further development. Such ambiguities contributed immensely to the errors
and doubts discussed in the next section. But how did practitioners discern barelyexisting genital structures at all?
Much of my tutelage with Dr. Ranjit focused on the second step of SD. Observing
scans, I learned to focus on the space between the fetal thighs—often not a space in realtime, but a potential space, one that would open up with movement—and to search for
whether gray shadows occupied what would otherwise be “black”. The transition
between locating and reading was instantaneous, unpredictable, and fleeting. The
classifying gaze might have to spring into action at any moment to detect a vulva, or a
penis and a scrotum. Dr. Ranjit and I stared at the fetus interminably, constantly
anticipating views of an emergent presence.
It remains difficult to articulate that process of learning to see. I came to associate
shadowy, phallic presences with maleness, and black triangles and white Vs with
femaleness (Figure 3).32 But I also absorbed the uncertainties. Was I really seeing “that

31
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Cf. Khanna 2009: 102-104.
Again, compare Mitchell on learning to see in a Canadian ultrasound suite:
Before long, I was able to recognize the fetal head, femur, and spine on my own. Yet I
was also aware that I was learning to see from a particular standpoint: To read the grey
echoes as landmarks for measurements and as signs of abnormality, and to do this in
relation to normalized growth charts. Thus, I found myself learning to read ultrasound
images while trying NOT to become habituated to the conventions of a sonographic gaze.
My field notes record my impressions of other possibilities of seeing... (2001: 60).

Mitchell goes on to cite a variety of heterodox views from her fieldnotes: giggles at adults praising a gray
blur, a sense of all sonographic fetuses appearing alike, a feeling of voyeurism, shock at “creepy” eyes and
puppet-like movements, and discomfort at the local biomedical idiom of sonography as “cutting.” In some
ways, my biomedical positionality made it even harder to not become “habituated to the conventions of a
sonographic gaze”—to preserve the capacity for “other possibilities of seeing” that Mitchell so beautifully
illustrates. Nonetheless, I believe the scope of my fieldwork—like Mitchell’s, based in deep engagement
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thing,” as doctor and clients alike often called it? Was I really seeing “nothing”? Because
Dr. Ranjit generally confirmed results from multiple angles before disclosing them, a
typical day of scanning entailed hundreds of moments of searching and judging. It was
exhausting to train my eyes on the screen for hours on end in a single-minded search. But
my cumulative exhaustion resulted not only from searching for a clear view, but also
from repeated disappointment on seeing female genitals. That disappointment—a feeling
I disdained, in its abstract form, at the outset of my fieldwork—gradually insinuated itself
deeper into my mind as I acquired a more situated view of what “female” results usually
meant for women: tragic choices, and the bodily suffering of selective abortion.
Dr. Ranjit also anticipated the misfortune of selective abortion in his scanning,
albeit in a more technical manner. His measurement of the fetal skull’s biparietal
diameter—a quantity the machine automatically translated into an estimated gestational
age—almost always pointed to an imminent “female” result. Through head size, the
doctor gauged the size of the fetus, and hence the difficulty of a potential selective
abortion.
Interpreting Images
In sharp contrast to journalistic accounts and circulating rumors that posited
elaborate systems for indirect communication of fetal sex, Dr. Ranjit generally conveyed
his results quite directly. He would say, “It’s male,” “a good report,” “positive,” “a boy,”
“okay.” Or he would say, “It’s female,” “not good,” “negative,” “a girl.” Given that he
used the terms in a given set conjointly and interchangeably, his repertoire for reporting
already tied together sex, gender, kinship, and positive or negative valence.
Like Rajni-ben, many pregnant women came to know the result after their
relatives. Dr. Ranjit frequently disclosed his findings in a low voice before the patient
even sat up, or outside in the consultory before she emerged. Women sometimes emerged
to find others already engaged in downstream discussions about abortion planning. They
had to ask, “What is it, Saheb?... What did Saheb say?” and wait for a lull in conversation
to learn the results.
Unlike some clinicians, Dr. Ranjit regularly “showed” families the genitals,
constructing and construing fetal anatomy. In fact, with “female” results, he typically
began demonstrating immediately after disclosure, before clients even asked. As with
Rajni-ben and Asif-bhai, he usually started by pointing to the screen and tracing the leg
landmarks—hips, thighs, knees—in order to orient clients’ vision. He then indicated the
space between the thighs and narrated “female” results in terms of lack33—the presence
of empty space, and the absence of a phallic shadow: “You can see that there is nothing.
It’s just black. It’s blank space... Because it’s a flat space, it’s a girl. If that were present,
it would be here... If it were male, there would be three structures: two little pellets and a
phallus.” Occasionally, he placed two fists and an index finger on the screen to illustrate
how the much-desired male anatomy would appear. When the image included a view of
the small white V at the apex of the arch, Dr. Ranjit identified it as the yoni [vagina] or
with clients outside of the scanning context—allowed me to resist sonographic sights full colonization of
my mental possibilities for seeing.
33
Cf. Jordanova 1989; Laqueur 1990; L. Moore and Clarke 1995: 276, 300en265, and passim.
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yoninā pad [labia]. But the white lines to which he pointed were tiny, and sometimes
only subtly present or intermingled with shadows; I frequently had trouble discerning
them, and clients universally admitted to not really seeing them. Sometimes, when
families with “male” results expressed doubts, Dr. Ranjit demonstrated for them as well,
using the English words “penis” and “scrotum.” Occasionally, he used the frozen fetal
image to illustrate barriers—folded legs, an intruding cord, a lateral view—that prevented
him from visualizing definitive absences and presences.34
Dr. Ranjit sometimes repeated demonstrations several times in a sort of ritual for
creating certainty. For instance, I sometimes saw mothers-in-law, nearly blind because of
advancing cataracts or missing glasses, nonetheless ushered into the examining area to
“see”—more accurately, hear—the explanation. In such encounters, Dr. Ranjit’s
interpretive authority condensed through iterative performance. Clients could not
straightforwardly check the doctor’s expertise against the enigmatic image, but they also
did not have to accept a simple verbal declaration. The doctor performed his certainty,
eliciting knowledge from an evidentiary image—inscrutable to lay eyes, but containing
the promise of technically mediated correlation with developing fetal matter, and hence
long-term life destinies. Nonetheless, as I discuss below, doubts and anxieties about error
remained pervasive, largely due to the sonogram’s opacity for clients.
Scholars have widely noted that biotechnical images, far from providing direct
views of material reality, always emerge as evidence in intertwinement with biomedical
expertise. “Images unto themselves” cannot provide information or proof; they require
“particular rituals of registration and display—especially the complex of practices known
as ‘reading’” in order to make authoritative knowledge. Far from being “self-evident,”
“icons of professional knowledge... require interpretation during which health
professionals not only reveal some of their arcane wisdom but also shape the perceptions
of the client.”35 Despite its enmeshment within conventions of visual realism that make
“seeing the baby” a seemingly straightforward proposition,36 ultrasound is no different.
Lisa Mitchell has observed:
To most untrained viewers, ultrasound images are confusing. Women and
their partners depend heavily on sonographers' accounts of the image in
order to see their baby amidst the swirling grey mass of echoes....
Sonographers endeavour to help parents to 'see'... by offering advice on
how to read the image... While these hints about the technology of
ultrasound help some parents see the ultrasound fetus, and provide

34
Dr. Ranjit’s demonstrations were a specific instance of the broader pattern Nishizaka (2011) has
described for obstetric sonography, in which interaction around vision, touch, and talk produces a fetus in
real time by exhibiting and integrating orientations to the spatially separated operational fields of maternal
abdomen ultrasound screen. In particular, they exemplified a “differentiation sequence,” beginning as they
do with Dr. Ranjit’s “invitation to differentiation” and ending with client affirmation of the anatomic
identification (cf. Nishizaka 2011: 314-322).
35
Rapp 1999: 66.
36
Draper 2002; Georges 1996; Harris et al. 2004.
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reassurance, they also constrain that vision in particular ways. The fetus
emerges as the product of expert intervention...
"'Seeing' was, for [the women in my study], inseparable from the
sonographer's explanation of what was visible on screen. And even with
the sonographer's instructions about how to see... and the descriptive
labels of what to see..., several women made distinctions along the lines of
'I could see what she was pointing at, but I couldn't tell what it was.'...
While the image itself may make little sense, the comments made by
sonographers do....37
Consequently, one might expect SD at Chetna to follow the pattern Mitchell observed, in
which “the sonographer rather than the ultrasound machine was often the... ‘window onto
the fetus.’”38
Sonographic images did, indeed, prove largely opaque to Dr. Ranjit’s clients.
Before, during, and after demonstrations, families insisted they could not read the images
without the doctor’s acts of interpretation: “What could we see? Whatever you show us,
Saheb. We don’t know.” “It will only be understandable if you tell us, finally.” “Only an
experienced man can know—someone who is an expert.” “He showed us, but you can
hardly see at three months... You have to take him as God for this... The child is just a
little round blob.” Clients who reported seeing the genitals invariably clarified that they
could only pick out the shapes as such with the doctor’s guidance. The penile and scrotal
shadows, or “blank space” and the labial V, were not self-evident, iconic representations
of the genitals. Rather, they materialized as indices—residues and proofs—of the
doctor’s knowledge-making process.
The fetal image’s opacity was what viabilized the standard excuse Dr. Dilip and
various others proffered in deflecting SD requests: “I don’t have the software.” And it
was the reason several relatives, peering over Dr. Ranjit’s shoulders, asked whether
“XX” or “XY” would be “written on the screen.” In some sense, of course, the image
contained these chromosomal meanings, and many others—but only for the expert
observer that could elicit them, translating among shapes, structures, and sex. For lay
people, SD’s visual products were strange symbols, requiring explanation from someone
privy to the code.
Fetal Formations, Fetal Futures
Well before the doctor delivered results—indeed, in the very contemplation and
pursuit of SD—clients were already mobilizing their own interpretations based on the
vague but overdetermined futures described in Chapter 2. By subjected newly
materialized fetal bodies to particular social roles, such interpretations made the scan a
watershed moment. SD revealed whether continuing a pregnancy would make a couple
parents of an avidly desired son or yet another daughter. Suddenly, families could
recognize gendered potentiality and initiate decisions about whether to affirm or sever
relations with the emergent fetal person.
37
38

L. Mitchell 2001: 120-121, 141-142.
L. Mitchell 2001: 143.

173

Before and during scans, families anticipated a “male” result with one eye on the
past—individual and family histories—and one on an indeterminate future. Particular
reproductive histories—“too many daughters,” multiple prior selective abortions, years of
difficult fertility treatment—folded into the wait for a result. Patients and relatives
explained their responses to results—instantly opting for selective abortion, collapsing in
relief at the word “good,” keeping a twin gestation with one boy and one girl—with
phrases like “all this effort was for a boy.”
Immediate reactions revealed the heavy affective load of both anticipation and
outcome. The exultant cries, broad smiles, relieved sighs, and prayers to the divine in the
aftermath of a “male” result contrasted with dejected murmurs, clenched jaws, crumpled
features, hung heads, twitching faces, and slumped bodies after the opposite. Both
outcomes elicited profuse tears and convulsive sobs as patients saw long quests for a son
meet fruition or disappointment. Results drew out emotional reactions that clients would
never display elsewhere; Dr. Ranjit chucklingly recalled how one overjoyed SD patient
had hugged and kissed her husband in full view of his parents—a behavior otherwise
unimaginable.
Clients’ reactions offered small glimpses of the broader reproductive meanings
contained in the ultrasound image. With “male” results, families quickly transformed the
pregnancy into a collective project.39 Many began asking Dr. Ranjit about the fetus’s well
being—heartbeats, growth and development, absence of disabilities, and so on. The
pregnancy immediately became “precious” (a term used by both doctors and families),
eliciting greater familial and medical care for the pregnant woman and her male cargo.
Little illustrated the gendered preciousness as vividly as the phenomenon of mothers-inlaw complaining about how they found themselves compelled—and willing—to invert
typical domestic hierarchies by “doing too much service” for daughters-in-law carrying
future grandsons.
With “female” results, by contrast, some families retreated to obtain second
opinions or discuss the new information. But many, like Asif-bhai and Rajni-ben,
summarily chose selective abortion. In numerous cases, including Rajni-ben’s, relatives
spoke for the women, leaving them as silent bystanders in the clinical decision. (I
examine this pattern, and familial decision-making more generally, in Chapter 4.)
Relatives—and women, when they spoke—frequently made explicit their reasoning
around the obviousness of elimination: “Well, how can you have daughters in today’s
society? Getting an abortion is best.” “A girl—so what other decision is there to make?”
“We’ll have to get it taken out, right?”
In SD, expert and everyday interpretation collaborated to produce recognition of
gendered fetal subjects. Based on this initial recognition, the threshold person could
become the subject of selective elimination or selective nurturance, both of which I
discuss below.
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See the discussion of “parental projects” in Boltanski (2013). Due to a narrow ethnographic scope and a
lack of engagement with prenatal diagnostics, Boltanski’s grand account misses how such projects may be
contingent on not only extrinsic or life history factors, but also factors intrinsic to the pregnancy itself.
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But for all its weightiness, the interpellating knowledge of SD scans was also
mired in ambiguities, uncertainties, and anxieties. How, then, did clinicians and families
navigate around the pervasive possibility of error—of a misclassified fetal subject?

“1,000%”: Error and Uncertainty
The second couple of the day—a tall, mop-topped man with a thick gold chain
and a short woman in a turquoise salvaar-kameez—came from Ahmedabad. Dr. Ranjit
interrogated the husband for several minutes before feeling satisfied that he had, in fact,
examined the wife before. From the conversation, I gradually realized that they had
originally visited Chetna through Uma-masi. I would come to know them as Anjali-ben
and Bipin-bhai.
Dr. Ranjit sat down to scan. “Rarely do we get a view as clear as with the
previous patient,” he said of Rajni-ben’s quick result. “Usually, it is somewhat harder.”
Sure enough, despite fifteen minutes of shifting the transducer’s position and angle on
Anjali-ben’s belly, he could not find a clear genital view. Eventually, he instructed
Anjali-ben to go outside, drink water, and let urine accumulate.
During the next scan, Dr. Ranjit pressed a button, and red and blue blotches
appeared on the screen. He explained, “We check the Doppler for blood flow. Because
sometimes, if the cord is between the legs, it may look like a penis!” After about ten
minutes, he declared, “It’s a good report.” Only I seemed to hear, for both patient and
husband craned forward. Already walking out, the doctor repeated himself nonchalantly.
After settling the payment out in the consultory, the patient asked whether the result was
“sure.” Dr. Ranjit nodded: “It’s good. It’s a boy.”
In the day’s fourth SD scan, the doctor again approached the fetal thighs from
various angles. At one point, he murmured, “Appears echogenic in perineum,” informing
me in biomedical code of an apparent presence between the legs. But he must not have
been certain, for he kept scanning. Eventually, the legs appeared in the bottom left of the
screen, flickering in and out of visualization. Pointing to one, he said, “See, this baby is
having legs crossed—like a yoga pose.” I perceived an upward-folded foot, but I would
not have perceived it just by looking; like clients, I required expert guidance to see.
Freezing the image, the doctor told me, “What we initially thought was the penis—it was
actually the foot.” Shaking his head, he declared, “It’s a negative report. Looks female.”
He provided a standard demonstration on the screen. Both patient and husband nodded
slowly. When the husband asked if the result was “certain,” the doctor suggested, “Come
back in two days. We’ll look once more.”
Like Anjali-ben, the fifth patient of the day was told, after some initial scanning,
to sit outside, drink water, and wait. A few minutes into the next SD, Dr. Ranjit asked
me, “What’s your finding?” Frankly unsure, I ventured that there was perhaps a
“shadow” between the thighs. The doctor shook his head: “We have no prominence.
Look.” He zoomed in, and I realized that the white matter between the fetal legs appeared
similar to that in “female” scans. Before I could ask, he confirmed, “Vulva, vulva.”
Now, it was Anjali-ben’s turn again. Dr. Ranjit re-scanned her and confirmed the
result from the previous visit—“male”. I stepped out and chatted with Anjali-ben and
Bipin-bhai while the doctor took a phone call.
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Then, just before leaving for lunch, Dr. Ranjit performed five scans in quick
succession—all “positive” results. All five families queried his certainty. He reassured
them, “110%, confirmed... No need to waste money anywhere else... Final, final... No
need to go anywhere else... No need to come back, but I’ll check again in a few days if
you want.”
Sources of Failure, Ethics of Accuracy
Anthropologists have detailed how profound diagnostic ambiguity pervades
medical practices around conditions such as genetic disease and radiation-related
sickness.40 In such practices, “overwhelming uncertainty and unknowability”41 prevails
because the material aspects of bodily phenomena—onset, duration, severity, unfolding,
symptomology—vary unpredictably, as do their situated social meanings. By contrast,
Mahesana-area SD presumed a simple dichotomy—male or female—with
overdetermined meanings. But as selective reproductive technologies often do,42 it, too,
produced new uncertainties and anxieties.
Concerns regarding SD centered on possible classificatory errors. While research
on sex selection has seldom problematized SD’s reliability,43 people around Mahesana
fully acknowledged the possibility of misgendering. Awareness of errors suffused clients’
everyday worlds, shaping orientations to doubt and worry. Families almost always
probed Dr. Ranjit’s confidence after scans: “Sure?” “Final?” “100%?” “Decided?”
“Confirmed?” “1,000% sure?” “Perfect?” “Any chance of doubt?” “Any chance of it
being different?” People subjected expert classification to intense doubt because of its
high stakes. Misclassification could lead to erroneous acceptance of an undesired
daughter or erroneous elimination of a much-desired son. Because the inchoate gendered
subject remained visible only through sonography, the choice to embrace or reject
nascent relations with it always entailed an act of profound, if sometimes grudging, faith
in obstetricians’ technologically mediated vision.
Obstetricians acknowledged three ways their expertise could fail. In general, they
quickly dismissed the first possibility—fetal bodies that could not be forced into a rigid
male-female binary—by noting that cases of “intersex” or “ambiguous genitals” were
“extremely rare.”44
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Featherstone et al. 2005; Finkler 2000; Lock and Nguyen 2010: 303-347; Petryna 2002; Rapp 1999: 6673, 90-96, 107-115, 210-213.
41
Petryna 2002: 4.
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Gammeltoft and Wahlberg 2014: 207-208.
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But see Khanna 2009: 101-102; Lock and Nguyen 2010: 141.
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Only one doctor—a radiologist often consulted for specialty scanning—said he had seen more than one
or two cases of “ambiguous genitals.” He explained, “Utpal-bhai, I have also done sonography after birth,
male or female! The pediatrician had sent them along, asking, are there ovaries inside, or a prostate? There
was nothing on the outside, or he would have diagnosed it. I’ve done five or six sonographies like that. It
can go both ways—undescended testes and prostate, or uterus and ovaries. That is a natural congenital
anomaly! So in cases like this, if you set out to tell with certainty antenatally, you’ll be put into confusion!”
Even this doctor emphasized that such cases represented a miniscule proportion of errors in sonographic
SD.
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Ultrasound technology was a second, more frequently cited source of inaccuracy.
Doctors identified screen size, grayscale definition, and pixel count as factors influencing
visual clarity, and many disparaged colleagues who performed SD on portables and other
small machines. Connectors like Uma-masi also invoked machine size to promote
partnering clinicians and discredit competitors; according to them, a “small TV” posed
considerable risk of incorrect gendering.
The third source of error lay in sonographers’ choices and interpretations—in
other words, human expertise. Clinicians could fail, for instance, through haste: if they
scanned around the thirteen-week threshold of genital legibility, the likelihood of
misreading inchoate structures was higher.45 Even with a sufficiently “mature” fetus,
intrusion of extraneous parts might lead to mistaken inference of a penile shadow.
Doctors could mitigate the risk of such “interference” by using different angles,
activating Doppler, and rescanning after some time, but not all did. Numerous subtle
factors—maternal bladder fullness, amniotic fluid levels, idiosyncrasies of fetal
development, and so on—also required careful navigation and interpretation. Such factors
opened up considerable variation in interpretive practices and corresponding reputations.
For example, several clients endorsed Dr. Narendra’s accuracy by noting, “His machine
is tiny, but his method of looking is good.”
Invoking reputation, moral obligation, and possible extortion by clients following
errors, many past and present SD practitioners emphasized the importance of
confirmation. Dr. Ranjit maintained a particularly firm ethic of accuracy, consistently
allowing and even encouraging families to return to Chetna for confirmation. Once, after
reciting errors emanating from his colleagues’ carelessness, he explained:
Most doctors aren’t as careful as us. Only one visit—haphazard! We are
sensitive. Patient is spending a huge amount! We should also be
responsible for accuracy. And this is an illegal activity, so patient
satisfaction is very important.
See, I’m verifying the result. Whenever I see there is female, I will
cross-check in different views, different angles, different positions. We
45

Most Mahesana-area obstetricians declared thirteen weeks of gestational age the threshold for
sonographic SD. This aligns with the findings of a study that measured accuracy using sonography
machines and SD techniques similar to those prevailing in the Mahesana area at the time of my fieldwork;
the study found that the rate of “correctly identifying fetal gender” rose from 71.9% at eleven weeks to
92% at twelve weeks, and 98.3% at thirteen weeks (Hsiao et al. 2008).
In discussing the timing of SD, Lock and Nguyen observe, “Sunita Puri notes that there is
agreement among her medical informants that the sex of a fetus cannot be determined by ultrasound with
unfailing accuracy in the early states of gestation... Ultrasound specialists with whom we have spoken in
Montreal concur that only from about 17 weeks can the sex be determined with reasonable confidence...”
(2010: 141). I have encountered similar thresholds in my biomedical training, with instructors informing
me that fetal sex cannot be definitively determined through sonography before sixteen weeks. Without
disputing the local validity of these thresholds, I would propose a “local technologies” interpretation of the
divergence. It is possible that the higher stakes of Mahesana-area SD—in terms of both accuracy and
abortion timing—have more acutely driven obstetricians toward accurate classification at the earlier limits
identified by the study referenced above.
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take action only after becoming very precise. But till now, I’ve only had to
change the result in three-four cases—very rarely.
Dr. Ranjit voiced confidence and pride in his accuracy, and in his conviction regarding its
commercial and moral importance. Uma-masi also trumpeted his infallibility to clients,
using phrases like “1,000%,” “it’s perfect,” and “don’t waste your money anywhere
else.”
Both Dr. Ranjit and Uma-Masi maintained he had committed very few SD errors
during his career. Two surfaced during my fieldwork. When a Nandini patient delivered a
girl, Uma-masi frowned and muttered, “They got it looked at with Saheb, but it came out
wrong.” She distanced herself from the error: “But this wasn’t our patient. Our work’s
totally perfect! I’d never let a mistake happen.” A few months later, however, she
confessed that routine ultrasound suggested another Nandini patient, who had continued a
pregnancy despite a “female” result at Chetna, actually appeared to be carrying a boy.
She said ruefully, “I didn’t say anything to her. What’s there to say, since we went
together?” After a pause, she waved her hand and added, “But Saheb’s the one who was
wrong! He looked too early, at exactly three months, and didn’t call them back. So isn’t
that Saheb’s mistake?”
False “Males” and the Risk of Unexpected Daughters
While not privy to the technical ambiguities of sonographic interpretation, clients
also acted with error in mind. In accounting for potentially inaccurate gendering, families
drew on everyday awareness of reproductive misfortunes resulting from SD failures: the
neighbor who paid 50,000 rupees for a “good” scan and birthed a girl six months later, or
the cousin who received “male” and “maybe female” reports from the same doctor one
week apart, without any further guidance. Uma-masi’s older daughter-in-law often
recounted with glee how Dr. Ganpat had guaranteed her parents she would be a boy. The
Nandini staff frequently recalled the woeful case of a fortysomething woman who
endured burdensome fertility treatment, gestational diabetes, and gestational hypertension
in pursuit of a boy; upon seeing her newborn girl, she had screamed—“How can that
be?!”— and confessed that Dr. Narendra had assured her of a son months earlier. In
short, people were acutely aware that SD could fail, with stories of error encouraging
rescans and second opinions because of the profound implications of “male” and
“female” results.
With initial “male” declarations, families sought confirmation to ensure that
reproductive labor—not merely during the pregnancy and birth, but for years to come—
was being committed to a son. Cautionary tales about the catastrophic births of
unexpected daughters indexed more than the narrow loss of a misspent SD fee; they also
pointed to wasted reproductive effort and endurance, and the tragic lack of closure
resulting from not having reached the (male) end of reproduction.
Families expended considerable energy and money to attain certainty around
sons-to-be. After receiving a “positive” result at Chetna, my neighbor Megha- sought
opinions at three other clinics, ultimately spending nearly 100,000 rupees; even then, she
suffered through “constant tension” until she saw her newborn boy. Although few
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patients sought out four independent scans, my neighbor’s quest reflected the doubts that
plagued women expecting sons. Many reported feeling anxious, uncertain, or worried
until the baby actually “arrived.” Esha-ben, whose selective abortion and subsequent
“male” result I described in Chapter 2, once told me, “I was in doubt all the way to nine
months, all the way to the end! After the child came, I finally felt satisfied—‘Okay,
good.’ My cousin had it happen: a gynec in Banaskantha told her it was a boy; then the
delivery happened, and it was a girl! This was a fresh example. Since we’d seen this, we
were both worried...”
Esha-ben’s comment indexes a key factor impelling the quest for conformation:
whereas a female fetus could be eliminated in utero, a newborn daughter exerted an
immediate claim on her parents’ love and care—what one obstetrician called “moral
bondage.” When I spoke to Anjali-ben about her and Bipin-bhai’s visit to Chetna, she
corroborated this dynamic: “Saheb has declared it. But when it comes, when God gives it
to us, that’s when it’s real! At that point, it’s not like we can do anything. Then, whatever
it is, we have to accept happily.” Dr. Ranjit also observed that parents quickly developed
emotional ties to unwanted and even unexpected daughters; though the girls might suffer
differential treatment or subtle neglect, they could not be rejected, as a newly gendered
fetus could.
People often discussed the stakes of specious “male” results in the language of
“risk.” After years of fertility treatment, Gauri-devi and Dhruv-ji conceived and
subsequently arranged a visit to Chetna through Uma-masi.46 Upon returning to Nandini,
Dhruv-ji repeatedly asked Uma-masi if the result was “100%,” even though the doctor
had expressed full confidence. As he explained his apprehension, words tumbled forth in
an impassioned cascade:
It’s not doubt, nothing like that. But it’s a matter of risk. Because now we
can’t take a risk. We’re both about to be forty. There are so many
responsibilities to raising a daughter: How will she grow up? What will
her in-laws be like? What will happen to her? What about her education?
All that. And with a boy, there’s nothing like that. A boy’ll grow up all on
his own! So for us—our capacity will start decreasing soon. We can’t take
that big a responsibility. So it’s a matter of risk; we can’t take any risk.
The shadowy possibility of a misclassified girl represented a risk with low probability but
high potential harm.
Dr. Ranjit and Uma-masi also invoked tropes of risk in their reassurances to
clients. In one instance, a couple returned for confirmation two months after initial SD.
The husband complained that his wife was “keeping tension on her mind, staying up at
night and not letting me sleep.” The patient admitted sheepishly to worrying because
older relatives interpreted the similarity in hend [embodied experience]47 between her
current and previous pregnancies as a sign of another impending daughter. After scanning
46

I describe my experiences accompanying Gauri-devi and Dhruv-ji in Chapter 5.
Hend denoted the overall bodily experience of a particular pregnancy, including patterns of nausea, pain,
craving, and so on.
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and demonstrating the fetus’s now-prominent penile and scrotal shadows, Dr. Ranjit
smiled wryly and said, “Let’s make a bet! How much will you put up? 500,000? If you
have a girl, I’ll give you 500,000!” The couple chuckled, but he continued, “Come here
for delivery, alright? If you have a girl, I’ll give you 500,000. If it’s a boy, you give me
500,000! Give it to me for your satisfaction.”
Unlike the proposed wager, Dr. Ranjit’s suggestion of delivery at Chetna was
more than a rhetorical device. Many women returned to give birth at the clinics where
they underwent SD, even if they received routine prenatal care elsewhere. Such returns
indexed the sense of obligation that bound practitioners and clients: families would
inevitably seek redress upon exposure of catastrophic error, and the mere possibility
pushed some obstetricians toward greater care in sonographic interpretation.
All the same, unexpected daughters did appear with some frequency. Obtaining
compensation for misclassification depended on clients’ willingness to enter uneven
extortive terrain. Some families voiced a feeling of helplessness, noting their implication
in illegal activity and the lack of concrete records. Others, by contrast, effectively
leveraged doctors’ interest in keeping their illegal activity invisible. By threatening to
expose practitioners—often with the knowledge that prosecution under the PreConception and Pre-Natal Diagnostic Techniques (PCPNDT) Act had never targeted
clients in Gujarat—families could extract considerable sums. In one case, a facilitator
helped a family recover a 10,000-rupee fee and squeeze another 60,000 rupees from a
Patan doctor who had mistakenly declared an eventual daughter “male”; multiple sources
confirmed that the obstetrician stopped providing commercial SD thereafter.
False “Females” and the Specter of Mistaken Elimination
Viewed against birth of an unexpected daughter, abortion of a potential son
represented a different kind of catastrophe. Mistakenly eliminating a male fetus would
amount to discarding the desired object of reproduction. Families grasped for
confirmation after a “female” result to avoid losing a precious son-to-be due to erroneous
interpretation.
People also pursued confirmation because of the embodied suffering and moral
transgression entailed by sex-selective abortion. Women and their relatives cited fear of
“ruining the body” and “enduring all that” as a motivation when seeking rescans or
second opinions. They similarly expressed a need for certainty before initiating “wrong
deeds” or “sin.”
Finally, quests for certainty were a way of grappling with the existential
misfortune of a female fetus. A “negative” result derailed the teleological narrative of son
pursuit, redirecting it from hope into despair. Recognizing a daughter-to-be placed
families in a dilemma: embrace sentiments for and against particular types of children
and reject the pregnancy, or accept the pregnancy and suppress avidly held desires. In
struggling with the existential dilemma of an unwanted result, families might search for
alternative certainties. (In fact, as I detail in Chapter 5, they might even attempt to open
up uncertainties in seemingly airtight knowledge.)
As with birth of an expected son, final proof of an accurate “female” result lay in
examining anatomy ex utero. Families often requested to see fetal genitals after abortion,
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and many clinicians complied.48 Paradoxically, familial inspection still relied on expert
interpretation to make fetal fragments intelligible as markers of a specific kind of rejected
potential person. Even after placing the fetal pelvis in a bedpan and showing it directly to
relatives, Dr. Ranjit or the nurses generally had to point to the remains and declare, “It’s
definitely a girl.” Despite anatomic inspection’s dependence on biomedical mediation,
clients valued it as a means of confirming accuracy. Uma-masi recounted an instance in
which she had had to arrange a 50,000-rupee settlement after a family threatened to
expose Dr. Harnish following selective abortion—not for an error, but for disposing of
the fetal remains without showing them.
The paradoxical probatory status of fetal anatomy—significant, but largely
inscrutable—made it a common site for forging new certainties and uncertainties.
Numerous doctors admitted quietly discarding obviously male fetuses and subsequently
telling clients the procedure had mangled the genitals. In such cases, the claim of
mutilation-induced ambiguity masked the actual certainty of error, allowing clinicians to
perpetuate the fiction of an accurate result. One doctor recounted this tactic in
conjunction with even more overt deception:
It happened that we said female, and it came out male. It happened rarely,
but it happened—especially in the beginning, when we first started
looking in the ‘90s. You can’t show that patient the male child. If the
perineal part’s broken up, how’s the patient going to know anyway?
Once, I had to cut off the penile portion—this was a temporary
measure, the only option I had left. I told the staff to cut it off with
scissors...
“You have to protect yourself,” the doctor concluded. “You have to do this, or the patient
may come against you.”
Perhaps due to post-abortion fetal anatomy’s relative illegibility—and perhaps
due to obstetricians’ elimination of evidence undermining their infallibility—cautionary
tales of mistakenly aborted male fetuses did not circulate in everyday discourse as widely
as tales of unexpected daughters. Instead, stories about misgendered potential sons tended
to center on narrowly averted disaster. They highlighted cases where some intervening
event—doubt, second opinion, aversion to abortion—enabled birth of an unexpected son.
Through ongoing engagement with Anjali-ben and Bipin-bhai, I learned that
theirs was one such case. Bipin-bhai’s voice rose in indignation as he recounted:
48

Ganatra et al. (2001: 119-120) found that the fetus was shown to most of the women who underwent sexselective abortion in their rural Maharashtrian sample (185 of 252), with five reporting that the fetus turned
out male. Also see Gammeltoft (2014a: 209-223) on confronting and grieving fetal remains after disabilityselective abortions in Vietnam, and Rapp (1999: 242-244) and L. Mitchell (2014) on parental interaction
with fetal remains after similar abortions in North America. In contrast to the latter three cases, in which
handling of fetal remains often combined anatomic appraisal with acts of fondness and remembrance,
display of female fetuses after selective abortion around Mahesana tended to focus solely on evaluation of
genitals. Women would sometimes speculate about “the girl” represented by the body, but such meanings
were not foregrounded in the moment of inspection.
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First, we had it done in Ahmedabad. He told me the opposite report—a
girl. Well, I had full doubt.... I’m not the kind of man who just trusts
someone else’s word. I didn’t see it, did I? How would I know?...
He was just interested in his money! He figured that if he told us it
was a girl, he would get his full 25,000. Understand? That maybe if he
said it was a boy, we might have paid 10,000 and left. So for his money,
he was prepared to wreck us!
The couple had found Uma-masi through Anjali-ben’s cousin—a previous client—and
arranged a visit to Dr. Ranjit, who declared the fetus male. They were returning to Chetna
for a confirmatory scan the day we met.
A month later, the couple obtained a 3D sonography in Mahesana and purchased
the images on CD. Bipin-bhai took the CD to the first obstetrician and threw it on his
desk, thundering, “Just check this on your computer—the photo speaks for itself! Give
me back my money, or I’ll hit you with a case!” Confronted with the iconic evidence of
mid-second-trimester 3D images—more amenable to lay scrutinization than the fuzzy
shapes of earlier 2D scans—the doctor immediately returned the payment.
Bipin-bhai and Anjali-ben’s cautionary tale demonstrates how doubt could lead to
further care-seeking, reclassification, and an altered reproductive trajectory. The story
also gives firm voice to an accusation that many families and even obstetricians
whispered, though rarely with concrete evidence. Expert knowledge, the rumor went,
could be tainted by greed; when unsure, doctors erred toward “female” results to collect
extra fees for selective abortion.49
Revelation of inaccuracy allowed Anjali-ben to avoid selective abortion. But
many women were not so fortunate. I turn now to their experiences.

Sex-Selective Abortion and Risk
Returning from lunch, I learned Dr. Ranjit had already completed Rajni-ben’s
abortion. He performed another selective abortion; the patient had obtained SD the
previous day.
When the doctor returned to the consultory, a couple was already waiting for him.
He evidently recognized them, for he scolded, “You are very late!” The husband said
they had encountered difficulty in taking time off to return for confirmation, since both
worked as agricultural day laborers. Appearing exasperated, the doctor showed them into
the examining area.
As he scanned, Dr. Ranjit confirmed the patient’s obstetric history: one daughter
by Caesarean, a second by vaginal birth, and a third by Caesarean just six months ago. At
one point, he sighed heavily and whispered to me, “Gestational age is quite advanced—
nineteen weeks. Now it is quite large. In this, you cannot do dilation and evacuation. We
will have to initiate labor.”
Out in the consultory, Dr. Ranjit informed the couple that while he might have
risked a “curetting” two weeks earlier, the fetus’s subsequent growth and the history of
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two Caesarean deliveries now necessitated a “kāchi delivery.” The process would last
more than twelve hours, reaching completion early the next morning. The couple
assented, and Dr. Ranjit instructed the staff to take the patient out for catheter placement.
A bit later, when I stepped out for a moment, the husband pulled me into the ward
where he and his wife were sitting. He asked if the abortion could be sped up at all: “See,
we’ve left our three little girlies at home. And the little one just can’t bear to be without
Mummy at night.” They had travelled nearly 100 kilometers by bus, from a village in a
neighboring district, and were anxious to return home quickly. I explained that rushing
the abortion could pose significant risks. The man shook his head and sighed. “What
choice do we have?” he asked. “Saheb said it’s a girl. And we already have three. Our
only work is piecemeal labor. What else could we do?” The couple nodded toward me,
which I took as a sign to leave.
Dr. Ranjit performed the day’s fifteenth SD on a patient accompanied by two
men. “This is XX, clear-cut!” he murmured to me. “There is nothing there.” Sonographic
measurement of the fetal skull suggested a gestational age of sixteen weeks.
Outside, the doctor collected the payment—10,000 rupees—and chatted with the
group about mutual acquaintances. After some minutes, during a lull in the conversation,
one of the men hesitantly asked the result. Very softly, Dr. Ranjit replied, “It’s a girl.”
Both men frowned. “If you don’t want to keep it, then you’d have to have a kāchi
delivery done. It’s not possible by normal method any more.” Turning to me, he
explained, “This patient has two C/S. Because it’s sixteen weeks, we cannot do it except
by induction.” He turned back to the men. “There would be risk in taking it out. If you
want to get it done elsewhere, get it done, but don’t take my name.”
As the group rose to leave, the woman looked at the men with furrowed brow and
asked, “What did Saheb say?” Amid the low murmuring, she still had not heard the
result. Turning toward the door, one of the men mumbled a one-word reply—“female”—
and motioned her out.
During the afternoon, I saw Dr. Ranjit encourage several other couples to “get it
taken out” elsewhere. His rationale for doing so became clear during an interlude
between patients, as we discussed the legal risks of his practice. When I hazarded that the
legal prohibition seemed to make SD more risky than selective abortion, he smirked
skeptically and said, “No, no! In termination, the risk is there. There may be more risks!
Medical complications are there: perforation of the uterus, bleeding. Then we have to
give explanation. And then the patient will not keep quiet... Patient may become hostile.
And SD patients stay for a few minutes; termination patients stay for a few hours.”
I thought of the day’s abortion patients. For them, the medical risks Dr. Ranjit
cited were bodily risks. Rajni-ben, the women from the neighboring district, several the
others—because they sought procedures that almost no one was willing to perform, they
found themselves forced to accept whatever the conditions at Chetna might be.
“Ruining the Body”
Most families receiving a “female” result ultimately opted for abortion, whether at
Chetna or elsewhere. That Uma-masi referred to selective abortions as “cancel” vividly
captures how the procedures eliminated potential children the watershed SD event had
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made undesired. Knowledge of fetal sex, interpreted through gender-kinship norms as
overdetermined life prospects for future child and parents, prompted severance of
inchoate relations with the female fetal subject. At the same time, selective abortions
were not a monolithic category: differences in maternal or fetal bodies influenced the
procedure’s risks and the doctor’s willingness to assume them. Bodily and legal risks
sometimes interacted in ways that forced women to stage medical emergencies as means
to eliminate daughters-to-be.
Sex-selective abortion imposed marked suffering on pregnant women.
Emotionally, many experienced ambivalence, sorrow, and anxiety around the “chosen
loss” and the procedure that enacted it.50 Such reactions were elicited by “not abortion in
general..., but selective abortion in all its specificity.”51 Women spoke of sex selection as
“killing a girl”—an ethical anxiety I return to in Chapter 5. And as I discuss in Chapter 4,
many experience profound grief at being forced by in-laws to give up daughters-to-be.
Physically, selective abortion—a risk management technique for families—
entailed significant suffering and risk for women. Patients undergo selective abortion at
Chetna experienced intense (and sometimes avoidable) physical discomfort, inadequately
palliated pain, frequently secondary infection, and incomplete abortions and consequent
ongoing bleeding; I knew of cases in which hasty obstetricians perforated the uterus,
leading to a catastrophic bleeding and a surgical emergency. Whereas scholarship and
policy discourse on abortion in India have frequently highlighted the harm from
unqualified practitioners and self-medication, the physical toll of Mahesana-area sexselective abortion—a middle-class practice mediated by trained clinicians—owed much
to the procedure’s medical characteristics and legal context. Second-trimester timing
elevated the risk of complications relative to typical first-trimester abortions, and the
specter of government surveillance drove doctors to rush selective abortions, raising the
possibility of greater recklessness and negligence.
Women almost universally agreed that sex-selective abortions “ruin the body.”
Shortly after Nayna-ben’s husband complained the high financial costs of sex selection to
me, her sister nodded toward the unconscious woman and explained the corporeal costs:
Look: her body’s energy is so low! This ruins the body so much. If you
take it out unripe, of course it’s going sap your energy, right? This is a lot
worse than a delivery. A delivery is a thing God started. But abortion,
kāchi delivery—these are things we’ve started. Unnatural. So there’s a
difference. She never felt so much torture in the deliveries. But when we
do this kind of bhrunhatyā, the energy goes down, the body is ruined
more, and everything gets messed up inside.
As “unnatural” events disrupting an advanced pregnancy, selective abortions produced
pain, weakness, and damage to the maternal body.
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Through conversations with women, I came to understand the trope of bodily
ruination as standing in for the broader set of embodied sufferings—repeated
pregnancies, dashed hopes, ongoing uncertainties, profound disappointment and grief—
that women assumed for their conjugal families in the collective pursuit of a son. Sex
selection was a bodily inscription of an incomplete reproductive trajectory, one that
might contain many more pregnancies and many more chosen losses. Experiences and
memories of it always carried a nagging sense of indeterminacy and open-endedness,
which came to be contained by the synecdoche of bodily ruination. Moreover, amid the
pervasive normalization of sex-selective abortion and the concomitant absence of a
cultural language for recognizing the tragedy of specific instances,52 “ruining the body”
became the idiom for grieving the loss of pregnancy, possibility, and potential children.
Women visiting Chetna for selective abortions pervasively discussed fears of the
procedures and their attendant pain. Such discussion drew on others’ stories as well as
their own prior experiences.53 Dr. Ranjit had little patience for expressions of fear and
often chided patients, “Then let it be!” He was often joined by husbands and mothers-inlaw who admonished women to “toughen up” and “stop worrying.”
The procedures that women dreaded typically took place during the fourth month
of gestation. Nurses began by administering hormonal tablets and injections to initiate
uterine contractions and cervical softening.54 As the drugs took effect over several hours,
pain, discomfort, and nausea mounted. Families typically bided the time in one of the
clinic’s private rooms or general wards, often complaining about the uncleanliness. They
also complained of boredom and found themselves at pains to occupy young daughters,
who often alternated between caressing their ailing mothers and throwing tantrums. For
some groups, the ennui of waiting was punctuated only by phone calls to arrange for
others to milk buffalo, tend shops, feed daughters left at home, convey apologies for
missed social functions, and provide transport home from the clinic.
When the procedure was imminent, many women echoed Asha-ben by asking me
to remain present after they were sedated. I read such requests as attempts to secure a
biomedically informed check on the doctor’s care. The requests also ensured women of at
least one familiar, responsive person amid a flurry of often-indifferent clinicians.
The procedure room was dark and grimy, dotted with fresh and dried blood. It
was home to several rodents and occasional flies. In preparing patients, nurses undertook
frenzied activity around their bodies while almost never responding to their desperate
questions about impending pain and sedation. The nurses spoke to the women only to
provide stern instructions: “Lie down!” “Take off your underwear!” “Spread your legs!”
“Give me your hand!” “Move down!” “Stay still!”
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Just before the procedure began, a nurse injected a sedative-anesthetic
preparation, often without any warning except “Make a fist!”55 The patient’s body
usually slumped, and her words petered out. Some women remained somewhat
conscious, often moaning or crying out in pain. Dr. Ranjit would shrug and explain,
“Response is variable—some are very sensitive.” I strongly suspected that his practices
also played a role: his staff tended to administer low anesthetic and sedative doses in
order to conserve stock amid high patient volume, and he himself often progressed
rapidly from injection to physical instrumentation. Like the dirty conditions of the clinic
and the procedure room itself, the possibility of pain was an inconvenience patients found
themselves compelled to accept, given the scarcity of sex selection services.
After the procedure, staff hurriedly moved patients onto a metal stretcher and
wheeled them back out to their families. A nurse handed over a bag of post-procedural
pills for the ensuing days: two antibiotics to prevent infection, a vitamin, two drugs to
calm gastrointestinal distress, a pain medication, and a lactation suppressant. (Dr. Ranjit
explained that his staff dispensed the medications directly, rather than instruction families
to procure them at an outside pharmacy, because “otherwise it becomes evidence.”)
Patients slowly emerged into consciousness, gradually becoming aware of nausea and
pain. As with Asha-ben, their first intelligible utterances were often queries about the
comfort of existing daughters.
Bodily Risk, Legal Risk, and Staged Emergencies
Dr. Ranjit employed alternative abortion techniques in the presence of three risk
factors: more advanced gestation, which correlated to a larger fetus; multiple previous
Caesareans, which correlated to more uterine scar tissue; and recent Caesarean, which
correlated to immature scarring. All of these significantly raised the risk of uterine
perforation, massive blood loss, and downstream complications in a standard dilationand-evacuation abortion. In such cases, the doctor induced kāchi delivery, using an
extraamniotic catheter to mechanically irritate the uterus and initiate a labor process that
lasted up to twenty-four hours and ended with the expulsion of a whole fetus. As in the
early cases recounted by Asha-ben’s mother-in-law, kāchi delivery generally proved
harrowing for women and their accompanying relatives.
Induction of kāchi delivery in riskier cases fit into a strategy of risk management.
Many obstetricians agreed with Dr. Ranjit’s view that selective abortion could prove
more dangerous than SD. Explaining why he refused to perform selective abortions
despite providing SD, Dr. Tapan said, “There are more complications in termination,
right? Where does exposure happen? Where do things come out? With complications!”
Referencing the recent scandalous death of a selective abortion patient, he continued,
“What happened in that Ahmedabad case, with that woman’s death? If she hadn’t died,
they wouldn’t have been caught.” He went on to talk about an obstetrician he knew who
had become embroiled in a patient’s divorce proceedings after she claimed that her
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family had forced her to undergo two selective abortions at his hands. He concluded, “So
the whole car flips over. When there are complications, you have problems.”
While disclosure of sex was difficult to catch, an abortion mishap like uterine
rupture could easily expose a practitioner, with emergency treatment and family outcry
bringing down unwanted attention. State policy thus transformed women’s bodily risks
intro legal risks for clinicians. Though patients sometimes decided to keep pregnancies
when faced with the riskiness of a potential abortion, those proceeding entered a terrain
shaped by the confluence of three agendas: their own, which focused on eliminating a
known daughter-to-be while balancing safety and speed; the doctor’s, which focused on
generating profits while avoiding medical and hence legal complications; and the state’s,
which focused on protecting the threatened female fetus, but without regard for pregnant
women’s safety.
Mahesana-area obstetricians responded to laminated medical and legal risks by
assuming positions within a division of labor. Some, like Dr. Tapan, performed SD but
left ensuing abortions to colleagues like Dr. Ranjit, thereby profiting from sex selection
while avoiding its more dangerous component. Meanwhile, Dr. Ranjit performed
selective abortions but left the most difficult ones to “bold” colleagues. Clinicians’
divergent roles within the divison of labor depended on differences in their degree of risk
aversion, but also differences in their perceptions of risk due to expertise level; many
colleagues agreed that Dr. Ranjit could perform dilation-and-evacuation abortions on
patients for whom they would attempt only kāchi delivery, and the former maintained
that Dr. Ganpat could perform quick abortions on patients for whom he would insist on
induction.
Faced with risky cases, Dr. Ranjit did not refuse categorically. Instead, he did so
in ways that left open the possibility of his relenting. He frequently carried on protracted
negotiations with families, refusing while avoiding full foreclosure. Within the small
openings that remained, insistent clients could convince him, overcoming his medicolegal (and sometimes religious) ambivalence with pleas of desperation and promises of
profit.
That the outcomes of such negotiations did not always favor women’s safety
became clear when I met Falguni-ben and her husband. They came to Chetna from
Ahmedabad, toting a six-year-old and an infant, for confirmation of a “female” result
declared two days earlier. As soon as the doctor holstered the transducer, Falguni-ben sat
up and asked, “The same?” At his silence, she frowned.
“This is when we need to be sure,” Dr. Ranjit said to me. “She has two previous
C/S. So generally, we don’t perform termination. There is scarring, so there is a risk of
perforation.”
Falguni-ben’s eyes widened in alarm: “Saheb, is there risk in this?”
“Ben, with two previous C/S, there’s definitely risk. If we do anything, and
something happens, then we might have to take out the whole uterus.” Dr. Ranjit asked
the infant’s age and scowled at the reply—eight months.
“Now that there’s a problem,” Falguni-ben pressed, “can’t you do something to
solve it?”
“Get it done somewhere else.”
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“But no one’ll do it in Ahmedabad.”
“Sister, if it comes to it, I might even have to do a hysterectomy!”
“Meaning?”
“Meaning, we would have to remove the uterus. With no Caesar, it’s possible to
take a chance, but not here.” The couple slumped in place for a long while.
Stepping out to the consultory, Dr. Ranjit encouraged them to “think it over.”
Falguni-ben retorted, “We don’t want to! Since it’s negative, what else is there? I’m
ready to make the decision.”
We sat silently for two minutes—the longest silence I ever observed at Chetna.
Falguni-ben’s jaw clenched, and her eyes filled with tears that eventually cascaded out in
soft sobs. Eventually, Dr. Ranjit said, “Lately, there’s been a lot of raids. And the thing
is, sister, healing takes time. After a C/S, you have to keep a gap of at least twelve
months!” The doctor harangued the couple at length for not utilizing contraception.
Then sounding more conciliatory, he continued, “With a Caesarean, it’s safe if we
do it by delivery. Or I can talk to Ganpat-bhai. If he does it for you, well and good.”
Falguni-ben and her husband shot each other glances. She pleaded, “Saheb, can’t
you try?”
“Sister, I say no in such cases. When we have such risky cases—say, people with
three Caesareans—we always refer to Ganpat-bhai. He can do it with five scars, too!”
Falguni-ben asked about the induction abortion procedure. After explaining it, the
doctor cautioned, “But if the child coming down disturbs the stitches, and the scar rips,
and a hole forms through it—then you have to take out the whole uterus! Then it’s a
major problem! Instead, why not keep this one?... Because if your uterus goes, it’s all
over for you. If the abortion works, it’s fine. If not, you’re in trouble.”
“But we don’t want it!” Falguni-ben’s tone was indignant. “Since it’s a daughter,
there’s no way we can keep it, no? We already have two.”
“If you keep this, then there are chances of a male in the fourth—“
“We don’t want to take any such risk! I don’t want to keep it. Let’s make a
decision right now.”
“Well, let me try calling Dr. Ganpat.” The patient protested, but Dr. Ranjit had
already dialed. “Yes, there’s a patient... Two previous C/S, but last C/S just nine months
ago... Should I send her?... Very well.” Hanging up, he relayed that Dr. Ganpat would see
them.
Doctor and patient went back and forth for several minutes. Falguni-ben pushed
for Dr. Ranjit to perform the abortion—but quickly. The doctor, in turn, insisted she
would have to either go to Dr. Ganpat or accept a slow induction.
Eventually, Falguni-ben ventured, “Could I take abortion pills, to start bleeding?
Then we could get it done in Ahmedabad.”
To my astonishment, Dr. Ranjit acknowledged the tactic—a dangerous one—as
possible: “Then you could get it done with your regular doctor.”
“Exactly. See, it’s possible to stay overnight there.” She pointed to the infant:
“This one’s very little, that’s why.”
Dr. Ranjit instructed the husband to step outside and ask a nurse for the pills.
Alarmed, I asked, “So you’re giving them abortifacient pills to induce miscarriage?”
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He smiled: “Heavy bleeding is an extremely clear-cut indication! Nobody can
deny.” I asked pointedly whether the plan didn’t carry risk of grave complications. He
admitted, “Yes. Contractions are always there with prostaglandins.” I waited for further
elaboration, but he shuffled papers on his desk.
After a bit, Dr. Ranjit asked where Falguni-ben would obtain the “emergency”
abortion in Ahmedabad. She named her regular obstetrician, noting, “We went there
yesterday, after you gave us the result. We asked her, but she said, ‘There’s no reason.’
So then we didn’t push it.” Now, the couple would have a reason.
Once the husband returned from the dispensary, Falguni-ben began asking about
the effects on her uterus, and whether the pain would be “tolerable.” Sounding impatient,
Dr. Ranjit explained, “It will be tolerable. But the process of pain and bleeding can break
the stitches. But, don’t go too early either! What if you go early, and she gives
medication, and the pain and bleeding stops? What’ll you do if she says you can keep it?”
Now, it was Dr. Ranjit’s turn to sigh. “Instead of all this,” he said, “it’s better if
Ganpat-bhai does it. It’ll be over in three-four hours. He’s done a lot of these. The other
way, you could get stuck with problems—bleeding, pain, an infection. And the doctor
might refuse.”
“Well, this whole problem exists because you won’t do it, right, Saheb?”
“I’d do it slowly, by delivery. You’d have to spend the night.”
“How would Ganpat-bhai do it?”
“It’s nothing big for him. He used to do forty in a day—forty!”
“Saheb, I have no problem going to him. But I don’t want my body to be ruined! I
don’t want anything to happen to me.”
The husband, silent till then, interjected emphatically: “Yes, nothing should
happen to her!”
Worried about Falguni-ben’s safety if she staged a miscarriage, I proposed, “If
you don’t want anything to happen to you, getting admitted here would be best.” She
reiterated her concern regarding safety, and the doctor reassured her nothing would
happen if she remained at Chetna.
Falguni-ben asked, “What do you say, Saheb? If you say, I’ll stay. I’ll make do.”
Dr. Ranjit pursed his lips. “It’s up to you.”
“I’ll go by your advice. If you tell me there won’t be a problem, I’ll do it.”
Beginning to sob and gasp, Falguni-ben continued, “If I do it here, and you’re around,
then there’s safety. If I go home and take the pills, and something happens in the middle
of the night, where would I go? If you’re around, there’s safety for me—you can take
immediate decisions.”
After another silence, the doctor asked, “What do you want to do?”
“Whatever you say.”
“If you want it done in three-four hours, Ganpat-bhai does it. It won’t be a
problem.”
A vigorous head-shake. “I don’t want to go there. Why does he do it so quickly?”
“He’s prepared to take risk! He’s done a lot. He has experience. Doctors like us
wouldn’t even think of doing what he does.”
“We’ll do whatever you say.”
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“You’re the ones in a rush!” Dr. Ranjit was shouting. “If you weren’t, you
wouldn’t even have to consider it, right? If we tried doing it that fast, the complications
would increase.”
“So what do you say? I’ll stay here and get it done.
“Talk it over with your husband—“
Falguni-ben laughed: “I don’t have to ask him! He’ll tell you to ask me. What else
would he say?”
They discussed induction abortion logistics further, and Falguni-ben asked Dr.
Ranjit to try for completion before daybreak. Smirking, he said, “For us, it’s best if you
leave by the morning! It’s safety for us!” He instructed the couple to go outside and wait
for induction. After they left, he turned to me and exclaimed, “How much the patient is
insisting! ‘You do it, you do it, you do it.’ But they’re not prepared to spend the night!”
Dr. Ranjit stepped out briefly. I went to the patio, where Falguni-ben and her
family were sitting. A nurse came out to report that Dr. Ranjit wanted to see the husband.
While he went in, Falguni-ben and I occupied the girls with hand games. At one point,
she shook her head and muttered, “In this era, it’s already so expensive with two
daughters. With marriage—and after marriage, so many problems! If you find a good
household, no problem. Otherwise, it’s all problems.”
After ten minutes, the husband returned. Sighing, he reported Dr. Ranjit’s words:
“’It’ll take three-four hours for the pain to start. And I have to step out, so I won’t be
back for five-six hours. And after that, another five-six hours. Instead, it’s better if you
get it done in Ahmedabad. Give her the pills at night. It’ll happen by morning.” Dr. Ranjit
had used the meeting with the husband to subvert Falguni-ben’s own wishes for her care.
I had to say something directive. Looking at wife and husband by turn, I warned,
“In my view, this is very risky. If you have limited bleeding, it’s fine. But if you have a
lot, there’s a lot of risk. Here, he’ll handle any complication. But if you do it at home, too
much bleeding won’t do, nor will too little.” The husband was nodding along, repeating
some of my words. “The middle road isn’t an easy thing. With no doctor, how’ll you
know how many hours to wait?”
The husband nodded and said, “Saheb said he’ll do it, if we tell him.”
We entered into a flurry of discussion. They asked me about different abortion
procedures. After I answered their questions, they began speaking in hushed tones. The
decision was now theirs.
When a nurse came out to the patio, the husband turned to her and declared,
“We’re going to go back to Ahmedabad and do it there.” The nurse went in to retrieve the
medication.
Feeling a lump in my throat, I asked, in a last-ditch attempt, why they did not trust
Dr. Ganpat. Frowning, Falguni-ben explained, “A friend went from Ahmedabad, and the
place was sketchy—sketchy treatment, sketchy nurses, sketchy doctor. And he’s been
caught once. You have to look at the man, too, don’t you?”
The husband, already clutching the younger daughter, patted the older one on the
head and said, “It’s because of these two girls that we’re not staying. If the two of us
were alone, it’d be no issue. But with these two girls, it’s a problem.”
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The nurse brought out the pills and reiterated instructions. The couple gathered up
the girls and left.
Some days later, I called them to ask after Falguni-ben’s health. Her husband
sighed, “Forget about it. It was torture. It’s taken care of, but it was torture.”56
I subsequently learned that staging emergency—intentionally making a woman’s
bodily state so precarious that any reasonable obstetrician would remove the fetus—was
not just Falguni-ben’s ad hoc tactic. Dr. Ranjit routinely used the technique with families
that did not wish to remain admitted for kāchi delivery. Such staged miscarriages carried
their own grave risks. In one case, a patient returned to Chetna at twenty-two weeks—
more than a month after initial SD. Given the advanced gestational age, Dr. Ranjit gave
her pills to take at home and instructed her to go to a clinic the once bleeding began. I
was present at 5:00 AM the next day when two men carried in the woman, now unable to
stand. The staff rushed to treat her, and I stayed out of the way. Later, a nurse explained:
It came out at home, the whole child... But the cord broke! There can be
lots of bleeding in cases where it comes out at home. With the placenta
stuck inside, that’s bound to happen, right?... The bleeding finally stopped
only when we removed the placenta, removed the clots, and gave
Methergine.57 Thank God, her blood pressure was not too low. But with so
much bleeding, she was so weak.
“There’s no problem if God gives you what you want,” the nurse mused. “But people run
into such difficulties!
While creating the possibility that a patient might experience severe
complications, the staged emergency balanced the competing demands of patients,
doctors, and the state. Families were generally reluctant to remain at Chetna for long
periods; doing so entailed lost time and disruptions to routine tasks like childcare,
housework, farming, and business, as well as considerable discomfort, given the clinic’s
dirty conditions. While Dr. Ranjit generally expressed willingness to admit patients for
induction, he felt ambivalent; doing so carried a small but nontrivial risk of heightened
government suspicion if an inspection happened to occur during the patient’s admission.
He admitted that in precipitating miscarriage, he was wagering that the benefits of
avoiding a lengthy, risky abortion at Chetna outweighed the unpredictability of an
induced emergency that would unfold between the patient’s home and another clinic. The
PCPNDT Act formed the ground from which both doctor and client orientations arose:
because the prohibition on sex selection had made most doctors even more reluctant than
Dr. Ranjit to take on late abortions, patients felt compelled to place themselves in such
precariousness that no obstetrician could refuse to end the pregnancy.
Put differently, while failing to prevent the elimination of female fetuses, the
PCPNDT Act made second-trimester abortions scarcer in a way that perversely
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endangered women with “risky” fetuses or “risky” wombs. Where reproductive
governance generated unintended negative effects, those effects—just like the effects of
the patriarchal order the governance clumsily sought to combat—were visited most
starkly on the bodies and psyches of women.

Late-Term Sex Tracking and Selective Perinatal Care
The Nandini Code and Bifurcated Care
Only after two years did I discover that Dr. Dilip still performed SD on each and
every obstetric patient at Nandini. He did not disclose the resulting information to
families. Instead, he utilized it in other, tremendously consequential ways.
From observing Dr. Dilip’s dictation to his assistant, I knew that when he derived
the estimated date of delivery (EDD) from sonographic measurements, he might yell
“EDD” or “ED.” I had long assumed the variation to be a matter of haste or indifference.
But one day, I heard him ask the assistant, “What’s written on the chart: ED or EDD?”
Confused, I asked the difference. Dr. Dilip socratically turned the question back
to me: “What does ‘EDD’ mean?” I gave the only reply I knew—“estimated date of
delivery.” Smiling mischievously, the doctor continued, “And ‘ED’?” I had to admit I
thought it was the same. Dr. Dilip broke into a full grin and chuckled, “Yes! But this has
a meaning for PCPNDT.” Scrawling the two abbreviations on a chit, he said, “Think
about it!” As I pondered the letters, he returned to seeing patients.
After a few minutes, Dr. Dilip briefly stepped out. His assistant waved me over
and grabbed the chit. Below the second ‘D’ in “EDD,” she continued writing: “...A-U-GH-T-E-R.” My eyes widened.
Smiling, the assistant explained, “This is a code. Saheb, Uma-Masi, and me—
only the three of us know it. Sometimes, we have to actually say the date too, so the
patient doesn’t figure it out! If the patient’s uneducated, it’s not a problem. But if they’re
educated, we have to say the date, too. We used to have a different code—‘S’ and ‘D’—
but we got rid of it.”
Then, she elaborated, “See, if it’s male, they’ll immediately agree to Caesarean.
It’s not like we won’t try, but if we try to do a normal delivery at all costs, and something
happens, then the patient will get more worked up.”
Returning to the consultory, Dr. Dilip turned to me and asked, “Did you figure it
out?” When I nodded, he shouted in mock anger, “Someone must have snitched!”
Chortling, he further clarified the code’s function:
See, this is useful to us in the management of delivery. In the end time, if
at all anything happens to a male child, the family will not forgive. They
will be very angry. If something happens to a female child, they will not
be as much angry. And so with both, we take care. But with “ED,” with
even the mildest indication for C/S, we will not hesitate to take C/S.
Whereas with “EDD,” we can stretch it a little.
If we need to take the C/S and the child is a male child, then
afterward, the patient will not object; looking retrospectively, the patient
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will be happy that you have taken this decision and will gladly pay for the
operation. But with a female child, they may not be so happy. We don’t
want any child to expire; we take care in every pregnancy. But this is a
well-known fact: if a male child should die perinatally, the family will
become very angry. They may become violent, may ruin the doctor’s
reputation. They may form a mob, as in that Chandrika-ben’s case.
“With a female child,” he concluded, “they will be sad, but they will be quicker to
accept the loss; they will not feel that they have lost so much.”
I asked the doctor when he determined whether a patient had an “ED” or an
“EDD.” He replied:
Any time after five-six months. Any time I am a little bit free, I will look,
and we will note it down, because it can help us in the management.
Because with male child, we will not take any risk of normal delivery—
we will do C/S for even the mildest indication. Whereas with a female
child, if there is some indication for C/S, say fifty-fifty chance of delivery
by normal labor, then we will do a longer trial of labor. If there is
something like oligohydramnios or cephalopelvic disproportion, we will
not even take any chance with a male child, whereas with a female child,
we may try normal delivery.
With that, he returned to examining patients, leaving me in thought. I marveled at how
the code allowed Dr. Dilip to continue incorporating knowledge of fetal sex into his care
decisions—which were, of course, also business decisions.
From then on, I began noticing the Nandini code in every late-term prenatal visit.
Sometimes, Dr. Dilip shouted “ED” or “EDD” to his assistant from behind the curtain.
On other occasions, he asked her to specify one or the other and then made decisions
about care based on the information.58
I also noticed a drastic bifurcation in perinatal care at Nandini, precisely as per the
clinicians’ explanations. Whereas mild to moderate concerns regarding fetal wellbeing
often led to watchful waiting in “EDD” cases, Dr. Dilip often recommended immediate
Caesarean delivery in otherwise similar “ED” cases. In other words, he intervened more
aggressively to deliver sons from the womb. The doctor did not divulge fetal sex, but he
frequently pushed families with “ED” pregnancies toward Caesarean delivery, listing out
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a litany of fetal complications if the child was “left in too long.” In numerous cases, he
preemptively delivered male fetuses in the early ninth or even eighth month—a stage
considered “premature” by biomedical standards.
The divergent care enabled by the Nandini code reflected the differential
valuation of sons and daughters within the moral economy of gender-kinship. This
differential valuation corresponded not only to intensity of familial anger if something
befell the fetus, but also to the profitability of male and female newborns as products of
obstetricians’ work. When doctors gave families what both parties sometimes called
“something good,” the latter made minimal attempts to bargain down the fees for
Caesareans, which easily quadrupled those for vaginal deliveries. By contrast, families
receiving a daughter often insisted on a lower price; if the delivery had been Caesarean,
they might also portray the obstetrician as over-inclined toward operative delivery,
damaging his reputation among prospective clients. Surreptitious detection and tracking
allowed clinicians to capitalize on fetal sex, performing Caesareans when they were most
profitable and avoiding them when they might harm business.
Bifurcated perinatal care, which flatly contradicted the doctor’s insistence that
“we take care in every pregnancy,” had palpable consequences. During my fieldwork,
several Nandini patients near full term experienced the heartbreaking stillbirth of a
daughter. Uma-Masi, other Nandini staff, and I concurred in our assessment of these
cases: Dr. Dilip had not intervened at the earliest signs of danger, when the babies might
still have been saved by Caesarean delivery, because the charts had not borne “ED”
designations. The assistant doctor’s comments after such incidents were always some
variation on the same theme: At least since it’s a female, they’re a little less shocked. If it
had been a male child—imagine what they would be like! Everyone agreed that stillbirth
of a male fetus would carry the potential for what Dr. Dilip called the “atom bomb”—the
sort of mob violence that had descended after the death of Chandrika-ben’s newborn son.
Ironically, Chandrika-ben’s loss had resulted from precisely the type of
aggressive intervention that it was eventually used to justify (at least for “ED” cases): the
child had died after Dr. Dilip, preparing to leave for an out-of-state trip, performed a
premature Caesarean. While guaranteeing more biomedically management of transition
into the world, early Caesareans also created new threats to emerging sons’ survival. In
some cases, male newborns, having exhibited no signs of “fetal distress,” experienced
extensive complications—likely attributable to premature delivery—and had to remain
under inpatient pediatric monitoring for a week or more. Although the doctor took some
steps to mitigate the risk of complications, the alternative to the son “left in too long” was
not a straightforward passage to safety.59
Selective perinatal care at Nandini exhibited the same tendencies Claire
Wendland has identified in biomedical discourse around Caesarean delivery: it obscured
the woman as all but a container, marketed “fetal safety” as a paramount concern, and
advocated aggressive intervention to overcome unpredictability.60 Wombs became
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“dangerous sites from which fetuses must be rescued,” and tales of tragedy were
mobilized to justify aggressive action.61 These tendencies reflected reproductive
medicine’s broader interventionist model, which often transforms maternal and fetal
bodies into objects of invasive technocratic management.62 The fetus’s emergent
personhood and the specter of perinatal mortality augmented one another, producing an
“unborn patient” that merited intervention.63 In this, the Nandini pattern also paralleled
Amrita Pande’s recent observations at a Gujarati transnational surrogacy center, where
Caesarean delivery became almost inevitable as a means of ensuring safe extraction of
“precious” babies attained at great cost and effort.64
What distinguished Dr. Dilip’s Caesarean interventionism amid these broader
patterns was its selectivity. Only some babies appeared precious enough to merit
aggressive action. The Nandini code and its clinical deployment produced a gendered
classification of emergent lives and a corresponding bifurcation of care. Surreptitious SD,
coded tracking, and Caesarean delivery allowed Dr. Dilip to control the delivery of male
life into the world and extract profit from it. By increasing the risk of iatrogenic
complications, such intervention paradoxically endangered the much-desired son.
Nonetheless, because preemptive delivery substituted apparent biomedical control for
“natural” unpredictability, aggressive Caesarean became the hallmark of a diligent
doctor.
The obverse of this overly interventionist approach was a laissez-faire treatment
of female fetuses. By late term, biomedical action was no longer actively eliminating
potential daughters. Instead, it was simply leaving emerging girls to weather the
vicissitudes of late gestation and delivery, “marked as unpredictable, uncontrolled, and
therefore dangerous.”65
In speaking with Dr. Dilip’s obstetric colleagues, I learned that many similarly
determined and tracked fetal sex without disclosing it to families.66 Once obtained,
knowledge of fetal sex functioned in various local clinics much as it did at Nandini. In
discussing his routine antenatal care practices, Dr. Tapan said, “See, what we do is, we
find out, and we just remember, or note down somehow in chart. Then, at the time of
delivery, this can be helpful to manage properly. Because this is a fact, that a male child
will have more complications. Scientifically, male child will have much more difficulty
61

Wendland 2007: 227, 224.
Cf. Davis-Floyd 2004; Jordan 1993; Martin 1987; Oakley 1984.
63
Cf. Casper 1998; Weir 2006.
64
A. Pande 2014: 116-120. By contrast, Deomampo interprets high Caesarean rates among commercial
surrogates in Mumbai as a function of a racialized view of their bodies as always-already risky (2016: 171193). The two emphases—the preciousness of the emerging baby for Pande, the riskiness of the intrauterine
environment for Deomampo—complement one another in highlighting the importance of aggressively
extracting valued children from the womb.
65
Wendland 2007: 224.
66
Perhaps wary of the legal risks or moral connotations of admitting to SD, some obstetricians denied
deliberately searching for the genitals, instead insisting that the third-trimester penile and scrotal shadows
were so prominent that one could not help but notice them. While knowledge of sex may have imposed
itself in a pseudo-self-evident manner during sonography, the use of the information for care decisions
obviously required a degree of active calculation from doctors.
62

195

in same delivery than female child.”
Like Dr. Tapan, many clinicians justified the need for greater vigilance around
male fetuses on the basis of perceived differences in the hardiness of male and female
infants, invoking both personal experience and scientific literature. Research does,
indeed, support the notion that greater susceptibility to difficult labor, birth injuries, and
maternal disease or accident leads to greater mortality among male fetuses and neonates
than among their female counterparts, with the rate of demise perhaps 20% to 40% higher
for the former.67 But in the context of obstetric practice in Mahesana, the documented
difference became exaggerated and mobilized to naturalize unequal treatment. For
instance, in clarifying his use of the Nandini code, Dr. Dilip ventured:
One thing you see, that if you have five boys with an alarming situation,
then of those five, perhaps three will have difficulty—difficulty breathing,
postnatal problem, need to be kept admitted as a neonate, like that. But if
you have five girls in the same situation, only one will have that difficulty.
Nature has given females this strength, that they are better able to endure a
difficult situation perinatally. Males’ bodies are less able to handle.
The lower valuation of girls made it easy to speciously contend that nature, left to its own
course, accorded them much better survival prospects than their precious male
counterparts; the same lower valuation also made their demise less commercially
damaging when nature took an unfavorable course. As integral parts of doctors’ mental
dispositions for fetal monitoring and evaluation, presumptions of female hardiness and
male weakness pathologized identical bodily situations as different threats according to
sonographic sexing. Naturalization of divergent care for male and female fetuses
reflected and reinforced the broader social and market situation, in which families more
keenly desired, demanded, and remunerated safe passage into the world for sons.
Family Knowledge and Precious Pregnancies
Of course, clinicians did not simply pull unwitting patients into a regime of
bifurcated perinatal care. Six months after I first learned the Nandini code, I entered the
clinic from a driving rain to see Sheela-ben and her husband, whose early prenatal visit
had been the occasion for my first observation of the “software excuse.” Now, after
having received a “positive” declaration at Chetna, they were entering the ninth month of
pregnancy.
During their visit with Dr. Dilip, the husband said sternly, “There shouldn’t be
any problems!” The doctor assured him there were none, but the husband retorted, “What
if something happens to the child in the belly in the next ten-fifteen days?” Dr. Dilip
explained that there was little likelihood of any difficulty, and that to “get it out before
the months are complete” could generate its own problems. He dictated his
ultrasonography findings—all normal—to his assistant and told her to prescribe the
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patient two corticosteroid injections, as he typically did near term to ensure fetal lung
maturation. The husband interjected, “Make it three!” The husband was almost certainly
unfamiliar with the biomedical evidence regarding dosing and efficacy of prenatal
corticosteroids; in fact, when we discussed the encounter, he admitted he did not really
know what the injections did. But his insistence indexed an embrace of intensive
biomedical intervention to protect a known male fetus.
At the end of the visit, Sheela-ben asked, “What if we draw it out and something
happens? You have to do a C/S, Saheb! We have to have a C/S!” They eventually agreed
that Dr. Dilip would do a Caesarean delivery in a few days, once the corticosteroids had
taken effect.
Doctors widely reported that recognition of a son-to-be drove clients like Sheelaben and her husband to actively push for more intensive perinatal care. The assistant
doctor at Nandini observed:
Patients who’ve gotten SD—they worry more. They worry about
everything and come in for checkups every ten days. ‘It’s a boy! What if
something happens to him?’ It becomes a very precious pregnancy. Then,
at the end, they don’t want a normal delivery—they only want a C/S. 90%
of normal deliveries won’t face any problem, but if it’s a boy, they won’t
take any risk. We recently had a patient like that—very wealthy. They had
a boy, and they insisted on us doing a C/S. Saheb refused. But they
insisted. They said, ‘Saheb, what if something happens to our boy?
Patients won’t do this for a girl. But if it’s a boy, they want a C/S.
An anesthesiologist who attended many Caesarean deliveries similarly observed that
many patients felt a need to “get it out” quickly when they had “gotten it checked.”68
Such statements underscore the intense impulse toward active extraction of male lives
from the womb, where a son-to-be could become endangered at any moment. Based on
doctors’ pre-delivery warnings and various circulating stories, families generally knew
the potential for neonatal complications after premature Caesarean. Yet they demanded
preemptive intervention all the same. Early extraction at least rendered the fetus
physically accessible, enabling further direct monitoring and intervention; for prospective
parents, as for doctors, the iatrogenic risks of such extraction seemed preferable to the
unpredictability of intrauterine existence and “natural” passage out of the mother’s body.
By contrast, families expecting a daughter often insisted on leaving the fetus to
survive the late-term womb and normal delivery without interference. Dr. Tapan
observed, “If they find out it’s a girl, then no matter what, the patient’ll say, ‘Just do a
normal delivery, Saheb.’ That patient won’t get a C/S done. Even if there’s a natural
complication, they won’t be ready... If they know it’s male, then they’ll be overjoyed and
do whatever it takes. If it’s a female, they won’t be too concerned.” Given a daughter’s
lower value to the family, her safe extraction was less imperative. Families explained that
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foregoing Caesareans allowed them to avoid higher medical costs, as well as to spare
women’s bodies the wear that would decrease short-term contribution to domestic work
and long-term ability to safely bear the inevitable son. In an echo of doctor’s biological
rationalizations, many clients also justified differential care by positing that girls were
“naturally” stronger and so could weather greater perinatal difficulties.
I observed dozens of cases substantiating the notion that prior SD heavily
influenced client preferences around late-term care. Sometimes, families explicitly
declared their knowledge of a son-to-be and demanded safe extraction at all costs.
Sometimes, they dropped heavy-handed hints: “This time, it’s good, so do whatever you
need to—do a Caesar if it’s necessary.” Sometimes, they stopped short of revealing their
knowledge but raised concern after concern to nudge the doctor toward or away from
intervention. And sometimes, they insisted on non-operative delivery despite warnings of
imminent danger to the fetus, mumbling among themselves, “Why do a Caesar for this?”
Within the regime of secrecy, partial sharing, and incomplete communication
created by PCPNDT enforcement, families and routine antenatal care providers seldom
disclosed fetal sex to one another explicitly. But each party incorporated the possibility of
the other’s knowledge into thinking around late-term decisions. Obstetricians and their
staff could often infer, even before examining a fetus sonographically, that families
insisting on a Caesarean must be expecting a son. Conversely, patients and relatives
sometimes assumed that clinician recommendations for Caesarean delivery indexed the
maleness of the fetus, with several offering me asides like “Saheb is saying to definitely
do an operation. He knows our situation. Would he keep pushing us toward a Caesar if it
wasn’t good? So we can infer from that.” Occasionally, families expressed acute
disappointment when Dr. Dilip or his colleagues delivered a daughter by Caesarean,
noting that the doctor’s insistence on the necessity of intervention had led them to
presume a son.
In sum, doctors’ and families’ awareness of fetal sex, even when not
communicated directly, contributed in largely congruent ways to shaping a regime of
bifurcated perinatal care. SD made male fetuses precious to families, prompting them to
advocate for greater intervention. And sonographic gendering by the routine care
provider identified future sons as prioritizable (and profitable), again leading to greater
intervention. Conversely, recognition of femaleness left daughters-to-be less deserving of
fully vigilant care. This bifurcation of fetuses and their perinatal care into extremely
precious and relatively dispensable, overly aggressive and overly passive, had life-anddeath consequences for all emerging babies.

The Cutting Edge of Biomedical Sex Determination
For most doctors and families in the Mahesana region, the only realistic method
of sex selection was standard sonographic SD followed by selective abortion. But a range
of more exotic technologies—advanced sonography, sperm sorting, pre-implantation
genetic diagnosis (PGD), and cell-free fetal DNA (cffDNA) tests—lay near or just
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beyond the edges of the local biomedical imaginary.69 Though inaccessible or infeasible
for most clients, they became the topic of animated discussion among practitioners.
One advanced SD technology was simply a further development of the familiar
2D ultrasound machine. Already the standard equipment at many high-end clinics in the
Mahesana region, 3D machines could produce more lifelike renderings of the fetal body.
Given the material limits of genital development, 3D scanning could not shift the
thirteen-week threshold for detecting sex. But many patients and doctors expressed a
common-sense view that by displaying three-dimensional images on larger, higherresolution screens, the more advanced equipment must enable more accurate SD. For
instance, Dr. Ranjit said, “With 3D, it is much easier, obviously! Even an intelligent
family member can tell!” As indicated by Bipin-bhai’s use of a 3D image CD to demand
repayment of charges for incorrect SD, the 3D picture could perhaps “speak for itself,”
representing the genitals in an iconic form that even lay people could understand.
In fact, many experienced practitioners disagreed. High-risk pregnancy experts—
those who most frequently used 3D scanning—scornfully said that “anyone can do SD,
with even a cheap machine!” Some SD practitioners suggested 2D technology might even
prove more accurate than its advanced counterpart. Dr. Tapan explained:
See, in 3D, that part actually isn’t so clearly visible. That’s what I’ve
heard. Because 3D is a high-intensity modality, you see everything in
three dimensions. But this gets a bit obscured. Because sometimes, there’s
only a one-millimeter difference between penis and vagina-vulva. What if
that gets blurred in the shape? That, you can see more clearly in a 2D
machine.
By asserting the superiority of 2D scans for SD, Dr. Tapan located the key classifying
faculty in his and other sonographers’ vision, rather than machines themselves.
Disagreements over accuracy notwithstanding, 3D equipment enabled at least one
novel method for skirting PCPNDT regulations, though I rarely heard of it being used.
Once, while attending a state-level obstetricians’ conference, I met a doctor from Anand,
in central Gujarat. Upon learning of my topic, he took a long sip of cha and sighed:
What a mess! You know what some of my patients have started to get
done lately? They go to a 3D specialist, and they get a CD with the video
or images made. That doctor doesn’t tell them the sex! But he gives them
the CD. And then they go to someone else, who puts the CD in the
computer, and tells them. I don’t do it, of course. But this is a thing that
happens. So the scanner is one man, and the revealer is another.
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I was stunned. The iconism of the 3D picture—and the visual overload of a 3D scan CD,
in which a momentary glimpse of the genitals might be buried amid countless other
images—allowed even further disaggregation of sex selection services. In addition to
separating SD and abortion, clients and practitioners could now subdivide SD itself into
two stages. In a way, the practice echoed the sampling-and-interpretation collaboration
between obstetricians and pathologists in the bygone era of amniocentesis and CVB.
Other biomedical possibilities, visible more to clinicians than clients, promised to
determine sex in the sense not of ascertaining it, but of actually causing it.70 Doctors
often reference the possibility of subjecting a sperm sample to centrifugation or flow
cytometry in order to separate sperm bearing X and Y chromosomes. The resultant Yenriched subsample—“semen highly qualified for producing a male child,” as one doctor
put it—could then be used for intrauterine insemination or in vitro fertilization (IVF).
One doctor went so far as to warn, “Watch—it won’t matter any more if there’s female
foeticide. The patient will say, just give me a male to start!”
But most obstetricians seemed skeptical that sperm sorting would emerge as a
local modality of selective reproduction. The early-2000s amendments to the PCPNDT
Act had outlawed pre-conception methods like sperm sorting; one obstetrician with past
training in Mumbai recalled her seniors offering wealthy patients sorting services in the
1990s but ceasing it after 2003. Now, acquisition of the clinical equipment, expertise, and
market profile necessary to offer commercial sex selection by sperm sorting would likely
attract intense government scrutiny.
PGD was a related technique for shaping, rather than ascertaining and reacting to,
fetal sex. Performed on embryos prior after IVF, the method allowed for selective
implantation of male embryos. Again, local obstetricians expressed skepticism around the
feasibility of an underground PGD operation. They cited specialized equipment, need for
coordination with a pathologic lab, high cost, and PCPNDT surveillance as barriers to the
rise of the practice in Gujarat.
Several clinicians did, however, report cases of patients with means traveling to
Southeast Asia or the Persian Gulf to undergo IVF in conjunction with PGD. One fertility
expert said of his elite clientele:
The people who want to get PGD done and have the money, they go to
Thailand. Or they go get IVF in Dubai... So they get pre-implantation
analysis before embryo transfer. And in Thailand-Dubai, selective transfer
is perfectly legal. People can get it done easily there, with no PCPNDT
restriction. Couples go, get IVF, get pre-diagnosis and selective transfer,
and they come back home with a designer pregnancy.
Gujarat’s ever-increasing global linkages, including daily flights from Ahmedabad to
Thailand and the U.A.E., permitted affluent families to skirt the PCPNDT Act altogether
by shifting key elements of selective reproduction outside Indian jurisdiction. Patients
and relatives became “reproductive outlaws,” “literally navigating outside the law to
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secure the prohibited reproductive procedures that they [felt] they need[ed].”71
Journalistic and ethnographic reports from the past decade corroborate the picture of
Indian citizens travelling transnationally to “level out the family and get a boy” by
PGD.72
At the time of my fieldwork, Mahesana-area obstetricians seemed most captivated
by the possibility the prospect of cffDNA testing. Based on isolation and analysis of fetal
DNA circulating in the maternal bloodstream, the assay yielded SD results with 95%
accuracy between seven and twelve gestational weeks. It could thus extended SD back to
the first-trimester timeframe previously achieved only by chorionic villus biopsy—and
without the latter procedure’s invasiveness or medical complications. Doctors returned
from various state- and national-level scientific conferences fascinated by the prospect of
cffDNA testing: what, they asked, would the government do to restrict an SD technique
based on something as banal as a maternal blood draw? Indeed, the state was already to
calibrate PCPNDT enforcement to cover cffDNA amid reports of families shipping
maternal blood samples to laboratories outside India.73
*
Despite the proliferation of sex selection technologies within Indian biomedical
markets and imaginaries, selective reproduction in Mahesana remained resolutely
centered on sonography. One IVF practitioner told me, “Even most people who get IVF
are doing SD by sonography at three months, because it’s cheaper. Why would they
travel and spend for PGD, when this is available for 20,000?” I observed that preconception and pre-implantation methods could help avert the “mental and bodily
torture” of selective abortion, but he shook his head: “In our country, the economic
difficulty is greater. They’ll endure mental and bodily difficulty if it means saving money
and getting a boy.” Cost was, of course, a household consideration; mental and bodily
difficulties primarily affected individual women. The overwhelming reliance on
ultrasound for SD in the Mahesana region was, no doubt, a function of access to
biomedical technology. But local access was also a function of the burdens that could
acceptably be imposed on women’s bodies in the reproduction of patriarchy.
One can certainly approach this imposition on women through a lens first
proposed by influential writings from the 1980s and subsequently carried forward into
present-day discourses. The lens in question brings into clear focus how sex selection
enacts “femicide” on passivized female bodies, ultimately producing a patriarchal
dystopia.74 Reflecting on the wrenching scenes of SD, selective abortion, and selective
perinatal care at Chetna and Nandini, I cannot but see the utility of such a lens. It is
sometimes difficult to find in sex-selective acts anything except the violent reproduction
of patriarchy through biomedical action on women and their fetuses.
But like all lenses, the one in question brings some things into focus and distorts
others. While sex selection in Mahesana pervasively objectified maternal and fetal
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bodies, pregnant women did not simply endure the process passively. Just as often,
“patients [could] manifest agency... through their objectification.”75 Many women
embraced the biomedical control enacted through SD and selective abortion—sometimes
even in the face of familial objections. Though patriarchal, selective reproduction was
also a space of women’s agency.
Both lenses are ultimately partial. Sex selection involved neither total imposition
of masculinist order on women’s bodies nor exercise of unfettered agency. Instead,
instances of selective reproduction presented a vivid examples of constrained agency—of
women navigating an unequal social structure by resisting, acquiescing, coping, and
collaborating.
With the need to balance both lenses in mind, I turn now to women’s experiences
of agency and constraint in decision-making around sex selection.
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Figure 3 – Ultrasound Images of Fetal Genitalia, 12 Weeks

Top left: Side view of male genital tubercle. Top right: Head-on (“legs spread”) view of male
genital tubercle. Bottom left: Side view of female genital tubercle. Bottom right: Head-on (“legs
spread”) view of female genital tubercle.
Source: Hsiao et al. 2008

Chapter 4: Family Decision-Making and Women’s Agency
Situating Reproductive Decisions
Kavita-ben and Rohit-bhai
One day at Chetna Clinic, immediately after lunch, Dr. Ranjit performed yet
another selective abortion. The patient, a curly-haired woman named Kavita-ben, had
received a “female” result the previous day.
An hour later, on rounds, Kavita-ben lay on a bed, awake. A slender man with
bloodshot eyes slouched next to her. A toddler girl in a heavy sweatshirt jumped on the
bed, a balloon clutched in her right hand. The doctor asked how the patient felt—a quiet
“good” in response. He asked whether the couple had had a Form F filled out or
registered the pregnancy with the village community health worker; husband and wife
shook their heads in unison, with Kavita-ben explaining that their local worker was
“understanding.” The doctor nodded in satisfaction that the potential daughter was
invisible to surveillance.
A bit later, stepping out, I found the haggard-looking husband—Rohit-bhai—on
his way to the street corner to purchase crackers for his daughter. I walked with him. He
explained that they were Prajapatis from a village south of Mahesana. He worked in a
government mechanical workshop, on a monthly salary of 4,500 rupees. Shaking his
head, he muttered, “So my wife said, how many girls are we going to bring home on that
much? Otherwise, I didn’t want to get this done.” The husband claiming reluctance for
himself and shifting the responsibility for sex selection onto his wife—it was a pattern I
had observed in many families. Over time, my acquaintance with Kavita-ben and Rohitbhai couple would illuminate the complex dynamics that could lie beneath such initial
representations.
Back on the clinic’s patio, Rohit-bhai unwrapped the crackers. Clutching her
snack with one hand, his daughter began playing in the dirt. Suddenly, Rohit-bhai
frowned and said with conviction:
I’m against this! I said, “Let’s not do this.” But my wife insisted that she
wanted to have it looked at. Her feeling is, how many girls are we going to
gather in this era? And on a limited salary, too. We discussed it with
everyone—Mummy-Pappa, my sister-in-law and brother. Their thinking
was the same as mine—against this. They said their piece but left the
decision to us. Well, my missus insisted. She’s the one who pulled me
here.
Otherwise, my feeling is, aren’t we falling into pāp [sin], doing
this? At three months, the child’s development starts, so it’s killing a
living life, isn’t it? Before that, it’s not pāp, because the development
starts at three months. But at three months, if we look, we can tell if it’s a
203
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boy or a girl. It’s developing, so the life is in it. If we take it out after that,
it’s pāp—it’s bhrunhatyā. Don’t we accrue pāp if we kill that? I told my
wife, if it’s a girl and we get it taken out, and we get pregnant again, we
get it looked at, it’s a girl—then what will we do? She said, we’ll address
that then... But is this a thing you can get done again and again? And
what’s the effect on the body—long-term damage, right?
Rohit-bhai’s monologue presented an assortment of troubles that initially overwhelmed
my ability to make sense of them: economic precarity, familial disagreements, ethical
misgivings, conjugal blame shifting, and the real possibility—palpable in that immediate
post-abortion moment—of long-term bodily and psychic wounds from sex selection.
Dizzied by the range of concerns bundled up in the situation, I wondered what Kavitaben could possibly be feeling and thinking.
A while later, we moved back inside. Kavita-ben was now sitting up. We sat
down across from her cot. She said she felt nauseous but otherwise “okay.”
After we chatted a bit about our backgrounds, Rohit-bhai started bringing up their
decision-making again. Kavita-ben cut in to highlight the world of risk that having a new
daughter represented for her: “With a girl, we’ll always remain worried. What’ll her inlaws be like? What’ll her conjugal household be like?” She pointed to her daughter, who
was jumping on the cot again. “Now with this one—we’ll always worry about what her
life will be like! If she encounters sorrow, we’ll have to hear about it for the rest of our
lives.” The futurity of daughters-to-be weighed heavily on her.
“She thinks like this!” Rohit-bhai cut in impatiently. “This girl is two years old,
and she thinks, in-laws this, and conjugal household that, and all that. How can we think
about all this right now?”
“You have to think about it now!” his wife retorted sharply. She was now leaning
forward, toward us. “How can you think about all this later? How to bear the costs of her
upbringing, how to educate her, all of this!”
Rohit-bhai grabbed my arm and intoned, “But I say, I’m here, aren’t I? Their
father?”
Ignoring her husband’s pleading claim to successful breadwinner status, Kavitaben frowned: “It’s difficult to run a household on a government salary.” Rohit-bhai
snorted audibly. Was he taking affront at her diminishment of his earning? Or scoffing
blithely at her domestic anxieties?
Kavita-ben continued, “And we think, why should we give another a life like this,
like the one we have?” She straightened the hood on her daughter’s sweatshirt, caressed
her shoulder, and turned back to me. “Why should we subject others to what we have
suffered through?” A soft coda, trailing off into silence: “What we know, being a
woman...” The rest remained unspoken.
We sat quietly, save for the girl’s jumps on the cot, until a nurse came in to
discharge Kavita-ben. We left together to catch a bus back to Mahesana, whence they
would take a rickshaw back to their village. Just outside the clinic, Rohit-bhai told us to
pause on the dusty curb so he could run to pick out a kite for the upcoming Uttarayan
festival from a nearby vendor’s pushcart. As we waited, the toddler wrapped herself
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around her mother’s legs and swung from side to side, peeking out at me and giggling.
Following Rohit-bhai with her eyes, Kavita-ben mumbled, “People can say whatever they
want—be as educated as you please—but ek chhokaro joie. That’s the way it is.” She
shook her head and looked down.
Seeing beyond Stock Narratives
In mass mediatized anti-sex selection messages, there was copious discourse
about family decision-making—in other words, about how different family members
oriented to and acted around visualizing, accepting, and eliminating female fetal subjects.
Such discourse often centered on two ethical figures, both feminine: pregnant women and
their mothers-in-law. The latter usually appeared as cruel, backward, and coercive,
forcing their daughters-in-law into sex selection through physical, verbal, and emotional
abuse. Conversely, pregnant women themselves typically appeared as victims, devoid of
voice or agency. More rarely, they might emerge as heroes, defying a patriarchal family
and society to love and birth a daughter. In such cases, they functioned as the opposite of
victims: rather than being totally engulfed by the social structure, they stood outside it,
rejecting the conjugal and communal bonds of Indian women’s sociality in order to
realize the modern ideal of gender equality. When pregnant women appeared helpless,
the villain-victim-hero trichotomy also allowed for interpellation of the masculinist state
as savior.1
In examining journalistic narratives of infanticide in Venezuela—depictions of
“monstrous mothers and fathers” that “transfixed” readers, “generating steady streams of
conversation and public outrage”—Charles Briggs has identified several strikingly
consistent characteristics.2 These instantiations of stock stories feature an emplotment of
tragedy devoid of redeeming figures; a generic or familiar quality that produced a sense
of the violent act as “familiar, knowable, and contained within the stories”; and
provocation of fear or rage from a stable narrative trajectory.3 The “communicable
cartographies” of infanticide in Venezuela enact symbolic domination by “projecting a
small set of shared and predictable circuits, creating subject positions, arranging them in
spatial, moral, and legal terms, and making only a very limited range of responses
thinkable."4 Most notably, stock narratives sequester violent acts from modernity and
state projects, leaving them simultaneously “individualized as products of pathological
subjectivities and defective domesticities, and made to represent entire populations,
1

My characterization of characters in the stock narratives finds affinities in Ortner’s analysis of the
“narrative politics” of gendered agency in Grimm’s fairy tales: female protagonists are frequently victimheroes, the only consistently active female characters are all evil, and passive women ultimately require
saving through active masculine intervention (2006: 139-142).
2
C. Briggs 2007: 317. I note at the outset that my purpose here is very different from Briggs’s. He is
interested in examining “how stories construct themselves as epistemological objects through projections of
their own making, dissemination, and reception” (C. Briggs 2007: 325). By contrast, I am drawing from a
specific portion of his contribution: namely, the analysis of how the form of stock narratives imposes
restrictive subject positions on perpetrators, other participants, and the public audience, and how these have
the effect of obscuring power relations and agentic action.
3
C. Briggs 2007: 325-330.
4
C. Briggs 2007: 338.
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thereby naturalizing representations of class, gender, space, state, and nation” that force
certain bodies into the slot of backward or traditional and push others toward the subject
positions of “moral, legal, and rational citizens.”5 Ultimately, such archetypal stories
matter because they profoundly shape how a social problem becomes publicly visible. In
fact, they may become the problem’s chief public face.
In Mahesana, there abounded representations that pitted the oppression of
traditional culture—embodied in the domineering mother-in-law—against rational,
modern gender equality—embodied in official discourses and aimed at reaching the
powerless or valiantly resistant daughter-in-law.6 A television advertisement by the Beti
Bachāvo program depicted a snarling old woman pointing menacingly and shouting, “Get
it knocked out!” upon learning of a “female” result. In seminars for village women, local
Health Department officials often lectured at length about how “females become females’
enemies” and how “you are the ones forcing your sons’ wives to do this.” A popular
Hindi soap opera portrayed, over many weeks, a woman’s struggle to evade in-law
pressure for sex-selective abortion by falsely claiming a “male” result after a scan. One of
Bollywood’s biggest stars, Aamir Khan, dedicated the much-hyped inaugural episode of
his social issues-themed talk show, Satyamev Jayate, to the stories of three Rajasthani
women who resisted and escaped from families that demanded they undergo sex
selection. Magazine essays, plays staged by religious organizations, youth speeches that
became viral WhatsApp videos—all these, along with many other representations,
perpetuated and amplified the morality tale of the insistent mother-in-law and the
victimized or transcendently powerful pregnant woman, often with little pretense of
specificity or empirical grounding beyond received common sense. Even the PCPNDT
Act encoded the presumption that women had been compelled to undergo sex selection,
such that they could not generally be prosecuted for requesting sex determination (SD),
as their kin could.
Apart from the PCPNDT Act’s bracketing of women’s agency, which has always
served an important social function, most of the widely circulating narratives about
household decision-making functioned largely to reproduce dichotomies between
backward tradition and enlightened modernity. Chapter 6 examines the broader
representational context within which such stories emerged and circulated. In this
chapter, I focus on what was elided in straightforward morality tales of coercion,
passivity, and resistance: the complexity of reproductive agency7 around sex-selective
reproduction.
5

C. Briggs 2007: 331, 336.
Cf. Saharso (2005) and Ticktin (2005), who have observed that Dutch public debates on sex selection
reinscribed dichotomies between the complex of culture-tradition-oppression-foreignness and the complex
of modernity-rationality-liberalization-West. In my case, the narratives in question are less overtly
transnational, instead posing the problem of traditional Indian patriarchy as a problem to be overcome in
crafting an Indian modernity (cf. Chatterjee and Riley 2001).
7
Unnithan-Kumar defines “reproductive agency,” as “ideas, actions, thinking and planning in the domain
of human reproduction by women and men who engage in reproductive activities and seek healthcare
services, as well as in terms of the strategies, compulsions and motivations which inform the actions of
medical, clinical and health personnel” (2004b: 6). My analysis in this chapter focuses on what is described
in the first half of her definition.
6
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Previous research has described sex selection as a familial choice, frequently
hinting at considerable variation in decision-making dynamics.8 I build on this work by
considering how women experienced agency in the process of sex selection. Close
engagement with women’s voices reveals complex power dynamics, in which different
family members pursued action around the gendered fetus in accordance with their own
subject positions within the moral economy of gender-kinship. Such an analysis
challenges stock narratives of coercion and resistance, making visible other agentic
dynamics: household consensus, women’s pragmatic coping, or active defiance of
conjugal prohibitions on sex selection.
While adopting the heuristic of “agency,” I am mindful of the need to avoid
romanticizing and fetishizing the capacity for action, lest I reproduce the victim-heroes of
stock narratives.9 In attempting to “engage simultaneously women’s systematic
8

In an early study from rural Maharashtra, Ganatra et al. (2001: 114-116) reported women’s considerable
decision-making power around sex selection, albeit in a context of joint family consultation, implicit
pressure for sons, and occasional explicit demands from conjugal relatives. By contrast, in her study of
Mahesana-area villages, L. Visaria (2007b: 159-160) reported not only intense familial pressure, but also
“virtually no decision-making power” among pregnant women,” who “simply went along with the decision
made for them by others” by “[accepting] whatever their conjugal families, including husbands, wanted”—
albeit with a certain amount of caste stratification, according to which upper-caste women had to inform or
consult their in-laws, and lower-caste women only their husbands. Studies of peri-urban Delhi (Khanna
2009: 102-103, 108-110) and the Punjabi-American diaspora (Puri et al. 2011: 1172-1173) have also
mentioned considerable influence from husbands and in-laws, along with some evidence of resistance in
the Delhi case (Khanna 2009: 110-112). Noting that “agency in the elimination of girl children or female
foetuses is multiple,” John et al. have written:
Even though a woman may on her own take the initiative to visit a doctor for
contraceptives and/or take the decision to undergo a sex determination test, and
subsequently may even contemplate abortion, most often it has been seen that the
ultimate right to decide on matters pertaining to family size, sex distribution, and fertility
control lies with the man, or in some cases the extended family. The couple, the motherin-law, the father-in-law, and the woman’s parents are all actors in a system that
systematically devalues the girl child and the mother without sons (2008: 63).
They have cited a number of pressure tactics from in-laws, as well as cases in which women pursued sex
selection without affines’ knowledge or even in defiance of the latters’ wishes (2008: 64-65). Finally, while
her analysis does not foreground the process of familial decision-making, Unnithan-Kumar (2011: 162163) has noted the importance of viewing sex-selective abortion as an exercise of pragmatic agency within
domestic and social constraints—neither full autonomy nor the full imposition of patriarchal control on
women’s bodies. Also see A. Agarwal (2003: 12-27) and D. Singh (2007: 27-28), who discuss family
decision-making dynamics in ways that are empirically and theoretically more limited.
9
Two decades on, the introduction to Jeffery and Jeffery’s Don’t Marry Me to a Plowman continues to
offer a valuable manifesto regarding the middle path to be charted in examining women’s agency in
patriarchal North Indian contexts:
It is important neither to exaggerate the potential of women's everyday resistance to alter
the terms under which they lived nor to render invisible the ways women were co-opted
by the protective and maybe comforting certainties of the structures in which they were
embedded... We want to avoid either stereotyping women as the virtuous victims of
oppressive structures or romanticizing their capacity to resist. Their lives were far more
complex than that. Women did not speak with a single voice. If they sometimes talked
about themselves as victims, they also portrayed themselves in ways that suggested either
critique or acceptance. Often, their resistance coexisted with a subservience that took
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subordination and the ways in which they negotiated oppressive, even determining, social
conditions,”10 the most useful approach is one that foregrounds constrained agency. In
this view, agency—an intentionality or orientation toward pursuit of particular projects
according to local logics of the good—is always culturally shaped and bears an immanent
relation to power: the agency of projects hinges on the agency of power, such that action
always partially reproduces public and private structures but also holds the potential to
challenge them.11 Given that the “conditions within which we exercise agency certainly
matter—some circumstances are more empowering while others are more
constraining”—it becomes imperative to think about agency and oppression as
simultaneous, rather than oppositional.12 Situations of high-stakes choice do not activate
an agent that pre-exists outside of or even embedded within social relations; they
constitute that agent through complex dynamics of subjection and subjectification.13
Analyzing women’s reproductive agency around sex selection therefore entails
uncovering the processes through which pregnant women become agents,14 enunciating
and acting on complex dispositions toward action and reaction, acquiescence and
resistance, defiance and cooperation.
Much of the analysis below surfaces the importance of sex selection as a
pragmatic tactic adopted by women who, while never passive, always acted amid the
constraints of patriarchal power relations.15 Women like Kavita-ben were neither
“passive vessels, simply acting in culturally determined ways with little possibility for
reflection on their own condition” (a different sort of victim), nor “inherently suspicious
of and resistant to technological interventions” (a different sort of hero), and their
“dominant mode of response” to SD and selective abortion was frequently “ambivalence
coupeld with pragmatism.”16 Tactical use of sex selection technology often subverted or
diverted the patriarchal system without leaving it, evincing its nature as “too vast to be
able to fix [agents] in one place, but too constraining for them ever to be able to escape
from it.”17
The pervasiveness of pragmatic coping in the stories below highlights that the
analytic role of “agency” is not to reveal and celebrated unfettered free action, but to
situate various actions vis-a-vis systems of power.18 Understanding women’s agency in
account of both the balance of power and the balance of long-term benefits... Certainly,
women's agency by no means always took the form of resistance. Women also had many
stakes in the system. Their agency might entail endurance as well as acquiescence. It
might also entail coercing other women. In brief, women’s agency was rather more
complex and rather less rosy-tinted than it is sometimes portrayed (1996: 16, 19-20).
Also see Abu-Lughod (1990) and Mahmood (2005: 10, 15).
10
Mani 1998: 10.
11
Ortner 2006: 134-139, 142-147, 148-149, 152-153.
12
Madhok et al. 2013: 2-3.
13
Das 2007: 77; Madhok 2004: 235; Ticktin 2005: 269. Gammeltoft makes this point pithily:
“Subjectivities emerge situationally” (2007a: 160; also see 2014a: 19-21, 225-226, 228-231).
14
Cf. Ortner 1995: 187.
15
Cf. Lock and Kaufert 1998a: 11-12.
16
Lock and Kaufert 1998a: 2.
17
de Certeau 1984: 40, also 32, 34, 36-37.
18
Abu-Lughod 1990: 47; Kandiyoti 1988: 275, 1998: 142; Ortner 1995: 190.
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sex selection experiences entails simultaneously understanding the operation of
patriarchal hegemony. Women struck “patriarchal bargains,” consciously making
sacrifices in the present for future benefits within a masculinist social order.19 Such
bargains certainly articulated and reinforced feminine subordination. But unpacking both
the bargains and the subordination, through examination of how specific pregnant women
contended with others within the moral economy of gender-kinship—husbands, conjugal
relatives, potential daughters and sons—reveals complexities that challenge
oversimplifying accounts of familial and social reproduction.
Moving beyond the monolithic gender-kinship imaginary of Chapter 2 and the
zoomed-in clinical glimpses of Chapter 3, this chapter explores how action around a
gendered fetal subject—seeking it, embracing it, rejecting it—played out in people’s
lives. Through the stories of Kavita-ben and four other women, I consider how different
family members imagined relations with and action toward potential children, and how
women negotiated the resultant household dynamics. Traversing the moral economy of
gender-kinship, these five stories reveal the complex and variegated internal power
relationships that could condition specific instances of selective reproduction. They
exemplify patterns that frequently surfaced in other families, albeit less through extended
glimpses of women’s trajectories and more through oblique comments, heavy sighs, and
third-party rumors. An empirically grounded analysis of women’s experiences challenges
stock narratives of sex selection, rendering visible nuances that multiply the archetypes
for reproductive agency beyond the stereotypes of villain, victim, and hero.

Contentious Decisions, Collective Decisions
Clinicians tended to echo stock narratives of sex selection, often highlighting
“pressure,” “harassment,” and “torture” from conjugal relatives as crucial drivers. Many
reinforced the view that mothers-in-law, rather than husbands or other men, played the
key coercive role. Dr. Tapan, for instance, said of the families that came to him for sex
selection:
The poor husbands don’t say anything. Generally, male is not against
female. But the mother-in-law! Generally, the mother-in-law is against the
female child. The government should stick mothers-in-law in jail in every
district, and then see how the ratio improves!... The poor men don’t care
about male-female. Gents don’t prefer this. But the mother-in-law and
other relatives create such a home environment that the patient has to get it
done... Woman is woman’s worst enemy! No male will pressurize. You do
the research: in over 90%, the mother-in-law will be the main figure... And
she won’t say anything herself here in the clinic—she’ll make the poor
woman say everything!
Many obstetricians echoed Dr. Tapan, maintaining that “the mother-in-law wants it
more” and that “the poor husbands don’t say anything.” The mother-in-law appeared as
19

Kandiyoti 1988

210

the chief decision-making figure, a misogynistic woman who imposed her will—and
concomitant suffering—on a hapless daughter-in-law. Husbands and other male relatives
remained hidden. Again, this juxtaposition of a blameworthy older woman with a
passive and hence supposedly innocent man prevailed not only in doctors’ accounts, but
also in widely circulating public representations. It posited a straightforward, womancentered mechanism for the enactment and propagation of patriarchy, absolving men of
responsibility and eliding the complex ways in which selective reproduction reproduced
gender subordination.
In commenting on the perceived dynamics of family deliberation, past and present
sex selection providers like Dr. Tapan insisted that they had always performed SD and
selective abortion only after receiving a direct “request” from the patient or her family:
“If there was any dispute, we wouldn’t do anything. We would only do something if the
woman herself was ready.” “We never got in the middle of their discussion; we always
told them to go outside, or go home, and come back after deciding.” “They would come
to us with a decision already made.”
But as most doctors were prepared to acknowledge, prevailing decision-making
dynamics meant that senior relatives’ wishes often won out over those of patients.20 As
such, restricting the ethical basis of action to just the clinical request—which might well
come from a patient under duress, or from a domineering relative who had successfully
silenced the patient’s own wishes—frequently meant complicity with in-laws imposing
their favored reproductive vision. In our conversations around families’ choices, Umamasi readily recognized this fact:
Oh, I’ve seen cases! Many women are not willing to get it taken out. They
will cry. Then the mother-in-law and father-in-law force her to get it done.
The in-laws say, we don’t want a girl... I never get in the middle in those
cases. Whatever they decide among themselves is right. There’s nothing
for us to say—no point in getting involved in their affairs. If they need us,
they’ll call... Of course, in those cases, in the end, they always get it taken
out. What the daughter-in-law wants doesn’t matter. The in-laws won’t
allow it, right? She has to get it done. So then she’ll come to us.
Similarly, a Mahesana obstetrician speculated regarding his previous sex selection
practice that while he “wouldn’t have any idea of what was going on in the home,” it was
very likely that “when a patient came to me, she had already been beaten and bullied into
submission.” In a generally patriarchal reproductive context, clinicians’ provision of a
20
Studies of sex selection report considerable in-law control—through overt demands and more subtle
pressures, verbal abuse and neglect, threats of insecurity and withholding of help—across a variety of
contexts (Ganatra et al. 2001: 114-116; John et al. 2008: 64-67; Puri et al. 2011: 1172-1173). More
generally, an extensive literature on decision-making around fertility and contraception in Hindu patrilineal
families shows the tremendous influence that conjugal relatives—and especially mother-in-laws—wield
over young daughters-in-law and couples (Char et al. 2010: 157; P. Jeffery et al. 1989: 195-198; R. Jeffery
and Jeffery 1997: 117-164; T. Patel 1994: 167-171, 202-208; Säävälä 2001: 148-155, 157-163; H. Singh
2016).
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service “on request” ultimately favored whatever party was best positioned to make its
request heard within the consultory.
So what were the actual processes by which different family members struggled
to actualize their visions regarding gendered fetal subjects? Frequently, SD appeared as
an obvious choice to everyone, with little interpersonal conflict. When it did not, most
families engaged in multiple conversations about pursuing the test, and what to do with a
female fetus, before reaching the clinic. Similarly, after a “negative” result, many couples
placed phone calls or returned home to recruit the entire household—and sometimes
other conjugal relatives or the woman’s parents—into deciding how to reproduce the
family. In “discussing it with everyone,” as Rohit-bhai and Kavita-ben had done, couples
frequently collectivized difficult and impactful decisions around selective reproduction.21
Although women were always subject to the will of others—and sometimes in overtly
violent ways—decision-making dynamics varied greatly, in counterpoint to the
unidirectional compulsion portrayed in clinician, media, and government representations.
Ethnographic encounters with women revealed a complex process of collective
negotiation with respect to selective reproduction. Conjugal relatives’ influence on sex
selection varied considerably, not only in degree but also in type. Across different
ethnographic cases, husbands and in-laws appeared in the foreground and background; as
opponents and advocates of SD and selective abortion; and as subjects of obedience,
resistance, and agreement. Better understanding understand kin group contention around
selective reproduction requires exploration of complex questions around women’s
experiences and agency: What were women’s childbearing projects, and how did they
interact with the projects advanced by relatives? And how did patterns of coercion,
coping consensus, and insistence drive sex selection?
Some stories did, in fact, conform closely to the archetype of in-laws compelling
an unwilling woman to undergo sex-selective abortion. But even in such cases, close
engagement with women’s speech illuminates the gender-kinship dynamics that
undergirded coercion, as well as the agentic experiences—however constrained—that
emerged from it.22

21

Unnithan-Kumar has proposed the idea of “collective ownership” over pregnancies in Rajasthan (2004a:
61-69, 2004b: 5). Gupta has echoed this in her discussion of collective decisions around prenatal testing in
India (2010a). Similarly, Gammeltoft has emphasized how Vietnamese women facing disability-selective
abortion turned unbearable decisions into matters of kinship, sociality, belonging, and shared responsibility
by recruiting relatives and thereby collectivizing “choice” (2007a).
22
In analyzing Preeti-ben’s experience of coercion through the lens of agency, I am drawing on Sumi
Madhok’s suggestion that recognizing agency within conditions of oppression (and hence avoiding
equation of subordination with passivity or victimization) requires rejection of an “action bias” in favor of a
focus on speech acts (2004: 223-227, 234-237, 2013: 1, 5-7, 36-68). In Madhok’s view, agency-throughspeech-acts lies not so much in resistance or even action per se as in the articulation of relations to selves
and others, and in the realization of a reflexive capacity for formulating and enunciating ones own
preferences for projects. I believe that this framework must be applied carefully, for its indiscriminate use
risks reproducing old fetishizations of agency. But in cases like Preeti-ben’s, it helps the heuristic of
“agency” do important work by demonstrating how alternative projects are imagined—even if not
realized—even in events and conditions of profound domination.
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Coercion: Preeti-ben
In my youth, I first learned about sex-selective abortion through my mother and
grandmother’s hushed conversations about how Preeti-ben—a relative distant in
reckoning, but close in relationship—had been forced to undergo the procedure. During
my preliminary fieldwork trips, Preeti-ben inquired about my research on several
occasions. She did not offer any hint of her own experience, and I did not press further.
But one day, she called and said, “This study of yours, for Beti Bachāvo? Well, I’ve had
an experience like that happen to me. So I want to talk to you.”23
Some days later, we met at her sister Sonal-ben’s house. The three of us sat on
adjoining couches, the afternoon light casting shadows on our faces. For over an hour,
Preeti-ben narrated her experience. She largely alternated between looking at me and
staring into the distance, occasionally furrowing an eyebrow or shaking her head. Sonalben played the role of sympathetic listener, nodding, grunting, and occasionally
interjecting to express the shared anger that her sister did not.
Some facts remained implicit, for I knew them from our longstanding association:
Preeti-ben belonged to a Patel gol of the Mahesana area. In the early 1980s, she had been
married to Nitin-bhai, an Ahmedabad real estate developer who was the only son of a
wealthy family; from the beginning, she had had a fraught relationship with her in-laws,
who lived apart from the couple in Mahesana. After the births of two daughters in 1985
and 1988, and two miscarriages, she became pregnant again in 1991.
At that point, her in-laws began pushing for SD. “Once we had two girls,” she
explained, “the old lady was unhappy. She kept saying, ‘Next time, get a sonography!’
But they couldn’t force me to do anything until three months.”
Preeti-ben acquiesced to undergoing a scan on the reasoning that “if it was a boy,
it would be fine.” She and Nitin-bhai went to Ahmedabad’s Dr. Chandresh—an “early
expert in diagnosing at three months,” in many colleagues’ recollections. Preeti-ben
recalled, “He was very clever in this—he’s famous! He was Number 1 in all of India for
this task. He would look with squinted eyes and tell you, boy or girl. He was never
wrong, not even once!”
Later in my fieldwork, I heard Dr. Chandresh’s name repeatedly in connection
with prestigious conferences and high-class referrals. He had entered a second career act,
reinventing himself as an infertility and advanced sonography specialist. Upper-class
clients flocked to him. Twenty-five years after the test that initiated Preeti-ben’s trauma,
the man who had performed it remained casually present—and praiseworthy—in her
23

I believe that our conversation, and the knowledge that its contents might be more widely disseminated,
allowed Preeti-ben to claim some small measure of agency over her experience. She repeatedly emphasized
the importance of “you writing all this down,” expressed a desire to fill in any missing facts and make the
story “complete”, and on several occasions explicitly framed our conversation as an act of defiance against
her husband, mother-in-law, and now-deceased father-in-law. When I explained my confidentiality
protocol, Sonal-ben interjected—perhaps expressing a sentiment that her mild-mannered sister would not—
that I should “write it with the names,” so that “the scoundrel would really know how much suffering it’s
been!” As we wrapped up our conversation, Preeti-ben said, “It’s like this in speech, in writing. But you
imagine what it must have been like then.”
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social circle’s quotidian conversations. “Go meet that scoundrel,” Sonal-ben suggested
scornfully, “that dog! We call him The Dog. So many lives, he’s ruined.”
Dr. Chandresh’s scan revealed a female fetus. With recognition of a potential
daughter, Preeti-ben’s in-laws began insisting on selective abortion. She recounted:
Every morning at 6:30 or 7:00, there was a phone call from them: ‘What
did you do?’ Meaning, did you get rid of it, or not? Imagine! ‘We don’t
want that at all!’ It’s the two of them who got together and made this
mischief happen. Nitin didn’t say anything. They felt that since it was a
girl, we should get rid of it...
What scoundrels! Imagine it. I certainly wanted to keep it. Two
already—what’s wrong with a third? Were we going to end up with an
army? I opposed it hard. And my family—Sonal, my brother—everyone
was with me. But then these people’s najar got me—I became helpless.
In Preeti-ben’s memory, the neutralization of her resistance began with the in-laws’ najar
[evil eye] alighting on her pregnant body.24
Early in the second trimester, she experienced heavy bleeding—a threatened
miscarriage. She recalled:
I was admitted, and my two poor girls at home. What did they do then?
My mother-in-law was at home during the day, manage the household,
care for the girls. When she came in the mornings to see me, she came
empty-handed. She brought nothing—no milk, bhakhri, crackers—
nothing! She wouldn’t give me food—imagine! She came alone to the
clinic to see me, so normally she should bring food, right? But she didn’t
bring anything. I was hungry and thirsty, so I would ask for milk. Well,
she would say, ‘No, I forgot’—forgot! Every day, she said that! Is it
possible to forget something like that every day? She would grab my hand
and ask, ‘So what did you decide?’ But she wouldn’t give me food.
Eventually, Nitin would bring something when he came to see me. But she
did this to apply pressure.
They also told the doctor, we don’t want a girl, just do an abortion.
That doctor—she herself had just two girls—said, ‘Preeti-ben is my
patient. If she doesn’t want it, I can’t do it.’ But they did a lot of forcing in
that way. No physical abuse, but all this stuff.
Preeti-ben was discharged after a few days, but her situation remained precarious.
She remembered:
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Pocock has analyzed how accusations of najar among Gujarati Patels are enmeshed in relations of strain
with intimate others, appearing as both cause and consequence of interpersonal strife (1981).
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I had to be on strict bedrest. Who would give me food? She kept me
hungry. Who would look after the household? And my two girls were so
little then! Who would care for them? There was just the old lady! Two or
three weeks went by. The old man called every day: ‘What did you do?
Have you gotten rid of it?’ My mother-in-law was at my place, handling
all my household affairs, so I had become totally helpless. Your husband
doesn’t look out for you, no one looks out for you; these people are the
only ones to look out for you, and they are not even giving food! You
imagine it. Your piyar relatives could come and meet you in the clinic or
at home, but then they would go away. They forced me so hard, forced me
so hard!
I was stubborn. I told Nitin, ‘Boy or girl, I definitely want to keep
it.’ A mother doesn’t kill her own child. Would anyone do that? I always
opposed it. But then I became helpless. In a way, it was coercion. What
else could I do? That person is the one feeding you; that person is the one
caring for your children. What could I do? Who could I turn to? Nothing
of my own, so what could I do? If I was self-reliant, if I was working a
job, then it would be a different matter—I could have somehow eked out
enough for myself and my daughters. But having no support, being
dependent on these people, what could I do? I could go to my piyar. But
how long can you stay in your piyar?
What choice is there, then? I had to go. So then at last I said, fine,
let’s get rid of it.
Through constant pressure, Preeti-ben’s in-laws had manufactured an unwilling
willingness that was just barely sufficient to appear clinically as “consent”—or more
accurately, lack of objection.
Once Preeti-ben acquiesced, Nitin-bhai and his parents took her to another doctor
in Ahmedabad. (Sonal-ben would later express satisfaction that “that scoundrel is now
dead!”) The doctor rechecked the sonography to confirm that he was eliminating a
daughter-to-be; his assistant explained patiently that could happen that “the whole case is
ruined—we see a girl, and then a boy comes out!” Preeti-ben recalled bitterly, “Once he
said it was a girl, my father-in-law said, ‘Get rid of it! I don’t want a girl!’ And my
mother-in-law, too. Nitin didn’t say anything.”
The doctor initiated a kāchi delivery. Preeti-ben would later recall, softly but
matter-of-factly:
The doctor gave an injection—he let the medication go in, for the child to
suffocate. The child started turning this way and that, jumping. Because it
was suffocating on the inside, it turned a lot! I definitely felt that
something was happening. Oh, the pain in my lower back!
And no one was with me. The old man sat outside, all quiet. He
said, ‘What do you need me inside for? You go ahead and get rid of it.’
The old lady came in, but then she didn’t stay with me. She walked
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around, through all the rooms. People said to her, ‘You look so young, so
good! We would not believe that you are the mother of five children.’ So
she enjoyed it. Here I was going through this, and there, she was smiling
and walking around happily.
And Nitin wasn’t even there. They had been smart and kept him at
home, to care for the girls. They said, ‘What need is there for you at the
clinic? We’ll call you there later.’ He did come later. But he wasn’t with
me when all this was happening. A husband would feel something if he
saw his wife suffering in this way, wouldn’t he? Those people didn’t want
that.
So I was alone. Only Sonal was with me. And that girl flipped this
way and that, jumping. She must have been suffocating. I was in so much
pain! I screamed out so much, so much. Then, the girl must have passed
away inside. After that I was able to lie down. The girl was gone.
“Delivery” of the expired fetus occurred twelve hours after the initial injection.
According to Sonal-ben’s recollection, the father-in-law asked the doctor to trash the fetal
body—“so fair-skinned and nice-looking, a slender girl!”—but found himself responsible
for burying it under a bridge, in the Sabarmati riverbed.
After leaving the clinic, Preeti-ben went to her piyar, where her brother’s wife
nursed her back to health. Nitin-bhai and her in-laws did not answer phone calls, even
though the prescription for post-abortion medications had ended up with them. After a
few days, Preeti-ben called her neighbors and asked them to contact her husband. “After
that,” she recounted, “Nitin finally called back: ‘Don’t bother coming back. We have no
need for you here.’ So he threw me out. My father-in-law called a month later and said, ‘I
don’t want to ever bring her back.’” According to Preeti-ben, her in-laws had “decided to
divorce me” and begun proclaiming their intention widely. In her view, their
determination resulted from her being “so stubborn during this pregnancy”: “They
thought to themselves, ‘Let’s get a good one, one who will listen to everything we say,
not be stubborn. Let’s get one who will take five abortions if we make her get them.’”
Preeti-ben’s expulsion from her conjugal household hit a snag after six months,
when Nitin-bhai’s sister returned home for her first childbirth. Needing someone to do
domestic work, the in-laws finally summoned Preeti-ben. She remembered of the period,
“The milkman told me, ‘You’re back? Your mother-in-law was saying they were going to
divorce you!’ Imagine! Then, the scoundrels—there was a family function, and there was
going to be a photo. Everyone else was posed, and I was still sitting on the side. My
mother-in-law said, ‘Oh, you can be in the photo! It’s not like we’re going to divorce you
any more.’”
Preeti-ben conceived again in 1995, after Nitin-bhai had completed an Ayurvedic
regimen for increasing the proportion of Y chromosome-bearing sperm. Recalling the
pregnancy, Preeti-ben said:
When we got it looked at by sonography, I was so scared! I was praying,
‘O God, let it be a boy. Otherwise they will grab me and drag me to a
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clinic to get another abortion.’ Because they tortured me so much the first
time, I thought it would be good if it wasn’t a girl. I just didn’t have any
courage left to fight back. I wouldn’t have been able to resolve that I
wanted to keep it, like the previous time. Would anyone, after being
tortured so much? But that time, it was a boy.
The in-law’s previous actions around a potential daughter—pressure for SD, coercion to
bring about a selective abortion, temporary expulsion from the only feasible and
normatively acceptable position within the gender-kinship system—had disciplined or
dissipated Preeti-ben’s resistance, channeling her desire toward a potential son as the best
possible outcome.
She recalled bitterly of her son’s birth:
My in-laws were sitting outside waiting. They were anticipating: when
will the boy be born? They didn’t care about me. When the nurse came
out, they immediately asked her, ‘Is it a boy? Is it a boy?’ She said, at least
ask about your daughter-in-law! I had had lost a lot of blood—bad enough
to need a transfusion. But these people didn’t care. They just immediately
asked the person who delivered me: ‘Boy or girl?’ They were finally
satisfied when she said it was a boy.
The linear narrative ended there, and Preeti-ben, Sonal-ben, and I shifted to a meandering
discussion of Preeti-ben’s relationship with her in-laws.
In that discussion, it became clear how only blurry boundaries separated the sex
selection event from tensions in everyday family life. The violence of the forced abortion
was of a piece with more banal indignities and injustices, with which it oscillated back
and forth in narration.25 Preeti-ben repeatedly referred to her in-laws as “like Hitler” and
talked about how they routinely subjected her to harsh words, heavy work, and strict
restrictions. “They cannot recognize a human being,” she said. “They cannot recognize
their own daughter-in-law. And they would get so angry with me! My father-in-law,
really—when he spoke, it was poison. Once, he said in front of me, ‘A dead daughter-inlaw is gone. So what? You just get another.’” The experience of reproductive coercion
intertwined with myriad gender-kinship experiences, large and small, both shaping them
and being shaped by them to produce an overall sense of devaluation, oppression, and
restricted agency.
The fact that Preeti-ben’s in-laws themselves had four daughters featured
prominently in her criticism of their attitudes and behavior. She noted:
He’s a father of four girls himself, my father-in-law! He doesn’t think, ‘If
I had thought this, my daughters would not exist.’ He thinks this only for
25

In this regard, Preeti-ben’s connections to her in-laws—through the forced abortion and through ongoing
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recesses of the ordinary” (2007: 1).
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others... They have four girls themselves, but they say you shouldn’t have
girls. ‘It was different for us’—they said that openly. ‘Ours was a different
era, and this is a different era.’ The thing is, in their era, there was no
looking. The difficulty arrived when these sonography machines arrived.
Preeti-ben’s comment illustrates a certain historical element to in-law pressure: with the
transition from a reproductive regime characterized by high fertility and ungendered
fetuses to one characterized by lower fertility and visualizability of fetal sex, selective
reproduction became a possibility, desideratum, and object of familial negotiation for her
generation of women in a way it had not been for their predecessors.
But the generational difference in reproduction was embedded within more
fundamental dynamics that tied familial contention back to the moral economy of genderkinship. On the one hand, according to Preeti-ben, her in-laws devalued and rejected her
potential daughter on typical grounds: “she would go off to her conjugal family”; “she
would be a wasted cost”; “she could not be an heir”; “the costs would increase so much—
including the cost of marrying her”; “there always remains the question of whether you
find a good match for her, and how difficult her in-laws make things for her”; “daughter’s
sons belong to someone else’s family—they aren’t ours”; and so on. But on the other
hand, the in-laws exhibited great love for their own daughters, lavishing them with gifts,
showing them affection in countless verbal and physical forms, and often saddling Nitinbhai and Preeti-ben with various burdens in order to make his four sisters more
comfortable. The in-laws’ violent rejection of a granddaughter-to-be, and their
concomitant ravaging of the daughter-in-law’s body, were not expressions of simple,
undifferentiated misogyny, as stock narratives might have it. Even in this case of blatant
coercion, something nuanced was driving action around the gendered fetal subject.
Crucial here are the distinctions between daughters and daughters-in-law, and
between actual daughters and potential daughters, within the prevailing moral economy.
Preeti-ben hinted at these distinctions when she commented on her mother-in-law’s
“discrimination”:
When the old lady went to see her daughters, she would take all this good
fruit with her. But that’s because it was her daughters—that’s why she’d
take the good stuff. Nothing like that for me. When she took care of her
daughters during their pregnancies, she would take apples, cashews,
raisins, all kinds of good stuff like that. And nothing for me—she
wouldn’t even give me food! You can see: what a difference between
daughters and daughters-in-law! To those people, only their own
daughters are dear—not their son’s daughters.
One might build on Preeti-ben’s statement by adding that in all likelihood, only actual
daughters—not potential ones—would be dear to her in-laws. The reference to feeding is
revealing: Nitin-bhai’s parents cared about their four daughters because they had cared
for them, building and being drawn into an affective bond over decades of parenting.
(Preeti-ben also invoked the trope of nourishment to concretize her inchoate emotional
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investment in the lost daughter, “I’ve cried a lot—a lot. I have two daughters, and then
this one—the one that was killed. I feel so much grief for her! You imagine it—at the
time of my pregnancy with that girl, I drank good milk every day. Every day, I ate fruit.
To keep things good. And then, to kill her off?”) Post-marital alienation only sharpened
Preeti-ben’s in-laws’ sentimental connection to their daughters, imbuing it with the
poignancy of nostalgia. The in-laws affectionately cared for their daughters as conjugal
relatives almost certainly would not—as they themselves would not for Preeti-ben. The
apparent paradox of forcing sex-selective abortion while showering love upon daughters
illustrates the precise structural dynamic that made daughters a liability and marked the
daughter-to-be for elimination. For Preeti-ben’s in-laws, there was likely no incongruity
in devaluing the daughter-in-law (and the potential daughter in her womb) relative to
actually existing adult daughters. The temporal positioning of different actual and
potential daughters within lived gender-kinship experiences played a key role in shaping
orientations toward them. We might ask: if family sizes had been smaller, and SD
available, would Nitin-bhai’s parents have accepted the four girls they subsequently came
to adore? I suspect not.
Preeti-ben’s story also illustrates how women’s ability to resist coercion was
compromised by their positioning within the very moral economy that sex selection
reproduced. Having been alienated from the support, protection, and security of her piyar
when given to a household that viewed her as an outsider, Preeti-ben found herself in a
precarious position the moment she chose to resist her in-laws. Her reflections on being
completely economically dependent—on feeling at-a-loss with regard to the job market
despite having a college degree—point to how gender-kinship and political economy
intertwined with one another, tying the woman to her husband and in-laws by material
bonds of domination and subordination. Moral, domestic, and market economies
articulated in a fashion that exacerbated even highly educated women’s vulnerability to
kin group pressure. Moreover, resistance could jeopardize a woman’s own future, as well
as the reputation and wellbeing of her natal kin. In light of prevailing norms, divorce,
expulsion, and other forms of domestic abandonment would prove more disadvantageous
to defiant women than to their conjugal kin, who could usually procure a more compliant
daughter-in-law. Resistance also jeopardized the reputations of women’s piyars, which
would suffer from the stigma of a permanently returned daughter. The helplessness of the
woman and her natal kin in the face of violence and suffering—a pervasive element of
the futures people imagined for daughters prenatally—pervaded Sonal-ben’s witnessing,
which stood in for the reactions of a whole group of relatives who were outraged but
powerless against the alienated woman’s oppression.
Regarding her husband, Preeti-ben observed, “Nitin didn’t have any say. He
didn’t say anything. He would just do whatever they said. He just wouldn’t consider me.
‘Whatever my Pappa says goes,’ like that... And he has never said sorry. He has never
taken responsibility.” She described in detail how “my in-laws have always kept him
down... always treated him badly.” At different points in the story, Nitin-bhai appeared as
a hapless co-victim, silent bystander, or even co-perpetrator. He was, in fact, all of these,
with the latter two roles conditioned by the first one. While stock narratives often left
husbands hidden, they could actually take on multiple and often conflicting roles within
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the moral economy of gender-kinship, with significant ramifications for the fates of
daughters-to-be.
Ultimately, the power dynamics within Preeti-ben’s conjugal household subjected
her to an immense pain whose violence bled into the everyday, suffusing ongoing
relationships among kin. Multiple aspects of suffering—the physical torment from the
unwanted abortion, the embodied loss of a desired child, the anguish of disempowerment
with respect to one’s own body, and the misery of isolation and abandonment—
overlapped to form a tragic whole. One might synecdochically read the whole into Preetiben’s recurrent references to isolation and abandonment: being left, by her husband’s
inaction or complicity, to her in-law’s wishes; being abandoned by her husband at the
abortion clinic; being left alone during the abortion, in favor of more pleasant pursuits, by
both parents-in-law; being barred from her normative place in the conjugal home; being
exposed to the indignity of ongoing residues of rejection, such as the milkman’s
comments, even after return; and being ignored in favor of the newly birthed son despite
grave medical complications. In all of these, there was a palpable disregard for—or
willful sacrifice of—the woman’s body and person in the headlong pursuit of a son.

Pressure, Prohibition, and Coping: Pushpa-ben
Preeti-ben’s story illustrates the lived experience of the real women reduced to
stereotypical victims in many representations of sex selection. It therefore represents one
extreme within a range of decision-making possibilities. In other cases, pressure from inlaws was less direct, and selective reproduction emerged as a tactical exercise of agency
by women placed in impossibly difficult positions.
I met Pushpa-ben at the home of a mutual acquaintance—an older woman for
whom she performed basic housework. We reclined across from each other—I on a sofa,
she on a rattan wicker chair—limbs splaying across the arms of our seats. She laughed,
smiled sadly, and cocked her head from side to side as she narrated her experience of sex
selection.
A Rajput by caste, Pushpa-ben had grown up in a town of Mahesana District.
Some years after marrying young—she could not say at precisely what age—she moved
to her conjugal household in Ahmedabad. Pushpa-ben’s husband was a college graduate,
but he had difficulty procuring a job, and they remained dependent on her father-in-law’s
government salary. She had a daughter in 1983, another in 1985, and a third in 1986.
According to Pushpa-ben’s recollection, that was when the trouble really began.
She explained:
Whenever I was pregnant, my mother-in-law kept wondering, boy or girl?
In the second, she felt it a bit more. And with the third, a lot more... No
one else in the family, but my mother-in-law kept saying, ‘My boy doesn’t
have a boy! Chhokaro to joie ja!’ Where was I going to go get one, if it
wasn’t in my destiny?... But she kept saying, ‘The house has been filled up
with girls!’
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Pushpa-ben recounted with a chuckle that following the third birth, her mother-in-law
conspicuously rejected the newborn baby by refusing to take the girl from the
obstetrician’s hands.
Pushpa-ben subsequently faced a dilemma. On the one hand, her mother-in-law
disapproved of sex-selective abortion. Pushpa-ben explained:
My mother-in-law didn’t want another girl, but if she found out I did
anything like that, she would’ve made a big fuss—definitely a big uproar.
“You went and did what shouldn’t be done!” My in-laws definitely
wouldn’t have let me get rid of a girl. They would’ve said, “If it’s a girl,
then let her be born.” They wouldn’t have let me get it out.
The mother-in-law had made it clear that she viewed sex selection as sinful and would
not permit it.
On the other hand, the mother-in-law continued to repeatedly and forcefully
express a perceived need for a grandson. Pushpa-ben recalled:
My mother-in-law kept worrying—”My son doesn’t have even one boy,
and what if he has a fourth girl? How will he make ends meet, without a
job? Feeding, marrying off—we have to spend so much money when we
send a girl to her family!”
There was some dispute every day: “Just girls, just girls, just girls!
The house is full of girls! They won’t let my son advance.” My feeling
was, the girls are still ours. Were we going to go throwing them away?
And well-educated daughters could raise their fathers, too! But she felt,
“For my son, chhokaro to joie ja! These girls are outsiders—will they
remain with us? Chhokaro to joie...” Because she kept saying, saying,
saying it, I thought, what is this life? “No boy, no boy, no boy.” I had to
hear that every day.
While opposed to biomedical sex selection, the mother-in-law continued to harbor a
strong desire for a son for her son, and she used her familial power to constantly express
that desire to the woman responsible for bearing the boy.
The mother-in-law’s contradictory attitudes—disapproval of sex selection,
disapproval of repeated daughters—placed Pushpa-ben in an untenable position. With
domestic friction taking a toll, she eventually resolved the dilemma by secretly pursuing
SD. She explained:
I just didn’t have the strength any more. I said, what if I have a fourth girl?
This third one was barely accepted. But with a fourth, there’s no question
of acceptance. So I asked lots of people, gathered lots of information.
People told me, if you request it, they will look and tell you, boy or girl;
and if it’s a girl and you don’t want to keep it, they will take it out for you.
So I started to get the picture that I should do this thing. So I did it. I had
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already decided: if it’s a girl, I don’t want to keep it; it will be the end of
me if I bring a fourth Mataji into my home!
While the son desire and daughter aversion driving sex selection came largely from the
mother-in-law, the movement toward clinical SD appeared as a coping tactic— a
“weapon of the weak”26—initiated by the pregnant woman in the face of harassment and
potential domestic insecurity.
Pushpa-ben’s agency in seeking sex selection emerged gradually over the course
of our conversation. Early on, she stated, “My faiji [father-in-law’s sister] said, hey, since
it’s like this, let’s go get it looked at and decide whether to get it out based on if it’s a boy
or a girl.” A few minutes later, passing over the events again, she said, “I said I wanted to
go to the doctor because it was like this, and my faiji said she would come with me.”
Toward the end, she explained more fully, “After my third girl, I would talk to people
wherever I went to do housework—what to do in a situation like this. People would talk,
and I got a sense. They taught me—‘Oh, a doctor can do so-and-so...’ So I got the
information and asked my faiji where we could go for something like this.” As we talked,
Pushpa-ben’s active role in pursuing sex selection unfolded palimpsestically, revealing
itself in parallel with narration of the household conditions that had compelled it. The
emergent narrative defied facile characterization of its protagonist as straightforward
hero, victim, or villain. Pushpa-ben was a pragmatic woman, choosing a course of action
that was simultaneously suboptimal, overdetermined, and empowering.
Pushpa-ben and her faiji went to a female obstetrician in Ahmedabad. After
explaining the situation, Pushpa-ben began crying. She “had just three hundred rupees,
gathered together from the five rupees, ten rupees, whatever my brother gave me when he
came to visit,” and knew that she could not afford both SD and an abortion. The doctor
“held my hand, calmed me down, talked very nicely to me.” “’Don’t cry,’” Pushpa-ben
recalled the clinician saying. “Don’t be afraid. I’ll do it for you for free.’” The doctor
“put in a needle and pulled some water from the belly,” and then sent the patient on her
way.
Three days later, the obstetrician summoned the two women. The pathologist’s
report was back: female. Pushpa-ben broke down sobbing, worried both about how the
doctor would possibly perform an abortion without payment, and how to hide the
procedure from her disapproving in-laws. The doctor again reassured her, saying that she
would perform the abortion as an “act of charity,” and in such a way that no one in the
family would find out. She asked the pair to return the next day.
Thinking back to the day of the procedure, Pushpa-ben remembered, “I felt like it
was no good to get the girl taken out, and no good to keep her. If I kept her, there would
be a furor at home. And if I got her out, then I would be sad. I am a girl, after all—I
myself am! But then I resolved in my mind, and I went.” Having reviewed the constraints
of her aporia once more, Pushpa-ben stole out to the clinic with the excuse of buying
vegetables. The doctor completed the procedure in an hour, and Pushpa-ben was back
home within two.
26
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In contrast to Preeti-ben’s disdain for “The Dog” who scanned her and “that
scoundrel” who aborted her pregnancy, Pushpa-ben expressed only positive evaluations
of her sex selection provider’s actions, which had helped her resolve an intractable
kinship dilemma. This was typical of a broader pattern among women who pragmatically
sought out sex selection. Unlike those subjected to overt coercion, who sometimes
described complicit practitioners in the most disparaging terms, women seeking sex
selection on their own initiative (however constrained) tended to praise their biomedical
patrons as understanding and helpful; complaints among the latter category of patients
tended to focus on specific issues, such as exorbitant prices, without telescoping them
into broader critiques of the doctors as moral actors. Different relationships between
familial pressure and selective reproduction produced very different attitudes toward the
biomedical practitioners who made sex selection possible.27
Throughout the sex selection process, Pushpa-ben’s husband remained
uninvolved. She recounted with what I heard as a rueful chuckle:
He would never say anything—neither to me, nor to my mother-in-law. It
made no difference to him if we had a boy or a girl. But he never spoke
up. I asked him, “Why don’t you say anything, when your relatives say so
much? When she keeps telling me, telling me, why don’t you say, ‘It’s not
just her fault, it’s mine, too?’ Why don’t you say something?” But he
wouldn’t speak up. So then I had to be strong myself.
The husband’s role as a silent bystander was part of what drove Pushpa-ben to pursue sex
selection as her own solution to the familial conflict. Other alternatives might have been
possible if he, too, had taken an active role in plotting the couple’s reproductive future.
In 1989, upon becoming pregnant again, Pushpa-ben reasoned that “I had to
check, boy-girl; if I had a girl, I would be in trouble all over.” With her faiji’s help, she
went to the same doctor. This time, the result was “male.” When Pushpa-ben announced
the good news at home, her mother-in-law scolded her for obtaining SD without
informing the family. To calm the older woman’s anger, the faiji had to insist, “I took
her”—again hiding Pushpa-ben’s agency.
Pushpa-ben’s experience provides a point of comparison for understanding the
extremeness of Preeti-ben’s story and, by extension, circulating stock narratives of
selective reproduction. It illustrates heavy in-law pressure without permitting a flattening
of complex agentic dynamics into simple “coercion.” Placed under myriad and frequently
overwhelming constraints, women might turn to sex selection as a pragmatic response,
taking decisive action that ultimately had dual effects: making a patriarchal domestic
situation slightly more bearable on a personal level while reinforcing patriarchy on a
structural level. For Pushpa-ben, SD and selective abortion comprised a path out of an
aporia, one that expressed simultaneous compliance with and defiance of in-laws’ wishes,
27
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as well as strategic maneuvering within and enactment of a violent gender-kinship
system.
Pushpa-ben’s story undermines simplifying attempts to categorize those
forbidding sex selection as heroes, those desiring it as villains, and those undergoing it as
passive victims. Like Pushpa-ben, women could and did pursue the elimination of future
women as a matter of situated agency; they did not thereby relinquish a claim to careful,
sympathetic consideration as something more than “sinners” and “cruel mothers.”
Similarly, like Pushpa-ben’s mother-in-law, family members could reject sex selection
without feminist motives, and in ways that actually exacerbated the suffering of women
beneath them in the domestic hierarchy. Wading into the complexity of Pushpa-ben’s
experience, it becomes impossible to project a straightforward morality play onto the
process of sex selection.

Shifting In-Laws, Shifting Agency
It is no accident that the two rich accounts of family decision-making patterns
presented above come from women who underwent sex selection several decades ago, in
a city at some remove from Mahesana. Because my fieldwork was heavily anchored to
clinics and to home visits with entire families, I often could not have the extended
individual conversations that close acquaintance facilitated with Preeti-ben and Pushpaben.28 But many contemporaneous cases from my research exemplify, nuance, and
complement the two patterns that emerge from Preeti-ben and Pushpa-ben’s stories.
Following the Preeti-ben archetype, I saw several instances in which in-laws
played a disturbingly forceful role in pressuring reluctant or resistive women toward
selective abortion. For example, during one visit at Chetna Clinic, an older woman began
dismissing her daughter-in-law’s concerns and objections before even exiting the
examining area: “So we have to get it taken out. We don’t want to keep it, right?.. No, no,
get rid of it, get rid of it! You can’t go keeping this... What is there to be afraid of?” In
such cases of intense in-law pressure, women could and did resist—with or without the
support of their husbands—by insisting on keeping a pregnancy or lying about results to
kin who had not been present for the scan.
Similarly, I saw a familial dynamic like Pushpa-ben’s in some Chetna cases. This
was especially true among Rajput women, many of whom were accompanied by natal
relatives lamenting the same dilemma: the conjugal family prohibited the patient from
seeking SD while threatening her with abandonment, divorce, or a second marriage for
the husband if she did not produce the elusive son. 29 By forbidding selective
28

Analytically, the temporal remoteness of Preeti-ben and Pushpa-ben’s sex-selective abortions is both
strength and weakness. The passage of time allows for analysis, clarification, and schematization of
dynamics that may not be articulable initially. But by removing the possibility of correlative observation,
past-ness also raises the issue of selective narration, selective elision, and exaggeration or minimization of
certain actors’ agency. Ultimately, even if they selectively add, omit, or modify information—as all
narratives inevitably do—Preeti-ben and Pushpa-ben’s stories illustrate key aspects of two reasonably
prevalent family decision-making patterns.
29
In facilitating sonless women’s access to sex selection services, relatives from the piyar engaged in a
specific form of the “stigma management” that Marcia Inhorn found among infertile Egyptian women’s
natal kin, who sometimes acted in direct response to conjugal relatives’ attempts to tear up a childless
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reproduction while posing catastrophic consequences for the birth of an unwanted
daughter, in-laws expressed a burdensome hope, one whose disappointment would
radically disadvantage a woman within the gender-kinship system. In such cases, furtive
sex selection appeared as an escape hatch, amalgamating compliance and defiance in a
pragmatic coping tactic.
There were many other configurations in which in-laws appeared as obstacles to
selective reproduction. In them, women’s agency became largely a matter of overcoming,
skirting, or obeying relatives’ wishes against sex selection.30 Kavita-ben’s was a case in
which a woman overcame relatives’ objections through sheer insistence. By contrast, my
neighbor Megha-ben and her husband—they of the four separate opinions—had
completely hidden their pursuit of SD from his parents, who viewed sex selection as
sinful. Uma-masi commented:
A lot of cases that come with me are like Megha’s. They keep it secret;
they don’t let the parents know... From the moment there’s a pregnancy,
they don’t let anyone know. They hide it. The families don’t know—just
the husband and wife. They get the work done quietly, secretly. If it’s
good, they keep it. Many in-laws don’t allow it, right?
Unlike Kavita-ben, many pregnant women were not in a position to successfully mount
explicitly challenges to senior relatives’ prohibitions on sex selection—at least without
precipitating marked familial discord or jeopardizing their sometimes-tenuous positions
within the household. Many such women (and often their husbands) went to practitioners
like Uma-masi to “get the work done quietly.”
The pattern described by Uma-masi provides a foil against which to understand
the experience of Shilpa-ben and her husband Dhruv-bhai. After three months of
antenatal care at Nandini, they went to Chetna with Uma-masi; Dr. Ranjit declared the
fetus female. On returning home to their village, they voiced a shared preference for
ending the pregnancy. But Dhruv-bhai’s father forbade it. “I’m sure,” he said, “that it will
be a boy. I’m sure that I have a grandson coming!” He emphasized how Dhruv-bhai’s
mother and most women of her generation had borne three or more children “without any
problem.” The collective decision-making process ended there.
Six months later, Shilpa-ben gave birth to a second daughter. The Nandini
pharmacist, per her usual custom, expressed bewilderment directly to Dhruv-bhai: “A
second girl? Didn’t you get it looked at?” Following an awkward silence, she smiled and
reassured him, “Oh well, it’s no problem! God’ll give you a boy next time.”

marriage (1996: 165-199). See John et al. (2008: 64, 65-66) for further examples of women accessing SD
and selective abortion through natal kin.
30
The analysis here echoes Madhok’s examination of three different women’s experiences of
contraception—two of them involving sterilization in defiance of conjugal opposition, and sterilization
thwarted by conjugal opposition—to emphasize that agency lies “not in the abilities of these women to
undertake free action but rather in their reflexive capacities to actively formulate and articulate their
preferences” (2004: 226-227).
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After momentarily hanging his head and sighing deeply, Dhruv-bhai suddenly
stood up erect and reframed the unchosen state of affairs, firmly declaring, “God gives
girls to families that are strong enough to care for them!” Uma-masi told me afterward
that despite putting on a brave face, both he and Shilpa-ben had felt despondent
throughout the pregnancy, ultimately approaching the birth in a spirit of resignation.
Shilpa-ben’s story, with its divergences from those of Megha-ben and Kavita-ben,
illustrates how different members of a household could channel son desire into different
reproductive pathways. Rohit-bhai and his family, Megha-ben’s in-laws, Dhruv-bhai’s
father—all of them insisted, like Pushpa-ben’s mother-in-law, on a high-fertility pathway
to the necessary son, advocating for repeated pregnancies over selective reproduction. In
each case, the pregnant woman herself oriented to and sought SD as a method for
minimizing the number of children needed to reach a boy. The disagreements within each
family—resolved in favor of Kavita-ben in her case, in favor of senior relatives in Shilpaben’s, and entirely evaded in Megha-ben’s—indexed a generational divide in the
acceptability of multiple pregnancies and selective abortion.
Furthermore, many women and providers said that in the era of open sex
selection, “strict” in-laws, concerned about sin and “more understanding of right and
wrong than people today,” had forbidden SD and selective abortion more frequently and
vehemently than in the 2010s.31 Observers proposed three interrelated causes for the
perceived decline in the prevalence and strength of in-law prohibitions, which forced
women to carry unwanted pregnancies or surreptitiously seek sex selection. First, people
felt that the force of senior relatives’ dicta had diminished due to family nuclearization
and “women’s empowerment,” including increased education and paid employment.32
Second, with the transition to a low-fertility regime, even older relatives frequently
agreed on the importance of limiting family size.33 Third, there was supposedly an
increased flexibility in attitudes toward sin, divine will, and the morality of sex-selective
abortion—in other words, a difference in how people were “understanding of right and
wrong.”34
The trend of decreasing familial restrictions raises a dissonance when juxtaposed
with stock narratives about the coercive role of mothers-in-law, and with experiences
such as Preeti-ben’s, which doubtless continued to occur. Governance institutions, mass
media, clinicians, and even sex selection clients trafficked in a cacophony of
contradictory explanations, in which conjugal relatives, pregnant women, and the
desirability of sex selection seemed to shift trickily with respect to one another: In-laws
drive sex selection... No, they prohibit it, though now the prohibitions have become
softer... Women will stop going for sex-selective abortion once education, earning, and
collapse of the joint family empower them to make their own choices... But when

31

Cf. John et al. 2008: 58-59; Khanna 2009: 102-103.
Cf. the studies (and assumptions) reviewed in Madhok (2004), which largely deal with the association
between women’s domestic “autonomy” and declining fertility.
33
Cf. L. Visaria 2007b: 157-158.
34
I examine the last factor—a profoundly important one for understanding deliberation around sex
selection—in Chapter 5.
32
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permitted to have the final say in reproductive decisions, women generally opt for sex
selection...
The various explanatory discourses around intra-household struggles usually fell
short because they flattened agentic dynamics that must be understood in their
complexity. What happened when women acted on what they perceived as their own
reasons for sex selection, with familial impulsion relatively attenuated? How might sex
selection be situated, but in dynamics not of conjugal coercion or pressure, but of
consensus, or even pregnant women’s own open, defiant initiative?

Consensus, Divergence, and Women’s Reasons
Quite often, the first-approximation paradigm in family decision-making around
selective reproduction was one of consensus rather than conflict.35 Of course, even cases
of consensus showed the traces of invisibly and pervasively violent gender-kinship
processes. And then there were many cases, such as Kavita-ben’s, in which pregnant
women drove the process, often over the objections of husbands and other relatives.
Instances in which women themselves initiated pursuit of sex selection services must be
understood both as exercises of reproductive agency and as reflections or enactments of
the household power dynamics and social structures within which those women were
embedded.
Consensus: Deepa-ben
In many households, such as Gita-masi’s, Kinjal-ben’s, and Esha-ben’s in Chapter
2, a broad consensus favoring sex selection united different family members. Early in my
fieldwork, I rode along with Deepa-ben—a “VIP patient” from an affluent, Patel family
of Mahesana—for a visit to Chetna. When I got into the car at the landmark where we
had agreed to meet, I was surprised to see only Uma-masi and the patient inside. The
subsequent trip was the only time, in hundreds of car rides around the Mahesana region,
that I rode in a car driven by a woman. As we started off on the road to Chetna, Deepaben introduced herself and explained that her in-laws were “very good,” “very forwardthinking”—they had permitted her to pursue a master’s degree even after her marriage,
and they had allowed her to learn driving and given her a car to take her daughter to and
from school.
A few minutes into the ride, Deepa-ben reflected on families in which girls “piled
up” without a brother:
What is the sad state of those girls? On the inside, they feel, ‘Oh, I don’t
have a brother’—especially on Rakshabandhan and other occasions. See,
in my piyar, we are three sisters, and just one brother—the youngest.
When I finished my master’s, he was still in elementary school! So
35

In calling this pattern “consensus,” I do not mean to imply a harmonious whole free of contradictions or
ambivalences. I am, instead, attaching a provisional label to a prevalent domestic pattern that must be
understood as complex. Rather than demonstrating the absence of inequality, consensus in fact
demonstrates the “paradoxical logic of masculine domination and feminine submissiveness, which can,
without contradiction, be described as both spontaneous and extorted” (Bourdieu 2004: 240).
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growing up, I didn’t have a brother. On occasions like this, we sisters
cried. Especially on Rakshabandhan—‘Why don’t I have a brother, like
everyone else, to tie a rākhdi on? When will my brother come?’ And
really, on any social occasion, I felt the lack of a brother.
Deepa-ben understood, from experience, the anguish that local moral-economic
arrangements imposed on girls without a brother.
I asked how many daughters Deepa-ben had—just one—and she began gushing :
the five-year-old girl was “very smart,” always “bringing home top marks,” and she
participated in speech competitions and sporting events “with confidence.” Then, to my
surprise, Deepa-ben added, “Actually, we weren’t planning for another child after our
daughter. But my husband’s grandfather, on his deathbed, said that God would give us a
boy. So then my husband’s grandmother said, won’t you fulfill Dada’s wish? That’s
where this all came from. Otherwise, we had no plans.” Like the unplanned pregnancies
in Kinjal-ben’s and Gita-masi’s families, Deepa-ben’s belatedly planned pregnancy was
desired only contingently, as a means to a son.
When I inquired generally about other relatives’ attitudes, Deepa-ben
preemptively dismissed the question of coercion: “My in-laws are all very good, the poor
dears! No forcing or anything. My mother-in-law doesn’t even say anything.” From
there, she began intimating the family’s shared desire for a son: “Yes, my husband’s
grandmother feels that way. She won’t say anything, and she doesn’t harass me. But of
course I get a sense that she is hoping. That’s everyone’s hope. And she will say things to
other relatives—not directly to me, but you can figure it out, no?” Coming to the
stereotypical figure of pressure, Deepa-ben continued, “And my mother-in-law must also
feel that way inside. She doesn’t say anything to me, but she must feel it.” Then, she
added, “Everyone feels that it would be good if the household gets a boy. Because our
Indian culture’s system is that the girl marries and goes to a pārku household, but the son
remains with us.” This sex selection trip was driven, it seemed, by a broad consensus in
which the desires of others slowly bled into Deepa-ben’s own orientation.
Reflecting further on her in-laws’ desires, Deepa-ben said, “After this, I’ll go
home, and we’ll decide. I’ll tell them whatever it is.” I asked whether she would consider
keeping the result from her kin, as some women who went with Uma-masi did. Her reply
was swift and vehement: “No! I could never lie like that. It’s all well and good now, but
once they found out afterward, they would feel for the rest of their lives, oh, Deepa
deceived me. They wouldn’t trust me anymore. And I couldn’t face them.” Her statement
was an expression of disciplining within a particular gender-kinship position, but it was
also much more. It tied reproductive transparency to familial mutuality and affection.36
To honestly reveal knowledge of the gendered fetal subject, with the myriad relations it
implied, was an act of domestic belonging.
A few moments later, Deepa-ben elaborated:
36

Cf. Gammeltoft’s discussion how Vietnamese women inhabited mutuality and belonging through
consultation about sonographic diagnosis of fetal disability with kin and neighbors (2007a: 159-161, 2014a:
231-234).
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It wouldn’t even be a problem to have a second girl! The entire family is
supportive. But see, I had very high blood pressure in the last pregnancy—
impossible to control, even with every medication. That’s why we had to
do an emergency Caesarean—oh yes, there’s that, too: there’s one
Caesarean already! But so my mother-in-law and grandmother-in-law say,
‘Why endure all of that over and over? How much will you have to
suffer?’ If I have high blood pressure this time, and it’s a girl, then what
will the sad state of my body be?
I thought to myself that there was an unspoken but palpable sense of the additional
question: And what about the inevitable pregnancy for a boy after that? I was still
reflecting when Deepa-ben rounded out the picture: “My father-in-law, my husband, they
say it’s okay. But my mother-in-law says, ‘Boys don’t understand what women have to
endure.’” Unlike Preeti-ben, who saw blatant disregard for her body in her mother-inlaw’s behavior, Deepa-ben found solidarity and maternal concern in conjugal women’s
advocacy of selective abortion.
As in so many cases, Deepa-ben’s husband remained on the margins of the sex
selection pursuit. She chuckled as she told us, “He said, get done whatever you want to
get done. But don’t do anything wrong. See, abortion, all that kind of stuff—he can’t bear
to see it. He has a soft personality. That’s why he’s not here. He said that he couldn’t bear
to see it if the doctor said it was a girl and then there was an abortion or something.” Like
other men, Deepa-ben’s husband had the privilege to remain “soft”—and aloof—in the
process of selective reproduction. Because his body did not tether him as tightly to the
reproduction of his own patriline, he could avoid direct involvement.
After arriving at Chetna, we had to wait outside for almost an hour. (Dr. Ranjit
was scanning a police sub-inspector’s wife and wanted to preserve the impression that he
provided sex selection services only in “select cases,” to “special people.”) Sitting in the
car, Deepa-ben compulsively rubbed her forehead and bit her fingernails. Eventually, we
went inside, and the doctor completed the scan quickly. As Deepa-ben sat up and wiped
the gel from her belly, Uma-masi leaned in and whispered, “It’s good!” Deepa-ben
smiled.
Subsequent conversation confirmed my sense that Deepa-ben’s sex selection
experience, like her affinal relationships more generally, was less riven with explicit
conflict than those of Preeti-ben, Pushpa-ben, and others. She seemed to feel for her inlaws the deep-seated, subtle ambivalence that I generally found to be the best-case
scenario for adaptation to the pervasive and normalized violence of being alienated from
one’s own home and thrust into another. She described her in-laws as jabara—a difficultto-translate word carrying shades of power, strength, willfullness, and even
imperiousness. While relatively permissive by the standards of North Gujarat, they
stopped well short of the most liberal behavior locally imaginable. They maintained
exacting expectations regarding childcare. Partly as a consequence, they had imposed
search criteria so onerous as to make paid work virtually impossible despite Deepa-ben’s
high level of education and the fact that all of her natal relatives—including her sister—
worked outside the home; several times, she described her own desire for a job and then
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concluded with statements of the form “They say that all this education shouldn’t go
unused, but...” At the same time, Deepa-ben frequently expressed what seemed like
deeply felt affection and admiration for her in-laws, describing incidents and patterns of
harmony, cooperation, and mutual respect, and occasionally even chuckling about how
one or another relative was “afraid of me.”
I believe that this well-adjusted ambivalence in the realm of the everyday bears an
elective affinity with uneasy consensus around sex selection. The coexistence of the two
was a highly common pattern among the families I observed. In contrast to cases of
coercion or prohibition, in which in-laws staked out positions opposed to those of
pregnant women themselves, Deepa-ben’s experience involved a collective initiation of
selective reproduction. Like all situated agents, Deepa-ben participated in the collective
initiation under heavy influence from her own embodied history—a brother-less girl’s
sorrow, a trying pregnancy—as well as the desires and statements of other kin, including
the dying grandfather-in-law, the eager grandmother-in-law, and the silent but palpably
hopeful mother-in-law. Deepa-ben’s SD trip was a manifestation of personal desire that
had merged with and taken on those of familial others.
Divergence: Ami-ben
In other cases, such as Kavita-ben’s, women seemed to drive the pursuit of sex
selection over the objections of other relatives—not as an adaptation to direct familial
pressure for a son, as in Pushpa-ben’s case, but for other reasons. Just two days before I
met Deepa-ben, I accompanied Ami-ben and her family on a Chetna visit facilitated by
Uma-masi. Ami-ben sat in the passenger seat of the family’s beat-up car, holding a small,
round-faced two-year-old bundled up in a bonnet and a red fleece sweater. Her husband
drove. I squeezed into the back with Uma-masi and the “close friend” who had connected
her to the couple—the husband’s sister. They were Patels, from a village between
Mahesana and Patan—he a farmer and bhuva by trade, the two women housewives.
As we pulled away from Mahesana, Ami-ben recalled with a slight frown, “Last
time, we went in that bhai’s rickshaw.” Uma-masi smiled and nodded. Ami-ben looked
over her shoulder and explained to me, “It was a girl then, so we got her taken out.” The
previous visit had occurred just five months earlier. I was startled by the small gap
between the abortion and the current pregnancy. The sister-in-law mentioned that Umamasi had taken her for SD when she was pregnant with her son, who was now five.
Her brother shook his head and muttered, “I told my sister no! She kept a bādhā
with me, so I said they should not do this sin.” The sister-in-law smiled, shook her head,
and looked at Uma-masi, arching her eyebrows—“But are we women ever satisfied
without getting it looked at?” As Uma-masi grinned and grunted supportively, the brother
cocked his head toward his wife and daughter, mumbling, “I’m having to suffer for that
sin now, with girl after girl! Karma—that is the most powerful thing in this world.” The
husband elaborated on his work as a bhuva to Shikotar Mata, listing off the various cities
where he had connections with clients and fellow bhuvas. Then, shaking his head, he
said, “I release other people from their sorrow. It’s ours that won’t let go!”
Uma-masi and I explained my research a bit further. Ami-ben’s sister-in-law
nodded and said, “See, the main thing is the feeling that if there’s one boy, then the door
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to the home will remain open.” Pointing to her niece, she added, “This one will go to a
pārku household after marrying.”
Suddenly, the husband shouted: “I never wanted to get it looked at! I said, let
whatever it is come. Whatever comes is fine—whatever God gives us! After we got it
taken out last time, I said, oh God, I will marry a second girl, give her away in kanyādān, but release me from this sin!” Again, reluctance, disavowal, and blame of the wife:
like Deepa-ben’s husband and Rohit-bhai, Ami-ben’s husband distanced himself from
responsibility for the actions he and his wife had undertaken in the pursuit of a son. Amiben stared silently into the fields passing by on the other side of the road.
When we reached the clinic, Ami-ben sat silently on a bench in the waiting room,
her jaw clenched, her gaze flitting from one point to another every few seconds. The
toddler’s right arm draped over the mother’s right hand, which held the toddler’s left arm,
which in turn lay across the mother’s left arm; they were intertwined like vines.
Eventually, the nurse told the husband and sister-in-law to stay in the waiting
room with the little girl and took the rest of us to the back corridor to await Dr. Ranjit’s
call. Uma-masi asked Ami-ben how she felt. She began, “The hend is the same as last
time. People say the hend should be different! And I don’t have a brother myself—we are
just three sisters...” Sobs interrupted her speech. She wiped her mouth with the edge of
her sari and wrung her wrists, looking down. Tears filled her eyes, and her lips and jaw
trembled. Before any of us could say more, the nurse summoned us into the consultory.
The doctor scanned for quite a while. Ami-ben’s gaze remained focused on his
face, with occasional glances around the room. Her hands were joined, and she seemed to
be mouthing a prayer the entire time. After more than fifteen minutes, Dr. Ranjit
instructed Ami-ben to step outside and pass urine, explaining that he would need to scan
again. She shook her head as she stepped down from the examining table.
Out in the general ward where Uma-masi shepherded us, there was a pair of
women whom I recognized from Nandini. Uma-masi began conversing with them. It
soon became apparent that though they had come from Mahesana in a separate vehicle,
they were also her clients. Uma-masi asked “what excuse you made,” given that “the
family was saying no.” One of the women said, “Oh, they were definitely saying no! But
we said we were just going for an outing in the car.” Uma-masi turned to Ami-ben and
me and explained that the woman had snuck out with her husband and sister-in-law to
obtain SD secretly, since her in-laws objected to the practice. Ami-ben nodded and
mumbled some words of general sympathy—“Oh, that’s the way it has to be, isn’t it?”
A few minutes later, the nurse called us all out into the corridor. Ami-ben turned
to the other patient and said, “I’m getting this done a second time. I had it done once
before, but it was a girl.” Her eyes filled with tears, and the corners of her mouth
twitched. “Now, this is the second time. But the hend feels the same!” She began
weeping. The other women vaguely reassured her that a male child did not always
correspond to a different bodily experience of pregnancy. The nurse called us in, and
Ami-ben quickly wiped her tears away.
Following another long scan, Dr. Ranjit mumbled something to Uma-masi, who
quickly ushered us out of the examining area, out of the consultory, and into the back
corridor. Ami-ben opened her mouth, but before she could say anything, Uma-masi
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declared, “It’s a good report! Nothing to worry about!” Ami-ben’s whole body slumped,
and she buried her face into Uma-masi’s shoulder, leaning on her as we walked away.
We exited to the waiting room, where Uma-masi informed the husband and sister-in-law
of the result. We rode back to Mahesana, sitting in silence save for the devotional hymns
the husband blasted on the stereo: “Oh this world, this world is full of sinners...”
Later interactions confirmed the impressions I gained from that initial trip. With
support from the sister-in-law, Ami-ben had previously insisted on pursuing SD and then
selective abortion. The husband had vehemently objected to both steps but ultimately
conceded to his wife’s wishes. Like the other client we encountered at Chetna, Ami-ben
had been the major advocate of sex selection within the family, in ways poignantly
inflected by her own experiential understanding of what being sonless and brother-less
entailed. Where her husband voiced concerns grounded in karma and sin, she focused on
pragmatic factors such as the inevitable alienation of daughters, the “sorrow” of girls
without a brother, and the exhaustion of repeatedly bearing and caring for “whatever God
gives.” Of course, as the tears in the back corridor suggested, it also fell to Ami-ben to
deal most directly with the physical and emotional consequences of a female result—
consequences that she found painful despite their chosenness.
Women’s Reasons
Deepa-ben and Ami-ben’s narratives differ in the degree of familial consensus
around sex selection. But they stand united, and in contradistinction to Preeti-ben and
Pushpa-ben’s stories, by the degree to which the women protagonists were empowered to
adopt somewhat active, rather than reactive, approaches to reproductive choice. Pushing
aside stock narratives of coercive in-laws, victimized daughters-in-law, and women
resisting sex selection against all odds, these stories illustrate how women might agree
with and even drive the process of selective reproduction.
Sex selection clients, obstetricians, and connectors often emphasized that women
generally seemed more invested in having sons than did their husbands. Couples seeking
SD or conceiving yet again in hope of a son frequently joked about the pattern: wives
self-deprecatingly admitted that “he doesn’t care, it’s all me,” while many husbands,
echoing Ami-ben’s, muttered that “whatever comes is fine” or that “I didn’t even want to
get all of this done.”
Families and practitioners usually ascribed greater maternal avidity to “talk in the
community,” “neighborhood gossip,” or “how women always chatter when they get
together.” In this account, women’s son desire could be explained by the amount and
content of talk about children, which fetishized a son as a token that bestowed greater
social recognition. (Here, too, men remained largely hidden in the analysis of patriarchal
dynamics.) Women wanted sons because they were the ones to “hear about it” from
relatives, neighbors, and caste-mates when they did not have them. Taunts, expressions of
pity, and other negative social commentary about a couple’s sonless condition—and the
converse once a son was born—differentially affected women, whose access to other
avenues of social recognition was often more circumscribed.37 Whereas Deepa-ben’s
37

For the specific role of sons in enhancing mothers’ social recognition and status in patrilineal Indian
families, see P. Jeffery et al. (1989: 144-145), John et al. (2008: 66), and Puri et al. (2011: 1171). Das has
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husband garnered respect as a successful entrepreneur, and Ami-ben’s as a sacrally
powerful bhuva, their wives’ social renown depended largely on becoming mothers to
sons.
But it would be mistaken to overdetermine sex selection as merely a function of
social talk in women’s everyday worlds. Such talk fit within a much broader moraleconomic apparatus that channeled the desires of particularly positioned persons toward
the reenactment of patriarchal structures—an apparatus that allowed considerable latitude
of desire and action, even as it imposed heavy constraints. An account of women’s
reasons for actively pursuing sex selection must consider how such action could rest on
pregnant women’s experientially situated understandings of potential girls’ lives, as well
as their own direct stakes in reproduction.38
If women frequently exhibited greater apparent desire for sex selection than
relatives—particularly husbands—it was partly because they possessed situated
understandings of the difficulties of feminine lives. The phrase I heard from Kavita-ben
without further elaboration—“Being a woman...”—surfaced countless times as a prelude
to women explaining why they did not wish to bring more female life into the world.
After trying and failing to access SD, one Nandini patient lamented, “Oh, I’m so worried!
A woman’s avatar—well, a man’s avatar is better. Worrying about the kids, worrying
about everything—women have all the difficulties.” The reference to avatar, with its
evocation of physical form and consequent social destiny, aligns with the way many
women talked about the implications of SD: a gendered body implied a gendered fate.
Shaking her head, the same Nandini patient later elaborated, “There’s no worth to
a girl in our community! I see what the situation for women is every day—abuse,
disrespect—in my home, in my community. After seeing all that sorrow, a boy is better.
What is the sad state of a girl? How can someone live like this?” Such statements about
the sad imagined life of a potential daughter make sense as experientially informed
statements about the helplessness of the woman—the wife, the daughter-in-law—within a
social structure predicated on expropriation, devaluation, and subjugation of women.
Women like Kavita-ben, Deepa-ben, and Ami-ben deeply loved and took pride in their
existing daughters, as was evident in boasts about intelligence, hopeful plans for future
discussed how feminine personhood can be caught up in “dominant norms that would allow a woman life
only as a mother of sons” (2007: 189). Writing of Chinese patriliny, Sangren has noted that the “instituted
fantasy” of kinship inverts the producer-produced relationship of biological and social reproduction by
making the son the agent of the father’s actualization through ancestor worship rituals (2009, 2013);
moving away from the ritual realm and toward everyday interaction, it is perhaps apparent that the son of
Hindu patriliny can perform a similar function for his mother, completing her actualization within the
community and creating the illusion of producing her as a person. There is a parallel here to Inhorn’s work
on infertility in Egypt, which examines experiences of “missing motherhood” that are partly articulated
through social ostracism (1996: 51-85, 200-221).
38
Mookherjee echoes this dual characterization in discussing sex-selective abortion as a form of patriarchal
bargain:
A woman's option for SSA may constitute the most rational and even most empowering
decision that she could possibly make. By choosing to abort a female foetus she
addresses the problem of gender inequality directly, not only by protecting herself from a
loss of social status within her community, but also by saving her unborn child from a life
of sexual subordination (2005: 277).
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education, and innumerable quotidian acts of embodied care and affection. If their pursuit
of sex selection rested on not only son desire and generic preference for fewer children,
but also specific daughter aversion, it was partly because they knew from experience the
pain of separation—of becoming pārki to one’s own kin, and hence an outsider
everywhere. As Deepa-ben and Ami-ben’s impassioned statements suggest, pursuit of a
son was frequently informed by an exquisite understanding of the anguish visited upon
girls who lacked a brother to make their homes whole within the patrilineal moral
economy.
The gender-specific understanding that frequently led women to drive sex
selection also encompassed conscious, practical deliberation regarding the implications of
childbearing for their own futures.39 Having gone through at least one pregnancy and
having at least one daughter, women seeking sex selection appreciated, in embodied
fashion, the work involved in gestating, bearing, nursing, and raising for offspring. with
each new child occasioning years of feeding, bathing, cleaning, tutoring, and other
unremunerated childcare. As seen in Deepa-ben’s narration of family deliberations
around the possibility of multiple pregnancies, women possessed unique insight on what
they had to endure in the absence of selective reproduction, in a way that “boys don’t
understand.” As seen in Ami-ben’s tears, women also possessed unique insight on what
they had to suffer when they chose sex-selective abortion as the least bad of all options.
And women understood that their own domestic and social ascendancy, from middle age
to old age, depended on establishing a patrilineal foothold through a son.40
In light of the above factors, the seeming disappearance of men in explanatory
discourses and actual decision-making patterns around sex selection becomes more
comprehensible. From a systemic perspective, there was doubtless a patriarchal
bargaining dynamic at play, with adult men remaining on the margins, disclaiming
responsibility, and even disavowing their wives’ actions while allowing the women of the
household to drive forward son-seeking practices that presumed and re-enacted masculine
domination.41 The aloofness of Preeti-ben and Pushpa-ben’s husbands in the face of
39

This deliberation is part of what Jeffery et al. have referred to as “counting the cost of motherhood” in
terms of pregnancy, childrearing, and healthcare and evaluating “the costs of children” in terms of food,
clothing, education, medicine, and other forms of care—calculations that feature more prominently in
women’s minds than in their husbands’ (1989: 167-175, 184-187).
40
This is one of the central dynamics in Kandiyoti’s original conceptualization of the patriarchal bargain:
making some tradeoff in the present for enhanced security, status, and power as a senior woman of the
household in the future, with the result being “women’s active collusion in their own subordination” (1988:
279-280). For a discussion of women’s life cycles in patrilineal India and the importance of motherhood in
progression through them, see Kakar (1983: 52-102), T. Patel (1994: 74-79), P. Jeffery and Jeffery (1996),
Säävälä (2001: 104-119, 134-135, 139-148), and Brunson (2016: 93-112). Cross-culturally, one of the most
lucid discussions of this phenomenon remains Wolf’s examination of the “uterine family” in patrilineal
Taiwan (1972: 32-41).
41
My use of the term “masculine domination” is intended to evoke Bourdieu’s insights on gender
inequality (2001, 2004: 340; Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992: 170-172), which displaces a coercion-consent
dichotomy in favor of examination of the processes by which “male sociodicy” is rendered self-evident and
inculcated into the subjectivities of men and women alike. But in contrast to a simplistic reading of the
Bourdieusian perspective, which might treat gender hegemony as an irresistible force that automatically
acts through docile subjects, I have attempted to demonstrate throughout this chapter how the hegemonic
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verbal harassment and frank coercion amply demonstrates how men’s inaction could be a
key form of complicity.42
But there was also something more intimate—a difference in the quality or
channeling of desire—in men’s tendency to frequently play less active roles in pursuing
sons. Men could afford to waffle, plead “softness,” excuse themselves from the process
of selective reproduction, or even express objections because their social positioning,
experiences, and future prospects did not make childbearing consequential for them as it
did for their wives. They did not bear the difficulties of repeated pregnancies or the pain
of selective abortions. To a great extent, they did not have to feed girls, bathe them, drive
them to school, or engage in the countless other acts of care that constituted everyday
parenting. The social patterning of interaction and recognition offered them multiple
avenues for self-actualization that partly offset the incompleteness of a sonless state—an
escape generally less available to their wives. And whereas social talk usually subjected
women with multiple daughters to only scorn or pity, a father of multiple daughters could
earn respect for successfully discharging paternal duties by financially supporting and
successfully marrying “so many girls”; perversely, his contribution to the alienated
reproductive labor congealed in a daughter was often more valorized than his wife’s.
The challenge that multiple daughters posed to traditional breadwinning
masculinity43 often activated bold posturing, which usually ended in impotent objections
(as in Rohit-bhai’s case) or, more rarely, a successful barring of sex selection. Hiteshbhai, a Mahesana-area government official responsible for promoting both family
planning (i.e., fertility reduction) and Beti Bachāvo, once told me proudly:
I have four daughters—and only then, my son! After three girls were born,
in the fourth pregnancy, various doctors and friends supported us to get a
sonography done. We found someone in Unjha, and he said it was female.
My mother and wife were in agreement: we don’t want to keep it. But I
said no, we should keep her! I didn’t let my wife go to the clinic. She tried
to take an abortion pill, but it didn’t work—see, it happened as it was
meant to happen. I said, ‘I’m standing here, aren’t I? Hitesh-bhai, the
girls’ father? Let her be born!’
ideals of son necessity and daughter aversion may be taken up and enacted (or not) by different actors in
different ways.
42
Ganatra et al. (2001: 115-116) and Puri et al. (2011: 1172-1173) have identified men’s silence as a form
of complicity in sex selection. John et al. have characterized men as “backstage” actors who often remained
out of sight in the clinical process of sex selection itself while still dictating action and controlling material
resources (2008: 65).
43
This is a somewhat different relationship between sex selection and paternal masculinity than the one
found by John et al., who have observed:
In the case of large agrarian castes (both high and low), such as Thakurs, Gujjars, and
Jatavs, in Morena and Dholpur, it was found that men have a much stronger voice in
deciding matters related to childbearing. Women are subjected to repeated childbearing
and are not allowed to restrict their fertility. Fertility is seen as a symbol of masculinity,
and women who wish to abort a foetus are accused of infidelity, implying that the child
they wish to get rid of has been fathered by another man (2008: 66).
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A girl had been saved, in a manner of speaking. But what of the woman forced to
unwillingly bear her?

Constrained Agency, Impossible Choices: Kavita-ben, Again
Just a few days after my initial meeting with Kavita-ben and Rohit-bhai, I saw
them again. They had invited me to their village for Uttarayan celebrations, and I had
gladly accepted.
When I got off the shared rickshaw shuttle, I found Rohit-bhai waiting for me on
the side of the highway. He was seated on his moped, clutching his daughter, who was
bundled up in a faux-fur sweatshirt.
As we rode toward the village, Rohit-bhai asked, “Do you take drinks?” Catching
a faint whiff of alcohol on his breath, I suddenly felt apprehensive about sitting on the
back of his speeding scooter. I answered meekly that I sometimes did, and the matter
ended there.
We dismounted in front of Rohit-bhai’s house, a modest but well-constructed
affair. He introduced me to the entire family. His brother, a comfortably positioned State
Transport official, and his sister-in-law, a government schoolteacher, lived in Mahesana.
His father had just recently retired after thirty years of service as a schoolteacher in a
village near Unjha. I learned that Kavita-ben had completed a bachelor’s degree in
education—a surprise, given her husband’s manual labor job and presumably limited
schooling. As we settled in on the floor of the house’s main room, Kavita-ben’s sister-inlaw goaded her to take the teaching certification exam again; the latter chuckled and
waved off the prodding with some mumbled words that I could not make out. I noticed
that she shot a quick glance at Rohit-bhai.
After lunch, we moved to the roof, where Rohit-bhai and his younger cousins had
installed an impressive stereo system. We lounged for a bit on plastic patio chairs,
soaking in the mild warmth of the winter sun. Then, Rohit-bhai brought up alcohol again:
“You must take drinks, being from America!” I repeated that I did so, but only
occasionally. I asked if anyone else in the family drank, and his eyes widened: “No! No
one!” His tone was vehement. “Don’t say a word of it, or I’ll be in for it!” Noticing a
stronger odor on his breath and a distinct slurring of his speech, I suddenly thought back
to his several momentary disappearances in the hour since our arrival.
Worried that we were moving toward drinking moonshine, I asked where he
obtained his alcohol. With a casual wave, he reassured me, “You can get as much as you
want here!” Widening his eyes earnestly, he quickly added “But since you were going to
come in, I got some imported stuff, especially for you, from Patan.” He abruptly stood
up, tottering onto his feet, and waved me downstairs: “Come, I’ll show you the house!”
Rohit-bhai led me on a brief tour that quickly ended in a little-used storeroom. He
squatted and slid open a cabinet, hissing at his nephew, who had accompanied us, to
bring water and then stand guard outside the door. He pulled out the bottle—Hennessy—
which was by now about half full. His eyes kept darting toward the door. He poured a bit
out into a plastic cup, filled the rest with water, and thrust it to me. Feeling panicked, I
downed the drink in three big gulps. He made himself the same mix and took it down in
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one. From outside, the nephew whispered urgently, “Hurry up, hurry up!” Rohit-bhai
shook the cup out, flipped it onto the bottle, and slid the cabinet shut. As we stepped into
the daylight, I looked at the boy and wondered what he was thinking.
Back on the roof, Rohit-bhai quickly fell asleep in his chair. His father then gave
me his own tour of the house, detailing how he had built it up by saving his
schoolteacher’s salary over many years. It was a very different perspective on the shared
domestic space. We discussed the price of land, the cost of construction, and government
salaries. At one point, commenting on the difference between Rohit-bhai and his brother,
the father mumbled, “Well, our Rohit didn’t really apply himself in his studies. We had
high hopes for him. But he got into some trouble in high school, and then he had to go to
vocational school.” That confirmed it: Kavita-ben had attained a considerably higher
education than her husband; if working outside the home, she would likely earn
significantly more than him. I found myself wondering about their pairing: had it, like so
many of the marriages I saw, been fixed in mid-adolescence, when a daughter’s
development into womanhood compelled her parents to “throw” her into another
household, despite a paucity of information about the partner being chosen for her?
The father continued, “Everyone in the family is very well educated—our son,
both daughters-in-law. I’m a teacher myself. It’s only our Rohit who fell behind, in all of
this...” His voice trailed off. He stared into the distance for a moment before resuming an
explanation of rising land prices in the village.
After Rohit-bhai woke up, we flew kites with his younger cousins and nephew for
an hour or so. He then suggested that we make a “round” through the village. Mounting
the moped, he stumbled a bit; he had to ask his nephew to kick-start the vehicle. We rode
to a small shop. The shopkeeper asked with a smile whether Rohit-bhai needed a plastic
cup, but he shook his head—“Not right now.” Another man came up and asked for a cup
and three pouches of water. The shopkeeper smiled: “Everyone’s doing the same thing
today, since the morning!” I looked at Rohit-bhai’s bloodshot, slightly discolored eyes.
They had appeared identical when I saw him at Chetna.
When we returned to the house, Rohit-bhai hunched toward me and put his
extended thumb to his mouth quickly in the standard gesture for “Drink?” I shook my
head and asked for some water. He looked disappointed. Shortly thereafter, I took my
leave of the family, and he dropped me off on the highway.
*
Kavita-ben’s experience illustrates, in heartbreaking fashion, how elimination of
female fetal subjects—rejection of potential daughters—might prove the most reasonable
step for women who found themselves with no good choices. While the dynamics of
action in her story differ markedly from those in Pushpa-ben’s, both women were united
in how structural and domestic factors combined to make them feel that sex selection was
inevitable.
In seeking selective abortion, Kavita-ben was certainly acting on the futurity of
the gendered fetal image, moving back and forth between the reproductive present and
various points in a potential daughter’s future—childhood, marriage, and so on. Another
daughter would be a lifelong emotional liability because of kinship norms that demanded
her separation and propelled her into a potentially harsh conjugal environment. And an
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additional girl would also stretch the household economy, making sustenance on a
meager government mechanic’s salary tenuous not only for herself, but also for her
parents, her older sister, and her inevitable younger brother.
But Kavita-ben’s story shows how the motivations for sex selection not only
fused together care and cost, but also moved beyond their sole attachment to the gendered
fetal subject itself: how could the prospect of caring for, paying for, and losing another
girl be separated from Kavita-ben’s own sense of struggle, feminine suffering, and loss
within her conjugal household? Social norms and practices of marriage had funneled her
into a household environment in which Rohit-bhai’s drinking, educational
underachievement, and meager income combined to create a situation of precarity and
downward mobility. Despite considerable schooling, Kavita-ben could not improve her
and her children’s lot through market labor. By avoiding a second daughter, then, she
protected herself and her family from further immiseration.
There was a gendered chasm in experience underlying Kavita-ben and Rohitbhai’s divergence on the question of sex selection. He insisted that he was against it and
faulted his wife for “pulling” him into wrongdoing. While sharing her husband’s sense of
sex-selective abortion as pāp, Kavita-ben—like Gita-masi—insisted on the necessity of
the sin. Like so many men, Rohit-bhai saw the prospect of another girl as a challenge to
his breadwinning masculinity, a challenge that had to be met head-on by accepting and
supporting the daughter-to-be. But it was Kavita-ben who had to directly reckon with the
pragmatic effects of bearing yet another daughter on the path to the inevitable son:
carrying the pregnancy to term, birthing the child, nursing, providing years of
unremunerated childcare atop domestic labor, and squeezing yet another hungry mouth
into the tight household budget. Where her husband emphasized relatively abstract
concerns—the sinfulness of selective abortion, his inflated confidence in his own ability
as a provider—Kavita-ben’s insistence found justification in the lived experience of the
domestic. For her, sex selection was an exercise of circumscribed agency in the face of a
moral economy of gender-kinship, a stressful domestic life, and a trajectory of downward
mobility that left her with only difficult choices.

Chapter 5: The Local Ecology of Son Production
Struggling with Sonlessness
Gauri-Devi and Dhruv-ji
When Uma-masi pulled me into the Nandini Clinic room and introduced me to
the couple—“these are the people going today”—I realized I already knew them. Gauridevi and her husband Dhruv-ji had been traveling from Rajasthan for months to receive
fertility and pregnancy treatment from Dr. Dilip. Now, after countless pills and hormonal
injections, one round of intrauterine insemination, and fourteen weeks of meticulous
supportive care, they were going to Chetna for the all-important test.
Gauri-devi and Dhruv-ji were in their late thirties. They belonged to the Jat caste,
a landholding agricultural community. Gauri-devi worked as a government schoolteacher
in their home city, several hundred kilometers away. She was tall, with long, black hair
that betrayed the first hints of graying, and wide glasses that made her eyes appear
distant. As usual, she was dressed in a colorful salvaar-kameez. Dhruv-ji, a bank clerk,
was even taller than his wife, with thin-rimmed glasses and oiled hair. He was dressed in
gray jeans, a black ribbed sweater, and white sneakers.
Speaking in an ad hoc mixture of Gujarati and Hindi, Uma-masi quickly gave the
couple instructions regarding discretion: “Don’t name names, don’t tell anyone, because
these government people are now trailing patients!” She then relayed the payment plan:
15,000 rupees for the scan, and another 10,000 “if the other thing is to be done.” Smiling,
she joined her hands and said, “Keep faith in Sai Baba for a good result! Pray!” Scurrying
into a corner, she took a phone call from the rickshaw driver; he had arrived to escort the
couple. Downstairs, Gauri-devi, Dhruv-ji, and I got into the rickshaw; Uma-masi had to
remain at Nandini, but she had already arranged everything with Dr. Ranjit.
Once the rickshaw was puttering along, Gauri-devi and Dhruv-ji recounted the
exhausting work involved in their ten-year-long pursuit of a son, detailing frustrating and
frustrated efforts in the realms of biomedicine, Ayurvedic treatment, and religion. I
listened and interjected questions occasionally, reviving my shaky Hindi.
At one point, the rickshaw flew roughly over a bump. Dhruv-ji frowned and
squeezed the driver’s shoulder. “Careful, Bhai!” he said sharply. And then again, gently:
“Careful.” The still-ungendered fetus, achieved after a decade of longing and several
years of tiresome treatment, was too precious to endanger.
The preciousness rested on the potential for a son. The impending sex
determination (SD) could still dislodge the pregnancy as a successful endpoint to the
couple’s arduous reproductive trajectory. Gauri-devi said they had asked Dr. Dilip to
“check,” but he had demurred, voicing some excuse about “software.” Overhearing,
Uma-masi had informed them that she “knew a saheb,” paving the way for the current
ride.
Shifting into the third person, Dhruv-ji opined, “Everybody will want one boy.
238
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That’s our social structure. There is the law, there is checking, but still, people get this
done. Every man will feel, ek ladkā to chāhie,1 so this happens everywhere. Nothing will
change by just the law, because this is our social custom.”
Gautam-bhai left us at Chetna after introducing the couple to the waiting room
nurse as “Uma-masi’s patients.” We sat on the benches to wait. Dhruv-ji noticed a
photograph of Sai Baba—a nineteenth-century spiritual master whom he held in great
esteem— hanging on the wall. He joined his hands, closed his eyes, bowed, and began
mouthing a silent prayer. Gauri-devi leaned back against the wall and sighing.
Following a long wait, Dr. Ranjit summoned Gauri-devi. After a few minutes of
scanning, he said he would have to repeat the test after more urine collected in Gauridevi’s bladder.
We waited, moving back and forth between the patio and the waiting room.
Gauri-devi occasionally grimaced, citing the discomfort of a full bladder. The
anticipation of a son, full of hope and fear, stretched out for another hour.
During the second scan, Dhruv-ji remained in the consultory, gazing at a
photograph of Sai Baba on his phone. Inside the examining area, Gauri-devi’s face was
tense, her jaw clenched. She threw her dupatta back over her face. Underneath, her breath
ebbed and flowed rapidly.
After ten minutes, Dr. Ranjit grunted, holstered the ultrasound transducer, and
stepped out. He took a seat behind his desk, and Gauri-devi emerged to sit next to her
husband. I watched, with bated breath, from the sofa along the side wall. The two men
haggled about pricing for a few moments, with Gauri-devi sometimes whispering in her
husband’s ear. Eventually, they settled on 13,000 rupees. Dhruv-ji pulled out a wad of
cash and extended it toward Dr. Ranjit. Seeing it, the doctor nodded gently.
“It’s all set. Male.”
Dhruv-ji mouthed the last word as if in disbelief. Dr. Ranjit repeated it twice.
Dhruv-ji’s face brightened, and he shouted, “Are, what news! If you want, I’ll pay the full
15,000!” He practically slapped the doctor’s outstretched hand. Both Gauri-devi and
Dhruv-ji began shouting in Marwadi, their mother tongue. Dr. Ranjit smiled mildly and
looked on.
After the couple’s shouts had died down, the doctor chuckled and said quietly,
“Well, if you want, you can pay the full 15,000.” Dhruv-ji’s hyperkinetic motion slowed
just a bit, and his grin mellowed to a smile. He began asking about the certainty of the
result—“Sure? Hundred percent confirm? Definitely male?” The doctor nodded; it was
“100%.” Dhruv-ji loudly professed full faith in Dr. Ranjit and Dr. Dilip’s work “because
you both have photographs of Sai Baba—you are true devotees.” He promised that he
and Gauri-devi would forever keep the doctor in their prayers “for this very good thing
you have done for us.”
I turned toward Gauri-devi. Streams of tears were suddenly pouring down her
cheeks, with her entire face and torso convulsing spasmodically. She wiped her face with
her dupatta and continued crying for several minutes. We three men stood there in
silence. Several times, Dhruv-ji whispered us a reassurance—“Tears of joy.” At one
1

Ek ladkā to chāhie is the Hindi equivalent of ek chhokaro to joie.
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point, Dr. Ranjit leaned over to me and mumbled, with wonder, “See the patient’s
emotion!”
As we left the clinic some moments later, Gauri-devi shook her head and said to
me matter-of-factly, “I feel so sad. So much sorrow. We are just two sisters—no father,
no brother. My father was murdered when I was very young. And I have always felt it—
that I have no father, no brother, no son. So I always felt that if I got a boy in my home, I
would feel...” She trailed off and shook her head. For her, the report of a son-to-be was
the culmination of not a decade-long, but a lifelong quest.
We walked to the tea stall near Chetna. As we sipped cha and ate biscuits, Dhruvji was the picture of confidence. Nodding toward his wife, he smirked, “I had told her
from the beginning! Checking—I mean, we get it done for our satisfaction. But I knew
that’s what it would be—meaning, a positive result! So for satisfaction, fine, we get it
done. With technology increased so much, no one can wait that long.”
I turned to Gauri-devi and asked if she had felt as certain. She held a wry smile
for a few seconds before shaking her head: “Nothing like that.”
At one point on the rickshaw ride back to Mahesana, I returned to the issue. “Had
you made a decision already?” I asked. “If—“
Dhruv-ji did not let me finish the question. Shaking his head vigorously, he
interjected, “We did not even think about it! From the beginning, we trusted in Sai Baba.
That if it was happening after such a long time...” He trailed off and stared into the
landscape speeding past, leaving the implication hanging: divine justice required a boy
after such a long ordeal. No other outcome had even been conceivable.
I interpreted Dhruv-ji’s confidence as a post hoc reframing of an uncertaintyfilled reproductive trajectory, one whose animating hope might just as easily have met
disappointment as fulfillment. I had witnessed too many cases of shattered expectations
to think otherwise.
Dhruv-ji’s words and actions lent some credence to my cynical interpretation.
Upon returning to Nandini, he repeatedly asked Uma-masi and Dr. Dilip “what that
saheb’s result is like”—whether “it is 100%.” When the couple returned for routine
prenatal care a fortnight later, he had Uma-masi arrange another visit—“for
confirmation”— to Chetna, “We’re not worried,” he insisted on the rickshaw ride there.
“We’ve already gotten it looked at once. But this time—a guarantee.” Throughout the
ride, he peppered Uma-masi’s appointed driver with questions about Dr. Ranjit’s
expertise and the quality of his machine. His persistent anxieties indexed just how high
the stakes of an accurate result were.
At Chetna, Dr. Ranjit quickly confirmed the “male” result. Turning to Gauri-devi,
he said with a smile, “Go ahead and cry now, if you want to.”
She smiled back and said quietly, “No, no. That was an emotional outburst. But
we know now, right? It’s pakka [certain, ripe, fixed]—it’s a boy.”
The Coin Toss of Son Pursuit
Like all the couples I observed pursuing sex selection, Gauri-devi and Dhruv-ji
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were flipping a coin,2 contending with the unpredictable vagaries of bodily processes,
divine will, and chance in order to obtain a boy. Experiences like theirs reveal how
reproductive uncertainty and misfortune breached the taken-for-granted character of son
production, pushing people to the limits of their analytic capacities, endurance, and moral
insight.3
Ethnographic scholarship shows that, far from simply constraining, uncertainty
and misfortune may expand therapeutic endeavors, precipitating resort to different
healers and healing modalities—particularly so when causality lies not just within an
individually bounded body, but in interactions and extra-corporeal personalistic forces.4
In this chapter, I focus on such therapeutic expansion. I examine biomedical, herbal, and
religious techniques that operated alongside or instead of the sonography and selective
abortion described in Chapter 2. Such techniques offered couples different sorts of
agency around a process that Mahesana-area obstetricians treated as essentially random:
sex determination, in the sense of “causing” rather than “ascertaining.”5
In contrast to the exploration of familial “choice” in Chapter 4, here “agency”
refers to the capacity for intervention on the “fleshiness and fragility of life”6—for
proactively channeling inchoate vital processes toward the end of son production. It is a
matter for changing, or attempting to change, fate or chance in line with deeply held
desires that define the self.7 The coin toss is, indeed, a “serious game”—one in which
people’s pursuit of “the good” (a son) unfolds amid a field of bodily, divine, and chance
forces.8
For couples like Gauri-devi and Dhruv-ji, son pursuit entailed recruitment of
various modalities into a “reproductive quest” 9 aimed exclusively at producing a boy.
Couples acted not on generic “child desire,”10 but on son desires of the sort described in
Chapter 2. The movement toward leaving a state of sonlessness11 was animated by an
emplotment of hope that narratively constructed lived time, emplacing various failures
and successes within a larger, culturally shaped teleological plot.12 Hope undergirded the
pathways that son desire might follow once put into motion—pathways that empirically
ended in disappointment as well as satisfaction.
Scholarship on sex selection has amply documented a dizzying array of
technologies that operate alongside conventional biomedical methods. These include
2

My use of the “coin toss” metaphor—one appreciated on the ground in Mahesana—echoes the notion of
“demographic roulette” (Attwood 1995, cited in Bossen 2007: 211).
3
Gammeltoft 2014a: 133-135, following Geertz 1973: 100-108.
4
Reynolds-Whyte 1997.
5
The distinction is drawn from Rothman (1986: 138).
6
Mol 2008: 11.
7
Cf. Sangren 2012.
8
Cf. Ortner 2006.
9
Inhorn 1994.
10
van Balen and Inhorn 2002: 8.
11
van Balen and Inhorn make a useful decision between “infertility” as the process of being unable to have
children and “childlessness” as the resultant state (2002: 11). Given the lack of established terminology
around “sonlessness,” and a desire to avoid multiplying jargon, I use the one term to refer to both process
and state throughout this chapter.
12
Mattingly 2010.
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herbal medications for “reversing” fetal sex, Ayurvedic pills for shaping a boy, ingestion
of particular foods, torso bandaging, amulets, blessings, tantric rites for moving up a
boy’s birth order, pilgrimages to shrines, calendric methods for properly timing
conception, and various techniques for reading the sex of the unborn from the pregnant
woman’s body.13
In this chapter, I focus on a few such technologies, describing how they operated
in people’s lives and offered control in the face of unpredictability. I situate biomedical,
herbal, and religious methods with respect to one another in a local ecology of son
production.14 In bringing together “biogynecology” and “ethnogynecology,”15 my
account builds on anthropology’s longstanding attention to “medical pluralism” in
India.16
But the goal is not to uncover the logic of pragmatic “choices” amidst a variety of
healing modalities. Nor is it to patronizingly counterpose modern, rational science—
anchored by “knowledge”—to “traditions” of magic, religion, and “folk healing” rooted
in “belief.”17 Instead, I am to seriously confront diverse, overlapping, and oftencontradictory ontologies of reproduction, avoiding disengagement from the “uncanny
metaphysics” and various other explanatory models invoked in pursuing sons.18
The task at hand appears most clearly in an encounter repeated many times during
my fieldwork. When couples expressed frustration at repeatedly conceiving girls, I
sometimes asked (as a diligent, bio-centric ethnomedical researcher) what they
understood as the cause of their misfortune. Pregnant women and their husbands usually
gave some version of a common answer, one that strongly pointed to the operation of
various causal forces: Of course, it’s because of the X and the Y. But who can say why—
why that sperm and that egg got together? That’s the question!19
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Dagar 2002: 37-46; John et al. 2008: 60-62; Khanna 2009: 95-97.
Cf. Das and Das 2006, 2007.
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Inhorn 1994.
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Alter 2005; Beals 1976; Kakar 1982; Khare 1996; Leslie 1976.
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Good 1994: 1-24; Tambiah 1990.
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Cf. Goslinga 2013.
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The question contains obvious echoes of Evans-Pritchards’s question about people injured by a
collapsing granary:
Now why should these particular people have been sitting under this particular granary at
the particular moment when it collapsed? That it should collapse is easily intelligible, but
why should it have collapsed at the particular moment when these particular people were
sitting beneath it?... We say that the granary collapsed because its supports were eaten
away by termites; that is the cause that explains the collapse of the granary. We also say
that people were sitting under it at the time because it was in the heat of the day and they
thought that it would be a comfortable place to talk and work. This is the cause of people
being under the granary at the time it collapsed. To our minds the only relationship
between these two independently caused facts is their coincidence in time and space. We
have no explanation of why the two chains of causation intersected at a certain time and
in a certain place, for there is no interdependence between them. Zande philosophy can
supply the missing link (1976: 22-23).
Evans-Pritchards’s discussion of the granary scenario clearly positions “Zande philosophy” as an excess or
superfluity beyond the bounds of an implicitly superior rational, empiricist thought. By contrast, I consider
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The pervasive question, which invoked different planes of causality, highlights
why analysis of North Gujarat’s son production ecology is much more than an
application of bland cultural relativism. It is a fundamental exploration of biomedicine’s
powerlessness and the contrasting avenues of action for proactively—rather than
reactively—creating a male fetal subject. Insofar as secular, modern bioscience emerges
in the enunciation of opposition to religious, superstitious traditions that are repressed,
rather than completely dominated,20 understanding son pursuit is a matter of tracing “the
haunting of modernity by the magic it represses”21—seeing “the myth in the natural and
the real in magic.”22 Sonless couples’ stories surface situations in which bioscience
obviously lacked a “grip” on the key substances and causal processes of reproduction.23
With biomedicine incapable of resolving even those problems it could nominally
identify,24 raw but locally legitimate treatments could prove more important.25 Nonbiomedical models, explanations, and therapies not only permitted coping, but also
enunciated the limitations of biomedical science and its practitioners.26 Given
obstetricians’ inability to shift the odds in the coin toss of son pursuit, a complex
syncretization took place. Biomedicine, indigenous medicine, and religion appeared as
“overlapping projects of world-making”27—interrelated spaces of politically significant
material action. The question became what “quacks” and “quackery” even were,28 as
obstetricians, other medical practitioners, religious ritualists, and individual devotees
engaged in complex practices around the scientific cipher of son production. Ultimately,
all the forms of work aimed at producing a boy—sonography and abortion, fertility
treatment, herbal treatment, formalized bādhās, personalistic bargains with God—were
suffused with trial and error, hope and failure, and the recognition that the phenomenon
of selective reproduction, as well as the desires associated with it, far exceeded the
available technology.
In the first three sections of this chapter, I examine the different technologies that
families employed in grasping for reproductive control. The first section traces the larger
biomedical pathways that couples like Gauri-devi and Dhruv-ji traversed in seeking the
elusive son. The second section considers herbal treatment regimens that attempted to
proactively intervene on bodily development instead of passively awaiting visualization
the question of why—one that allows a diversity of answers—as a critical gesture toward the limits of
bioscience and the agency it affords.
20
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25
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26
Cf. Bharadwaj (2006) on metaphysical explanations for the success and failure of assisted reproduction
in India as coping mechanisms, critiques of Western science, and admission of biomedical practitioners’
personal and systemic limitations.
27
Wiener 2004: 10.
28
Cf. Langford (1999) on practitioners of “folk medicine” and their participation in mimesis and countermimesis around professionalism and legitimacy.
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of already-determined fetal sex. The third section considers religious ritual and prayer as
means of exercising agency with respect to the cosmic forces—luck, fate, God—that
shaped the sex of children-to-be. The chapter’s final section—a coda of sorts—returns to
the question of a “necessary sin.” I examine moral deliberations around the meaning of
selective reproductive agency: How did people understand the act of visualizing and
acting on a gendered fetal subject—of playing God?

Biomedical Techniques: Reproductive Exhaustion
During our first ride to Chetna, Gauri-devi and Dhruv-ji recounted their laborious
quest for a son. They had begun trying to conceive shortly after the birth of their fifteenyear-old daughter. After “waiting, waiting for almost ten years, thinking, ‘Oh, it will
happen, it will happen,’” they had sought fertility treatment locally in Rajasthan. Four
years later, they had decided to seek out a doctor in Gujarat, since “people say the
technology’s a little bit better here.” They had settled on Dr. Dilip “after seeing he was a
great devotee of Sai Baba.” Once a fortnight for eight months—through summer heat,
monsoon downpours, and winter chill—they had boarded a bus at 9:30 PM, arrived in
Mahesana at 5:30 AM, spent the day at Nandini for a five-minute visit, and then returned
home on another overnight bus.
Reflecting on this time period, Gauri-devi said, “We’ve had a lot of trouble! But
this is our luck. Who’s bigger than luck? We kept thinking, ‘It’ll happen within three or
four years.’ It ended up being fifteen!”
Dhruv-ji added, “For us, just the pregnancy is a big deal. To me, it’s a miracle that
it happened naturally! I thought we’d have to go for a test-tube baby. That’s the ultimate
stage, and there’s still no guarantee of success.”
Dr. Dilip’s treatment had included pills, hormonal injections, and even an
exploratory laparoscopy.29 Using many different methods, the doctor and his patients had
somehow succeeded in producing a pregnancy.
During the ride back from Chetna, Gauri-devi recalled hearing that Dr. Narendra
provided sex-selective abortion on a large scale, and that some unfortunate women even
underwent two or three in a row with him. She shook her head: “Three girls! What
happens to the body after three abortions? Finished, right? They take it out by doing all
that rasping inside the uterus. So much damage! What kind of bad condition does it end
up in? That can lead to uterine cancer.” She expanded upon the damage she imagined
from multiple sex-selective abortions, repeatedly invoking the trope of bodily
“ruination.”
After a momentary silence, Dhruv-ji ventured, “But really, you have to
understand that as your penance. So many people have seven-eight—imagine how
troubled those people feel. But this is all your penance. And penance brings a result.
29

Laparoscopy is a less-invasive abdominal surgery procedure in which a visualizing scope and
instruments are inserted through small incisions in the belly. While the laparoscopy had not revealed
endometriosis, fibroids, or other conditions that might have contributed to difficulty in conceiving or
carrying a pregnancy, Dr. Dilip insisted, as did many other doctors, that the procedure itself tended to
promote fertility in a way that was scientifically inexplicable but nonetheless empirically observable in
practice.
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Whatever happens in the middle, that’s all well and good.”
Dhruv-ji’s words stood in sharp contrast to his wife’s. They exemplified a
triumphalist narrative of reproduction, in which the inevitable end—a son—justified any
suffering “in the middle.” But as Gauri-devi’s reflection suggested, the suffering—
endless fertility treatments, miscarriages, selective abortions, repeated births of unwanted
daughters—was not merely epiphenomenal to the eventual boy. And unlike Gauri-devi
and Dhruv-ji, many couples’s reproductive trajectories never led to the desired endpoint.
Navigating Reproductive Pathways
Biomedicine was part of the local son production ecology. Like Gauri-devi and
Dhruv-ji, couples pursuing a son often underwent expensive, tiresome treatments just to
conceive and carry a pregnancy to the point of SD. But the vicissitudes of human
reproduction, and the limitations of biomedical techniques, meant the clinical process
was always one of trial and error. Bodily phenomena exceeded the biotechnical capacity
to control them, imposing a burden of hope and exhaustion on families—particularly
women.
One could sketch a general schema for the low-fertility (selective) pathway to a
son, passing from conception and early gestation, through SD, toward the eventual birth
of a boy. But in reality, the linear pathway often stalled, derailed, or folded back on itself,
with the “reproductive disruptions” of infertility, pregnancy loss, and selective abortion
alternating in a complex cycle of frustration.30
I met Vinita-ben and her husband, an impoverished blacksmith, during a Nandini
prenatal care visit. When Dr. Dilip asked if he ought to fill a Form F, the husband shook
his head: “We have no choice but to get the test done.” In our subsequent conversation,
both patient and husband repeated the phrase again and again: “We have no choice.”
The couple had two daughters, four and seven, and had already endured an
exhausting, tortuous reproductive trajectory. Two years earlier, following twelve months
of fertility treatment with a village doctor and another twelve with Dr. Dilip, they had
nearly “given up—said, forget about it”; then, “by God’s grace,” Vinita-ben had become
pregnant. At three months, however, a scan had revealed “yet another girl,” and they had
ended the pregnancy. Two subsequent pregnancies—both scanned as “male”—had ended
in miscarriage at four months. Now, in light of weak finances, advancing age, and
concern regarding “how many pregnancies the body can endure,” Vinita-ben and her
husband were “praying to God that chhokaro joie.” As they left that first day, they
reiterated, “We will have to get the test done; we have no choice but to get the test done.”
Vinita-ben’s experience highlights the challenges of son production. Beginning
from a state of sonlessness, the first step was to conceive and carry forward a pregnancy:
without a potential child, there could be no potential son. Many couples, finding their son
pursuits stalled or derailed at this stage, endured and embraced extensive fertility
treatment. Doctors underscored patients’ relentlessness in seeking a boy by citing their
efforts to conceive at an “advanced age” like Vinita-ben’s—late thirties or early forties—
and by highlighting cases of women becoming pregnant simultaneously with their grown
30
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daughters.31 Son pursuit was hard work,32 and it imposed often-drastic physical,
psychological, and economic burdens on sonless women.33 Like Gauri-devi, many
lamented their exhaustion after treatment with pills, powerful hormonal injections,
intrauterine insemination, and even in vitro fertilization (IVF), often over many years.
Focusing more on cost, a barber’s wife once said to me, “We had to get treatment for four
years! Do you know how many shaves it takes to gather 80,000 rupees? After all that, to
have a girl? Of course we were disappointed.”
The comment illustrates another feature present in Vinita-ben’s experience: the
contingency of the desire that drove fertility and early-pregnancy treatments. Despite
great bodily, emotional, and monetary investment, many quests for a son were derailed at
the second step: SD. Couples explained that they had ended long-awaited pregnancies,
amid tremendous disappointment and pain, because “all the effort was for a boy.” In
cases like Vinita-ben’s, fertility treatments and supportive care became a matter of
creating and sustaining vital substance until the developing person could be recognized as
a desired or undesired future relative, and nurtured or rejected accordingly. I knew of
women enduring up to eight selective abortions due to the recurrent “woe” of “female”
results. As with infertility and miscarriage, the work of bodily “fate” often operated at
cross-purposes to couples’ reproductive labor.
I saw Vinita-ben and her husband again three months after our initial meeting. My
heart sank when I learned they had come in for excessive bleeding following an abortion.
After their departure, Dr. Dilip turned to me and said, “They will almost certainly be
trying again within a short period.”
Indeed, the couple returned to Nandini four months later for a prenatal visit. At
one point, as we sat in the waiting room together, the husband smiled softly and
whispered:
You know, we were all set last time! It was a boy. But when we went to
get it looked at, with Uma-ben, the doctor said that it was a boy, but that
there was a cyst in the child’s belly. We rushed here, and the child had
died inside. So it was a miscarriage... Now, with this pregnancy, we’re
praying to God. If it comes this time, that’s fine. Otherwise, forget it. You
can’t keep going like this, stretching like this. We’re exhausted.
He placed his hand atop his four-year-old daughter, who spun around and smiled into his
palm. He sighed, “If it comes this time, that’s fine. Otherwise, these two girls are
enough.”
31
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The husband’s statement illustrates the role of volitional as well as bodily factors
in prolonging or ending couples’ traversal of convoluted reproductive pathways. Despite
avid desire for a son, grew frustrated with repeated attempts and exited at the first
(conceptive) step. Others skipped the second (selective) step, extending uncertainty to
childbirth; this might occur due to religious reservations, in-law prohibitions of the sort
discussed in Chapter 4, or aversion to the abortion procedure and its bodily effects.
Two months after my last encounter with Vinita-ben and her husband, Uma-masi
and I were lounging in the waiting room when she received a phone call. Upon hanging
up, she informed me that Vinita-ben had been admitted to Chetna. The couple had been
reluctant, she said, but “they gave me the money yesterday, and went for the cancel
today.”
Vinita-ben’s long, draining, and ultimately futile quest vividly illustrates the
reproductive exhaustion I saw in so many cases. Hope, even a sense of inevitability,
persisted despite difficulty conceiving, repeated pregnancy losses, and sex-selective
abortion—despite the physical and emotional toll of son pursuit.34 Couples tried again
and again, until they could try no more. Not every process of work, waiting, and penance
produced a son before its animators gave up.
Cruel Certainties
In biomedicalized son pursuit, the gendering scan revealed the outcome of the
coin toss, sorting contingently desired (ungendered) pregnancies into definitively desired
and undesired ones. A “positive” result allowed some seeking SD for the first time, like
Dhruv-ji, to seamlessly continue an optimistic narrative of inevitability. “From the very
beginning,” people would say afterward, “I had a feeling”—a certainty of impending
male-ness. The scan merely confirmed an ostensibly prefigured success.
By contrast, many families expressing ex ante confidence found their expectations
shattered. SD became a moment of crisis that rerouted hope into disappointment, bringing
about a previously unthinkable and unspeakable state of affairs. Although pregnancies
conceived at great financial and human cost were precious, their value remained bound
up in the potential or actual presence of a male fetus. The moment sonography revealed
female sex, the child-to-be became unwanted. But contending with such reproductive
misfortune frequently took time.
This became clear when I observed Dr. Ranjit scan Stuti-ben, a patient from
Mahesana. Dressed in a stately orange-and-black sari, with a shock of white hair, she was
in her early forties. The accompanying facilitator explained that she had conceived twins
by IVF—at a cost of 40,000 rupees—after nearly a decade of fertility treatments.
A couple of minutes into the sonography, Dr. Ranjit said, “If you’ve gotten
pregnant after twelve years, what is there to look at? Keep it, no?”
“But we already have a girl, right?”
“But if you’ve gotten pregnant after twelve years, you should keep it.”
“So is it female?”
Without responding, Dr. Ranjit continued scanning. Eventually, he holstered the
34
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transducer, sighed, and declared, “Both are female.”
Out in the waiting room, Stuti-ben informed her husband, Nimesh-bhai, a short,
stocky man with an orange tilak that immediately identified him as Jain. He shook his
head stiffly. Turning to me, he said, “We want boys, or a boy and a girl. Ek chhokaro to
joie ja. We came here to get the boy-girl thing done, but I’m sure I have two boys!”
Thumping his chest with an open palm, he repeated: “Inside, I myself am sure I have
boys! Maybe he can’t see it exactly.”
Upon Dr. Ranjit’s return from lunch, Nimesh-bhai marched into the consultory
and insisted on a rescan: “She says you said it was female. That’s not possible—I’m sure
it’s male. So I wanted to ask you to look again. I feel I have two boys. I’m sure I have
males!”
The doctor grudgingly agreed to repeat the SD. When he froze an image of one
fetus, Nimesh-bhai exclaimed, “I’m certain that it’s a boy! We already have a girl. We
got pregnant after so many years, so it must be a boy.” I recalled Dhruv-ji’s confidence.
Pointing to the screen, Nimesh-bhai continued, “We must have two boys—look at it!”
Dr. Ranjit again suggested the couple keep the pregnancy, given the twelve-year
delay and heavy cost. Stuti-ben interjected, frowning and shaking her head: “But if it’s
girls, what’s the point?”
The doctor scanned in silence once again. After freezing an image on the screen,
he attempted to provide his standard demonstration of female sonographic anatomy, but
Nimesh-bhai interrupted: “I, Saheb, have a boy! 100%, I don’t have a girl.” Pointing at
Stuti-ben, he bellowed:
It won’t do to put her into confusion! They asked if we wanted to keep it. I
said yes. And they didn’t say, oh, you have two girls! And now she’s in a
lot of tension—so much tension that she doesn’t even talk at home. So
what I’m saying, Saheb, is that you have to tell her, or she’ll be left with
tension. Whatever it is—even if it’s one boy and one girl—I want to keep
it.
Smiling uncomfortably, Dr. Ranjit suggested that Nimesh-bhai “think of it that way—
with that certainty—‘It’s one boy and one girl, that the doctor is wrong and we are
right.’” The husband repeated—“Okay, one boy and one girl”—before returning to his
point of insistence: “Why don’t you say it once? For no other reason, but that way, my
wife is satisfied. I’m certain. But if you say it once—‘It’s a boy and a girl’—then she’ll
be satisfied that that’s what we’ll get. So say it once, Saheb, that it is a boy.”
Dr. Ranjit blandly offered to repeat the scan in a week. After a brief silence,
Nimesh-bhai told Stuti-ben, “Now you don’t take any tension. It is that. Don’t take
tension—‘Oh, it’s a girl.’ Now, the tension—it’s over! We’ll come back, sure, but get rid
of the tension that it’s two girls.” Turning back to the doctor, he implored, “Tell her,
won’t you?” Dr. Ranjit simply repeated his promise to recheck. Stuti-ben frowned. Her
husband was huffing in agitation. With some muttered parting words, the couple left.
A week later, they inadvertently returned to Chetna with a connector who
promised them a second opinion but failed to divulge the clinic’s name until arrival. Dr.
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Ranjit rescanned and confirmed the previous result. After they left, he smiled
sardonically and recalled, “On that first day, he wanted to force me into saying it—‘You
say it, that it’s a boy!’ Sometimes, people do that, if they’re emotional: ‘Tell me it’s a
boy... I don’t have the strength to hear it... I want it to be good.’ I tell them, you want it to
be true—not good, but true.” The harsh reality, of course, was that only half of clients
could count on the result being both “good” and true.
A few months later, Dr. Ranjit casually mentioned, “Oh, you remember that Jain
couple? The one with twins? They came back recently. They finally got a termination
here—at four months!”
Unlike Gauri-devi’s quest, Stuti-ben’s had ended in disappointment. She and
Nimesh-bhai had attained the long-elusive pregnancy, but had not—presentiments
notwithstanding—won the coin toss. The husband’s defiant exclamations, the search for a
second opinion, and the one-month SD-abortion delay indexed a reproductive labor on
the couple’s part: letting go of years of striving, the product emerging from it, and the
hope underlying it.
An Opportunity Foreclosed
A week before Stuti-ben’s initial visit, I observed an unusual encounter that
illustrated how people might attempt to use SD to actually shift the odds of the game,
rather than merely reveal its outcome.
The couple hailed from a distant town in Kutch, and spoke the melodic, lilting
Gujarati of that region. They had with them a toddler girl—one of three daughters. their
obstetrician had referred them to Dr. Ganpat, who had referred them on to Chetna. The
husband furnished the couple’s clinical file from Kutch—a highly unusual move for an
SD visit, and one whose significance would soon become clear.
Showing the couple into the examining area, Dr. Ranjit explained that the charge
would be higher that usual. “Ten might be okay for twins,” he said. “But with triplets...”
His voice trailed off. The husband mumbled willingness to pay a high fee, as long as Dr.
Ranjit provided “some suggestions,” since they had to go for “remove.” The unusual
purpose of this particular SD became clear to me: because a triplet pregnancy was
unlikely to safely continue for nine months, the obstetrician in Kutch had recommended
“selective reduction,” or in utero abortion of one fetus. Given the rare chance to intervene
on unpredictable reproductive processes, the couple wanted guidance on how to proceed.
As Dr. Ranjit scanned, the husband said they were planning to obtain the selective
reduction with Dr. Chandresh—the Ahmedabad clinician who had rebranded himself as a
high-risk pregnancy specialist after shelving the SD enterprise for which Preeti-ben still
called him “The Dog.” The husband explained that the triplets had resulted from
extensive fertility treatment, including hormonal injections that had spurred his wife’s
ovaries to release eggs at an artificially high rate.
After the better part of ten minutes, Dr. Ranjit declared, “You have two females,
and one male.” The husband nodded slowly. “But when you do the reduction today, you
can’t say that you want a female reduced.” The doctor was complicating the couple’s
plan. “Most likely, they’ll do a female, because they go for the one that’s most accessible,
and the one in front is female. The male’s a bit downward. But if, accidentally, they inject
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that one, and the male gets finished off, then everything will be ruined! So you’ll have to
come back afterward for confirmation. You can’t say anything to them!” Concerned
regarding his own visibility as an SD practitioner, Dr. Ranjit was enjoining the couple
from acting on his identification of the son-to-be.
Squinting, the husband asked, “Can’t we make a suggestion to them? Or could
you tell them?” He was trying desperately to render the crucial knowledge actionable.
The doctor shook his head. “No. I can’t say that either, can I?”
Scowling, the husband began, “Okay, so if the male gets reduced—“
“Then it will be a big problem!” Dr. Ranjit said. “Then you would have to get rid
of the whole thing, right?” The couple looked down and nodded slowly. The doctor
added hastily, “For the most part, that won’t happen. They’ll do the one in front.”
The husband persisted: “So would it be possible for us to meet with him—ask
him—and then, maybe if we don’t do it—would that be okay? He’ll tell us which one
he’s going to remove, right?”
“Bhai, you can’t ask! He’s just going to say, whichever one comes first—“
“And that one’s female.”
“Yes, that one’s female. This is just—by chance, if something happens—you’ll
have to come back once. No charge at that time.”
Then, Dr. Ranjit asked for his 20,000 rupees. While counting out the notes, the
husband made one last-ditch plea: “And suppose maybe we say, that the front one—“
“But you can’t give that kind of suggestion!”
“No, I’ll just ask: which one are you going to do? Then we can say no, right? That
we don’t want to do it?”
“Most likely, they’ll just do the front one. But you can’t tell them to do whichever
one is good. You can’t ask directly, is it this one or that one or that one? And you also
can’t say that you’ve had it checked.”
“Okay.” The man handed over the money, and the doctor thrust it into his jeans
pocket. The couple bowed and left.
Some weeks later, I asked Dr. Ranjit what had happened with the Kutchi couple.
He shook his head, smiled weakly, and sighed:
What happened was—the doctor tried, but he couldn’t get the front one.
So then he tried another, and that was the male! And the two females were
left. This is called luck, eh? Hard luck. The one that was all the way in the
back, that’s the one that expired! After getting it done, they came here, to
get it confirmed: ‘The male one is still there, right?’ Then I had to tell
them the truth.
“After that,” he concluded, “they had it done in Kutch. They already had three females,
after all. What would they do with two more? But all their effort ended up wasted, didn’t
it?”
Of course, the “hard luck” could have been averted. The doctor’s restriction on
the couple’s use of the knowledge emerging from SD—a restriction they respected—left
them powerless as another practitioner, acting without regard to fetal sex, eliminated the
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very object for which they had endured the travails of intensive fertility treatment. The
treatment, motivated by son desire, had produced more fetuses than could safely be
gestated; SD had identified which of them was the object of desire; and then a procedure
to address the precarity of the pregnancy, performed in ignorance of the key knowledge,
had rendered the entire gestation unwanted. The post-procedural sonography could only
confirm the wasted effort, as it did in half of typical cases. Despite the unusual
opportunity for proactive intervention to shape sex prenatally, Dr. Ranjit’s injunction had
reduced ultrasound back to its usual function: viewing coin toss results and facilitating
reactive acceptance or rejection.
The Kutchi couple’s experience highlights a key question regarding son pursuit: If
sonography could only identify an already-formed male fetus, what techniques allowed
people to channel inchoate vital substance down a male development pathway? How
could families actively shift the odds of son production, determining fetal sex in the
stronger sense of the term?

Herbal Techniques: Proactive Son Production
On the ride back from Chetna after Gauri-devi’s second SD visit, Dhruv-ji
surprised me by bringing up something the couple had not previously mentioned: nonbiomedical treatments for producing a son. He explained:
See, there are Ayurvedic treatments that make it so the child ends up
male—a boy—for sure. We got an injection in Udaipur, and a medication
in Ahmedabad. The second one’s very strict! After finding out about the
pregnancy, you have to start within ten days—if you don’t, there’s no
point. And you have to take it for a month, two-three times a day: a
powder, a tablet, a liquid, to be taken with cow’s milk. You can’t miss a
single dose or it will be unsuccessful. We had this treatment done.
The regimen, which cost 3,000 rupees, came from a doctor in Ahmedabad. Dhruv-ji
elaborated, “The embryo’s sex gets decided after three months. Within the first three
months, it can still be affected—it can be changed, so that it definitely becomes male. But
you have to start on time.”
I asked what the medication was like. Dhruv-ji continued:
It’s five-six tablets, different ones! You have to do them all, and on time—
it has to be perfect. And all for the woman. Nothing for the man. Because
the embryo is affected by whatever goes into the woman’s body. That’s
why there’s that injection in Udaipur. It has some effect on the
hormones—on the developing embryo—so that its development is only
toward the male sex.
The treatment regimen for son production was exacting in administration and mysterious
in content. Its known and unknown burdens—punctilious compliance, blame in case of
failure, potential bodily complications—all fell on the pregnant woman.
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Knowing Dhruv-ji’s passion for science, I asked how the Ayurvedic treatment
worked if embryonic sex was fixed at conception, as held in standard biological
knowledge. He shook his head:
They say that, but I don’t find that science so sure [pakka]. Because there
are so many cases with this medication, and they’re all male! How are
there so many, if the sex is decided? Some effect or modification must be
possible. Because the embryo’s sex is determined after three months.
There can be some effect in the early months. That’s how this medication
works. How does science know it’s this or that in the beginning? And
there’s nothing developed in science that allows you to separate X and Y,
so that you can get just one or the other. Science doesn’t know that. I don’t
think the science on that is so complete.
So this is another method. It’s hard to say what the success rate is.
It’s not like the doctor can follow up with everyone!... So if you do it and
you get a result, it’s true.
I wondered how deeply Dhruv-ji’s explanation for the medication’s mechanism was
intertwined with the three-month threshold for sonographic SD. How might the
medication and its justification differ in a world of pervasive first-trimester chorionic
villus biopsies or pre-conception sperm sorting? More generally, I wondered at the
verificatory impossibility that Dhruv-ji posited. How did the lack of bioscientific studies
into the method, along with the isolated, idiosyncratic nature of individual cases, actually
help to boost its credibility?
Turning to Gauri-devi, I found her already chiming in: “Yes, I completed the
whole course! I didn’t miss even one dose—no, no, no! I finished the full course as she
instructed. That’s how you have to do it.” As she nodded enthusiastically, I wondered
what it would have meant for her to admit to missing a dose, given the high stakes, the
husband’s emphasis on compliance, and the disproportionate burden on her to make a son
through her actions.
The revelation that the couple had pursued Ayurvedic treatment in parallel with
biomedical fertility treatment and SD fit with a pattern I saw in countless cases.
Ultrasound and abortion allowed recognition and rejection of a daughter-to-be. But the
pursuit of a son often pushed couples toward medical treatments offering proactive
intervention material shaping of gendered fetal subjects.
Weighting the Coin
I observed people use various herbal treatments to avoid a fifty-fifty coin toss—to
proactively produce a boy. As Dhruv-ji articulated, such treatments presumed that the
fetus acquired form, sex, and life between three and five months of pregnancy.35

35

Cf. P. Jeffery et al. 1989: 76. This is, of course, just one possible ethnoembryology of fetal bodily
formation and sex determination. O'Neil and Kaufert (1995) described how Inuit fetal sex remained
malleable until the moment of birth, with the process of labor itself capable of altering the fetal genitalia.
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Given the ethnoembryology of fluid vital substance, there have long existed a
variety of desi [folk] and Ayurvedic techniques for shaping bodily matter toward a male
destiny. Ethnographies of childbearing in North India have described a variety of herbal
preparations that could “flip” or fix the sex of the unborn if administered to women in
early pregnancy.36 Similarly, scriptural scholarship attests to Ayurvedic techniques of son
production, mostly notably the pumsvana sacrament. Typically performed in the third or
fourth month of pregnancy, before quickening signals fixity in formation of the unborn,
pumsvana typically involves husbands offering a comestible or herbal substance that
wives ingested orally or nasally to masculinize the fetus.37
Recent research in North India has demonstrated families’ utilization of such
Ayurvedic and desi treatments in simultaneity with biomedical sex selection.38 One study
examining son production drugs noted their widespread availability at pharmacies, their
imputed concretization of pumsvana principles, their promotion by public and private
biomedical practitioners, and the rigid dosing requirements they imposed on women like
Gauri-devi.39
In fact, a pumsvana-based pill called “Select” was one of the first targets of antisex selection campaigning in Gujarat. In 1991, before the advent of the Pre-Natal
Diagnostic Techniques (PNDT) Act, activists successfully employed a consumer safety
argument to secure a state government ban on the drug.40 Numerous pre-natal and preconception herbal, dietetic, and other “natural” methods later came under greater scrutiny
nationwide; the most prominent example was a kit advertised by the U.S.-based company
Gen-Select, which touted higher rates of son conception through the use of nutriceuticals,
dietary modifications, meticulously timed intercourse, external douches to alter the
acidity of the female reproductive tract.41 Early-2000s amendments to the PNDT Act
explicitly banned advertisement and administration of son production treatments, but they
have continued to flourish just below the state gaze.
Though often dismissed by obstetricians and other skeptics as “quackery”, herbal
treatments stood in rather complex relation to biomedicine. Their providers variously
described them as resting on, complementing, or superseding bioscientific knowledge and
practice. Ultimately, such treatments offered women and their relatives something
conventional biomedical sex selection could not: a means of contending with and
intervening on reproductive unpredictability by actively making a boy.
Acting through the Mother-to-Be: Shastri-ji
Ayurvedic and desi treatments aimed at producing a male fetus could be divided
into two categories based on whether they acted through the maternal or paternal body.
Morgan (1997: 340-341) described the intrauterine formation of the unborn in the Ecuadorean Andes, in
which male and female fetuses developed at different rates.
36
P. Jeffery et al. 1989: 191-193; R. Jeffery et al. 1984: 1210.
37
Stork 1992: 92-93.
38
Dagar 2002: 23, 37-38, 44; John et al. 2008: 60, 61-62.
39
Bandyopadhyay and Singh 2007.
40
Unnikrishnan 1993.
41
See P. Menon and Choudhury (2003) and Aravamudan (2007: 81-82) for discussions of the Gen-Select
controversy.
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Maternally focused treatments—the kind utilized by Gauri-devi and Dhruv-ji—were
exemplified by the practice of the astrologer, priest, and uncredentialed Ayurvedic healer
Shastri-ji, whom most people called Shastri-ji.
I first met Shastri-ji at a shop in Mahesana. He had come from his home-cumdispensary near Vijapur to purchase specialized supplies and see local patients. He was a
fifty-something man, with hair that ended posteriorly in the long, slender tuft
characteristic of Brahmins.
When the shopkeeper introduced me and my research, Shastri-ji arched his
eyebrows. “I’ve helped 4,000 families get boys!” he declared. The causative verb he
used—apāvvu—is difficult to translate. Literally meaning something like “to cause to be
given,” it describes actions such as purchasing an object for another or successfully
requesting (or forcing) a third party to give something to someone else. People frequently
used it to describe the action of obstetricians, other healers, and bhuvas in producing a
son, with the implication that the practitioner had successfully secured a bestowal from
nature, God, fate, or some other cosmic entity.
“4,000!” Shastri-ji repeated. “And among them, a thousand must have been in
their forties already. I can show you the names, addresses, telephone numbers. Name the
country, and I’ll show you. You must know Chicago. Then New Jersey. Mozambique.
Africa. Australia. U.K. Name any district of Gujarat, and I’ll show you!”
I asked Shastri-ji how he helped people obtain sons. Smiling broadly, he said, “At
one and a half months, I prescribe a course of seven packets. If they take those seven,
100%, it’ll be a boy!” He preempted me before I could probe the explanatory model. “Of
course, the doctors claim that it’s decided from the beginning, when the two seeds
meet—that it can’t be changed after that. I’m looking to challenge that! It can be
changed.” I expressed my interest in learning about the work people undertook to shape
fetal sex, and Shastri-ji invited me to visit him.
Some day later, I was settling onto a charpoy in the dimly lit back room of
Shastri-ji’s house. He reached into a drawer and produced a yellowed diary, which he
opened to reveal an extensive list of names and addresses. He thrust it toward me. “This
is just the latest!” he exclaimed. “I have so many filled up like this—all boys!”
Until recently, Shastri-ji had facilitated son production by administering
pumsavana. Once a month, “thirty-forty-fifty women would line up” at his house. He
would grind several plant essences into cow’s milk and administer the paste nasally via
syringe. Based on this, “it was guaranteed—definitely a boy!” In performing pumsavana
for countless expectant woman, Shastri-ji had acted as the uber-husband, providing the
virile substance that would actively shape developing children toward masculinity.
Of late, however, the key herb in Shastri-ji’s pumsavana formulation had become
difficult to procure in fresh form. He had begun putting the dried plant into an herbal
powder, which he offered to clients at a price of 1,100 rupees. His description of the
treatment model strikingly echoed Dhruv-ji’s words:
It’s a seven-day regimen. But it has to be taken within three months, while
the fetus is still fluid in form. I give them a powder and tell them to take it
with cow’s milk—or with water, washed down by milk from a cow that
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has had a male calf. The cow’s milk facilitates the process, blocking any
problems and ensuring the treatment is successful. And the powder
actually changes the fetus on the inside: the girl essence in it gets turned
into masculine essence. It’s the X and Y—it increases Y. See, the doctors
say the proportion is decided from the beginning. That’s why I want to do
research, to show how these plants increase Y. The masculine essence in
the cells increases—just in the fetus, not in the woman! Only the woman
has to take it, not the man, because the effect must be exerted in the uterus,
and the uterus is the woman’s... Honestly, you would get a result from just
one day of treatment! But I give a week’s course in case people forget one
day, or if the female seed is more developed... If people keep having girls,
it means the female seed is greater. This medication increases the male
seed, so then it can’t be anything but a boy.
He further assured me that the process never ended “incomplete” or produced a “neuter
gender” child—a healthy boy was the only result.
I asked Shastri-ji what made the plants masculinizing, and he said, “That’s what I
want to research! Right now, we’re just accepting the result; we don’t know why it’s
happening. It’s all based on faith, or trust. But it’s written in the scriptures—written by
our sages.” He added that the need for the treatment had increased lately because various
poisonous substances—tobacco, alcohol, spicy and fried food, processed food, South
Indian food—had led to “a decrease in masculine essence in the body”—“sperm counts
of zero.” Consequently, many men were “impotent,” and Shastri-ji’s treatment of their
wives helped to promote conception and increase the likelihood of a boy.
According to Shastri-ji, his patients enjoyed nearly complete success. Girls were
born “once in a while”, but there was always a reason: treatment initiation after the fetus
became paripakva [mature, ripe] at three months, ingestion of fried food within fifteen
days of therapy, poor compliance with dosing requirements.42 Citing cases of
insufficiently virile husbands, with “zero sperm,” he acknowledged the impossibility of
“making something out of nothing.”
Like the model Dhruv-ji posited for Gauri-devi’s treatment, the model underlying
Shastri-ji’s method rested on a complex amalgam of Ayurvedic, biomedical, and lay
knowledge about sex and intrauterine development. The maleness of the fetus depended
on a high ratio of Y to X chromosomes—of masculine to feminine essence. Because
unhealthy substances had rendered men impotent and decreased their sperm counts,
external intervention was needed to produce male fetal subjects. Shastri-ji provided that
compensatory intervention in the form of herbal medicine. Critically, the intervention had
to take place during the first three months of pregnancy, when the developing child’s
matter was still “fluid”; after that, the fetus’s form and sex became “ripe.” With its
emphasis on male virility as a determining factor in reproductive outcomes, Shastri-ji’s
model harkened back to seed-and-soil ideologies long enshrined in Hindu scripture,
42

Bandyopadhyay and Singh’s study of sex selection drugs (2007) found similarly fastidious requirements
regarding early initiation, dietary abstemiousness, and exact compliance with dosing and administration
requirements.
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ritual, and lay discourse;43 the woman was sometimes a mere vessel for the developing
child, and sometimes a “threatening” field, whose femininity could overwhelm weakened
sperm.44 Consequently, in prescribing his packets, Shastri-ji was not merely acting on the
developing fetal body. He was also treating individual and collective anxieties about
impotence and reproduction, to which I return in Chapter 6.
Shastri-ji contrasted his treatment to the work of biomedical doctors, who could
not change fetal sex—and might even misidentify it—and bhuvas, who were “all false.”
He explained:
The bhuvas tell patients not to go for sonography. That way, their business
continues for nine months—no problem till then, right? I have no such
restriction. I actually tell them that they should go get it checked!
Sometimes, people come back and say it’s a girl, but that’s only if they
started after three months, or ate spicy and fried food, so that the
medication can’t take effect... But if people don’t get sonography done,
that’s fine too. The result will be there! I’m sure... I’ve had cases where I
give my treatment and say it’ll be a boy, and the doctor looks and say’s
it’ll be a girl, and then it comes out a boy!
The relationship between Shastri-ji’s practice and sonographic SD remained at the
forefront of my mind long after I left his house shortly thereafter.fd How did the
biomedical practice’s uncertainties combine with its complete first-trimester ignorance to
create a space for complementary action, even among those who would eventually pursue
a scan?
Acting through the Father-to-Be: Dr. Rajen
As stated on the card Asha-ben received following her abortion, Dr. Rajen also
offered treatment for “obtaining a son.” In contrast to Shastri-ji’s, his approach focused
on action through the paternal body.
Once, as we lounged in the Chetna waiting room, Dr. Rajen mumbled through a
wad of tobacco that the best treatment for son production was a six-month medication
course, to be completed by the husband prior to conception. “In this,” Dr. Rajen
explained, “there are two counts—X and Y. If the proportion of X is higher, then it will
be a girl pregnancy. For a boy, you need Y.” He listed off the herbal contents of the
powders he prescribed, explaining that they all increased “the Y count—the quantity we
need for a boy.” Wives need not take anything, though certain herbs could help support a
male pregnancy. Dr. Rajen’s treatment, like Shastri-ji’s, mitigated the negative impact of
insufficient masculine substance on son production. But instead of acting on fetal matter
in utero, this treatment aimed to increase Y-chromosomes in the partner’s sperm before
conception.
43

Dube 1986; cf. Delaney 1991. In reviewing these ideologies, Dube has proposed their elective affinity
with women’s subordination within patrilineal, patrivirilocal relations of production, including land
ownership, expropriation of labor, and reproduction.
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Cf. Martin 1991.
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Within his 30,000-rupee treatment regimen, Dr. Rajen often prescribed
industrially manufactured Ayurvedic pills. With brand names like Y-Spur, Y-Grow, and
Alto-M, these tablets and capsules publicly promised to address low libido, erectile
dysfunction, low sperm count, and “seminal debility” while “ensuring deep penetration”
and “facilitating impregnation.” Conspicuously absent from their public marketing
materials—but readily implied for many practitioners and patients—was an all-important
purpose of such “male enhancement”: an increase in Y chromosome proportion and the
likelihood of conceiving a boy. The possibility of son production did not have to be
inscribed in the biomedical imaginary through written information, which PCPNDT
surveillance might scrutinize; they readily emerged and travelled in the untraceable
discussions, promises, and hopes of people like Dr. Rajen and Dhruv-ji. Multiplied across
hundreds of practitioners in North Gujarat, thousands in the state, and hundreds of
thousands in all India, the “male enhancement” pills that Dr. Rajen sold at an
astronomical markup represented a massive, oft-ignored part of the son production
economy.
The doctor readily admitted that his method was probabilistic rather than
deterministic: “You get sixty-seventy percent success. It increases the chances in our
favor. Even those who keep having girls, many have no idea there’s a treatment for this!
They just keep getting pregnant, checking it at three months, and getting it taken out with
a negative report. So for them, we’re increasing the chances.” The treatment did not
promise a successful coin toss; instead, it offered a subtle improvement in odds.
When Dr. Rajen’s patients conceived and reached three months, he personally
took them to Chetna for sonographic SD. He explained, “I always have them check! That
way, we can be confident. And I make it clear to them at the time of treatment that there’s
no 100% guarantee. I tell some patients to pay me after they get the report. If they have a
negative report, I give them back their money—I count it as a loss. All we can do is give
them a chance.” I later learned from Dr. Ranjit that Dr. Rajen could forego a considerable
proportion of payments because he obtained his herbal substances very cheaply, such that
the 30,000-rupee cost of a full course represented a hundred-fold markup. And, of course,
regardless of the result, patients always had to pay him for facilitating sonographies and
selective abortions.
Like Shastri-ji, Dr. Rajen took pains to set himself apart from other practitioners
within the local ecology:
I don’t believe in all that bhuva stuff. That’s all false. If fifty people go to
a bhuva, then at least fifteen are going to have a son. That’s a matter of
nature! Then those fifteen each tell another ten, so you have 150
customers! But it’s all blind faith. It’s all false. Many patients come to me
having kept bādhās, and they get it checked, and its a girl. But they trust
the bhuva, and then a girl is born!
Dr. Rajen’s words about bhuvas echoed Dr. Ranjit’s words about him: “He is trained as
an Ayurvedic doctor, but he is doing only this kind of practice!... He is interested in being
a quack only! And in the end, in the patients he brings, I see more females, actually.” The
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landscape of son production was one rife with skepticism, in which others’ failures were
noteworthy, while their successes were ascribable to the work of nature.
Quackery, Superiority, and the Quest for Control
Within North Gujarat’s son production ecology, the herbal treatments offered by
Shastri-ji, Dr. Rajen, and countless other practitioners could integrate seamlessly with
conventional biomedical sex selection methods. Patients took medication to actively
shape a son and then sought out sonography to ascertain whether they had succeeded.
Like Shastri-ji, many providers encouraged their patients to obtain biomedical SD; like
Dr. Rajen, many facilitated visits for it. A variety of “escapes,” as skeptical obstetricians
called them—from Shastri-ji’s stringent requirements, to Dr. Rajen’s probabilistic
hedges, to the ultimate fallback argument about female pregnancies resulting from
inadequate virility in the potential father—meant that individual “female” results did not
challenge overall models. In fact, “negative” results frequently reinforced models,
providing cautionary tales for couples about how their behaviors or flaws could vitiate
the medication’s transformative effects.
More broadly, desi herbalists, Ayurvedic practitioners, and obstetricians engaged
in complex circuits of mimesis, counter-mimesis, and condemnation,45 selectively
critiquing and appropriating46 each other’s explanations and techniques to an extent that
blurred the boundaries between different medical models and practices. “Quackery,”
“blind faith,” and falseness became shifting signifiers that circulated in diverse
condemnations and contentions. Within this circulation, biomedicine was hardly immune
to critique. Who, many asked, was truly “false”? The practitioner whose treatments were
merely unproven? Or the one whose treatments were nonexistent, whose models
professed ignorance regarding the first few months of pregnancy, and whose “results”
were famously unreliable?
To be sure, many biomedical practitioners smirked at a pluralistic approach to SD.
Paralleling Shastri-ji and Dr. Rajen’s disparagement of bhuvas, they often dismissed
complementary treatments as “quackery” or “unproven.” In a striking echo of Dr.
Ranjit’s comments on Dr. Rajen, one Mahesana obstetrician lamented, “We’re a country
of snake-charmers! Some people take vitamin tablets, put them in a different wrapper,
and guarantee a male. For that, they take 30,000. Since 50% will have a male, they get
their profit. They give the other fifty their money back—just a ten-rupee loss!” Some
doctors also cited the potential harm accruing from the unregulated and often unknown
contents of herbal son production formulations.47
45

Cf. Langord’s discussion of an Ayurvedic pulse-reader’s mimicry of other practitioners and even of
publicly circulatings image of figures like him (1999).
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Cf. Unnithan-Kumar’s discussion of how midwives and other non-biomedical healers in Rajasthan
selectively appropriated biotechnologies of reproduction in order to enhance their own legitimacy within
local networks (2004a).
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There is some emerging biomedical research on the contents and safety of son production drugs. One
study (Neogi et al. 2015a) found hormonal content in some preparations but did not specify how the level
of hormones related to typical levels in medicinal herbs or to thresholds for harm. Another study by the
same group (Neogi et al. 2015b) found that women whose children displayed congenital abnormalities
reported use of sex selection drugs at much higher rates than women in a control group; unfortunately, the
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The skepticism was hardly restricted to obstetricians. Dr. Rajen dismissed postconception treatments like Shastri-ji’s on the grounds that sex was fixed at fertilization
and thus had “nothing to do with the woman”; Shastri-ji, meanwhile, disparaged
credentialed Ayurvedic practitioners like Dr. Rajen for relying on unreliable massproduced drugs.
The prevalence of desperation certainly created scope for blatant hucksterism
within the son production ecology. One humid monsoon day, I stood at a Mahesana
traffic circle, listening to Uma-masi chat with an Ayurvedic doctor who was referring her
a patient for SD. At some point, the man chuckled and said, “You should tell people, oh,
get this 5,000-rupee packet from Saheb, and your work will be done!” Guffawing, he said
he would put some inert substances in the packets, while Uma-masi would guarantee
patients a “100% result.” Practically cackling, he said, “If we get two males with a
treatment like that, we’re in business!” Uma-masi joined him in laughing and slapped his
outstretched hand in a gesture of conspiratorial satisfaction. Though she did not follow up
with that doctor, she later said she knew of several practitioners who ran such schemes.
The practice was supposedly quite widespread: Dr. Ranjit alleged that the region’s bestknown desi son production specialist charged patients several thousand rupees for “only
vitamins—B-complex, A, C, nothing else!”
But it would be mistaken to see son production regimens as a marginal
phenomenon driven by fraudsters and counterfeiters. Herbal medications for shaping a
boy pervaded the local reproductive landscape, overlaying on sonography and selective
abortion, because they offered a type of otherwise-elusive agency. Despite decrying
“quackery,” obstetricians frequently prescribed Ayurvedic son production medications.
Families grappling with the medical and emotional aftermaths of selective abortion at
Chetna often asked Dr. Ranjit to recommend medications “for next time, “so that this
doesn’t happen again,” prompting him to prescribe a pre-conception regimen of the same
pills Dr. Rajen used. Even for skeptical biomedical practitioners, son production
treatments held appeal as the only possible mechanism for altering biological processes in
the way clients desired.
Just as biomedical clinicians turned to complementary treatments to preserve
legitimacy with patients, providers of complementary treatments frequently invoked
biomedical knowledge to explain the efficacy of their interventions. Pre-conception
regimens like Dr. Rajen’s purportedly worked by increasing the proportion of “Y sperm”.
While post-conception treatments like Shastri-ji’s diverged from standard biology in
positing the first-trimester fetus’s sex as mutable, they nonetheless relied on a bank of
biosceintific concepts, emphasizing the ties among Y-chromosomes, male essence, and
embryonic development. Son production treatments proved appealing to highly educated
clients like Dhruv-ji and Gauri-devi because they permitted intervention on bodily
substance in a way that was simultaneously comprehensible through biomedical
knowledge and impossible in biomedical practice.

study’s case-control design leaves open the possibility of recall bias within the case group, and the authors
do not address the issue.
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Of course, there did exist biomedical techniques for actively shaping a male
pregnancy, such as sperm sorting, pre-conception gamete testing, and pre-implantation
genetic diagnosis. (Indeed, Dr. Rajen once told me he had overheard some obstetricians
discussing a “new allopathic method, in metro cities like Ahmedabad and Bombay,” in
which “the X is taken out of the semen, and only the Y is kept.”) But these techniques
were geographically remote, prohibitively expensive, banned by PCPNDT, and barely
visible in the local biomedical imaginary. Lack of access to them made Ayurvedic and
desi treatments the exclusive methods for materially promoting son production. Such
regimens were a way for families to contend proactively—rather than reactively—with
reproductive unpredictability.
But what if the key to son production lay outside the control of any medical
practitioner, in forces divine or cosmic?

Religious Techniques: Fate, Divine Will, and Bargains with God
Riding back from Chetna after Gauri-devi’s second SD, Dhruv-ji brought up the
matter of divine will and pāp [sin] without prompting. Nodding toward Gauri-devi, he
said:
I told her this! ‘God will not even give you the chance to commit pāp.’ We
didn’t think about abortion at all. What need was there? God was bound to
do good. God wouldn’t do that to us, would he? God didn’t even give us
the occasion to think about all this: Keep it, or not? How to care for a
daughter at the age of forty? Get an abortion, or not? God knew that it was
like this, that it was already quite late for us. So he didn’t even put this in
front of us—whether to keep it or not.
God’s work is always like this. He only does good. He won’t let
bad things befall a person. I had faith from the very beginning—why
would God have us go through such a long process, just to have it taken
out? God’s the biggest. God’s the one who does everything. I said, we’ve
spent fifteen years like this; well, God isn’t so cruel that he’d give us a
negative result after that. Fifteen years, we tried, tried, tried without a
result. That’s a punishment! Well, God wouldn’t give us another
punishment after that. She had doubts, but I always said it. Somehow,
from the beginning of the pregnancy, I kept feeling it’d be a boy, a son.
Because God can’t do such a great injustice, piling another injustice on top
of fifteen years of injustice. God wouldn’t do that to good people.
Told from the retrospective vantage point of a hope fulfilled, Dhruv-ji’s account
explicitly construed the long delay, the eventual pregnancy, and the fetus’s male sex as
reflecting divine will. The ordeal of infertility had been a karmic punishment—a
“penance,” in his earlier words; the developing son was a cosmic reward. Dhruv-ji’s
prayers to God and Sai Baba had borne fruit: a child-to-be whose sex obviated any need
to contemplate the pāp of selective abortion. As “good people” and reliable devotees, the
couple had earned a tipping of the odds in their favor.
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Building on Dhruv-ji’s impassioned monologue, this section considers fate,
destiny, God, and other cosmic forces with the capacity to shape the gendered fetal
subject. I ask:
What religious techniques did people employ in son pursuit, and how did they experience
the failures and successes of variously configured bargains with the universe?
The Powers of Cosmic Forces
For people around Mahesana, divine will and other cosmic forces could decisively
control the sex of potential children. I approach families’ talk and actions around such
forces from the perspective of a “nonsecular medical anthropology,” which insists on the
ontological co-presence of reproductive bioscience and cosmic intervention.48 I treat
deities as “cohabitants with the living,” sovereign figures who engaged with ordinary
people through diverse relations of force and contract.49 Seriously accounting for deities,
fate, and chance reveals the “clinical theodicies” that exceeded biomedicine’s limits in
explaining reproductive success, misfortune, and struggle.50 At the same time, by
drawing attention to the complexities of divine-human transactions, engagement with
cosmic ontologies highlights deities’ specific materializing agencies, provocatively
suggesting shrines, religious rituals, and personal relationships with God as sites of
assisted reproduction.51 The gendered fetus was subject not only to kinship, medicine,
and governance, but to cosmic power systems as well.
Mahesana-area families and clinicians pervasively talked about how cosmic
agencies could over-determine the coin toss of son pursuit. Some, like Asha-ben’s family
during the hopeful ride to Chetna, invoked karma as the key causative agent. Others cited
nasib [luck, fortune], kismat, kudrat [nature, the universe], God, various deities, or “what
is written,” often tying the diverse factors together as ultimately one. Many described
sons as the fruit of prayer, faith, or trust in God. When faced with anger over refusal to
perform SD or disappointment at repeated daughters, obstetricians often told clients to
interrogate fate, luck, or God, since “it’s not in our hands.” And on more than one
occasion, I heard families reflect the same clinical theodicy back to clinicians: “We’ll
accept whatever God gives. You may be a doctor, but you’re not bigger than God, right?”
The scope and tendencies of the cosmic forces shaping fetal sex could extend far beyond
the knowledge or control of any medical practitioner.
People’s statements often indexed the assumption that God understood the social
structure and could provide household balance. Hope and disappointment became
configured in the language of divine providence: “After this girl, God will definitely give
us a boy!” “God isn’t seeing that it’s our turn—he just keeps giving girls.” Occasionally,
women and relatives even responded to discussions of the sex ratio (SR) and Beti
Bachāvo by suggesting that God actively worked to preserve balance at the population
48
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level, making a disproportionate number of firstborns female. “Since there started being
less girls,” Gita-masi once told me, “God’s made a rule that the first child in every family
should be a girl.” Statistical evidence of roughly equal first-parity SRs notwithstanding,
perspectives like Gita-masi’s portrayed the divine father as paralleling the state in
working to preserve community-level balance.
Statements and stories regarding divine reproductive planning frequently centered
on notions of karma and moral deservingness. Echoing Dhruv-ji’s reflections on penance,
people sometimes treated infertility, repeated “female” pregnancies, and the excruciating
anticipation of SD as God-given challenges; this configuration concretized tensions
between piety and reproductive endurance while also allowing the further emplotment of
son pursuit on the basis of faith in the ultimate inevitability of a boy.52 The invocation of
karma—a personal but ultimately incomprehensible form of responsibility—functioned
to deepen or absolve blame on particular people, depending on the circumstances.53
Some examples were spectacular. Gita-masi told the tale of a drunken father-to-be
insulting a Mataji [mother goddess] and dismissing any need for her, given that
sonography had twice confirmed his future child as male; four months later, the man’s
wife had given birth to a girl, for “Mata-ji switched the child, even after it was fixed as a
boy.” Much like Shastri-ji’s challenges to bioscientific embryology and clinical SD, Gitamasi’s story indicated the importance of recognizing that other forces—here, divine
action based on moral deservingness—could override biomedical revelation of the coin
toss results.
Most instances of imputed divine planning, such as Gauri-devi and Dhruv-ji’s,
were more ordinary, though no less powerful. Many men treated sons as a focus of moral
improvement, pledging to give up a long-held vice—tobacco, alcohol, gambling—if a
particular deity granted a boy. Sagar-bhai, the medical supplies distributor whose wife
had undergone sex-selective abortion with Dr. Narendra before having a son, invoked
notions of moral deservingness in reflecting on the counterfactual scenario of yet another
female fetus: “It would’ve been tough—‘What have we done?’ We still would’ve had to
try again—for a boy—but our heart wouldn’t be in it. We would keep feeling, ‘What did
we do to deserve a third straight girl? What’s the flaw in us?’” One bhuva explained that
God gave more daughters to “the man who doesn’t fear anything, doesn’t give in to
anything,” “the man whom no one else can touch,” so that “he can realize how you have
to constantly follow daughters in this day and age, in fear”—“so that his progeny can
touch him, and he must bow instead of walking around with his head held high.”
Consequently, clinical sex selection intersected with two son production
techniques that attempted to recruit divine intervention: bādhās, and personalistic
bargains with God.54
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Of Bādhās and Bhuvas: Damini-ben and Govind-bhai
The religious ritualists known as bhuvas were just as much a part of the local son
production ecology as obstetricians, Ayurvedic practitioners, and desi herbalists. Like the
latter two groups, they offered interventions—bādhās—that could alter reproductive
trajectories in ways that conventional biomedical sex selection could not. One prominent
Mahesana-area bhuva once told me, “I use the bhuva’s technology! The doctor’s
technology—sonography and all that—is one thing, and that’s what you’ve studied. But
the bhuva’s technology is a different thing.” Because religious techniques operated on a
different plane of causation, they offered a different mode of action: accessing and
modifying fate, divine will, or chance where biomedical control could promise no better
than fifty-fifty odds.
The bādhā55 was a religious agreement—usually with a Mataji—based on
solemnly promising an offering in exchange for the desired object. While sometimes
undertaken with just a personal vow, bādhās were often mediated by Mataji-specific
bhuvas. The bhuva led the woman, couple, or family in performing rites to initiate
communication with the deity. He used his expertise to transmit supplicants’ requests to
the Mataji, who then transmitted them to the “writer of fates,” or the ultimate divinity.
The latter then decided whether to change written fates, making the bādhā effective or
ineffective. If the former, supplicants completed certain offerings through the bhuva
within an appointed period. A bādhā for a son could be initiated before or after
conception, and was considered fulfilled with the birth of a boy or—more rarely—a
“positive” SD result.
As a senior bhuva noted, “there is no young woman who does not have a son in
her fate,” but black arts, negative karma, or a protracted reproductive destiny could trap
her in a sonless state. Acting against conditions, a bādhā could expedite son production
by altering written fates. Another bhuva explained:
In such cases, all the work’s done by the one up there. We’re just the
proximate cause! We help heal people’s sorrow by trying to change the
written fate. We explain to people that they are making a request—not
with us! With Mataji, and with Him. Not here—up there! It all depends on
your faith, your trust. God is with you. We’re just the gateways. What
does a lawyer do? We make a request to him, and then he passes the
request forward. So just as the lawyer becomes a proximate cause, we
become a proximate cause.
Ultimately, then, the bādhā’s success depended on the strength of the supplicant’s faith,
the damaging or supporting effect of the supplicant’s karma, and an agency whose
operation was beyond the comprehension of both supplicant and mediator.
A bādhā was often a matter of kin-oriented action. Elders forced their sons and
daughters-in-law to pursue ritual requests—often to the exclusion of biomedical sex
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selection—even when the youngsters thought them ludicrous. Conversely, women
sometimes convinced in-laws to accept bādhās as a substitute when multiple selective
abortions led to reproductive exhaustion. Supportive relatives might also undertake
bādhās on behalf of long-suffering women. I knew a prominent anti-sex selection activist
who, while fighting tirelessly for recognition of daughters as equal, undertook two
separate bādhās pledging barefoot 100-kilometer treks to secure boys for kinswomen
whose sonlessness had brought down harassment from hostile in-laws.
Gita-masi’s grandson was the product of a bādhā. After the birth of her second
granddaughter, her son had sunk deeper into alcoholism. Gita-masi and her daughter-inlaw had initiated a bādhā pledging the son’s sobriety in exchange for a boy.
Some months later, the daughter-in-law became pregnant. Citing the bādhā, Gitamasi forbade her from taking an abortion pill. She compromised by saying the couple
could pursue an abortion if sonography revealed another potential daughter.
The Mata-ji and her bhuva gave permission for SD. This was in contrast to many
cases, where SD was prohibited as a sign of “false faith”; in some cases, bhuvas warned
that pursuit of sonography would so disappoint the Mata-ji that she might turn a male
fetus female at the moment of the test.
The family’s scan revealed a son-to-be. A few weeks after the boy’s birth, the
family rented a jeep at considerable expense to take him to the Mata-ji’s chief pilgrimage
site and offer coconuts, cash, penda, and various other sacrifices. Though I could not
verify the precise costs associated with the bādhā, my sense was that it reached around
10,000 rupees, or over a month’s income for Gita-masi’s son.56
Instead of simultaneity, bādhās and SD could also stand in sequential relation to
one another. In this regard, Gita-masi’s family’s story contrasted with that of their
neighbor’s daughter, Hetal-ben. Frustrated with three previous selective abortions that
had left her feeling “finished,” Hetal-ben and her in-laws decided to pursue a bādhā as an
alternative. In their case, the bhuva prohibited biomedical SD, saying it would betray
insufficient faith. When I last saw Hetal-ben, she was eight months pregnant, fervently
hoping the impending birth would end her long reproductive journey.
For other couples, such as Damini-ben and Govind-bhai, the frustration-based
switch between biomedical SD and bādhā could operate in the opposite direction. I met
the thirty-something couple one day in the Nandini consultory. She was quiet; he, louder,
with a booming laugh and heavy gold chains around his neck and wrists. He was a
prosperous moneylender and land broker with a monthly income of several hundred
thousand. He carried an infant in his arms, and two girls—five and three—trailed close
behind.
The couple requested placement of an intrauterine device. Govind-bhai explained,
“We’ll have to have a five-year gap.” Dr. Dilip asked if they wanted another child after
that. Govind-bhai chuckled, held up the baby and nodded to each side: “Since we have
these three Lakshmis, we’ll have to try for a boy in the future, right?”
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A few days later, I ducked into Govind-bhai’s office, set amid a modest retail
complex. Removing his overshirt after a busy morning and propping his feet up on his
desk, Govind-bhai motioned me to the sofa across from him. The aroma of smoldering
desi tobacco from his bidi filled the room.
He narrated his and Damini-ben’s reproductive history. In six years of marriage,
she had born three girls by Caesarean delivery. “Now,” he explained, “we’ve decided on
a five-year break. Even if nature said right now, ‘I want to give you a boy,’ I would say
no. I have to think about my wife—about her body. Since all three are operations, it’s
important to look out for her, right?” Then he added, “If they had been normal deliveries,
then it would be no problem. But all three are operations! My sense is, the doctors say
you should only get three. This is my fortune.”
I asked whether they had ever obtained SD. Govind-bhai replied, “Never! We left
it to nature. See, we didn’t want to commit pāp.” Looking at a corner of the cieling, he
mused, “After the first girl, we thought we would definitely have a boy. Watch, in most
cases, that’s the way it is—if the first child is a girl, then nature gives a boy.” In their
case, however, the cosmic balancing had not come to pass. He continued, “Even though
we are good, nature visited bad on our home. Even though we do good in our community,
and never wrong anyone, nature still gave us girls.” Holding up an open palm in a gesture
of helplessness, he added, “That’s a matter of luck. Many don’t have any children!”
Elaborating on the matter of SD, he said, “In the second trial, the whole family
said it would be good to get it looked at—my missus, too. But I held back. The third time,
too, people said, ‘Get it looked at, get it looked at.’ But I thought, okay, now it will come.
And again, I held back. We had a bādhā with the bhuva-ji, so we thought, this time it’ll
be a boy.” He smiled ruefully as he continued, “The bhuvaj-i is obviously going to say,
‘Yes, keep a bādhā!’ He’s going to get his. So we called the bhuva-ji, we kept a bādhā,
everything. We contacted him afterward; he just said, ‘Oh, it’s a matter of your luck.’ If it
was a boy, he would say he made it happen! Honestly, both dava and dua provide their
own benefits.” Govind-bhai’s regrets echoed the common refrain that son pursuit ought
to combine dava and dua—pills and prayer, or medicine and religion more broadly. Such
complementary use, he felt, might have aided him and Damini-ben in expediently
reaching the end of reproduction.
Upon asking about the prospective fourth pregnancy, I was taken aback to hear
Govind-bhai emphatically declare:
Then, it’s final, we have to get it looked at! It’s necessary to get it looked
at. Once there’s a fourth Caesarean, you definitely can’t have another. At
this point, it’s all for a boy. We’re like a critical patient—you can say
we’re ‘on oxygen!’ If there’s a fourth girl, we won’t be able to try for a
fifth pregnancy. This is the last round: if I don’t kill the enemy with my
last bullet, the enemy will kill me. So we’re going to get it checked, final.
At that point, we’ll go to the ends of the earth if we need to. Friends who
got it done previously told us to get it done, but we didn’t. That was our
biggest mistake.
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We have no alternative. We’re on oxygen. If they were normal
deliveries, maybe we’d make do. But even with three normal deliveries,
we’d have to think about it. Look at the era! To have a girl, take care of
her, let her go out at night—we have to move according to the era. It’s not
a question of money, but of what she will find: what kind of conjugal
family, what kind of mother in-law, what kind of sorrow?
The imperative of son production meant Damini-ben would have to endure further
reproductive wear. But with her body’s reproductive capacity reaching certain limits, and
a son the only purpose of procreation, there appeared no choice but to pursue biomedical
sex selection, however sinful. Another full-term coin toss would not do.
When I asked Govind-bhai if they would consider a fifth pregnancy after a
hypothetical selective abortion, he rolled his head in acknowledgment, saying, “Of
course, another try is necessary.” He waved his hand over his head, toward the walls of
the office. “All this effort I’m making, what is it for? Who is it for?”
Toward the end of our conversation, I thought back to the moment at Nandini
when Dr. Dilip and Damini-ben had gone behind the curtain for the contraceptive
placement. Govind-bhai had slid his finger sideways into their baby’s mouth, allowing
her to bite down and gnaw as a relief from teething pain. Once she had tired of the
activity, he had squeezed her into a ball, kissed her, and tickled her, laughing all the
while. Over the course of our acquaintance, I would see Govind-bhai care for his three
daughters in various forms readily recognized as embodied devotion: embraces, more
teething, games with the older girls, walks with all three in tow, proud sharing of their
photographs, and weekly trips to track the infant’s weight gain on a corner grocer’s scale.
These were all acts of affection and care—precisely the affection and care that, coupled
with compulsory alienation, made the futurity of daughters so bittersweet.
That afternoon in Govind-bhai’s office, thinking just of the scene at Nandini, I
asked whether he really felt it had been his “biggest mistake” to not obtain SD on the
fetus that became the teething girl. He practically shouted the response: “Of course, yār!
The thought is bound to occur to me, that I have too many girls—in this era, already
having three, right? Definitely, I feel that way sometimes—that if we hadn’t had this third
girl, if we’d had a boy instead of a girl, it would’ve been good.” There was a long pause.
Then, he grinned and added, “But now, if she cries, it burns my heart! Now, I can never
let her go. The point is, we did keep her.”
Govind-bhai’s views reiterate the lesson that sex selection was not the expression
of a crude, totally devaluing misogyny, but a complex manifestation of gender-kinship
inequality in which the evaluation of daughters as “bad” was compatible with deep
affection and care toward them. Govind-bhai’s words also reveal how, despite
considering biomedical sex selection morally abhorrent and preferring religious
alternatives, people might feel compelled to pursue the former when confronting the
simultaneous constraints of a rigid kinship structure and reproductive exhaustion. In
Govind-bhai’s perception, son pursuit had reached the stage of last chances. His vivid
metaphors of shootouts and oxygen, his pledge to travel the ends of the earth, his
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resoluteness on the whole matter—these indicate the extent to which he felt the end of
reproduction to be near. If that end was to be a boy, definitive action was necessary.
Govind-bhai’s statements evinced serious struggles with luck, nature, and God. If
his behavior had been good, why had the universe done him wrong by giving so many
girls? Why had the good—a son—been withheld? If nature generally bestowed boys after
girls, why had the couple received three consecutive daughters? And if sex selection was
pāp, did its necessity now make it acceptable? Damini-ben and Govind-bhai’s failed
bādhās and the prospect of future SD raised more questions than they answered. Given
the inscrutability of the substrate for divine agency around reproduction—karma, written
fates, the balance of pāp and punya—how could one make sense of a wheel whose turns
kept yielding unfavorable results?
“We Petitioned the Universe Every Day”: Mina-ben and Gajendra-bhai
Alongisde bādhās, people People also bargained with God in more personalized
ways. In such cases, the pāp of past sex selection often became a starting point for
negotiating a path toward a future son.
I first learned about personalistic bargains with God from Mina-ben and
Gajendra-bhai. We met when I accompanied them and Uma-masi on an SD visit to
Chetna. When Uma-masi’s son stopped the car at the rendezvous point, I saw four
figures: a lanky man; a short, stocky woman; a fashionably dressed preteen girl; and, in
the woman’s arms, a grinning infant.
As we crammed into the car, Mina-ben thrust the baby toward Uma-masi with a
smile. Smiling back, Uma-masi pinched the girl’s cheeks and asked, “Is this the one you
kept?” Husband and wife grunted and nodded. Mina-ben told me that after obtaining SD
through Uma-masi in the previous pregnancy, they had ultimately decided to keep the
daughter.
When we reached Dr. Ranjit’s town, Uma-masi, Mina-ben, and the two girls stole
away to Chetna. Gajendra-bhai and I wandered, chatting about his Patel gol, his farming,
cost of living, and prohibition on sex selection. “Uma-ben is a great person,” he said.
“Only one in a hundred people would do as much as she has done for us.” I did not learn
the full extent of her assistance until weeks later.
Eventually, the women emerged from the clinic and found us at the nearby tea
stall. After we piled into the car, Mina-ben smiled and declared a “good report.”
Gajendra-bhai returned the smile, and both parents clutched their daughters tightly. The
older girl looked back and forth between the parents, nodding happily.
On the ride back, Uma-masi said, “What did I tell you? With her, I told you,
‘Keep it. You don’t want to do pāp. If it’s in her destiny, she’ll bring a brother.’ And she
brought one! This is great news for these sisters.” The couple hurriedly agreed, squeezing
the girls.
A few weeks later, Gajendra-bhai and Mina-ben invited me to their village, just
outside Mahesana. For two hours, we sat on charpoys, playing with the infant and
discussing their experience.
The couple recounted a difficult reproductive history. In 2003, two years after
their marriage, a son had been born with cleft palate; despite extensive medical care, he
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had expired after five months. “God made it like that,” Mina-ben said, shaking her head.
“We argued a lot with God in our grief! But it was written in our karma, in our fortune.”
The older girl was born in 2004. Then, a “five-six year span when every pregnancy ended
in miscarriage,” per “whatever was written in our karma.” The second daughter had been
born in 2013, after SD at Chetna. And now, the anticipated son.
The couple explained that obtaining the desired son rested on a karmic balance of
pāp and punya [meritorious action]. They mused, “If we are true, if we only act truly, the
universe will eventually look toward us, no? We have to assume that we committed pāp
at some point, and that it got in the way. Who knows when God is satisfied with you?”
The male SD result signaled the sufficiency of their penance—waiting, enduring
difficulties, and accepting a girl.
More specifically, the couple characterized the son-to-be as the result of a bargain
struck with God after the previous SD:
• Mina-ben: Eighteen months ago, we didn’t get it done. We put our
hope in God! We told Him to look out: ‘We’ll bring her home, raise
her. But then you look out for us!’ Uma-ben suggested it, and it was
our will, too. We kept thinking, what if it’s in her fate to have a
brother? If we bring home another girl—if we don’t do bhrunhatyā—
maybe God will give us a boy.
• Gajendra-bhai: Honestly, when the doctor told us, we weren’t thinking
of keeping it. But then we came home and decided to welcome
whatever it was—to not do wrong. We thought, let’s not kill it.
Because it’s bhrunhatyā. Four months—that’s when the life is put in.
It develops, it’s given a form, and it’s given life. So then it’s
bhrunhatyā. Imagine how the life is offed as they scramble it up
inside!
• M: We thought, if we get this taken out, no good will come to us.
Because the pāp doesn’t accrue to the doctor; it accrues to us.
• G: Of course! He only does it because you pay him—because you go.
Does he come to your home? We’re the ones who made the inquiries
to find him. So we thought, this is nature, and you can’t change nature;
if we do bhrunhatyā and get pregnant after six months, it will be the
same thing.
• M: If we’d gotten it done, God wouldn’t have favored us. The pāp
would’ve gotten in our way... We would keep getting girls, again and
again, because we didn’t accept our fate. But we accepted it! We
accepted her, and it was in her fortune!
• G: We believed that, as far as possible, the universe wouldn’t do us
wrong.
• M: We figured God would give us a son. We petitioned the universe
every day: ‘Look out for us, now that you’ve given two already!’
Mina-ben and Gajendra-bhai described an agreement, established through prayer, with
God, fate, and the universe: the couple would welcome a second daughter-to-be in
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exchange for the reward of a son. Notably, the bargain took on its full meaning through
the act of SD, which facilitated recognition of the potential daughter as such; sexing the
pregnancy made its acceptance a more meritorious act. The couple’s stances on
bhrunhatyā, killing, and pāp echoed Rohit-bhai’s anguished meditation on Kavita-ben’s
abortion, conveying the sense that life and form, moral standing and fetal development,
emerged in parallel, so that the gendered (and hence selectively eliminable) fetus was
also one whose rejection carried the taint of pāp.
Mina-ben and Gajendra-bhai’s bargain presumed that God understood the
patrilineally, patrivirilocally structured moral economy and would act in accordance with
common-sense understandings of girls as burdensome and boys as necessary.57 At the
same time, the opaque workings of karma left the couple predestined to have two
daughters before reaching a son, as suggested by the hypothetical of interminably
repeated female pregnancies following a selective abortion. While mandating a second
daughter, “nature”— the universe, divine will, karmic balance, fate, a cosmic plan—
would reward compliance by bestowing a son. Moreover, girls’ compulsory alienation
meant fate and fortune applied intergenerationally: a boy embodied good luck for both
parents and sisters.
Despite the sense that “the universe wouldn’t do us wrong”—a feeling akin to
Dhruv-ji’s confidence—Mina-ben and Gajendra-bhai had experienced considerable
anxiety at the time of their most recent SD. “Uma-ben told me the result when we got
outside,” Mina-ben recalled. “Till then, my heart was like, ‘Boom, boom, boom!’ Like
there was nothing else in life. When she told me, it was a relief.” I was intrigued as she
continued, “Honestly, this was the work of the universe—of God. Otherwise, if it was a
girl, what would we have done?” She arched her eyebrow. “Cancel. Definitely. No doubt.
That’s it.” A shrug. “What else could we do? We have two already!” If SD had revealed
that the universe had not fulfilled its side of the bargain, the couple would have had no
choice but to turn to pāp.
Upon returning to Mahesana, I went to Uma-masi’s house. Before I had even
opened the gate to the compound, she shouted from the patio swing: “They just called to
say they told you about all this! I told them it was no problem. They called before you
went, too—‘This is how it is, can we talk freely?’ I told them, no tension! They trust me a
lot.”
Then, her words took me aback: “And of course they trust me! I’ve done so much
for them—saved them a lot of money. I took them to Dr. Tapan four times for MTP. I got
it looked at for less, and finished off for less.” Four times. A different picture was coming
into focus in my mind.
“We went to Dr. Tapan,” Uma-masi reiterated. “They got it taken out four times!
Then, with this girl, I told them to keep it. And now, this boy!”
Uma-masi’s revelation cast the bargain with God in a new light. The repeated
“miscarriages” during the gap between the two girls had been deliberate sex-selective
abortions. Mina-ben’s scenario—fate indefinitely sending female pregnancies to force a
57
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second daughter—was no hypothetical. It was the lived reality from which their bargain
offered an escape.
Subsequent meetings allowed Mina-ben and Gajendra-bhai to slowly reveal the
physical and emotional tribulations of repeatedly hoping, conceiving, and aborting.
Identifying their problem as lying in the realm of pāp and karma, they had ultimately
decided that the solution would be religious, rather than biomedical. The acceptance of a
known daughter-to-be ended the chain of female pregnancies and its associated killing,
paving the way for producing a son.
“Are We Bigger than God?”: Nayna-ben and Ishwar-bhai
I also witnessed the aftermaths of bargains that ended poorly. Toward the end of a
twelve-hour kāchi delivery at Chetna, Nayna-ben asked me and her husband Ishwar-bhai
to go purchase a black salvaar, so that she might limp out of the clinic without worrying
about the inevitable bloodstains. As we walked through the twilight and into a narrow
alley of shops, Ishwar-bhai lamented the family’s precarious financial condition.
He then surprised me by revealing that the couple’s acceptance of their threeyear-old daughter—then snoozing on her mother’s cot—had not been sex-agnostic:
See, hers was the second pregnancy, so we got it checked. But we decided
not to get it out. Everyone pressured us, but we said no. We said, ‘Boy or
girl, no problem. Let’s keep it.’ I said, ‘I’m here, aren’t I? Their father?’
We were firm. And we made a request to God, that he listen to our
prayer—that he understand our situation and give us something good next
time. All parents hope this way, that God do something good for them.
But then some fault of ours must ‘ve gotten in the way. We’re not
going to fault God, right? Are we bigger than God? So it must be
something in our karma. Otherwise, we’d expect God to do us good. But
there must be some reason—some past wrong deed. See, we don’t like
doing this thing—we’re against it, since it’s pāp. But we’re put in a
position of weakness. How many girls can we gather? It would have been
good if she had brought a brother in her fortune, but she didn’t.
Like Mina-ben and Gajendra-bhai, Nayna-ben and Ishwar-bhai had bargained with God,
offering acceptance of a daughter-to-be in exchange for divine provision of the “good”—
a son. Their decision had been shaped by a shared notion of pāp, and by Ishwar-bhai’s
insistence that he could handle the challenge of another economic dependent. The bargain
had ended unfulfilled, leaving them to blame themselves, their karma, and—less
speakably—God himself.
After taking the salvaar to Chetna, Ishwar-bhai and I stepped out. As we walked
through the light winter breeze, he shook his head and said, “All this—it’s pāp, isn’t it?
Killing a life? Because the life’s in the child from fertilization. Once the two seeds come
together, the life’s in it. That’s what causes it to develop, no? If we plant a seed and water
it, the whole process starts from there. Any seed—animal, man, tree, anything—it’s alive
from the time it’s fertilized.” Unlike Gajendra-bhai or Rohit-bhai, who felt life entered
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the fetus at three months, Ishwar-bhai saw the developing child as living—and hence
killable—from the moment of conception. The end result, however, was the same:
selective abortion added pāp to the karmic balance.
Staring at the crescent moon, Ishwar-bhai sighed, “If only in the third—! We were
always fine with keeping two girls. If we’d gotten a boy in this third, we would’ve been
all set. But this is our fortune, that it didn’t come.” Fate had forced them into a difficult
choice: accept the burden of a third daughter amid dire financial straits, or commit pāp.
On the ride back to Mahesana, Nayna-ben and Ishwar-bhai made several phone
calls. I could hear them mumbling: “No, no... Well, what’s the point of gathering together
lots of girls?... No, we were never going to keep a girl... This is called luck... It’s a matter
of our luck.” They were narrating a failed reproductive coin toss, identified through
sonography, enacted through abortion, and ordained by a seemingly hostile universe.
“We Left It to God”: Veena-ben and Bhanu-bhai
In still other cases, religious conviction prompted a complete turn away from SD,
toward a high-fertility pathway of son production. In such cases, the success or failure of
the bargain with God emerged over a longer time course, and reproductive destinies
could remain indeterminate for many years.
I was sitting in the Nandini consultory when Veena-ben and Bhanu-bhai entered
for a prenatal visit. Veena-ben was in her thirties, friendly and outspoken, with numerous
gold ornaments. Her husband appeared about a decade older.
A bit later, we sat down to converse in an empty patient room. At first, Veena-ben
and I were alone, as Bhanu-bhai was purchasing medications. She explained that she had
given birth to four girls and one boy. The oldest girl, twenty, had recently eloped, much
to the detriment of the family’s reputation within its Patel gol. The next, two years
younger, had died in a childhood accident. The sole son had died within a month of birth
due to congenital heart problems. After that, she had had several miscarriages, two girls
(aged nine and seven), and several more miscarriaged. She was now finding it “difficult
to keep a pregnancy without lots of medication.”
I asked Veena-ben if she hoped for a boy after such a long reproductive journey.
“We’ve left it up to God,” she replied, joining her hands and looking upward. “Of course
we’re hoping, since we don’t have a boy. But this time, boy or girl, we’ll get the family
planning operation done. Everyone at home agrees. Better that than to keep ruining the
body.”
Bhanu-bhai entered, and we continued discussing their experience. At one point, I
asked whether they had considered pursuing SD in this final pregnancy. Both shook their
heads vigorously:
•
•
•

Bhanu-bhai: We’ve just trusted God! Whatever comes, comes.
Veena-ben: We can’t commit the pāp of killing a daughter. It would be
killing a living life.
B: If we looked, the doctor said it was a girl, we got it knocked out—
then it’d be killing a living life! The life enters the child at three
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•

months. After that, if you get it looked at and kill it, then you’ll accrue
pāp.
V: And if we were getting it looked at, would we have so many girls?

Given selective abortion’s sinfulness, the couple was relying on God to grant a favorable
result in their final pregnancy.
Two weeks later, Bhanu-bhai met me in his village’s central plaza. We went to a
small corner shop, where he told the shopkeeper preparing his tobacco: “This bhai’s
looking to understand why people don’t let daughters be born.”
Reaching Bhanu-bhai’s neighborhood, we stepped into the first house’s courtyard,
where his late cousin’s widow greeted us. The woman offered me a seat and prepared
some fresh lemonade. After Bhanu-bhai explained my project, she gestured toward him
and said, “Just ask him! He has a lot of experience.” Stunned, I glanced sideways. Bhanubhai was looking down, avoiding eye contact. The woman continued, “You didn’t kow?”
Before I could answer, she smiled: “Of course you wouldn’t. I know because we’re
family, right?” As with Uma-masi’s divulgence regarding Mina-ben and Gajendra-bhai,
an intimate’s betrayal had revealed a previously hidden history of sex selection.
We soon retired to Bhanu-bhai’s house. Lounging on the patio, we chatted with
Veena-ben as she prepared lunch. Unsure of how to handle the sensitive disclosure, I let
our conversation meander around general gender-kinship matters.
We had been talking for an hour when Bhanu-bhai sighed and said, “Let me tell
you our history.” He explained:
We had two girls, then the boy. But he and one girl died. Then, another
pregnancy. They were doing sonography back then. It was a girl, so we
got a curetting done. We had three-four done like that!
But eventually, we said, you can’t keep killing like this. If there’s a
girl, and you kill that life—they can tell boy-girl by sonography at threeand-a-half months, once it’s been given form and the life is put in. So we
both decided that it was a child, and that we were killing it. So we left it to
God—on faith. Then, these two girls. And then, the miscarriages: there
was too much heat in her body, so she needs cooling medication to keep
pregnancy.
Both husband and wife likened their situation to the norm in an earlier era, when people
“just kept going,” having “five-five, six-six girls for a boy.” While giving up on the
selective path, they had continued pursuing a son through repeated childbearing.
In explaining the decision to stop pursuing sex selection, Bhanu-bhai emphasized
moral considerations:
I decided this was killing—a great pāp. Back then, there were ads on the
government buses for Beti Bachāvo: ‘Mother, let me be born! What’s my
fault, that you’re killing me?’ Imagine the damn feeling, seeing that! I
thought, ‘Really, what is her fault, that we’re killing her? That poor girl
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hasn’t done anything—hasn’t harmed us, hasn’t posed any obstacles. Then
why do we kill her? We feel hurt if someone gives our daughter a slap—
just a slap! Then what of killing her from the roots?’ So then we decided
this wasn’t right. ‘Whatever’s in our kismat.’ I decided we wouldn’t do
this any more. ‘If a boy’s in our kismat, all well and good.’ I kept thinking
maybe the reason we were facing such sorrow—such hardship, girl after
girl—was this killing.
Inspired by Beti Bachāvo programming and frustrated with repeated female pregnancies,
Bhanu-bhai had decided, much like Mina-ben and Gajendra-bhai, to give up the pāp of
sex selection.
Veena-ben—now scrubbing pots and pans—offered her perspective on how
Bhanu-bhai’s stance had become fixed as household policy. Her and her husband’s
accounts clashed, suggesting a fraught decision-making process around sex selection and
pāp:
•
•
•
•
•
•

Veena-ben: So then he decided that.
Utpal: And in terms of agreement—
Bhanu-bhai: No, no! Whatever I said, she agreed with.
V [arching one eyebrow]: He and my mother-in-law—the two of
them. Whatever he and the old lady said, I did. She was the one who
said no.
B: My mother said no. She said, ‘If God gives us more, we’ll give
them less, but let them come. We don’t want to do this pāp anymore.’
V [shaking her head, frowning]: With the first of the two youngsters,
things weren’t so strict, so the two of us asked, and Dilip-saheb told us
it was a girl. But then my mother-in-law said, ‘We don’t want to kill.
Whatever’s in our fortune, let it come.’ So that’s why we didn’t get it
done. They said we’d keep it. ‘We don’t want to kill,’ they said!

Veena-ben’s words added further complexity to the seemingly straightforward bargain
with God. They cast doubt on Bhanu-bhai’s account of his publicity-mediated
conversion: had he even been the ultimate decision-maker?
I met Veena-ben’s mother-in-law shortly after Bhanu-bhai and I sat down to lunch
inside the cool house. She barged in carrying a load of hay from the fields. Waving her
hands in my face, she shouted, “Will it be a boy or a girl?!” Her son muttered that I
wouldn’t know, but she looked me in the eye and asked, “Can’t you see it in the TV?
Can’t the doctor tell?” Again, Bhanu-bhai mumbled a soft deflection. The old lady
grunted and walked off in a huff. I marveled at how the mother-in-law, supposedly
against sex selection, was nonetheless eager to know the fetus’s sex.
After lunch, Bhanu-bhai and I lay down on the patio charpoys. He was soon
snoring, but I could not fall asleep. Washing the dishes, Veena-ben mumbled to me, “Oh,
the treatment with Dilip-saheb is so expensive! With each of these girls, it cost us 30,000.
And still, no happiness.” After staring into space for a long while, she shook her head,
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started scrubbing again and said, “Girl after girl—with God giving girls even after so
much cost, a soul is bound to feel it, no?”
A bit later, once Bhanu-bhai awoke, we talked of the cumulative toll of son
pursuit. Veena-ben, now reclining against the wall with a book, frowned and said, “When
we get abortions done, it ruins the body.” In a somewhat different vein, her husband
maintained that “if we knew we’d have a boy after seven girls” it would be “no problem,
no worry”—“we’d let eight be born!” Veena-ben scowled and mouthed the words, “Oh,
easy for you...” Then, as Bhanu-bhai turned toward her, she softened her face and stated
blandly, “Pregnancy ruins the body, too. I mean, how many girls can you have—gather
together—for a son? Anyway, after this pregnancy—whatever it is—it’s all over.”
Veena-ben’s stance underscored the gendered distribution of burdens from
bargaining (or not) with God. Repeated abortions and repeated childbearing—the
hallmarks of low-fertility and high-fertility son pursuit—were both visited upon women’s
bodies. Making a pact with God might free a household from the pāp of bhrunhatyā, but
it did not liberate women from the toll of son pursuit.
Her attitude, as obvious from the unspoken as from the spoken, made clear the
distribution of the burden from bargaining (or not) with God: repeated abortions and
repeated full-term pregnancies, the hallmarks of playing the lottery via the low-fertility
and high-fertility pathways, both imposed themselves on women’s bodies. Striking a deal
with God might free a household from the pāp of bhrunhatyā, but it did not free women
from bearing the physical and emotional toll of son pursuit.
As Bhanu-bhai walked me to the bus stop, he expressed hope that Mata-ji would
show his family mercy. In this pregnancy, he and Veena-ben had established a bādhā
with Meldi Mata. His mother, meanwhile, had fixed bādhās with both Meldi Mata and
Randal Mata, promising to donate silver crowns to local temples and hold feasts for the
entire village. Bhanu-bhai invited me to return “when we hold a procession for Mata-ji.”
When—the verbal embodiment of a relentless hope.
Five months later, I returned to the village. I found my way to the house, where
Bhanu-bhai’s daughters reported he was out in his fields. Veena-ben greeted me with a
smile. She showed me into the sitting room, where she was rocking a cradle. I sat down
to admire the baby more closely.
Veena-ben had just stepped away when her mother-in-law walked in. Standing
over me in the doorway, she shook her head and repeated what Bhanu-bhai had already
reported on the phone: “It’s a girl.” Not knowing what to say, I nodded and turned back
toward the child. As if to make her point clear, the old woman frowned and thrust her
hand between me and the cradle: “What’s the use of this?”
I ventured clumsily—perhaps a bit disingenously—that the girl would encounter
tremendous opportunity if she obtained a good education. The grandmother waved
dismissively. Searching for an entrypoint to dialogue, I fell back on the platitudinous
characterization of girls as “an avatar of Lakshmi.” Squatting down to my level, the old
woman widened her eyes: “You have to have something to give Lakshmi, right?” She
tood up and walked away, shaking her head the entire time.
I spent the next three hours picking cotton with Bhanu-bhai and his daughters.
The girls, their nimble fingers accustomed to the task, moved quickly down the rows of
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plants, while I bumbled my way along. Periodically, when we met at the end of a row,
Bhanu-bhai would mumble something about “broken hope” or the impending
“operation.”
Back at the house, Bhanu-bhai and I lay down to nap under the mild winter sun.
He closed his eyes and murmured, “It’s exhausted us—waiting-waiting-waiting. We’re
tired of it.” In contrast to Mina-ben and Gajendra-bhai’s successful bargain, or Naynaben and Ishwar-bhai’s ongoing quest, Veena-ben and Bhanu-bhai’s pursuit of a son had
come to an end.

Coda: “A Necessary Sin,” Again
Talking about Pāp
Stories about contention with God or the universe open up deep questions about
the ethics of sex selection. If a sex-specific fetus was a cosmically given living entity, its
elimination constituted an interference—a killing—that might prove gravely sinful. Some
people, like Veena-ben and Bhanu-bhai, eschewed SD or bore sonographically
recognized daughters-to-be in order to avoid pāp. Others, like Mina-ben and Gajendrabhai or Nayna-ben and Ishwar-bhai, contemplated and pursued selective abortion while
simultaneously agonizing over its sinfulness. Either way, the religious idiom of pāp and
karma became the chief medium for evaluating the ethicality of selective reproduction.
To be sure, people sometimes invoked other ethical standards. Like Kinjal-ben
and her husband in Chapter 2, some cited the plummeting SR to explain why “this should
not be done.” Some echoed Dhruv-ji, who highlighted the legal and social stigma
associated with the practice: “Every man gets this done, it’s routine, but no one considers
it good—ethically. It’s illegal, and society doesn’t consider it good, either.” But even
these speakers usually pivoted, as Dhruv-ji quickly did, from other social rationales back
to religious reflections on life, killing, and pāp.
The notion of sex selection as pāp appeared ubiquitously in my fieldwork with
families, facilitators, and obstetricians obstetricians, facilitators, and families: in Gitamasi’s articulation of a “necessary sin,” and her neighbor’s desperate switch from
repeated abortions to bādhā; in bargains with God, both successful and failed, around the
avoidance of pāp; in Rohit-bhai’s futile stand against Kavita-ben’s insistence; in Dhruvji’s construction of a teleological narrative in which God would never trouble good
people with the dilemma of a “female” result; and in the reflections of countless other
women, relatives, and biomedical practitioners. I took care to almost never mention pāp
myself, lest I bias people’s comments. Talk about it therefore emerged contextually, from
the fabric of ongoing conversation.
People considered sex-selective abortion sinful, and yet they participated in the
practice all the same. Scholarship on selective and non-selective abortion in India and
Buddhist-influenced Asia has shown how people manage this apparent contradiction
under a variety of circumstances. An early study on sex selection in Haryana found that
95% of surveyed women favored the practice even though 72% considered it “a sin as it
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is a murder and a rejection of God’s will.”58 Research from Southeast Asia has
demonstrated how abortion may appear as simultaneously “necessary” and “highly
morally problematic.”59 As one scholar has suggested for Japan, it may be helpful to
approach people’s navigation of the abortion paradox—a difficult choice made amid
liberal abortion laws and reverence for unborn life—as a form of “moral bricolage,” with
the tools for coping with ethics tensions arising from within the very social constraints
that produce the tension in the first place.60
Moral bricolage around sex selection in the Mahesana area traced the social limits
at which the gendered fetal subject appeared. The female fetus was an incipient person—
an incipient human life—such that its elimination entailed killing. At the same time, its
inchoateness, situated within a processual view of life’s emergence, meant such killing
entailed involved less pāp than infanticide or other forms of ex utero murder; the precise
degree of pāp was the subject of the most anguished moral deliberations I have ever
witnessed. Gendered family planning rationales heightened the fetal subject’s personhood
and the perceived degree of sinfulness, but they also bolstered the act’s seeming
necessity. And different people managed guilt and responsibility differently: doctors and
connectors dodged, dissipated, compensated for, or inverted the pāp; families accepted it,
but justified it through a discourse of familial need.
These themes readily emerged, in microcosm, during my conversations with Dr.
Ranjit. One day, during a lull in patient flow, he leaned back in his chair and said, “Now
we want to stop this. We don’t feel good when we do this. We feel guilty. While doing an
MTP after SD, we feel guilty. We feel we’re committing a crime—and a sin.”
A few weeks later, during a selective abortion, I raised the comparison some
families drew between prenatal sex selection and the female infanticide of yore. After
thinking for a moment, Dr. Ranjit nodded: “It’s basically the same. In previous centuries,
they did dudh-piti. That’s direct murder. Now, parents are allowing indirect murder.” He
gestured forward, toward his own hands. “This is indirect murder.”
After a few minutes of silence, he chuckled, “If the gynecologist is responsible for
this, all gynecologists are murderers—number one murderers!” I observed that such a
judgment would require not only holding doctors responsible, but also treating fetuses as
entities whose elimination constituted killing. Squinting at me, he declared with a tone
almost flippant in its implication of obviousness, “This is a living thing! This pregnancy
is life! Six weeks, seven weeks—viable pregnancy is viable, right? If you don’t do MTP,
it’ll continue... So almost all gynecologists are criminals, all over. If you consider us
responsible.”
A month later, during another selective abortion, the doctor caught me off guard:
“I can’t decide who’s guilty—whether I’m guilty, or whether parents are guilty. Who is
responsible? Agents, of course, are also responsible. But it is the consent of the parents.
58
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On what basis should we decide?” I noted that the law held doctors, relatives, and
facilitators all responsible. With a fierce look in his eyes, he bellowed, “But I’m talking
in God’s eyes!” Following a brief silence, he said, “I’m feeling, sometimes, very guilty—
during the MTP.”
He curetted silently for some minutes. Then he continued, softly:
When the mother is thinking bad—when mother is ready for
termination—who should be called responsible? Mother is the epitome of
sacrifice, the epitome of love. When she is prepared, for her own kid, how
much must she be compromising? That is the only way of consolation for
me. When mother gets ready for termination—
He trailed off. Then, a whisper: “When that epitome of sacrifice, that epitome of love, is
prepared—if she is determined for termination, she will go anywhere.”
For Dr. Ranjit, life and personhood inhered in the fetus’s potentiality, and became
more palpable with gendering. Sex-selective abortion was pāp—the killing of a living
thing. But responsibility for the act lay primarily in the household, with women’s needs
overriding moral objections and thereby absolving the obstetrician of culpability.
Marking Limits: Life, Personhood, Killability
Sex-selective abortion represented an experiment at the limits of gendered
sociality, personhood, and life itself.61 It raised two questions regarding killability. First,
there was the question recently posed by anthropologists Bhrigupati Singh and Naisargi
Dave: what was the social permissibility of ending particular lives, and what were the
associated modalities of killing?62 But it also raised a further question: what sort of
human personhood made it possible to see the elimination of female fetuses as a form of
killing, anyway?63 Killability became “a matter of life itself”64— a materialization of
social life’s boundaries.
Families, connectors, and clinicians uniformly considered sex selection a sinful
form of killing contrary to divine will. In a pattern well attested in research on selective
and non-selective abortions in India,65 people considered many abortions—and certainly
all selective ones—violent acts that destroyed “what God has given.” They described
what took place during abortions as māri nākhavu [killing] or hatyā [killing, murder,
slaughter, or massacre, with distinctly dharmic overtones]. The killing targeted a person:
a “child,” “girl,” “soul,” or jivto jiv [living life]. Adopting the denunciatory discourses
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promulgated by governance institutions, many families described their own actions as
stribhrunhatyā [female foeticide] or simply bhrunhatyā [foeticide].66
And yet, as sex selection’s pervasiveness might suggest, gendered fetal subjects
did not attain an all-or-nothing status as persons. Fetal personhood was a processual
phenomenon, with emerging fetal bodies exhibiting different kinds, qualities, and degrees
of life and moral standing.67 The unborn’s gendered potentiality became actualized
incrementally, and the process could be halted with incurrence of significant-butmanageable pāp. As Hemu-bhai once told me regarding his wife’s selective abortion,
“it’s a small killing: not like killing a person, but still not good—like crushing a bird.” Of
course, most people insisted that the “small killing” was not equivalent to killing an
animal, because the eliminated fetus embodied human potentiality.
The incremental development of human personhood that both permitted and
problematized selective abortion may be traced through a series of landmarks. The MTP
Act imposed a twenty-week limit on abortion, in accordance with the onset of
quickening, but this limit aligned only loosely with citizens’ complex moral and religious
views. More commonly, clinicians, connectors, and families cited three biomedicallyinflected milestones as key moments in an ongoing process of development.68 Like Dr.
Ranjit and Ishwar-bhai, some insisted that all abortions entailed some killing, since life
was present from “fertilization”; if undisrupted, the conceptus’s intrinsic potentiality
would inevitably manifest as full-fledged personhood.69Others maintained that
intrauterine matter “becomes living” with the onset of sonographically visible heartbeats
in the second month of pregnancy.70 Finally, many people, such as Rohit-bhai, Gajendrabhai, and Bhanu-bhai, invoked the cross-culturally significant trope of “form,” insisting
that life was “put in” at three months of gestation, when the fetus acquired a human shape
that could be recognized through sonographic visualization.71 Those who endorsed the
66
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first two landmarks as starting points for life also pointed to the importance of the threemonth landmark, generally describing it as a marker of increasing personhood and moral
standing.
Within this punctuated processual approach to life and personhood, sex-selective
abortion inevitably entailed killing, for a gendered fetus was always an inchoate person.
Because sonographic SD remained impossible until the second trimester, the unfolding of
fetal potentiality squeezed potential parents into an ethical dilemma. The emergence of a
human “shape”—including genital definition—enabled fetal gendering while
simultaneously rendering subsequent abortions more sinful. This dilemma was apparent
in families’ and clinicians’ countless anguished reflections on the nexus of “form,”
“development,” “life,” bhrunhatyā, and pāp. Development, visual recognizability, and
heightened human potentiality came together to generate an image of a person-information—killable, but not without moral transgression.
The importance of recognizability and potentiality came out in a comment from
Dr. Tapan, who performed SD but avoided selective abortion: “After SD, after twelve
weeks, once there’s viability, then it’s definitely pāp. See, at two months, viability is
short. But here, there’s a whole child—a shape! It can’t live independently, but if we
didn’t do anything, then the fetus was going to be born. It was going to live.” Like Dr.
Ranjit, Dr. Tapan used “viability” at variance with common biomedical parlance, in
which the term referred to the possibility of extrauterine survival; the doctors’ usage
focused more on human recognizability and potentiality than on immediate survival
prospects, but ultimately performed work similar to the standard deployment by
establishing the fetus’s clinical personhood.72
In drawing contrasts between fetal discourses in Euro-America and elsewhere,
anthropologists have noted that the emergence of the unborn into personhood may rest, to
different degrees, on two different processes: interpellation into life, and interpellation
into kinship and other social relations.73 In people’s ethical deliberations around
Mahesana-area sex selection, the two processes reinforced one another, as sonographic
gendering and kinning proceeded in parallel with a heightened perception of life.
Moreover, the processual the two intertwined components of emergent personhood
became situated vis-a-vis killability through a relativistic Hindu ethic; in this ethic, actors
constantly accrued both pāp and punya [merit], and karmic status depended on the
balance of the two, rather than on absolute adherence to particular moral precepts.
Doctors and their clients found themselves forced to weight the potential pāp of abortion
against the intention behind it and the consequences emanating from it. In a pattern well

personhood, moral status, and the sinfulness of abortion amid a broadly processual view of emergent life in
Thailand. Gammeltoft (2002: 323) has noted the specific importance of sonographically visualized human
form in establishing fetal personhood and the sinfulness of abortion.
72
Cf. Christoffersen-Deb 2012. Outside of discussing sex selection, Mahesana-area obstetricians also used
“viability” in the sense described by Christoffersen-Deb, to describe the capacity to survive outside the
uterine environment. In this usage, viability could be said to emerge in the late second or early third
trimester, depending on the availability of neonatal services.
73
Conklin and Morgan 1996; Roberts 2007; Strathern 1992b.

280

documented for Buddhist contexts, sex selection could be interpreted as “a sin, but only a
small sin.”74
Of course, the religious sentiments were influenced by circulating political
discourses. As some observers have noted, in normalizing abortion, Indian population
policy may have played a role in attenuating perceptions of the practice as sinful.75 At the
same time, as the widespread invocation of stribhrunhatyā suggests, perceptions of sex
selection’s sinfulness cannot be understood apart from mass mediatized promulgation of
a fetocentric discourse hinging on gruesome imagery.76 Ubiquitous references to pāp and
killing in public representations of selective reproduction helped to attach sinfulness to
abortion in general, as well as its sex-specific variant.
Given the gradual emergence of intrauterine personhood, the relativistic calculus
of pāp and punya, and the circulating discourse of stribhrunhatyā, sex-selective intention
emerged as a key factor in understanding of ethical transgression. Explaining his
longstanding avoidance of selective abortion, one Mahesana obstetrician said:
When I did it, I was comparing myself to a butcher. I don’t feel that
routine MTP is a sin. This is part of our regular process. But if someone
tells me to eliminate a sex-determined fetus—that I feel as a sin. I’m
killing someone! There’s no biological difference, but intention is
different... I get a sin feeling—that I’m killing something that’s alive.
Many obstetricians echoed this sentiment, locating the wrongness of sex selection in its
performance “for a particular gender bias” or “intentionally, because it is a girl.” Some
contrasted routine and selective abortions by referring to the latter as “genocide” or
“gendercide.” Such views prevailed among facilitators and families as well. The intent
behind selective reproductive practices factored heavily into evaluations of its sinfulness.
The moral segregation of sex-selective abortions from “regular MTP” reflects,
again, the liminality of prenatal life, which could be purposefully eliminated, but only for
“good reasons.” One obstetrician invoked the Bhagvad Gita to clarify the importance of
intention in distinguishing sinful abortions from meritorious ones:
If you test the fetus and then take out a girl, it’s pāp. If you don’t need it,
and you take it out, that’s not pāp—that’s MTP... See, Arjun says, how
can I kill my brothers? Krishna says, you are a warrior, so pāp and punya
don’t apply here. Your overall intention is to do something good. If the
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girl’s unmarried, if she’s young—then she has a need, so there’s no pāp. It
all depends on what your intention is—good or bad.
As the Gita parallel suggests, the moral calculus around abortions became a matter of
deciding not whether termination of pregnancy was violent or not, but rather what the
acceptable uses of violence were.77
Obstetricians generally identified three legitimate grounds for abortion: genderneutral family planning, fetal disability, and pregnancy out of wedlock.78 They
pervasively opposed these “good reasons” to sex-selective motives:
•
•

•
•

“If you have an unneeded pregnancy, and you get it taken out..., that’s not
killing. But suppose you do it for this purpose—to have a boy—then it’s
definitely killing, definitely wrong.”
“Suppose parents have completed their family, and a third pregnancy
comes—that’s family planning! If we don’t do MTP, the child that is born
will not have proper justice in terms of nutrition, all that. So it’s not
killing—you’re doing a justice to that family. But if you base it on seeing
a female, of course that’s killing.”
“Suppose the child is defective... Then it’s not genocide. Then it’s for the
better future of the baby and the mother, so it’s justified—there’s a good
reason.”
“I just did MTP for a seventeen-year-old-girl. Think how many lives were
saved: the girl’s parents and relatives, and now she’ll be able to get
married in a good place. Otherwise... imagine how much people would say
to the girl! If the girl is unmarried, the surrounding village, the whole
community—everyone will taunt her.”

Reproductive rights, financial precarity, the burdens of raising a disabled child, and the
scandalousness of “unmarried pregnancy” were invoked to justify abortions aimed at
avoiding unwanted fertility, disability, and unwed motherhood.
But similar arguments could be made to justify sex-selective abortion, in a way
that made sense within the local moral economy of gender-kinship—not merely to
providers, seekers, and facilitators of sex selection services, but also to sympathetic
bystanders in communities, clinics, and government institutions. The necessity of sex
selection could negate or override the killing it entailed. The three “good reasons” rested
on rationales—limiting family size, securing prosperity, avoiding long-term suffering,
preserving social belonging—that could and did apply to sex-selective abortion.
Avoiding the birth of another daughter allowed families to achieve all this, and
77
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sometimes more. The question then became who bore responsibility for joining the
moral-economic need with its sinful fulfillment.
Clinicians and Connectors: Dodging, Offsetting, Compensating, Inverting
Participation in sex selection—profitable, needed, perhaps even meritorious, but
sinful all the same—engendered deep ambivalence among obstetricians and connectors,
as evidenced by Dr. Ranjit’s equivocal reflections. Those providing and facilitating sexselective abortion might dodge pāp by shifting blame onto women and their families, as
the doctor did. But they could also mitigate pāp by dissipating, offsetting, or inverting it.
All four of these strategies came to the fore in Uma-masi’s constant waffling on
her work, its return, and its sinfulness. The first time she mentioned pāp in relation to sex
selection, she remarked, “It’s definitely pāp. To kill a life—it gets distributed to
everyone. Half goes to the family—the ones who have the life taken out. And if the
doctor has taken out the life, then he’s going to accrue pāp. Both get it, doctor and
family. I also get it.”
Then, she smiled and reevaluated:
But really, why me? The patient takes out the money, and I hand it over—
that’s it! Why would I accrue pāp? I just stay in the middle. You can’t
really call it anything—no real pāp for me. I’ve gone to do something
good for a living being [jiv], right? If you ask me to do it, it’s good for
you, right? And if the doctor does it, what’s there left to say to me?
She was dodging blame as Dr. Ranjit did, by invoking the overriding culpability of
others.
Then, further revising her own revision, Uma-masi continued, “Anyway, I always
push the money ahead. I use it up! Why would I keep money from pāp? I mean, I don’t
really consider it pāp for me, but I use up what I earn.” Diffusion of ill-gotten gains
dissipated the karmic harm from the act.
A few weeks later, commenting on her earnings from a day with several SDs and
selective abortions, Uma-masi declared, “However much I earn in pāp, I give in punya.”
She listed out gifts she had purchased for family members from the one-day earnings—
20,000 rupees. She clarified, “Once I give it away, I no longer accrue pāp, since I’ve
done good work. If you earn money through pāp, you have to use it up.”
Yet, some time later, while reflecting on how an SD result had forced a family
into “wrong work,” she paused and stated, “But I don’t accrue any pāp! Why would I? I
came to know of them because they lifted a finger. Whoever lifts a finger is the first to
get pāp. I’m trying to do good, right? Why would I get pāp? It’s the doctor, and the
client... And really, more the patient. The doctor does it, but only when you ask for it.”
Here, the dodge returned, but now with a subtle inversion of Uma-masi’s own actions as
“good.”
Such complex, ambivalent perspectives, which Uma-masi expressed with
regularity, underline they key dynamic of connectors and doctors’ moral reasoning
around selective abortion: the act was sinful, but they could dodge, dissipate, offset, or
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invert the pāp by shifting responsibility, exhausting profits, performing redressive good
deeds, or reframing their participation itself as meritorious.
In most accounts, the responsibility for sex selection was differentially distributed
across multiple “partners in pāp.” Like Dr. Ranjit and Uma-Masi, most people—
including clients—suggested a hierarchy in which patients were at least as responsible as
doctors, and connectors perhaps less so. Moreover, Dr. Ranjit and Uma-masi repeatedly
emphasized that they never recommended sex-selective abortion and often actively
discouraged it, as in Mina-ben’s case. But if families desired the service, they maintained,
there was ultimately little they could do but provide it.
Obstetricians and connectors could also mitigate pāp by using up profits, and by
atoning through acts of prayer or punya. Uma-Masi and other facilitators claimed to
summarily spend or gift the earnings from sex selection. Similarly, Uma-Masi and I
suspected that Dr. Ranjit’s sponsorship of local temples and religious events—often with
tens of thousands of rupees—was a way of “using sin’s earnings to wash away sin,” as
she put it. By allowing pāp to be carried away through gifts or exchanges and offsetting it
by making merit, clinicians and facilitators avoided karmic harm.79
The possibility of offsetting pāp with punya facilitated the ethical inversion of
service provision: because clients perceived sex selection as their desperate need, to
enable it was a good deed. Doctors and facilitators referred to their work around SD and
selective abortions as “help,” “good work,” or seva [meritorious service], all of which
carried the karmic implication of augmenting punya. When Uma-masi reflected on the
distribution of pāp within the sex selection process, she invariably concluded by
underscoring that she was ultimately performing a good deed. Other connectors
corroborated this view, with one observing:
In a sense, this thing is pāp, definitely—to ruin a life while it’s still inside!
But at the same time, it’s also the work of punya. If people have four-five
girls, it’ll naturally occur to them to want a boy, to keep the door of the
house open. So if you look at it that way, it’s also punya. So from one
perspective, pāp, and from another, punya!
Dr. Ranjit, frequently referred to selective abortion as “social service,” albeit sheepishly,
and only in passing. But clients corroborated the stance: after receiving “male” results,
many said they would pray for God to reward the doctor, and even in the midst of painful
and disappointing abortions, some praised his “good work,” declaring him “like God” for
having removed them from the bing of bearing an undesired daughter. Thus for providers
and facilitators of sex selection, there remained a way to renegotiate guilt by reimagining
the very character of participation. Because pāp was necessary for families, helping to
accomplish it was a meritorious act.
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“A Necessary Sin”
For their part, families usually admitted that most of the pāp of sex selection
accrued primarily to them. Echoing Mina-ben and Gajendra-bhai, many accepted the
brunt of moral responsibility by pointing out that facilitators and doctors acted only at
their behest—“The doctor didn’t come looking for us!”
At the same time, when initiating selective abortion, many clients lamented being
trapped in a situation where they felt like “we have to do wrong deeds” or “we have to
commit pāp.” Such statements indexed the rueful recognition of sex selection as a tragic
tactic for negotiating a moral economy of gender-kinship that bestowed burdens through
daughters, benefits through sons.80 Although shameful and wrong, sex-selective abortion
sometimes felt inevitable when a hopeful narrative collapsed in disappointment, leaving
pragmatism to trump karmic considerations.
In thinking about sex selection as an imperfect solution to the dilemma that
female fetal subjects presented, I have often returned to Damini-ben and Govind-bhai’s
case. That hot, dusty afternoon in Govind-bhai’s office, as he recounted unsuccessful
bādhās and declared an intention to pursue SD in the next pregnancy, it was clear he
considered sex-selective abortion profoundly wrong. Leaning over her desk, he told me
gravely:
See, in the previous pregnancies, if we got it checked, and it came out a
girl, we would’ve felt like getting it taken out. That’s a life—a thing
nature has given. If you get it taken out, that’s pāp! Killing a human—
that‘s the greatest killing. If we do that, the universe will surely get after
us.
Before, people used to make girls dudh-piti. Once a girl was born,
they would kill her on the spot, at home. Now, there’s no issue of doing
dudh-piti: at three months, you go to the doctor, give him money, and he
looks for you and does the work. Before, people did that because the
technology wasn’t there. But this is also committing pāp: it’s bhrunhatyā.
In concluding his reflection on selective abortion’s immorality, Govind-bhai pivoted to
the indeterminate future: “But we’ve thought it out. We’ve reached the position where
pāp seems right—if we have to do it, we’ll feel like we have to do it. It’s a sin, but it’s a
necessary sin.”
Govind-bhai’s reflections on the “necessary sin” echo Gita-masi’s from the
beginning of Chapter 2. While seeing sex selection as a heinous misdeed, both had
already made their peace with pursuing it as a last-ditch option. The moral stricture
against killing was strong, but not as strong as the compulsion of a moral economy that
necessitated separation of daughters and made sons the only mechanism of social
continuity.
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Govind-bhai and Damini-ben felt they would have to pursue the sinful killing of a
potential daughter because it was the clearest path to the production of the necessary son.
Repeated bādhās and consistent faith had failed to yield a son, leaving them facing the
bodily limits of reproduction itself. For them, as for so many families, the pāp of sex
selection offered coping mechanism when the conditions of social reproduction—son
necessity and daughter alienation—imposed themselves atop the hard constraints of
procreative chance.

Chapter 6: Anti-Sex Selection Discourse
Ever since the 2001 Supreme Court rulings mandating “awareness campaigns
against the practice of prenatal determination,” government institutions, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and sundry others have poured countless time and
resources into efforts to reduce demand for sex selection in India. Considerable applied
research has also tackled the questions of how best to effect “communication,”
“education,” “awareness,” or “exposure” around skewed SRs and threatened daughters.1
In Gujarat, the Beti Bachāvo campaign and related programming have long
deployed a wide variety of techniques. As early as 2005, an NGO “communication
campaign” in the Mahesana region was utilizing “house-to-house contacts,
neighbourhood meetings, street plays, Bhavai (traditional forms of plays with music),
rallies, road shows, essay competitions, open dialogues, CD shows, social audit, fairs,
[Youth Fair], and public meetings,” as well as “exhibitions... on strategic pathways of
pilgrims during popular religious events, malls and other public places.”2 To this
sampling, one could add the resort, over the past decade, to radio and television
advertisements, art exhibitions, murals, essay and speech contests, pamphlets, books,
poems, posters, and the ubiquitous Information-Education-Communication (IEC) events
held by local branches of the Health and Family Welfare Department (HFWD).
Rather than attempting an exhaustive survey of these materials and strategies,
which have publicly proliferated far beyond anyone’s capacity to fully catalog them, I
attempt in this chapter to examine some of the ideologies embedded in discourses of the
threatened daughter. I draw primarily on HFWD materials such as Beti Bachāvo posters
and pamphlets; privately printed books and artwork; observation of IEC events; and
conversations with government officials, activists, and target families.
Efforts to “save the daughter” interpellated female fetal subjects as “fetal citizens”
in need of protection by the (masculinist) state.3 As attempts to incite reproductive
subjects to self-regulate in accordance with state rationalities of population management
(most notably “balance”), activities around the threatened daughter were quintessential
instances of biopolitical intervention.4 Postcolonial governance in India exhibits a long
history of such intervention, with the regulatory fusion of household-level family
planning and collective population control serving as a key channel for production of a
distinctly Indian modernity.5 I discussed in Chapter 2 how the “modern,” officially
valorized trend of fertility decline played a key role in the rise of sex selection. Here, it
1
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bears noting that state regulation of Indian women’s reproductive capacities also ties to
colonial and postcolonial histories of women’s bodies as key sites for the elaboration of
national identity.6
The last point highlights just one way reproductive governance may link to the
affective realm in which much of the modern state’s institutional power operates.7 Fetal
imaginings may bind state and citizen through shared sentiments of anxiety, fear, hope,
and aspiration.8 But correspondence of sentiments is by no means guaranteed. The
pedagogy associated with states’ modernizing projects may fail to produce the desired
subjectivities.9 Even while patiently nodding along to public discourses, citizens may
practice a “politics of duplicity” in private reproduction.10
In general, I did not see Beti Bachāvo and related programming addressing
families’ deepest concerns—at least not in ways that would effectively divert them from
the pursuit of sex selection. Nevertheless, even such instances of failure can reveal much
about the state, its ideologies, and its functioning.11 In this chapter, I examine how the
state performed itself, and how citizens experienced it, through an examination of the
public representations and everyday practices that made reproductive governance
palpable.12
In many ways, my analysis echoes Rajeshwari Sunder Rajan’s appraisal of antifemale infanticide initiatives in Tamil Nadu, which concludes that unwanted girls became
“children of the state.”13 Considering three different framings of female infanticide—
crime, demographic imbalance, and gendered violence—Sunder Rajan has highlighted
how state interventions constructed the problem as one of deeply entrenched tradition and
social backwardness, thereby making its eradication a civilizing mission while
prefiguring the difficulty of fulfilling that mission. Similarly, in evaluating the Chinese
state’s responses to the conjoined problems of “missing girls” and “excess males,” Susan
Greenhalgh has emphasized the importance of dissecting population discourses (such as
the stigmatization of poor rural men) and constantly considering alternatives.14 Her work
pushes us to consider the work biopolitical framings do, and to imagine how things might
be otherwise.
Building on Sunder Rajan and Greenhalgh’s approaches, I analyze governance
discourses about sex selection as organized around three core ethical figures: the
backward family, the imbalanced population, and the threatened daughter. By both
presuming and acting on these figures, governmental and non-governmental pedagogic
practices sought to modernize traditional mindsets, optimize the distribution of citizen
bodies, and protect future women. In examining how governance activities missed their
6
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marks, I consider what such failure reveals about not only the state and its associated
discourses, but also the familial experience of selective reproduction.

The Backward Family
“There’s a Need to Increase Awareness”
One afternoon, I visited a Block Health Office responsible for administering
Health and Family Welfare programs in a Mahesana subdistrict. The Information
Technology (IT) officer—a young man, sprightly, in glasses and a short-sleeve collared
shirt—met me as I entered from the muggy heat. He gave a brief tour of the facility,
pausing patiently at the storage go-down so I could photograph some spare Beti Bachāvo
posters.
Back at his computer, the IT officer pulled up photographs of local IEC activities.
First was a recent Beti Bachāvo program. The Block Health Officer (BHO) and several
other dignitaries sat atop a dais, microphones on the table in front of them. A hundred
women in saris—community health workers—sat on the ground. The IT officer
explained:
Here, we’ve gathered all the Anganwadi and ASHA [Accredited Social
Health Activist] workers. Saheb gives a presentation—that the sex ratio is
low, and this and that—to bring awareness. There’s a need to increase
awareness. That way, a mindset gets formed, and they can go to people in
their villages and make them understand. Every pregnant woman should
hear this: ‘If it’s a girl, don’t kill her; we need both in society. And if
anyone pressures you, tell us.” That way, even if they go get it looked at,
this is in their minds—they have a sense.
The BHO, he said, folded “a bit of everything else”—malaria, tuberculosis,
malnutrition—into the event, using the gathering to deliver other programming messages
to the assembled workers.
Since the IT officer had apparently snapped the pictures himself, I eagerly asked
“what the audience response was.” Squinting, he shook his head: “There’s no response in
this. It’s a presentation from Saheb.” He explained that the office held many such
presentations, addressing not only community health workers but also the “public” in the
subdistrict’s villages. Then, he shrugged: “What else can they do to change people’s
mindset? Nothing more can be done.”
The IT officer then showed photographs from seminars and rallies the office had
organized during the ongoing World Population Stabilization Fortnight. In one,
schoolgirls marched behind a banner bearing the slogan “The Small Family: A Pillar of
Welfare”; the third girl in line held a sign declaring, “Boys and Girls Are Equal.” In
others, clusters of women sat in front of lecturing officials backed by banners with wellknown family planning slogans. At several points, the IT officer paused, straightened his
shoulders, and formally enunciated the phrases. He emphasized the difficulty and
importance of encouraging the “local public” to “keep the population in control.”
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Eventually, when we exhausted the images, the IT officer cocked his head to one
side. Deploying an anti-sex selection slogan as a metonym for the practice itself, he
mused:
Of course, if ‘Beti Vadhāvo’ stuff happens, it’s ultimately because people
want to reduce the population. They think, ‘How many can we afford?’ So
they have a selected two-three—really, more like one-two. And that’s
where the selection issue arises.
Before, with three-four, there’d be two and two. Before, six-seven
kids was nothing. Infant mortality was higher. The mortality rate
decreased with increasing medical services, so we got the system of twothree children. Now, they understand monghvāri’s increased and it’ll be
hard to sustain so many girls. And the daughter goes to her sāsri after
marrying but still remains a lifelong burden.
Of course, in the long term, there’ll be benefit! If the population’s
controlled, basic needs’ll be met.
“Then,” he concluded, “the people who consider this now will reconsider: ‘Boy-girl
doesn’t matter.’”
Pushing back against the facile narrative of progress, I asked whether people with
one girl would not still feel that “chhokaro joie.” The IT officer nodded knowingly:
“Absolutely. That’s why families become so large! People feel someone has to do the
final rites, and only a son can do that. Then there’s keeping the home open. And then
dowry... There’s such a difference between daughters-in-law and daughters!” With that,
he shrugged and offered to introduce me to the IEC officer.
The IEC officer—tall and rail-thin, with a pencil mustache and a velvety voice—
recapitulated the format of “awareness” events. Coming to my specific topic, he intoned
gravely, “This is a huge social problem! And it’ll have very bad consequences.” After
elaborating at length about the rising rate of intercaste marriages because of “shortage of
girls,” he suggested that PCPNDT-related stings, surveillance, and fear had decreased sex
selection—or at least driven it underground.
Then, the IEC officer admitted, “Things remain difficult. The whole family will
want a boy. And the woman herself will also desire a son.” With rising monghvāri, he
said, people were “choosing small families—so if they have two girls, there will
definitely be an expectation in the third.”
I asked how IEC activities impacted the situation, and the officer assured me,
“The events are full of women. I give them the example of some colleagues—doctors—
who have only girls. I say, ‘If you have an income, even if it’s from hard labor, why not
welcome a girl.”
Then, he frowned. “But in the third pregnancy, almost everyone goes for a check.
It’s hard.” He shook his head. “Our male-dominant society, that’s the thing hindering us.
Men have all the power.”
His face brightened. “But the women never say, ‘No, what you’re saying is
wrong.’ They know it’s true.” Reflecting on his presentations, he said:
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Right now, we’re more focused on World Population Fortnight. We just
sprinkle in some talk about Beti Vadhāvo. But when we talk about Beti
Vadhāvo specifically, we emphasize that daughter-son should be
considered equal: ‘Don’t keep any bias. Accept all.’ We talk about the
disadvantages to a woman of going through six-seven pregnancies. This,
too: the burden on a son of having the responsibility of six-seven sisters.
“It goes down pretty smoothly,” he assured me. “We don’t have to shove it down their
throats.”
I asked whether women in the village events ever asked questions. The IEC
officer shook his head:
Not really. When we give information about breastfeeding or something
like that, they do. With Beti Vadhāvo, they don’t go deep into it. They
accept. But then again, no matter how good a message we deliver, those
with two girls will feel—for the third—‘Chhokaro joie.’ Obviously, they
won’t ask any questions. And the problem is our Indian society; the
decision-making power is with the man and the mother-in-law, not the
daughter-in-law.
He listed off the various “customs” that drove families to continue seeking sex selection:
the daughter’s inevitable departure to her sāsri, the lifelong burden of vahevār, the son’s
role in inheriting property and keeping the home open, and the normative expectation of
old age care from the son and daughter-in-law.
Stretching and yawning, the IEC officer concluded by assuring me, “But now,
there’s not so much of a bhrunhatyā scenario. Only in very small-town type places.”
“Knowledge, Attitudes, Behavior”
My conversations at the block health office exemplify how governance
interventions around sex selection located the practice within families and “mindsets”
constructed as backward. Despite ample everyday evidence to the contrary—evidence the
IT officer and IEC officer readily acknowledged—both official discourses and individual
statements treated the problem as fundamentally one of poverty, ignorance, or antimodern intransigence. This treatment corresponded to a particular pedagogic model for
discouraging sex selection. It also highlighted tensions with the modernities and
rationalities of family planning and population control.
Speeches, pamphlets, books, and essays pervasively associated sex selection’s
underlying “gender bias,” “sex discrimination,” and “boy-craziness” with “customs,”
“inclinations,” or “beliefs” disparaged as “old” or “uncivilized.” In a pattern paralleling
the discourse around female infanticide in Tamil Nadu, government officials, activists,
obstetricians, and other citizens often steadfastly asserted, as the IEC officer did, that the
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problem belonged disproportionately to the rural or poor, despite strong statistical
evidence to the contrary.15
The imputation of backwardness bore distinctive gender-kinship inflections. Both
explicitly (in the content of discourses) and implicitly (in the targeting of discourses),
governance interventions constructed women’s minds as those that required changing.
Moreover, as discussed in Chapter 4, the offending women included not only the “cruel
mother,” as many poems and pamphlets called her, but also the domineering mother-inlaw. The approach stigmatized women in particular as “bad” or “backward.”16 At the
same time, it made individual feminine subjects responsible for fixing structural problems
through virtuous, empowered action.17
The construction of sex selection as backward practice fit into a neat historical
genealogy. Often laid out in sweeping terms, the timeline moved from an ancient period
of supposed gender equality or harmony into a pre-modern era of increasing female
subordination and devaluation, with Muslim and British incursions often cited as the
reasons for the transition.18 The pre-modern nineteenth century became the site of
rampant gender evils, ostensibly corrected through the civilizing efforts of British and
native reformers but now resurging in the form of selective reproduction. Despite the
historical and local specificities of sati, female infanticide, and dowry, the three practices
became rhetorical crops with which to flog those pursuing sex selection. Rajput widow
immolation in colonial Rajasthan, Leua Patel infanticide in nineteenth-century central
Gujarat, and Jat dowry in present-day Punjab were loosely invoked (usually without such
specification) to condemn all families seeking SD or selective abortion. Furthermore,
reformists like Ram Mohan Roy, Shahajanand Swami, and various British
administrators—highly complex figures with ambiguous relationships to gender issues—
appeared as exemplars of the efforts needed to combat sex selection.
The backwardness model implied that progress depended on families and
individuals embracing girls and thereby emerging from a hidebound tradition into a
progressive modernity. Consequently, saving daughters required a biopolitical approach
centered on enlightenment and responsibilization of reproductive subjects. Even while
drawing on notions of backward social mores, Beti Bachāvo programming and related
efforts individualized and psychologized the problem of daughter aversion, largely
bracketing off the collective morality and materiality of gender-kinship practices.
The enlightenment or awareness paradigm found its formal expression in the
standards that structured government education activities and heavily influenced other
efforts. National Health Mission materials from the Gujarat HFWD listed Beti Vadhāvo
as a chief IEC domain (along with antenatal care, safe delivery, family planning, and
support for various national programs).19 The definition of the approach reflected its
focus on transforming minds:

15

Cf. Srinivasan and Bedi 2009a: 11-12; Sunder Rajan 2003: 196.
Van Hollen 2003: 193-194.
17
Cf. Madhok et al. 2013: 4-5; K. Wilson 2013.
18
For a brief overview of this paradigm of historical myth-making, see Chakravarti 2008.
19
National Health Mission 2015.
16

292

[IEC] is used for generating awareness. It means process of working with
individuals, communities & societies to develop communication strategies
to promote positive behaviour that are appropriate to their settings...
Strategic IEC... programs use a systematic process to understand people’s
behaviour and influences. A successful IEC... plan would help in refuting
myths and misunderstandings prevalent in the society... thus bringing
about a behavioural change among individuals and the community at
large. 20
The National Health Mission website further schematized IEC’s roles as a series of
concentric circles, from “encouraging/motivating” on the outside through “shaping
opinions/attitudes,” “persuading,” and “informing” to “advocacy” in the smallest circle.21
Bipin-bhai, the director of a Mahesana-area NGO actively involved in several
anti-sex selection campaigns, further substantiated the paradigm when he explained to
me:
We intervene with newly married couples—because they’re going to
become parents—around the question of boy-girl, to change the mentality
of chhokaro ja joie. We do it on the basis of ‘Knowledge, Attitudes,
Behavior.’ This is a standard approach: if you give knowledge, attitudes
change, and that changes behavior. So if I have a conversation with them,
give them information, then they will change their thinking, and perhaps
put that into action. If your relatives say, ‘Let’s get it looked at, boygirl’—we’ve given counseling to give you the idea to not get it done.
Now, knowledge includes information, like the 0-6 sex ratio. It
also includes matters that touch the heart. So the other person gets
sensitized... We give the whole history: Vedic, Muslim, British. Then what
was the custom of sati, how did they make girls dudh-piti. So that pinches
the heart. Then we say, ‘Today, the fetus is being killed.’ We describe that
whole process, so that sensitizes people to what they are doing.
Knowledge makes the individual so empowered that he can solve his own
problem...
Within the standard public health behavior change paradigm (Knowledge-AttitudesBehavior), sex selection became a matter of misguided behavior resulting from
insufficient information and improperly oriented attitudes. Governance interventions
could protect female fetal subjects from their backward families by imparting
enlightening, affectively compelling knowledge. As my block health office conversations
indicate, such knowledge delivery was often a distinctly unidirectional affair, with
limited effort to “understand people’s behaviour and influences”—or to apply moral-
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economic understandings most officers already possessed by virtue of everyday social
interaction.
Anti-sex selection functions, writings, and artistic productions often operated on
the model of pedagogic revelation. Presentation of some previously unheeded thing—sex
ratio statistics, female fetuses’ tender voices, gruesome images of stribhrunhatyā,
sweeping generalizations regarding gender inequality—would increase “awareness,”
ensuring that “a mindset gets formed,” as the IT officer explained.
Among caste organizations and other NGOs, such pedagogy often worked toward
overtly conservative ends. Many Patel gols, for instance, folded discussions of sex
selection into “anti-vice” functions that also covered alcoholism, tobacco use, premarital
sex, and elopement. In such instances, cerebral information delivery and emotional
exhortations functioned less to dissolve backwardness and more to control social
reproduction. Such control frequently bore little relation to gender justice, as evidenced
by numerous printed materials, speeches, and conversations in which sex selection was
grouped with divorce, elopement, and voluntarily single women—all “calamities laying
siege to marriage arrangements,” as one pamphlet put it.
Within government institutions, the pedagogy of enlightenment ran into
somewhat different problems. First, bureaucrats rarely descended into dialogue around
sex selection with village women, leaving community health workers to “go to people in
their villages and make them understand,” in the IT officer’s words. But the social
embeddedness that positioned Anganwadi and ASHA Workers to best converse frankly
with “beneficiaries” made it exceedingly unlikely that they could or would parrot official
IEC discourses about selective reproduction. As many told me, they understood how
people felt—commonsensically, given the shared moral economy of gender-kinship—
and would hardly presume to lecture people with supposedly transformative but
practically out-of-touch declarations. The absence of Beti Bachāvo exchanges between
community health workers and their neighbors reveals how constructions of backward
mentality crumbled in the face of shared recognition that “backwardness,” if it could be
called that, pervaded the moral world. When officers from the block health office came to
speak, women listened quietly, with social distance and deferential silence preserving the
fragile illusion of an enlightening encounter. The bureaucrats could fulfill official duties,
temporarily suspending their own intimate knowledge of the kinship and fertility
pressures that drove families to SD and selective abortion.
Second, efforts to “enlighten” people into accepting girls conflicted with the
state’s own family planning and population control rationalities. Contrary to what the
backwardness model might suggest, families pursuing sex selection were already acting
as modern reproductive subjects.22 There existed a tension between the general promotion
of gender-neutral antinatalism and Beti Bachāvo’s promotion of gender-specific
pronatalism.
As indicated by the IT officer and IEC officer’s references to monghvāri, fertility
decline, and population control, government functionaries could readily recognize sex
selection as a family planning mechanism. But the state could not acknowledge as much
22
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without undermining one of its projects. Official discourse resolved the contradiction by
endorsing each project independently of the other: daughter acceptance without reference
to number of children, family planning without reference to gender. For instance, public
messaging on the fence around the Mahesana Block Health Office juxtaposed two
potentially contradictory slogans: “Small Family, Full Progress: Two Children Is
Enough” and “Stop Stribhrunhatyā, Celebrate Daughters.” Discourses, incentive
programs, service offerings, and legal provisions (such as exclusion of people with more
than two children from certain public positions) aggressively promoted a two-child norm,
while anti-sex selection programming discouraged families from taking steps to ensure
they reached the (male) end of reproduction within two births. The failure to address the
crucial and obvious tension-producing factor—son necessity—was part of what led so
many families to characterize Beti Bachāvo as a program out of touch with genderkinship realities.
Unbound by the same constraints as the state, citizens often refashioned
discourses around sex selection and population control to portray the former as a support
to the latter. While denouncing the selective abortion of potential girls, some obstetricians
bluntly stated that it did decrease the future number of “factories for generating children.”
Like Jiten-bhai and Sagar-bhai, many sex selection clients explicitly constructed the
practice as a method of “control” that ensured people “don’t just keep popping out kids.”
Characterization of both high fertility and sex selection as insufficiently modern
behaviors filtered into everyday life as part of broader contradictory discourses around
the backwardness of certain classes, communities, or regions. Early in my fieldwork, a
middle-aged neighbor asked why I had come from the U.S. to Gujarat. After I provided a
brief summary of my research aims, he nodded and said, “Let me explain it to you. The
issue here is education. The people who do bhrunhatyā are uneducated. They can’t
extract their minds from social orthodoxy.”
Perhaps seeing from my face that I was about to challenge his account, he
preemptively raised a hand and clarified, “So these people are either uneducated, or
they’re educated people who make themselves uneducated! Get it?” A he went on his
way, I thought of his daughter and son-in-law—both holders of master’s degrees—whose
SD from several months earlier his wife had quietly disclosed to me.
Almost a year later, the same neighbor and I sat lounging on a pair of plastic
chairs in our neighborhood’s common plot, relishing the occasional wisps of post-sunset
breeze. After asking about my research progress, he waited for only a sentence of
response before interjecting with a five-minute disquisition on how last rites and property
inheritance made people desire a son. He then continued:
This is most so among people who are ignorant, uneducated. See, I live in
the city, I’m educated, so I’ll believe that if I have a daughter, my son and
daughter are equal—just as Narendra Modi says. But in the village, where
people are ignorant, where there’s zero awareness—there, it’ll take the
government a long time to bring awareness. In some parts of Bihar or
U.P., there’s not even the most basic educational infrastructure. How can
the government bring awareness to even a 90% level? See, what happens
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is that people don’t have any schooling, so then they believe, ‘Chhokaro
joie’—as an heir, to perform the rites, to keep the house open. So then
they do this.
He arched his eyebrows, apparently seeking my acknowledgement.
I began saying that the population statistics widely circulating in public media
located the highest levels of sex selection in the most educated states; that urban areas
exhibited higher levels than rural areas; and that the practice’s prevalence rose rather than
falling with education. Before I could complete my explanation, he nodded and
interrupted:
Yes, yes! There’s a reason for that. The educated class has awareness: ‘I
should have just two kids. If I bring home more than two, then many
difficulties will arise—clothing, feeding, raising them. And if it’s a
daughter, at least 1,000,000 in cost, inevitably.’ If I have one daughter, I’ll
plan to give everything else to my son after marrying her off. But if I have
two-three daughters, then the costs’ll increase accordingly...
Whereas in the village, the totally ignorant, totally uneducated—
they’ll think it’s no problem: ‘The child’ll bring its own fortune.’ It’s no
problem to them even if they have four-five-six-seven kids. So people like
that don’t do this. They don’t get sex testing done, and they don’t even
know it exists. And they don’t get abortion done. While among people like
us, if you already have one girl, a state of fear arises as soon as there’s a
second pregnancy: ‘Boy or girl?’ So among educated people, the
proportion’s higher for this reason!
“See,” he concluded, “city thinking and village thinking are different things altogether.”
Like many people I encountered, my neighbor constructed a “geography of
blame” for sex selection. Sex selection became a shifting signifier, differently connoting
ignorant tradition and rational modernity based on where it was located. Like most, my
neighbor began by locating the problem elsewhere, in a place or class ostensibly beset by
backwardness: Bihar and U.P., which were so poor; Rajasthan, which historically
displayed such “male-dominance”; Punjab, Haryana, and central Gujarat, which had such
high dowries; Kutch and Saurashtra, which had unpredictable agriculture and social
“orthodoxy”; the Thakors and Scheduled Castes, who put their children to work; the
Chaudharys and Rabaris, who paid brideprice and so “don’t really appreciate girls”; the
Rajputs, who stuck stubbornly to their old martial ways; the uneducated, who simply did
not know better. If evidence revealed a lower prevalence of selective reproduction in the
designated community, the backward-modern evaluations could remain the same, with
simple inversion of the signifier: the others were so ignorant that they did not practice sex
selection, failing to act as responsible reproductive subjects within the national project of
population control.
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But if high fertility represented one threat to local, state-level, and countrywide
biopolitical management, what of sex selection? How did the gender-selective family
planning represent a threat to populations?

The Imbalanced Population
“Because We Didn’t Let Daughters Be Born”
“In 2014, thirty-nine boys and seventeen girls!”
Seated behind a long table, backed by a large banner, Hitesh-bhai thundered down
at the young and middle-aged women assembled before him. He apparently intended to
take a fire-and-brimstone approach to the “IEC function” in a village just south of
Mahesana.
“In your village, only seventeen girls against thirty-nine boys. Think hard about
it!” With this preface, the Hitesh-bhai launched into a fifteen-minute lecture about the
causes of bhrunhatyā, periodically pausing to remind the women, “This is why you make
your daughters-in-law go for the sonography! This is why you ask the doctor to take it
out!”
Shifting from causes to consequences, Hitesh-bhai softened his voice. “Now,” he
said, “let me give you an feample from my own village.” He drew out the ensuing words:
“In my village, seventeen men couldn’t find wives in their own communities! Listen up!”
He continued:
Seventeen men couldn’t find brides of their own caste. They tried-triedtried everywhere, but they couldn’t. Then they thought, let’s try
somewhere outside of Mahesana. They took a jeep and went around all of
North Gujarat, but they couldn’t find anyone to give them a wife.
So then they thought, let’s go somewhere outside. One man went
to Baroda and brought back an Adivasi woman. One man went to
Khedbhrama and brought back an Adivasi woman. Men from two families
went to Bharuch and brought back from there. Got it? Now all seventeen
men are married, and all the wives are from outside communities.
Sisters, now think of the situation that arises! What did these
outside wives do after arriving? You know how a daughter-in-law should
behave—can’t talk back to elders, must cover her head before elders.
What did these women do? They started wearing dresses! What do they
care? They started walking around the whole village in dresses! So then
what happens? If they’re my neighbors, then my daughter-in-law will also
think, ‘If the next-door lady wears a dress, why shouldn’t I?’
Beware! Our sanskār [culture, manners] are changing! Now,
daughters-in-law remain sitting on chairs and make their fathers-in-law sit
on the ground. Now, if you can’t even criticize your daughter-in-law
anymore, what can you do? Just sit there, right? Why did the
neighborhood’s sanskār go bad? Because they brought girls from outside.
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And why did they have to bring from outside? Because they
couldn’t find anyone in the community. And why couldn’t they find in the
community? Because we didn’t let daughters be born! Remember this. We
all did this—wished only for boys.
I can show you a village in Unjha subdistrict where there are three
women from the same family—from over there, the outside. One married
a Patel, one a barber, and the third a Thakor. Now imagine you are the
Patel family. If the barber’s wife comes to your house—they are sisters,
after all!—then you have to feed her, right? Now what kind of condition is
that, if you have to feed her? Think about it, sisters! What kind of situation
arises! There were all kinds of disputes—it’d look bad if they visited each
other, and bad if they didn’t (being sisters). Eventually, those families had
to leave the village!
So look. What’s the main reason for our social problems like this?
That we don’t let daughters be born. I say, as far as possible, welcome
whatever is born in your families. If it’s a girl, celebrate. And if it’s a boy,
join your hands and pray. Because tomorrow, people will be bidding on
girls. If you want to marry your sons, sisters, you will have to pay money!
The other thing is that if boys don’t find girls, then they’ll kidnap
our daughters when they’re out in public. You must know that cases like
that have begun, too. In the future, if there are fewer girls than boys, rape
and crime and all that’ll increase a lot.
“So,” Hitesh-bhai intoned gravely, “realize that it’s necessary for us to think this way—
‘We won’t do this anymore.’”
“Let’s Fulfill Our Social Responsibility”
Alongside the personified female fetus herself, the imbalanced population was a
key figure for rendering visible the existential threat to daughters in the Mahesana area.
Statistical and impressionistic renderings of “shortage” manifested sex selection as a
collective crisis with grave consequences for community, society, and nation. But
representations of skewed SRs frequently missed the mark by proposing population
balancing as a household desideratum, and they sometimes even reinforced the daughter
aversion they sought to rectify.
In an echo of colonial infanticide responses, government institutions, journalists,
activists, and common citizens constantly recirculated Census or Health Department SR
figures in attempts to capture the magnitude of the sex selection problem (much as I have
in this dissertation).23 Government posters, NGO pamphlets, newspaper articles, and
television news segments overflowed with numbers, graphs, and tables that emphasized
the drastic shortfall of girls. Political speeches, “awareness” events, and everyday
conversations abounded with references to population imbalance. As suggested by
Hitesh-bhai’s citation of a single village’s birth ratio during one year, such references did
23
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not always invoke India, Gujarat, or even Mahesana District as the relevant collective. In
targeted IEC efforts, government officials and NGO activists frequently presented highly
localized figures. Similarly, sub-caste organization leaders and publications frequently
used the results of community censuses to highlight the “missing girls” within their own
communities—an enterprise impossible for the state, given the lack of caste-specific
enumeration for all but a few groups since independence.24
Colonially and post-colonially, Indian governance has historically relied on
harnessing statistical knowledge to manage populations.25 In anti-sex selection efforts,
however, numbers did not merely support administrative interventions. Their
recirculation was aimed at enlightening an ignorant populace, eliciting affective
responses that would tie responsible subjects into the shared project of saving girls.
Quantitative demonstrations of the collective need to restore balance highlighted
how sex selection threatened social reproduction. Many printed materials juxtaposed
images of threatened daughters—for instance, an in utero infant being strangled by a
noose—with phrases like “Can you imagine a society without girls?” (See, for instance,
the advocacy book panel in Figure 4.) Local obstetricians widely displayed a
pharmaceutical company-provided “Glorifying Womanhood” leaflet (Figure 5), which
warned, “Woman Gives Birth to a Civilization: Save the Girl Child. Those Killing Girls
in the Womb—Wake Up!” Many posters and essays caution that stribhrunhatyā would
“destroy lineage, community, village, country, and nation!” In an echo of the fact that
India’s social contract was always premised on a domestic sexual contract,
representations of population imbalance concretized threats to social continuity at various
levels, from the household through the caste community and all the way to the national
polity.
Warnings regarding “shortage of girls” and its consequences often veered in a
decidedly masculinist direction by focusing on “all the men who can’t find wives.” In
fact, the marriage crisis was perhaps the single most frequently cited negative
consequence of population imbalance.26 Essays and poems with titles like “The Anguish
of the Unmarried” excoriated “those committing stribhrunhatyā” for reducing the supply
of future brides. Printed materials and IEC events like the abovementioned routinely
depicted marriage prospects as the chief reason to correct skewed SRs. Daughters became
valuable primarily for their circulation as daughters-in-law.
Whether implicitly or explicitly, invocations of marriage crisis always tapped into
anxieties about caste and class mixing. In instances like Hitesh-bhai’s IEC lecture, the
incitation to alarm appeared quite explicitly. Explaining his own use of the same tactic,
activist Bipin-bhai said:
When I go to the village level, I emphasize how we have to pay attention
to certain grave social consequences that are emerging because the sex
ratio is decreasing. For instance, the social mixing taking place. What will
24
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its outcome be after fifty years? There was recently a report on the BBC—
you may have seen it, too—that the arrival and mixing of people from
many different communities has led to changes in the DNA of the local
people in DNA. So I highlight that kind of thing: how the situation is very
bad, with Gujarati Patel men having to bring in Surati women—
Adivasis—and how illiterate and college graduate are marrying one
another.
For example, if I go to a Navratri function at the village level, the
Adivasi brides—fifteen, twenty-five, however many—will always be
dancing garbā together. And you immediately know, okay, this village
has this many girls from outside. Their clothes and accessories are nice,
like ours, but from their dance style, you immediately know they’re
outsiders. So I highlight this, too: how is your community changing
because of these tribal women, and what will this cause after fifty years?27
Bipin-bhai added that he also informed villagers about how skewed SRs were driving
local bachelors to frequent commercial sex workers and consequently raising rates of
HIV infection. In this, too, saving girls became largely about benefitting men who would
otherwise find themselves “with no choice”—as many government officials and activists
put it—but to violate sexual boundaries.
In keeping with the state’s broader silence around many issues of community
reproduction, caste- and class-based rationalities never appeared explicitly in printed
materials decrying skewed SRs. But as should be apparent from Bipin-bhai’s approach,
or from Hitesh-bhai’s parable of the three sisters, anxieties regarding social
miscegenation lurked just below the surface of official discourses, often bursting forth in
the everyday practices that made governance palpable. Even without allegorical
illustrations like Hitesh-bhai’s, citizens readily understood the subtext in bland official
lines like “Many men are now unable to find brides in their own communities.”
When governance discourses focused on SR balancing for the sake of women
themselves, the argument often rested on alarming visions of a future filled with violent
27
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bachelors. Like Hitesh-bhai in the village, many government functionaries warned that
gender imbalance portended rampant rape, kidnapping, and sexual harassment. Such
warnings often exerted frankly counterproductive effects. Many couples seeking SD and
selective abortion justified the practices with reference to governmental and nongovernmental representations of dystopian futures. With the jamāno becoming everworse due to the shortage of girls, they argued, it would be grow even more difficult to
protect young daughters from sexual violence; better, then, to not gather more than one.
This paradox—the reinforcement of sex selection motivations through arguments
ostensibly targeted at eroding them—reflected a fundamental contradiction at the heart of
governance institutions’ balance-centered arguments. In presenting aggregate SRs as
motivations and targets for combating sex selection, the state and NGOs asked families to
subordinate household balancing to population balancing. The biopolitical imperative
became one of reproductive sacrifice—of heroically enduring the experience of parenting
multiple girls for the sake of abstract population-level numbers. Beti Bachāvo materials
and performances frequently voiced calls for parents to accept a social responsibility to
produce daughters. As in Hitesh-bhai’s IEC session, skewed SRs became the grounds for
exhorting women to “let girls be born.” A banner hanging on the wall during the District
Health Office’s Daughter Day celebration made the demand explicit: “Let’s Stop
Stribhrunhatyā. Let’s Fulfill Our Social Responsibility.” Numerous pamphlets and other
printed materials placed images of scales alongside lines like “Bid farewell to your boycraziness! A girl is an inalienable, necessary part of society” (Figure 6).
But population-level rationales ultimately gained very limited traction with
couples desperate to obtain the necessary son while limiting fertility. The problem lay in
a fundamental feature of the moral economy of gender-kinship. The daughter’s inevitable
alienation made her an externality for her piyar—the reproductive labor of birthing and
raising her eventually benefitted another household (and society at large), but not the
parents themselves.28 A government nurse at one of the local public health facilities
explained of her attempts to prevail upon people with “balance” arguments:
People understand: my son is not going to get married by my having a
daughter! A little while back, a beneficiary came to me and said she
wanted to ‘get a check.’ Now, she was uneducated, so I couldn’t directly
talk about ratio. Instead, I said, ‘Sister, if we don’t keep girls, boys will be
left unmarried in the future.
Well, she said, ‘Ben, how is my son going to marry by my having
a daughter? My daughter will let someone else’s son marry! Why should I
keep birthing-birthing-birthing girls for someone else?’
So honestly, we don’t get too involved in the hassle of trying to
make them understand. We can explain the ratio thing—that the
government’s created this law to preserve balance in society. But each and
every person will say the same thing: ‘No more girls at my house. To
preserve balance, let them be born at my neighbor’s!’
28
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And people have their answers ready: in the community, so-andso’s girl was raped, and so-and-so’s daughter’s getting beaten, and so-andso’s in-laws threw her out of the house. What’s a daughter’s life like?
What’s the point of having a girl?
So in the end, we end up getting an earful. And before, there were
rapes even though there were lots of girls. Now that there are fewer girls,
the incidents will increase. And people think, ‘If this is happening, let’s
not have girls. So it increases even more!’
The nurse’s comments reveal how SR-based appeals fell flat. They failed to acknowledge
the disjuncture between household-level and community-level balance, as well as a
gender-kinship system that made daughters always-already to-be-alienated from the
moment of their recognition. There prevailed a collective action problem not unlike the
Prisoner’s Dilemma. Families could control only their own reproductive behavior; the
social environment into which children entered remained largely exogenous. With
additional daughters doing little to enhance a son’s marriage prospects within a genderskewed population—and perhaps embodying a particularly challenging burden of care
within that population—families saw little reason to go along with the imperative to
balance out SRs.

The Threatened Daughter
“The Anguish of an Unborn Daughter”
During a two-month stretch of fieldwork, a great many neighbors, friends, and
patient families—some of whom had pursued sex selection, some of whom had not—
showed me a clip that had gone viral among Mahesana-area users of Whatsapp and
Facebook. Dozens of times, I watched the same impressively steady video of third-grader
delivering a fiery speech at a large family reunion. Her red-gloved hands gripped the
microphone as she began, “My topic today is stribhrunhatyā. Today, I will tell you the
anguish of an unborn daughter—a letter from an unborn daughter to her mother.” Then,
her hands began gesticulating as she declaimed with feeling:
I am happy, and I pray to God that you all remain happy, too. I am
writing this letter because I have heard some astounding news that’s left
me trembling from head to toe. Oh, Ma, you must remember me, right? Of
course. Because since you rejected me, you must be the one remembering
me the most, moment to moment.
Oh, Ma! In ancient times, a daughter was considered auspicious.
Today, you have considered me inauspicious. But hear me out. Oh, Ma!
You pushed me away before I could even enter this world. Didn’t you
even think about the fact that this was supposed to be my one chance for
incarnation after passing through 84,000 avatārs? You took that away
from me in just one second. Oh, Ma! I wanted to come see the beautiful
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world, to know it. But you, for your own happiness, shattered all my
hopes.
What, is a boy everything? Isn’t a daughter a bed of tulsi? Oh, for
all you people, a girl is just a snake-like burden. But remember, Ma: a
home without a daughter is like a body without a soul!
Oh, Ma. I am a girl. You must have found out, and that’s why you
are stopping my innocent self from taking birth. Hearing this, I have no
faith left. Oh, my tenderhearted Ma—how can you do this to me? How
can you bear to have butchered the delicate body of the dear little daughter
growing in your womb?
Ma, just say once that everything I have heard is wrong. I am
terrified. My hands are so delicate that I can’t even tug your sari hard as
you go toward the doctor’s clinic. My shoulders are so thin and weak that
I can’t even embrace you. The medicine you want to take to kill me will
impose so much suffering on my tiny body! Dear Ma, it will cause me so
much pain. You will not even be able to watch how cruelly this medicine
will kill me in your womb—how cruelly the doctor’s hammer will break
my skull into pieces—how his scissors will cut up my fragile arms and
legs. Ma, if you had seen this image, you would never have thought of
doing this—never even thought of it!
Ma, save me! Have mercy—save me. This medicine will make me
slip out of your body like a bar of soap from wet hands.
Ma, I am writing this letter because I do not even have a voice yet.
Who would I tell, and how? I really want to be born, Ma. I want to dance
on your doorstep, play in your loving lap. Do not worry—I will not
increase your costs. Do not buy me an anklet; I will wear the old anklets
too small for my elder sister. I will cover my body with old clothes too
small for my brother.
But Ma, just once, give me the chance to come out of your belly
and live life under the star-filled sky. Let me see the pleasures of God’s
creation. I am your dear little daughter, your princess. Let me into your
home.
Ma, if I were a son, you would accept me. So what is my flaw? Is
it because of dowry that you don’t love me? No, no—do not fear dowry.
This is all a maze. You make an effort, I will make an effort; after growing
up, I will support myself, and dowry will not be a big deal. Watch, Ma—I
will have mehndi on my hands, and wedding music playing, and I will be
like a bird of your garden and fly away. Don’t make me fly away
prematurely.
Ma, I want your love. Is it appropriate to sacrifice an innocent
daughter for a son? The sin will accrue to only you and that son of yours!
Don’t ever let it happen, Ma. Oh Ma—beloved Ma—please just let me be
born. Don’t kill me. Let me blossom like a rose in your garden. Don’t
make me wither.

303

Yet who knows why?! Today, in this male-dominant society, in the
face of gender rules and mentalities, women who have accepted defeat and
set aside their weapons. Or perhaps in the scramble to for maleness—in
bhrunhatyā—they have donned the armor of derangement. What, have
you lost faith in your own shakti [power]? Do you not have confidence in
your own beloved daughter? Fie on women’s power, fie on the mother
doing stribhrunhatyā, and fie on her motherhood! For as far I know, no
man or doctor would dare to touch a woman’s belly without her
permission or will.
A daughter is Lakshmi! A thousand splendid suns pale before the
brightness of a daughter. This beloved role is daughter. A mother is a
stream of parental love, a father is a stream of love—but a daughter is an
ocean of love! A daughter ties everyone—grandparents, parents,
brothers—with a bond of love, and that’s why when she goes to her sāsri,
everyone weeps. A daughter is a father’s world, a mother’s support, a
brother’s love. The one who embodies this triad is a daughter... A son is a
father’s hand, but a daughter is his heart. A daughter is society’s wealth,
and life without a daughter is incomplete.
Preserve respect for a daughter in society! Never get diagnosis
done to know gender!
From the final crescendo, the red-gloved girl segued into a brief song expressing many of
the same sentiments, which she dramatized by vocally and physically miming tears.
The speech captured imaginations. Couples uninvolved in sex selection used it to
demonstrate how people “should” feel. Government officials pointed to it as a sign of
how widely people “accepted” the message of Beti Bachāvo. Obstetricians highlighted it
as a sign that “people’s mentalities are changing.” And families pursuing sex selection
sometimes invoked it simply to acknowledge that they knew what they were doing to be
wrong.
“The Right to Be Born”: Personifying Gendered Fetal Citizens
The red-gloved girl’s speech exemplifies attempts to make visible the threatened
daughter herself. Perhaps more than any other component of sex selection governance,
such attempts originated not only from formal state and non-governmental institutions,
but also from nodes scattered throughout society. Representations by essayists, visual
artists, schoolchildren, poets, journalists, dramatists, and others joined government and
NGO messages in constructing the female fetus as a full-fledged person with vibrant
subjectivity, thick kinship ties, and moral standing. Appeals for recognition, often
ventriloquized through the potential daughter herself, aimed to harness affects of love and
guilt toward acceptance of girls. But as in the virally circulating video, the valorization of
girls often reinscribed them within the very system of gender-kinship regularities that
made parents find them burdensome. Representations of the threatened daughter
ultimately remained out-of-touch with their targets’ subjectivities, invoking affective
elements of the moral economy while ignoring the realities of reproductive decision-
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making within that moral economy. Ironically, apart from making parents feel guilty
about an action they would nonetheless undertake, the biggest impact of personifying the
threatened daughter may have been to inadvertently generate and publicize anti-abortion
messages that jeopardized already-tenuous respect for women’s reproductive rights.
Beti Bachāvo posters frequently combined images of young girls with emotional
appeals to prospective parents. One typical poster hanging in the Mahesana Block Health
Office (Figure 7)—variations of which cropped up ubiquitously—juxtaposed a smiling,
preciously posed girl with the lines:
Stop and think! Isn’t innocent laughter on your doorstep dear to you?
Stribhrunhatyā—in the end, it’s the destruction of lineage, community,
village, country, and all creation! What if our mother had also been killed
in the belly? Stop stribhrunhatyā, celebrate daughters...”
Many other posters simularly used the trope of “innocent laughter” to personify and
sentimentalize the imagined daughter. A floor-to-ceiling English-language poster in the
HFWD’s main Gandhinagar office (Figure 8) made the appeal even more explicit,
captioning a girl’s face with the words “Do these eyes full of feelings and the innocent
face discourage you from committing female feticide? Prevent female feticide and save
daughters.”
These posters highlight the extent to which public representations personified the
female fetus. Personification often extended to creating for the daughter-to-be a fullfledged subjectivity and a will to live. Anti-sex selection poems often echoed the redgloved girl by giving voice to the imagined daughter, allowing her to directly express
feelings to potential parents (or more often, the pregnant woman alone): I want to see the
world. I want to bring my relatives happiness. I want to play with you. I won’t burden
you. I am part of you. Let me live. Official Beti Bachāvo posters emphasized the same
themes. One (Figure 9) superimposed an image of a frolicking mother-daughter pair with
a verse expressing hope and requesting hope: “Small and delicate is my mind/ A few
dreams, a few hopes/ Ma, I just want your support/ Then I will take wing and fly on my
own.” Personification collapsed future and present, discursively actualizing the female
fetal subject’s potentiality by rendering her as a fully formed person with a clear voice,
firm desires, and a recognizable body. The accompanying images of infants and girls, like
the red-gloved girl’s excruciating references to bodily weakness, corporealized the
potential girl as a recognizable human being, essentially fast-forwarding her
development. Governance messaging thus attempted to pull the fetal person out of
liminality and into full existence.
In some cases, the discourse of personification reached the point of explicitly
granting the potential girl a right to life. One HFWD pamphlet, whose contents the Indian
Medical Association’s Mahesana branch repackaged as a sign for display in obstetric
clinics, bore the title “A Daughter Also Has the Right to Be Born: Do Not Stop a
Daughter from Taking Birth by Committing the Sin of Stribhrunhatyā.” Similarly, a page
from an anti-sex selection book featured an image of an infant and mother, sandwiched
by a quote: “Don’t kill me in the womb... I have a right to be born.” Assertions of a right
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to be born represented a logical extension of a broader discourse that transformed
potential daughters into rights-bearing fetal citizens, subject to state recognition and
protection.
As has been observed for campaigns in several Indian settings, the heavy-handed
personification of female fetuses ultimately led to “mixed messages” about abortion, with
anti-sex selection messages often becoming anti-abortion messages.29 The public
reception of the profligately used terms stribhrunhatyā and “female foeticide” obscured
distinctions between sex-selective abortion and killing, reciprocally reinforcing the
notions of sin discussed in Chapter 5. Government and NGO posters, IEC lectures,
pamphlets, popular writing, and everyday talk positioned sex selection as pāp or
mahāpāp—a “great sin.” Murals, drawings, and other artwork condemned the practice
through grisly images of death and murder: fetal silhouettes juxtaposed with tiny
skeletons (Figure 10), nooses around the necks of in utero infants (Figure 4), giant fists
gruesomely crushing fetuses, and knives stabbing a globe full of girls’ faces, with hands
reaching up from below (Figure 11). Written materials referred to parents “killing” their
future daughters, frequently dramatizing the point by providing embryological
descriptions of “life before birth” or narrating “the unborn girl’s screams” during
abortion. Many informational pamphlets and books from NGOs unequivocally declared
abortion murder and listed out (often exaggerated) dangers to women during and after the
procedure. As in the seminal 2005 function at Unjha (discussed in Chapter 1), anti-sex
selection events and texts continued to make ample use of explicitly anti-abortion media
such as Bernard Nathanson’s film Silent Scream; Chief Minister Anandi-ben Patel, in an
earlier speech to the Gujarat Legislative Assembly, even referenced the Silent Scream at
length in order to graphically portray abortion as a gruesome and brutal practice. Though
nominally restricted to the denunciation of sex-selective reproduction, recirculations of
(largely American) anti-choice literature leaked pervasively, leading people to frame all
abortions in its terms. Just as stribhrunhatyā became simply bhrunhatyā, condemnation
of sex selection slipped into condemnation of all pregnancy termination. Given the
always-tenuous legal and social recognition for women’s right to access abortion, antiabortion discourse—which helped create the context for the serious refusals detailed in
Chapter 1—represented an instance of “violations by the state in the very act of
combating sex selection.”30
In a related instance, representations of the threatened daughter’s impending
murder disproportionately assigned pregnant women the burden of guilt for sex selection.
As typified by the red-gloved girl’s speech—structured around twenty direct addresses to
“Ma” and culminating in excoriation of pregnant women as uniquely culpable for
stribhrunhatyā—pleas voiced through or on behalf of personified female fetuses
specifically aimed to elicit feelings of love and anticipatory remorse in prospective
mothers. Ideally, knowledge of the unborn girl’s subjectivity would provoke protective
attitudes in “Mother,” who would then heroically parlay those affective orientations into
behavior that saved the future daughter. Posters, poems, and performances frequently
29
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took the form of direct appeals to pregnant women, with titles and tag-lines like “Unborn
Dream,” “Let Me See the Light of the World,” ”Letter from a Daughter in Heaven,” “Cry
to My Pregnant Mother,” and “Tell Me Why, Ma.” They sometimes literally demonized
mothers who sought SD and selective abortion, describing them as “merciless,”
“ferocious,” or “worse than monsters.” The singling out of pregnant women found its
justification in orthodox norms of maternality, with letters from unborn daughters and
other representations emphasizing a mother’s role as “the epitome of love and sacrifice,”
“the incarnation of parental affection,” or “a household’s heart” (versus the father, who
was its “head”).31 After personifying threatened daughters, anti-sex selection messages
assigned pregnant women the primary responsibility for heroically enforcing a female
fetus’s right to birth—despite the fact that selective reproduction was a familially and
socially embedded practice, as other programming readily acknowledged. Again, women
became responsible for heroically overcoming structural inequalities through the sheer
force of their own wills.
“Celebrate Daughters”: Negating Unequal Destinies
Public representations personifying the female fetus frequently missed their mark
because of a failure to acknowledge what gendered personhood meant within the local
moral economy of gender-kinship. Some posters, pamphlets, articles, and IEC sessions
highlighted that potential daughters might bring their parents renown by becoming
exceptional heroes. The three most commonly cited examples were Indira Gandhi,
Mother Theresa, and the American astronaut Sunita Williams, whose father hailed from a
village in Mahesana District. In fact, Williams and her father even appeared at a 2012
Beti Bachāvo event in Kadi. The latter beseeched the gathered women to “imagine what
would have happened if we had aborted the foetus knowing that it was a girl, like so
many people do here.” The astronaut herself told the audience, “When I sit in a
helicopter, the helicopter does not know whether I am a woman or a man. The spacesuit I
wear does not know whether I am a girl or a boy. Why should you allow the society to
limit you by the virtue of your sex? Limitations are only in your mind.” She later told the
Times of India, “It is hard for me to fathom that people can do such a thing... I just can’t
understand this skewed thinking. It is so unfortunate but, as an American, it is hard for
me to relate to this problem.” The commentary from Williams and her father exemplified
state and NGO efforts to ride backward women, families, and communities of their
narrow mentalities, which were configured as the only barriers to true gender equality.
Unfortunately, with their focus on the exceptional, such efforts often failed to
resonate with the everyday. To be sure, representations of alternative destinies
incrementally refashioned local gender imaginaries, and couples content with only girls
cited them in explaining a personal indifference to son necessity. But an activist
summarized the majority of reactions I heard when he wearily said:
People don’t look at the fact that Indira Gandhi was prime minister, or that
the head of the ruling party is a woman. They look at what’s going on
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next-door to them. No one thinks, ‘Let me make my daughter an Indira, or
a Mother Theresa, or a Sunita.’ They think, so-and-so’s daughter is being
harassed, and so-and-so’s was thrown out, and so-and-so’s was killed.
Those are the main thoughts.
While providing alternative imaginative possibilities, representations of exceptional
women often failed to modify anxious “horizoning”32 rooted in everyday experiences of
the gender-kinship system.
The same dynamic undermined the imperative to “Celebrate Daughters.” The
incorporation of the “Beti Vadhāvo” mandate into Beti Bachāvo efforts since 2008 meant
the rise of various forms of felicitation for parents of daughters. Government and NGO
functions included public recognition of families who had ceased childbearing with only
daughters. Caste organizations publicized the births of girls—especially second girls—
among their members and bestowed gifts on behalf of the community. A rapidly
proliferating genre of poems and folksongs condensed and expanded the shared language
for celebrating newborn daughters. And various institutions delivered letters, cards, or
plaques to felicitate parents of infant girls for “welcoming” them.
While well intentioned, such efforts sometimes diverged from the affective
experiences of the parents actually receiving more daughters. A government nurse said of
one initiative:
The district’s come out with cards. We’re supposed to go give
congratulations to all the households who have had girls in the past year.
Now, what congratulations can we possibly give to those who have fivesix girls? It’s like throwing ghee on the fire! Even with two. Another
daughter is born, and we go tell them it’s a matter of joy—seriously?! We
got the cards to the people who were supposed to get them, but what
congratulations are there to give?
The mandatory celebrations often conflicted with families’ everyday understandings of
what an additional daughter meant.
The dissonance between institutional glorification and household despondency
reflected a broader disjuncture inherent to the array of celebratory gestures, slogans,
oaths, and other public performances of the threatened daughter’s value. In Orwellian
fashion, posters and billboards insisted on negating moral-economic realities through
straightforward statements to the contrary: “A Daughter Is Not a Lifelong Burden, but an
Avatar of Lakshmi.” “Sons and Daughters Are Equal.” Various public functions, from
gol gatherings to IEC seminars to medical association meetings, featured full-throated
recitation of anti-sex selection oaths from gathered citizens: Today, I vow that I will stop
stribhrunhatyā from happening in my household, family, community, village, or city!”
“Beti Bachāvo, Beti Vadhāvo, Beti Padhāvo!” State and NGO speakers often instructed
groups of women to raise their hands and declare that “women’s power” was “unlimited,”
32
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and that “no one can stop it”—such that pregnant women, if they wished, could
singlehandedly end sex selection. In striving to manifest (and thereby materialize) the
threatened female fetus’s value through pure enunciation, such affective performances
perpetuated a head-in-the-sand approach to the disconnect between governance
discourses and lived experiences of gender-kinship.
“Erroneous Son-Daughter Notions”: Reinscribing Fetal Subjects in the Moral
Economy
At the same time, the governance of affect treaded also proved problematic when
it hewed to the prevailing moral-economic order in situating potential daughters. In
valorizing threatened daughters with reference to the same social structure that made
them threatening to families, public discourses inadvertently but powerfully reiterated the
hegemony of son necessity and daughter aversion.33 Put differently, they directly and
indirectly reinforced the very “tradition” from which backward families were supposed to
emerge in becoming modern, daughter-loving subjects.
Like the red-gloved girl’s speech, many messages emphasized affective
constructions of girls—“an ocean of love,” “the father’s heart,” “the embodiment of good
culture”—that emphasized their contradistinction to boys. Popular writings condemning
sex selection often presented extensive binary listings that symbolically reiterated the
moral-economic inequalities undergirding daughter dispensability, with “son:daughter”
becoming roofbeam:threshold, support:subservience, medicine:prayer, narrative:poetry,
hand:heart, lineage:part, word:melody, and so on; in each case, a girl represented
something pleasant but ultimately less essential or instrumentally useful than her brother.
Anti-sex selection discourses thus isolated superficially positive valuations from the
gender-kinship order while ignoring or reinforcing the inequalities associated with such
valuations.
In some cases, affective appeals actually emphasized the eventual alienation that
made additional daughters unwanted. IEC officers, caste leaders, and writers cited the
Gujarati adage “A daughter brightens two households,” reinscribing girls as inevitably
separated even while ostensibly valorizing them. Religious sermons, popular essays, and
fanciful poems attempted to underscore a daughter’s value by describing the sorrow
parents, families, and entire communities felt on bidding them farewell after marriage—
ignoring how the argument, though applicable to existing daughters with whom bonds of
love had already formed, only underlined the pain associated with imagined daughters.
Echoing discourses around backward families and population imbalance, some messages
situated sex selection within a field of misogynistic practices such as dowry, in-law
harassment, sexual teasing, and widespread rape, thereby reminding parents of the
dangers of bringing girls into a threatening environment.
In other cases, public representations of the threatened daughter advocated for
saving her on the basis of her value to men and a male-dominated social order.34 One
33
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exemplary poem—“Where Will You Get Them?”—emphasized future women’s
importance vis-a-vis men: bearers of joy for fathers, fulfillers of ritual obligations for
brothers, dutiful spouses for husbands, producers of grandchildren for lineages, and
bringers of good fortune and character for households. Again, the valorizations
highlighted roles that were pleasant-but-dispensable or else useful for others,
subordinating women to masculinist imperatives while glossing over how they
represented lost labor and value for natal households. Other messages extended the
instrumentalization of threatened daughters even further, focusing primarily on their
identity as future childbearers. As in Figure 5, many pedantically pointed out that women
gave birth to “civilization,” “society,” or “all of creation.” Some imposed an even more
masculinist inflection on the configuration of threatened daughters as valuable wombs,
stating how “great men” also came from women; for example, one Beti Bachāvo poster
(Figure 14) paired a young woman’s partly concealed face with the warning: “I could be
the mother of a future Gandhi, Sardar, Tagore, or Bhagat Singh waiting in the womb. The
arch supporting life’s relations: son-daughter are equal. Do not participate in the sin of
stribhrunhatyā.” Here, the female fetus’s value lay not in her potential to become an
exemplary woman in her own right, but in her capacity to bear an inevitably masculine
national hero.
One might say that representations valorizing potential girls according to standard
moral-economic tropes missed their mark precisely because the target audience already
had daughters. On the one hand, sex selection clients found exhortations to love girls
unnecessary, for they very much loved their existing ones. On the other, they found little
in such exhortations to change their reasoning around the pragmatic exigencies of family
planning—alienation, possession, fertility limitation, cost, care, support, and
recognition—that made one son imperative and rendered additional girls undesirable.
Families pursuing sex selection passionately quoted poems, folksongs, sermons,
government messages, and other texts extolling the virtues of daughters. In a particularly
poignant example, several couples who had opted for selective abortion recited or played
a recording of the same passage from a speech by the religious leader Morari Bapu:
In my view, mother-father are the epitome of affection. But daughter is
the epitome of compassion. She leaves behind affection and goes to her
husband’s home. The site of her affection changes, but her compassion
remains intact. And in my experience, her compassion for her father,
especially, is very great.
A daughter endures all of life’s incidents by her own politeness
and the virtues her parents have inculcated. She suffers them. But if
anything happens to her father, it’s always intolerable for her. If someone
tells her, ‘Your father’s in poor health’—well, only the daughter knows
her sad condition.
My understanding is that... the son is his father’s hand, but the
daughter is his heart. Indeed, that’s why, when a father gives a daughter’s
hand in the son-in-law’s hand during kanyādān, in terms of affection, he
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is giving away his heart itself. This is why our great folk poet Dadu-bhai
has said of the experience, ‘A piece of my heart slipped out of my hand.’
Upon sending a daughter away, a father ages several years; that’s
the experience, and people observe it, too. But when that same daughter
comes from her sāsri to meet the father, he again looks the age he is. And
he runs throughout the town—‘My child is here!’...
A young daughter becomes a mother to her elderly father. Just as
a mother feeds her children, cares for them, et cetera—the daughter bears
the same sentiments toward her father. Therefore, the father of a daughter
is never bowed.
The same passage circulated widely in Beti Bachāvo-associated programming. And when
parents read or showed it to me, it frequently brought tears to their eyes. But where antisex selection advocates framed the message as a statement on why girls were valuable
and should not be “killed in the womb,” families often framed it as an encapsulation of
how girls were precious but nonetheless—or therefore—had to be rejected. Where
governance discourses ultimately foregrounded Morari Bapu’s affective emphasis on
love and value, parents foregrounded the practical realities he indexed: the pain of
compulsory separation, suffering in the sāsri, and the rarity and fleetingness of
opportunities for a daughter to actually care for her parents. Everyday experience
suggested that the parents of daughters—and especially those of only daughters—were
all-too-often bowed. Where anti-sex selection messaging performed a bait-and-switch by
reinscribing female fetuses within a patriarchal system and then enjoining parents to
“Reject Erroneous Son-Daughter Notions [and] Let Daughters Be Born” (Figure 15),
parents routinely circled back to how material arrangements made the reasoning behind
prenatal discrimination far from “erroneous.”
“Women’s Empowerment” and Beyond
The discursive tendencies described in this chapter echo far beyond Mahesana. In
an analysis of China’s Care for Girls campaign, Lisa Eklund has observed many of the
same patterns: heavy reliance on performative slogans, valorization tactics that reinscribe
women into patriarchal structures, marked stigmatization of son desire as backward,
assignment of blame for sex selection to the rural and the traditional, and a disjuncture
between hopeful talk and gender-kinship realities.35 I suspect critical studies elsewhere in
India, or in other contexts of anti-sex selection activism, would likely replicate these
findings.
As many government officials and activists told me, “Beti Bachāvo can only do
so much.” For some of them, anti-sex selection discourse fulfilled its purpose if it people
were “aware” and felt guilty about pursuing SD and selective abortion. Issue-specific
campaigns could “create an atmosphere” (many pointed to the “selfie-with-daughter”
trend Narendra Modi encouraged), but diminishment of sex selection would ultimately
rest on “social change.”
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The definition of social change varied considerably. Reproducing families, noting
news reports of financial incentive schemes cropping up in other states, often expressed
the hope that Gujarat’s government would start assuming some of the financial
responsibility for the daughters it constantly encouraged its citizens to bear. The husband
of a Nandini patient who had twice undergone selective abortion remarked to me as we
played with his five-year-old daughter:
Look, there’s only one opinion to be had in all of this. If there is one
daughter, and with a second, the government assumes her costs—with a
third, the government assumes her costs—then, if you don’t get it looked
at, it’s fine. But if we’re the ones who have to spend the money, then it’s a
different matter. The root cause of people getting a test, getting it looked
at, is this—so much spending behind a girl! And not just money: taking
care of her, educating her, thinking about what kind of sāsri she’ll find,
what’ll happen—all of this worrying about the future. So if I have one girl,
and I have a second, and the government assumes her cost; I have a third,
and the government assumes her cost; then, my fourth is a boy, and I
assume all his costs, but the middle two girls are covered by the
government; then, it’s alright.
The comment made me think back to a line I heard repeatedly from one of the women in
Gita-masi’s neighborhood: “Okay, Narendra Modi keeps saying, ‘Beti Bachāvo, Beti
Bachāvo’—that’s all well and good. But is he going to help pay for our daughters? Is the
government going to handle their costs? Then we can talk!”
At the time of my fieldwork, several states already ran substantial financial
incentive schemes to encourage (or offset, some might say cynically) production of
socially necessary but familially expendable girls. Such programs varied considerably,
from conditional cash transfers to defray educational costs to government bonds that
would mature when a girl reached “marriageable age.” Many critics condemned the
programs for reinforcing differential valuation of girls by “bribing” parents or indirectly
legitimating the notion of dowry. Moreover, evaluations of such programs (largely
focused on Haryana) have not demonstrated immediate definitive impacts on SRs, and
have suggested the funneling of much of the incentive money into marriage expenditures
and dowry.36
Ultimately, many people told me, the solution would be women’s empowerment.
A catchphrase in public policy, mass media, and everyday conversation, “women’s
empowerment” meant different things to different people, but usually included some
sense of education, work for pay, and “strength”—the last element often psychologized
as a “will” or “capacity” to “fight” for one’s due in society. In my experience,
empowerment talk rarely included discussion of marriage transformation at a gol- or
society-wide level, or other forms of collective reform. Trapped in the interwoven fabric
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of patriarchy and atomizing liberalism, individual empowerment is unlikely to have much
more effect than the head-in-the-sand calls to simply welcome daughters against all odds.
Two decades ago, Manoranjan Mohanty warned against the empowerment
discourse arising in parallel with economic liberalization, explicitly denouncing the
concept as a disabling one.37 A decade ago, Rainuka Dagar noted the importance of
“rethinking female foeticide” by shifting from birth rights to more general rights, from
isolated practices to broader norms, from narrow resource control to transformation of
hierarchy, and from “women’s empowerment” to gender justice.38 Today, both these
perspectives remain highly relevant. The attenuation of sex selection, like true gender
justice, requires not a shift in mentality or a narrow form of capacitation, but persistent,
creative, and ultimately unorthodox striving for a different vision of gender justice.
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Figure 4 – “Can You Imagine a World Without Girls?”

Source: Gujarat Department of Health and Family Welfare IEC materials

314

Figure 5 – “Those Killing Girls in the Womb—Wake Up!”

Source: Dahlia Pharmaceuticals marketing materials
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Figure 6 – “A girl is an inalienable, necessary part of society”

Source: Mefro Pharmaceuticals marketing materials
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Figure 7 – “Isn’t innocent laughter on your doorstep dear to you?”

Source: Mahesana Taluka Health Office IEC materials
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Figure 8 – “These eyes full of feelings and the innocent face”

Source: Gujarat Department of Health and Family Welfare IEC materials
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Figure 9 – “A few dreams, a few hopes”

Source: Gujarat Department of Health and Family Welfare IEC materials
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Figure 10 – Silhouette and Skeleton

Source: Hada 2010
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Figure 11 – “What Is My Flaw?”

Source: Hada 2010

322

Conclusion

In this dissertation, I have argued for understanding the unborn subject of
sonographic sex determination as a kind of threshold person, one defined more by its
potentiality than its actuality. The gendered fetal subject is a boundary object, situated at
the edges of families, clinical practices, the state, and sociality itself. It proves the point
that limits, far from standing in a relationship of exteriority with their fields, actually
define those fields.
The gendered fetal subject does not possess a conscious subjectivity; it has not
undergone subjectivation. And yet its subjection to systems of power—gender-kinship,
biomedicine, and governance—seems to grant it a sort of fetishistic power. The existence
of a gendered fetus, or the mere possibility of such existence, authorizes and mobilizes a
whole assemblage of imaginings and actions.
In the foregoing pages, I have traced the gendered fetal subject of north Gujarat
through various aspects of its social life. Chapter 1 discussed the market within which
clinical gendering took place, as well as state attempts to repress that market in the name
of unborn daughters. Chapter 2 covered the moral economy of gender-kinship within
which familial gendering took place, including the sorts of futures that prospective
parents envisioned for gendered fetuses. Chapter 3 examined the collaboration of
biomedical experts, technologies, and families in recognizing and reacting to potential
sons and daughters. Chapter 4 explored different patterns of household decision-making
around sex determination and selective abortion, going beyond popular narratives of onedimensional victims or heroes to understand the complexities of women’s agency with
respect to prenatal gender. Chapter 5 considered techniques that operated alongside or
instead of conventional biomedical sex selection to determine fetal sex in attempts to
produce a son; it also systematically addressed a topic that appeared, in more subdued
forms, throughout Chapters 2, 3, 4, and 5—namely, the matter of ethics and sin. Finally,
Chapter 6 examined the public representations and everyday engagements that made the
female fetal subject a public problem worthy of intervention from state and society.
Throughout the dissertation, I have aimed to situated the gendered fetal subject
vis-a-vis a moral economy of gender-kinship—a system of emotional and material
regularities that, in the ultimate analysis, governed the distribution of differently
gendered bodies in society. One of my chief arguments has been that understanding the
gendered fetus within its moral economy allows for a firmer and more nuanced grasp on
the affects and actions associated with son necessity and daughter aversion. With such an
approach, “patriarchy,” “gender bias,” or “discrimination” cease to be static, generalized
explanations for selective reproduction and become, instead, lived processes whose
contours may be accessed by tracing engagements with the gendered fetal subject.
Another major argument—more implicit than explicit in most of the text—has
been that a rigorous, ethnographically grounded conceptualization of liminal personhood
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can help to elucidate how sex-selective abortion is and is not violent. Examining how
sonographic materializations and visualizations make a threshold person allows for
appreciation of how the process of selective reproduction tacks back and forth along the
person-nonperson axis for fetal being—and how recognition of this very ambiguity can
provide a more solid basis for condemning the gendered violence inherent to sex
selection. Such an ethnographically grounded perspective achieves at least two things.
First, it traces the process by which violent logics become embodied as differential
existence, following violence along the entire continuum from the structural to the
intimate. Second, it stakes out a middle path between the moral outrage that ignores sex
selection’s complexities and the moral relativism that normalizes it as a form of family
planning.
*
In concluding, three modest recommendations. The first concerns research.
Throughout this dissertation, I have often referred to my central figure as unitary: the
gendered fetal subject. But of course, gendered fetuses are always plural—even within
contexts, and certainly across them. With sex selection a burning social issue across so
many different settings inside and outside of India, there remains a need for close
dialogue with people in the active process of imagining, engaging, and acting on the
gendered potentiality of unborn beings. For instance, how does the black market for sex
selection services appear different in Indian states with different regulatory approaches,
and what strategies do clinicians use to finesse the resulting configurations of risk? How
did the One-Child Policy shape specific imaginings of fetal futurity within Chinese moral
economies, and how is the policy’s recent relaxation changing this? How do prospective
parents in different settings understand the stakes of erroneous gendering, and how (if at
all) does surreptitious selective interventionism make appearances? How do family
decision-making patterns (and perhaps even the stock narratives about them) shift with
different domestic arrangements? If bodily ruination and sin represented two of the
greatest downsides of a recognized daughter-to-be for couples around Mahesana, what
are the corresponding anxieties, fears, or disappointments elsewhere? What other
techniques do people use in order to actively shape male fetuses, and what can they tell
us about local ontologies, local anxieties, and local experiences of reproductive agency?
Are the backward family, the imbalanced population, and the threatened daughter the
inevitable representational pillars of anti-sex selection discourse, or have other ethical
configurations emerged and flourished?
These are just some of the questions one might ask in examining gendered fetal
subjects across contexts. Moreover, while the investigative project is doubtless
imperative in settings of highly prevalent sex selection, our understandings will best be
enhanced through examination of a variety of cases. How, for example, do parents
navigate moral economies in places where selective reproduction is unexpectedly rare?
Or how might gender inequality seep perniciously into the prenatal in settings, such as
the U.S., where many are not accustomed to expect it?
My second recommendation concerns the multifarious attempts to save the
threatened female fetus through “awareness.” As I hope to have demonstrated throughout
this dissertation, and in Chapter 6 in particular, anti-sex selection discourses miss their

324

marks because they fail to account for the complexity, over-determination, and
crushingly high stakes of moral-economic imperatives to have sons and avoid daughters.
Moreover, they reiterate harmful ideologies of backwardness and gender orthodoxy,
assign pregnant women disproportionate burdens of culpability, and encroach on the
already-tenuous acceptance of Indian women’s right to access abortion. More
fundamentally, they naively (or cynically) assume a need for “education” and
“sensitization” when even a cursory glance at social conditions suggests the need for
material shifts in the possibilities for gender justice. I propose that state bodies, nongovernmental organizations, journalists, and other agents of reproductive governance
might do well to scale back anti-sex selection efforts as currently constituted and redirect
attention to more modest but efficacious modes of intervention. The allure of righteously
saving daughters (or at least trumpeting the ideal) is strong, and it is admittedly difficult
for any institution to pull back from an aggressively meliorist line when its legitimacy is
at stake. But I propose that rather than trumpeting the same slogans and well-worn
explanations, those seeking to combat sex selection might do well to engage carefully
with their “audiences,” better understand the factors behind the practice, and seek out
grassroots possibilities for shifting some small part of the moral economy of gender
kinship.
And therein lies my final recommendation. Truly stemming the gendered violence
of sex-selective reproduction will require addressing not just mentalities, but the moraleconomic structures underlying them. In a way that neither “awareness” alone nor narrow
“empowerment” can achieve, it is necessary to open up different futures—to destabilize
the over-determination of potentiality that hung over every sex determination scan at
Chetna. This is no easy task. It requires nothing less than the prying open of alternative
arrangements of social security, social recognition, and post-marital residence. If
prospective parents are to treat male and female fetuses as equal, there must be some
prospect that sons and daughters will be equal in the future. I believe that caste
organizations can play a particularly important role in the necessary transformations.
Historically, gol associations and other caste-affiliated groups have often played the role
of reinforcing orthodoxy. But even if they have typically wielded their control toward
conservative or reactionary ends, I hope they may see the disproportionate influence they
could exert by advocating for and facilitating meaningful shifts in marriage and descent
practices—in the material arrangements undergirding social existence itself. If a gol
association developed and firmly committed to a program for ensuring social belonging
and wellbeing for parents with only daughters, it would have a better chance of
effectively realizing change than almost any other institution. Such change might prove
partial, incremental, still fraught with contradictions and ambivalences. But if designed
properly, it would mark a true step toward broader gender justice.
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